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This thesis examines the supposed subsidiarity of unjust enrichment in English, 
French (ie, of the action de in rem verso, in the category of quasi-contracts), and Scots 
law. Its central argument is that the relations (i) of unjust enrichment with other areas 
of law, namely, special statutory regimes, property, contract, and tort/delict, and (ii) in 
French law, of the action de in rem verso with different quasi-contractual claims, 
cannot be explained on the basis that unjust enrichment, or elements thereof, are 
subsidiary to anything else. Various scholarly accounts are considered, along with 
primary materials. Chapter one summarises basic relevant features of unjust 
enrichment in each jurisdiction under consideration. Chapter two examines linguistic 
and contextual perspectives on subsidiarity (respectively, from Latin, English, and 
French, then from the Roman Catholic Church, European Union law, and European 
human rights law). From these perspectives are distilled six conceptual essentials of 
subsidiarity, which any use of subsidiarity must respect. Chapter three of the thesis 
explores the current position of subsidiarity in each jurisdiction under consideration, 
and why so many have that unjust enrichment is somehow subsidiary (the main reason 
being its extreme generality and consequent potential to upset the solutions provided, 
or refused, by other legal institutions). Subsequent chapters then apply the essentials 
distilled in chapter two to arguments that unjust enrichment is subsidiary, to statute, or 
property, for example. This analysis shows, not that unjust enrichment should not be 
subsidiary to the other institutions examined, but that it cannot be subsidiary to them. 
Alternative explanations of unjust enrichment’s external and internal relations are put 
forward to replace subsidiarity. It is hoped that this will contribute to the disappearance 
of subsidiarity from unjust enrichment discourse, and foster a better understanding, 











1. This thesis is about the way an area of law called unjust enrichment interacts with 
other areas of law in England, France, and Scotland. Different areas of law are not 
watertight from each other. But most people would accept that it is often worth seeing 
the law of contract, for example, as at least descriptively separate from the law of 
property. And when rules about contracts interact with rules about property, most 
people would accept that an understanding of this interaction, or any other interaction 
between areas of law, is worthwhile. So, when you buy a house, you get property 
rights from the seller. But there will also be a contract which actually transfers those 
property rights, and the transfer will then be registered. Here, contract is interacting 
with property, and the special rules about the registration of property transactions. 
 
2. Unjust enrichment is (mostly) about the restoration to a person of a benefit which 
another person has obtained, in circumstances which the law says are unjust. One 
such circumstance is where a person makes a mistaken payment to another. This 
area of law, just like in our contract-property example, interacts with other areas of 
law, too. Many people – in legislatures, courts, legal practice, and university law 
schools – have tried to explain how unjust enrichment interacts with other areas of 
law. One way they have done this is to say that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to 
those other areas, or, to put it differently, that subsidiarity can help to explain unjust 
enrichment’s relations with them. There are many details about subsidiarity as a 
concept, but it is basically about deciding that one person, group, or entity, etc, is not 
allowed to do certain things, when those same things could be done by another 
person, group, or entity, etc, unless a particular condition is satisfied. Precisely what 
that condition is depends on the precise notion of subsidiarity being considered. When 
it comes to the supposed subsidiarity of unjust enrichment, many people who say that 
unjust enrichment is subsidiary mean that you cannot use unjust enrichment to resolve 
your legal problem if another area of law can do it for you, or if another area of law 
which could potentially also do it for you, would actually refuse to do it for you. 
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3. Some of the other areas of law to which unjust enrichment has been said to be 
subsidiary include special statutory regimes (like those which govern the payment of 
company directors), the law of contract (the bulk of which is concerned with when and 
why promises must be kept, and what happens if they are not), and the law of wrongs 
(like negligence in English law, for example). 
 
4. The main reason many people think that unjust enrichment is, or should be, 
subsidiary to other areas of law, is that unjust enrichment is a very broad principle of 
justice: if it is allowed too much leeway in our legal systems, then other areas of law, 
and the solutions to our legal problems which they provide, or refuse to provide, will 
be contradicted or otherwise upset, and that will be bad for everyone. 
 
5. After providing, in chapter one, a basic summary of the law of unjust enrichment in 
England, France, and Scotland, outlining, in chapter two, some essential features of 
the concept of subsidiarity, and addressing, in chapter three, the reasons why many 
people invoke subsidiarity to explain unjust enrichment’s relations with other areas of 
law, this thesis disagrees, in subsequent chapters, with everyone who thinks that 
unjust enrichment is subsidiary. 
 
6. The thesis does this by examining lots of arguments about unjust enrichment’s 
supposed subsidiarity to other areas of law (some of which are listed in paragraph 3, 
above), and applying to those arguments the essential features of subsidiarity which 
are outlined in chapter two. Doing this shows, not just that unjust enrichment should 
not be subsidiary to those other areas of law, which some people have argued before, 
but that it cannot be subsidiary to them. Alternative explanations of unjust enrichment’s 
interactions with those other areas of law are then put forward, in the hope of fostering 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The central question in this study is: what is the role of subsidiarity in unjust 
enrichment’s interaction with other areas of law and legal institutions, and in the 
relations between different enrichment claims?1 This introduction explains the value 
of our inquiry, and a comparative approach, examining English, French, and Scots 




Subsidiarity merits investigation because of widespread claims that it is an essential 
condition of liability, or even structurally inherent, in unjust enrichment, and usefully 
bridles that powerful principle of law. We must know whether these claims are true. In 
England and Scotland, enrichment law is still developing.2 Basic features of liability in 
unjust enrichment which we know to exist continue to require close attention.3 A 
fortiori, we must discover whether there are other such features. Super-structural 
questions persist.4 Progress towards answers must continue. In France, a major 
reform of the Code civil was adopted in 2016, then finalised, with amendments,5 in 
2018.6 For the first time, the action de in rem verso, rechristened the action en 
                                               
1 We ignore whether unjust enrichment should exist in its current form. Relevant literature and authors 
are mentioned by S Hedley, ‘“Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment?” – A Common Law Response’ (2016) 
20 Edinburgh L Rev 326, 327 and notes 7-16. See also, eg, IM Jackman, The Varieties of Restitution 
(2nd edn, Federation 2017) esp chs 1-2; R Stevens, ‘The Unjust Enrichment Disaster’ (2018) 134 LQR 
574. We also harbour no hopes of a harmonised European answer to our question. See Tomášová v 
Slovak Republic (French text) [2016] CJEU C-168/15 [37]-[41]: refusal to rule whether national legal 
systems’ laws of torts take any sort of priority over their versions of the condictio indebiti. 
2 Investment Trust Companies (in liq) v HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2015] EWCA Civ 
82, [2015] STC 1280 [46] (Patten LJ, with whom Moore-Bick and Beatson LJJ agreed); reversed on 
other grounds [2017] UKSC 29, [2018] AC 275; Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Patersons of Greenoakhill 
Ltd [2015] CSOH 137, 2015 GWD 34-548 [29] (Lord Woolman). 
3 Eg, the ‘at the expense of requirement’: HM Revenue and Customs v Investment Trust Companies 
[2017] UKSC 29, [2018] AC 275 [37]-[38] (Lord Reed, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord 
Carnwath, and Lord Hodge agreed); highlighted in Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v HM Revenue 
and Customs Commissioners [2018] UKSC 39, [2018] 3 WLR 652 [67] (Lord Mance, Lord Reed, and 
Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed). 
4 HL MacQueen, ‘The Future of Unjustified Enrichment in Scotland’ [2017] RLR 14, 19-21. 
5 As to which, see O Deshayes, T Genicon and Y-M Laithier, ‘Ratification de l’ordonnance portant 
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations’ [2018] JCP G 529. 
6 Ordonnance no 2016-131 du 10 February 2016 reforming the law of contracts, the general regime of 
obligations, and the proof of obligations; Loi no 2018-287 of 20 April 2018 ratifying Ordonnance n° 2016-
131 of 10 February 2016 reforming the law of contracts, the general regime of obligations, and the proof 
of obligations. For history and context, see further F Ancel, B Fauvarque-Cosson and G Gest, Aux 
sources de la réforme du droit des contrats (Dalloz 2017). 
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enrichissement injustifié, was codified, and its subsidiarity carried uncontroversially 
into the relevant provisions.7 These developments are an opportunity searchingly to 




The general worth of comparative unjust enrichment scholarship is well established: 
in a difficult area, open-mindedness is prudent.9 More specifically, a comparative 
approach is of interest because French legal thought, which contains by far the longest 
relevant discourse about subsidiarity, has influenced, at least casually, the arrival and 
contours of subsidiarity in Anglo-Scots enrichment law and scholarship. Considering 
English, Scots, and French law, is advantageous. Each represents (what is usually 
thought to be) a different kind of legal system: common law, civil law, and mixed.10 
This may permit our study to resonate more broadly than if it considered material from 
only one or two legal cultures. In a tentative effort to facilitate this, some reference is 
made in subsequent chapters to other common law systems, and South African law, 
to the learning of which English and Scots law are, respectively, particularly 
receptive.11 Unfortunately, space has precluded treatment of Louisiana and Québec 
law, which might have shed light on both Scots and French law.12 
 
 
                                               
7 Code civil, art 1303ff esp 1303-3. 
8 On the ‘nouvelle « exegèse »’, see F Chénedé, Le nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats (2nd 
edn, Dalloz 2018) [002.05]. 
9 P Birks, ‘Comparative Unjust Enrichment’ in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Themes in Comparative Law 
in Honour of Bernard Rudden (OUP 2002) 150. Birks also drew attention to the value of a Scots 
perspective to English lawyers: ‘Restitution: A View of the Scots Law’ [1985] CLP 57, 57. 
10 On the third of these, see generally V Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide (2nd edn, CUP 
2012). 
11 Starbucks (HK) Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC [2015] UKSC 31, [2015] 1 WLR 2628 [50] 
(Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath, Lord Toulson, and Lord Hodge agreed); 
D Carey Miller, ‘Sibling Mixed Systems: Reviewing South African/Scottish Comparative Law’ (2016) 20 
Edinburgh L Rev 257. 
12 But see chapter 3, footnote 2, for some references. Contrary to some assumptions, French openness 
to comparative law is greater than might at first appear: B Fauvarque-Cosson, ‘Deux siècles d’évolution 
du droit comparé’ (2011) 63 RIDC 527; ‘Lorsque le changement s’imposera’ (2015) 10 RD Assas 188. 
But it is usually necessary to go beneath the surface, to see evidence that that academic work on foreign 
law is often used for inspiration in improving, harmonising or unifying the law: Y-M Laithier, Droit 
comparé (Dalloz 2009) 17-24. For foreign law in French courts, see A Albarian, ‘The Use of 
Comparative Law before the French Cour de Cassation’, and G Canivet, ‘The Use of Comparative Law 
before the French Private Law Courts’, both in A Albarian, M Andenas and D Fairgrieve (eds), Courts 
and Comparative Law (OUP 2015). 
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III. OVERVIEW 
 
Distinguished commentators have remarked that unjust enrichment ‘always seems to 
raise the issue of subsidiarity’.13 The consistent trend in material endorsing it is to the 
effect that subsidiarity is concerned with the constraint of enrichment claims in the 
presence or absence or another claim or legal institution (including, sometimes, other 
kinds of enrichment claim). Variations on this theme exist in English, French, and 
Scots law and commentary, further addressed throughout this study. 
 
Many believe that our understanding of unjust enrichment’s relations with other areas 
of law and legal institutions is enhanced by recourse to the language of subsidiarity. 
With a minority of others, but at greater length,14 this study disagrees. No account 
surveyed correctly demonstrates unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to anything else; 
rather, the material shows that the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment is impossible. 
Instead, as later chapters explain, where the operation of unjust enrichment is 
excluded, this is explicable for other reasons. 
 
Chapters 1-3 address generalities about unjust enrichment, subsidiarity, and the 
status of, and reasons for, subsidiarity in unjust enrichment. Chapters 4-9 disprove 
claims about the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment. The study then concludes. A 
summary of each chapter follows. 
  
1. Unjust enrichment 
 
First, we sketch basic features relevant to this study of unjust enrichment in England, 
France, Scotland, and, where appropriate, other jurisdictions. We also reject a 
distinction between justifications for enrichments and impoverishments (in French 
law), and the view that, to be effective, a legal ground for an enrichment must confer 
                                               
13 D Johnston and R Zimmermann, ‘Unjustified Enrichment: Surveying the Landscape’ in D Johnston 
and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified enrichment: key issues in comparative perspective (CUP 2002) 
29. 
14 Eric Descheemaeker, for example, briskly dispatches subsidiarity almost entirely (compare his 
account to chapter 8’s here), for reasons similar to those given here: ‘The New French Law of Unjustified 
Enrichment’ [2017] RLR 77, 91-93. 
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an entitlement to that enrichment. This brief survey, and explanations of two points of 




Secondly, we examine subsidiarity, proceeding in two steps. First, a linguistic 
perspective is adopted. Dictionary definitions of the noun subsidiarity and the adjective 
subsidiary in Latin, English, and French are set out. From them are extracted points 
about the correct usage of subsidiarity. These are used as a framework in the second 
part of this chapter, which examines subsidiarity in three contexts – Roman Catholic 
social doctrine, European Union law, European human rights law – and draws on other 
material, including writing on subsidiarity in French private law. The chapter draws the 
threads together by setting out six principles to be respected by users of subsidiarity. 
These principles, which will be applied to the law and scholarship on the subsidiarity 
of unjust enrichment in later chapters, are the following. 
 
(1) Existence. Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not 
concerned to determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. 
 
(2) Plurality. A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least 
two entities, or groups of entities. 
 
(3) Overlap. For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities 
in that context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. 
 
(4) Meta-authority. For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of 
allocation and overlap, it must bind the relevant entities by constituting an 
independent, higher authority in relation to them. 
 
(5) Not sovereignty. For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part 
of that relationship can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. 
 
(6) Not concurrence. An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free 
concurrence of the entities said to be part of that relationship. 
 - 5 - 
3. Subsidiarity in unjust enrichment 
 
Thirdly, after addressing unjust enrichment and subsidiarity separately, we examine 
subsidiarity in unjust enrichment law and commentary. Across our three jurisdictions, 
the common reason for accepting subsidiarity is the power and generality of unjust 
enrichment: a perceived need to prevent its upsetting solutions provided by other legal 
rules. English law does not formally accept that unjust enrichment is subsidiary. But 
subsidiarity has a substantial foothold in mainstream scholarship, reinforced in part by 
reference to comparative sources, which might have been more critically engaged 
with. In France, and despite recently renewed periodic criticism, the subsidiarity of the 
action en enrichissement injustifié is firmly established in both law and commentary. 
Some corrections to the dominant historical narrative are, however, required. As for 
Scotland, subsidiarity’s foothold in enrichment cases is modest, and the commentary 
engages critically, both with subsidiarity in Scotland, and available comparative 
material. But this has not prevented scholarly endorsements, which, though often 
partial, nevertheless abound; and the law may soon commit itself further than it already 
has. 
 
4. Unjust enrichment, subsidiarity, and statute 
 
Fourthly, we examine claims in French and Scots law and scholarship that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to statute. None survives the application of the principles 
developed in chapter 2: subsidiarity is not what any of them describes. The best 
explanation for unjust enrichment’s contingency on the operation of statutes that 
exclude or limit enrichment claims is, simply, that statutes which do this justify 
enrichments, to which extent, there is no unjust enrichment to be subsidiary to 
anything. 
 
5. Unjust enrichment, subsidiarity, and property 
 
Fifthly, we consider claims in English scholarship, and in French law and scholarship, 
that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to the law of property. None survives the 
application of the principles developed in chapter 2: subsidiarity is not what any of 
them describes. All available accounts presuppose that retention of title scotches one 
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or more basic elements of liability in unjust enrichment, especially the requirement that 
any impugned enrichment be unjust. So, taking the accounts themselves at face value, 
subsidiarity is impossible and redundant in explaining enrichment’s relations with 
property. 
 
6. Unjust enrichment, subsidiarity, and contract 
 
Sixthly, we analyse claims in English scholarship, and French and Scots law and 
scholarship, that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to the law of contract. None survives 
the application of the principles developed in chapter 2: subsidiarity is not what any of 
them describes. The best explanation for unjust enrichment’s contingency on the 
operation of contracts that exclude or limit enrichment claims is that contracts which 
do this justify enrichments, to which extent there is no unjust enrichment to be 
subsidiary to anything. 
 
7. Unjust enrichment, subsidiarity, and tort or delict 
 
Seventhly, we encounter claims, found only in French law and scholarship, that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to the law of tort or delict. Those claims do not survive the 
application of the principles developed in chapter 2: subsidiarity is not what any of 
them describes. In any event, subsidiarity is irrelevant to the relationship of unjust 
enrichment and delict in France, because the institutions do not overlap with each 
other in their application to facts. 
 
8. Unjust enrichment, subsidiarity, and obstacles of fact 
 
Eighthly, we confront uniquely French claims about subsidiarity, in situations where an 
obstacle of fact bars a claimant’s action against a primary debtor, and (i) an action de 
in rem verso is then allowed against an indirect party enriched, or (ii) where, at one 
time, an action against the primary debtor is barred by obstacle of fact, and an action 
de in rem verso is later allowed against the same debtor. No claim survives the 
application of the principles developed in chapter 2: subsidiarity is not what any of 
them describes. In fact, all of the cases supposedly applying what we will call the 
obstacle of fact permission in a claimant’s favour are simply straightforward cases of 
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unjustified enrichment, in which there is no objection based on grounds of coherence 
in the law to the doctrine’s operation. In fact, they are quite unremarkable. 
 
9. Subsidiarity within the law of unjust enrichment 
 
Ninthly, we challenge claims in French law and Scots scholarship, respectively, that 
the action en enrichissement injustifié is subsidiary to other kinds of claim falling into 
the category of quasi-contract (la catégorie quasi-contractuelle), and that the general 
principle against unjust enrichment is somehow subsidiary to other kinds of 
enrichment claim. No claim survives the application of the principles developed in 
chapter 2: subsidiarity is not what any of them describes. But this does not matter. 
First, in France, the different conditions of liability in negotiorum gestio and 
enrichissement injustifié prevent them from overlapping, such that subsidiarity is 
irrelevant to their relations. And to the extent that they can overlap, the primacy of 
France’s condictio indebiti over enrichissement injustifié can be explained with the 
maxim specialia generalibus derogant. Secondly, in Scotland, the account to be 
analysed inaccurately presents the law. And, if it were correct, it would be liable to 
rejection for its failure to improve legal certainty – the only reason for its being proffered 




From now on, when reference is made to enrichment law and scholarship in a single 
legal system, generally accepted terminology for that system’s enrichment law is 
employed: unjust enrichment for England; unjustified enrichment, enrichissement 
injustifié, enrichissement sans cause, and action de in rem verso, for France; and 
unjustified enrichment for Scotland. The phrase unjust enrichment, or simply the word 
enrichment, are also used to refer simultaneously to relevant law in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
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This first chapter addresses unjust enrichment in four parts. The first three are general, 
and sketch basic features relevant to this study of unjust enrichment in England, 
France, Scotland, and, where appropriate, other jurisdictions. Features are relevant if 
taken formally by each legal system to be part of unjust enrichment,1 and if they need 
to be understood in their essentials to engage with the arguments presented in 
succeeding chapters. 
 
The fourth part of this chapter briefly addresses two specific points about unjust 
enrichment of further relevance in this study: a distinction between justifications for 
enrichments and impoverishments (in French law) is rejected; as is the view that, to 
be effective, a legal ground for an enrichment must confer an entitlement to that 
enrichment. This should ease engagement with some material addressed in 
succeeding chapters. 
 
I. ENGLISH LAW 
 
This part mainly addresses English law’s general approach to unjust enrichment 
claims. It also notes the status of unjust enrichment in two other major common law 
jurisdictions, Australia and Canada, to which reference is also made in this study. 
 
A. Status of unjust enrichment 
 
The Supreme Court appears to have endorsed two main functions for unjust 
enrichment.2 The first is as a viable category which merits recognition by the law.3 It 
assembles instances of liability. Even if basically distinct, common law categories are 
                                               
1 So, for example, cases involving restitution following the termination of contracts in French law are 
not considered, because addressed elsewhere: Code civil, art 1229(3). Consideration of quasi-contract 
and unjustified enrichment in the French public law of obligations has also been omitted. See further 
JC Ricci and F Lombard, Droit administratif des obligations (1st edn, Sirey 2018) nos 412-475. 
2 Barnes v Eastenders Cash & Carry Plc [2014] UKSC 26, [2015] AC 1 [102] (Lord Toulson, with whom 
Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, and Lord Hughes agreed). 
3 HM Revenue and Customs v Investment Trust Companies [2017] UKSC 29, [2018] AC 275 [39] (Lord 
Reed, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Carnwath, and Lord Hodge agreed). 
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not watertight. They may be debated, untidy, non-exhaustive, and deny history.4 
Despite their relative weakness, broad, overlapping categories, remain worthwhile in 
providing stability and guidance by consolidating expectations, and loosely expressing 
the law’s underlying ideals.5 
 
In performing this categorising function, unjust enrichment takes on a second: 
explanation. Cases in the unjust enrichment category are grouped because, in each, 
a person is left better off than it should be. So, it is said that unjust enrichment is a 
‘concept [or] unifying principle underlying a number of different types of claim’.6 If 
explained on this basis, rights, duties, powers or liabilities enjoy, de lege lata, some 
basic independence from others. They can often be differentiated, for example, from 
those arising from contracts,7 torts and equitable wrongs,8 persisting rights over 
property,9 or special statutory regimes.10 An accepted framework for analysis of unjust 
enrichment cases has been formulated as follows:11 
 
‘(1) Has the defendant been enriched? (2) Was the enrichment at the 
claimant’s expense? (3) Was the enrichment unjust? (4) Are there any 
defences available to the defendant? […] [I]f the first three questions are 
answered affirmatively and the fourth negatively, the claimant will be 
entitled to restitution […].’ 
 
                                               
4 S Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law (CUP 2003) chs 1, 11. 
5 H Dagan, ‘Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law’ (2015) 163 U Pa L Rev 1889, 
1905-1911. On taxonomy in private law, compare, eg, P Birks, ‘Introduction’ in P Birks (ed), English 
Private Law (1st edn, OUP 2000). For judicial recognition of the value of classification, but cautioning 
against overly rigid categories, see Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) 129 (Lord Millett, with 
whom Lord Browne-Wilkinson, and Lord Hoffmann agreed); Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 
(HL) 284 (Lord Nicholls, with whom Lord Goff, and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed), 290 (Lord Steyn). 
6 ITC UKSC (n 3) [40] (Lord Reed, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Carnwath, and Lord 
Hodge agreed). 
7 See, eg, Aspect Contracts (Asbestos) Ltd v Higgins Construction Plc [2015] UKSC 38, [2015] 1 WLR 
2961 [24]-[25] (Lord Mance, with whom Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, and Lord Toulson 
agreed), recognising that a remedy arises either from contract or unjust enrichment. 
8 Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50, [2014] AC 938 [10], [24] (Lord Clarke, with whom Lord Kerr, and 
Lord Wilson agreed); Novoship (UK) Limited v Nikitin [2014] EWCA Civ 908, [2015] 1 QB 499 [46], [84], 
[107] (Longmore LJ, Moore-Bick, and Lewison LJJ). 
9 Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176 [37] (Lord Clarke), [98] (Lord 
Neuberger), [108] (Lord Carnwath), [141] (Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson, agreeing with Lord Clarke, and 
Lord Neuberger). 
10 BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA [2016] EWHC 1686 (Ch), [2017] Bus LR 82 [454]-[455] (Rose J). 
11 Menelaou (n 9) [18]-[19] (Lord Clarke, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Kerr, and Lord Wilson 
agreed). 
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De lega lata, the dual functions outlined above give a generalising potential to unjust 
enrichment, on the foundations of which it is unnecessary to take a firm view here.12 
The courts may recognise new grounds of recovery in appropriate cases.13 These will 
join the unjust enrichment category if their facts disclose that somebody is wealthier 
than is proper in the eyes of the law, in a way presenting sufficiently close analytical 
links with established claims. 
 
Unjust enrichment holds a similar taxonomical and explanatory status in Australia.14 
There, it is not ‘a definitive legal principle’,15 or one ‘which can be taken as a sufficient 
premise for direct application in a particular case’.16 Rather, it is a ‘unifying legal 
concept, which’:17 
 
‘explains why the law recognizes, in a variety of distinct categories of 
case, an obligation on the part of a defendant to make fair and just 
restitution for a benefit derived at the expense of a plaintiff and which 
assists in the determination, by the ordinary processes of legal 
reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, recognize 
such an obligation in a new or developing category of case’. 
 
The position in Canada is again comparable. Unjust enrichment is one category of 
restitutionary recovery recognised by law.18 It explains traditional kinds of claim and 
                                               
12 One of the most interesting accounts favouring unjust enrichment’s normativity, a controversial issue, 
is K Barker’s ‘Theorising Unjust Enrichment Law: Being Realist(ic)?’ (2006) 26 OJLS 609, 615ff.  
13 Gibb v Maidstone & Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust [2010] EWCA Civ 678, [2010] IRLR 786 [23]-[27] 
(Laws LJ, with whom Rimer LJ agreed). 
14 See, perhaps most clearly in the High Court, Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] 
HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89 [150]-[151] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon, and Crennan JJ); 
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7, (2012) 246 CLR 498 [29]-[30] (French CJ, Crennan, and 
Kiefel JJ). 
15 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353 (HCA) 378 (Mason 
CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh JJ). 
16 Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21, (2009) 239 CLR 129 [7] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, 
and Bell JJ). 
17 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 (HCA) 256-257 (Deane J). Direct approvals: 
David Securities (n 15) 378-379 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh JJ); Lumbers v W 
Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) [2008] HCA 27, (2008) 232 CLR 635 [83]-[85] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, 
and Kiefel JJ). Direct and indirect approvals: Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills 
Industries Ltd [2014] HCA 14, (2014) 253 CLR 560 [20] (French CJ), [73] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, 
and Keane JJ), [105] (Gageler J). 
18 Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance) [2007] SCC 1, [2007] 1 SCR 3 [33] 
(Bastarache J, with whom McLachlin CJ, and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, and 
Rothstein JJ agreed). 
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permits generalisation in appropriate cases. This was confirmed, for example, in Peel 
(Regional Municipality) v Canada.19 In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada set out 
key statements from Peel, and commented that it had ‘further developed the law 





The first, second and fourth questions in the unjust enrichment enquiry do not arise 
for detailed discussion.21 Background is given here on the third, which does. Part of 
English law’s approach to unjust enrichment claims is to require that the claimant 
establish the existence of an unjust factor.22 In Moses v Macferlan,23 what are 
retrospectively understood as examples of these were given when it was held that an 
action lies: 
 
‘[F]or money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to 
fail; or for money got through imposition, (express, or implied;) or extortion; 
or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s situation, 






                                               
19 [1992] 3 SCR 762 (SCC) 788-789 (McLachlin J, with whom La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and 
Iacobucci JJ agreed). See also Moore v Sweet [2018] SCC 52 [35]-[38] (Côté J, with whom Wagner 
CJ, and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, and Martin JJ agreed). 
20 Bhasin v Hrynew [2014] SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494 [67]-[68] (Cromwell J, with whom McLachlin CJ, 
and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Karakatsanis, and Wagner JJ agreed), emphasis added. 
21 See further AVM Lodder, Enrichment in the Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Hart 2012); E 
Ball, Enrichment at the Claimant’s Expense: Attribution Rules in Unjust Enrichment (Hart 2016); E Bant, 
The Change of Position Defence (Hart 2009); A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), 
Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Hart 2016). 
22 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 363 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 386 
(Lord Goff), 395 (Lord Lloyd), 409 (Lord Hope). 
23 (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676 (KB) 1009 (Lord Mansfield). 
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Over a quarter of a century earlier, in Attorney General v Perry,24 the Court of King’s 
Bench held: 
 
‘[W]henever a man receives money belonging to another without any 
reason, authority or consideration, an action lies against the receiver as for 
money received to the other’s use; and this, as well where the money is 
received through mistake under colour, and upon an apprehension, though 
a mistaken apprehension of having a good authority to receive it, as where 
it is received by imposition, fraud or deceit in the receiver […].’ 
 
Several factors are established as grounds for restitution.25 The significance of the 
latter quotation is the phrase ‘without any reason, authority or consideration’. 
England’s approach to the unjust question appears in some way to be mixed. The 
unjust factors are important. But the law may also ask whether there is a positive 
reason for the defendant’s enrichment. Specifics remain uncertain. In particular, the 
question arises whether both the unjust factor and justification inquiries can be 
conducted in the same breath. They may to some extent have to be hived off.26 But 
the general line of thinking is recognised in its essentials by many commentators.27 
And there is good authority for it in principle. So, the Privy Council has accepted that 
enrichments conferred pursuant to contractual or statutory obligations, or other 
entitlements, are ‘not unjust’.28 English law does not formally think of itself as taking a 
                                               
24 (1733) Com 481; 92 ER 1169 (KB) 491 (Reynolds CB, and Carter and Fortescue BB). 
25 Eg, compulsion, mistake, and duress. See, respectively, Brook’s Wharf & Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman 
Bros [1937] 1 KB 534 (CA) 545 (Lord Wright MR, with whom Romer LJ, and Macnaghten J agreed); 
Jones v Churcher [2009] EWHC 722 (QB), [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 94 [41]-[43] (Judge Havelock-Allan 
QC); Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises PVT Ltd [2010] EWHC 113 (Comm), [2011] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 46 [92]-[96] (Christopher Clarke J). 
26 H Scott, ‘Defence, Denial or Cause of Action? “Enrichment Owed” and the Absence of a Legal 
Ground’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Hart 
2016). 
27 L Smith, ‘Demystifying Juristic Reasons’ (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 281, 291-300, 304; G Virgo, The 
Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2015) chs 6-7 esp 120-125, 133; J Edelman and E 
Bant, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Hart 2016) ch 7 esp 119-126, 130-134; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S 
Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [1-11]-
[1-12], [1-28]-[1-29], [2-01], [29-26]-[29-27]. For a more traditional approach not adopting legal grounds, 
see K Mason, JW Carter and GJ Tolhurst, Mason & Carter’s Restitution Law in Australia (3rd edn, Lexis 
Nexis 2016) [166] and, eg, [215]-[216], [233], [703], [909]-[910]. 
28 Fairfield Sentry Ltd v Migani [2014] UKPC 9 (BVI), [2014] 1 CLC 611 [17]-[18] (Lord Sumption, with 
whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, and Lord Toulson agreed), references omitted. 
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mixed approach. But legal grounds are relevant to unjust enrichment in this 
jurisdiction.29 This will be elaborated as appropriate throughout this study. 
 
C. No unified theory 
 
It is unnecessary to make any theoretical or philosophical commitments about unjust 
enrichment in this study.30 But it is necessary to accept its normative diversity. Courts 
in England and Australia reject ‘any all-embracing theory of restitutionary rights and 
remedies founded upon a notion of “unjust enrichment”’.31 The Supreme Court has 
said that:32 
  
‘English law does not have a universal theory to explain all the cases in 
which restitution is available. It recognises a number of discrete factual 
situations in which enrichment is treated as vitiated by some unjust 
factor. These factual situations are not, however, random illustrations of 
the Court’s indulgence to litigants. They have the common feature that 
some legal norm or some legally recognised expectation of the claimant 
falling short of a legal right has been disrupted or disappointed. Leaving 
aside [public policy] cases of illegality, legal compulsion or necessity, […] 
the defendant’s enrichment at the claimant’s expense is unjust because 
[…] the claimant’s consent to the defendant’s enrichment was impaired, 
qualified or absent.’ 
 
Canada is formally committed to a unified application of its absence of juristic reason 
approach across contexts – say, of commerce, or the family. The only flexibility 
                                               
29 See also DD Growth Premium 2X Fund v RMF Market Neutral Strategies (Master) Ltd [2017] UKPC 
36 (Cay), [2018] Bus LR 1595 [60], [62] (Lord Sumption and Lord Briggs, with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed), [66] (Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Mance agreed, dissenting as to the result). 
30 Relevant work includes R Chambers, C Mitchell and J Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of 
the Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009); D Priel, ‘The Justice in Unjust Enrichment’ (2014) 51 
Osgoode Hall LJ 813; C Webb, Reason and Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2016). 
31 Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd [2001] HCA 68, (2001) 208 CLR 516 [72] 
(Gummow J); approved in Barnes (n 2) [112] (Lord Toulson, with whom Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord 
Wilson, and Lord Hughes agreed); AFSL (n 17) [74] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, and Keane JJ). 
32 Lowick Rose LLP v Swynson Ltd [2017] UKSC 32, [2018] AC 313 [22] (Lord Sumption, with whom 
Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, and Lord Hodge agreed), reference and internal quotation marks omitted. 
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technically allowed is in the application of that law to the facts of cases.33 But both 
objective (or institutional) and subjective juristic reasons against restitution are built 
into the law’s structure. The former, considered first by courts, include contract and 
disposition of law.34 The latter, considered next,35 may be formed subjectively: the 
expectations of parties to a dispute (though these are objectively evaluated according 
to reasonableness).36 This is before one considers the mixture of objective and 
subjective analyses internal to each stage of the juristic reason inquiry.37 And it leaves 
aside the question whether Canadian courts have once and for all adopted an absence 
of juristic reason approach over one based on unjust factors.38 Even on that level, 
mixture might persist.39 
 
II. FRENCH LAW 
 
This part addresses the French principle against unjustified enrichment and the place 
of unjustified enrichment claims under the action de in rem verso, or action en 
enrichissement injustifié, as it is now called, following the reform of the Code civil, 
which entered into force on 1 October 2016. Other work covers the detailed history.40 
However, most of the discourse on subsidiarity to be examined in this study predates 
the codification of the action de in rem verso. So some general information on the law 
                                               
33 Kerr v Baranow [2011] SCC 10, [2011] 1 SCR 269 [33]-[34] (Cromwell J, with whom McLachlin CJ, 
and Binnie, LeBel, Abella, Charron, and Rothstein JJ agreed). 
34 For simultaneous acceptance of each, see Jedfro Investments (USA) Ltd v Jacyk [2007] SCC 55, 
[2007] 3 SCR 679 [34]-[36] (McLachlin CJ, with whom Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, 
and Rothstein JJ agreed). 
35 With public policy: Moore (n 19) [83] (Côté J, with whom Wagner CJ, and Abella, Moldaver, 
Karakatsanis, Brown, and Martin JJ agreed). 
36 Applying reasonable expectations, alongside contract, see, eg, Montor Business Corporation v 
Goldfinger [2016] ONCA 406 [116]-[117] (Pepall JA, with whom Cronk, and Lauwers JJA agreed), leave 
to appeal refused [2016] CanLII 89828 (SCC). 
37 See D Sheehan, ‘Unjust Factors, Absence of Juristic Reason and the Development of Canadian 
Unjust(ified) Enrichment Law’ (2016) 49 UBC L Rev 619. 
38 See especially the mixed messages in Kerr (n 33) [31]-[32] (Cromwell J, with whom McLachlin CJ, 
and Binnie, LeBel, Abella, Charron, and Rothstein JJ agreed). For evidence that even money had and 
received is alive and well, see International Longshore & Warehouse Union Local 502 v Ford [2016] 
BCCA 226 [23]-[31] (Garson J, with whom Groberman, and Felon JJ agreed). 
39 See L Smith, ‘The State of the Law of Unjust Enrichment in Common Law Canada’ (2015) 57 Can 
Bus LJ 39. 
40 See, inter alia, J-M Augustin, ‘Introduction historique à l’enrichissement sans cause en droit français’ 
in V Mannio and C Ophèle (eds), L’enrichissement sans cause – la classification des sources des 
obligations (LGDJ 2007); CP Filios, L’enrichissement sans cause en droit privé français (Bruylant 1999) 
nos 2-73. See also F Chénedé, ‘Charles Toullier, le quasi-contrat’ [2011] RDC 305; F Chénedé, 
‘Joseph-Émile Labbé, l’enrichissement sans cause’ [2011] RDC 1005. 
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prior to this is given. France’s condictio indebiti and doctrine of negotiorum gestio are 




The Code civil of 1804 recognised a notion of quasi contract (quasi-contrat). Formally, 
it encompassed France’s condictio indebiti and doctrine of negotiorum gestio. These 
were provided for by ex articles 1372-1381 of the Code. What used to be article 1371 
stated: 
 
‘Quasi-contracts are purely voluntary acts of man which result in a duty of 
some kind towards another, and sometimes a reciprocal duty between both 
parties.’ 
 
Originally, then, there was no provision, either for any unjustified enrichment action 
explicitly so called, still less a general principle against unjustified enrichment. Despite 
this, early modern French jurists asserted the existence of both.41 
 
The position of the Cour de cassation varied throughout the nineteenth century. It 
appears to have granted tacitly an action de in rem verso on occasion;42 explicitly 
denied any general principle;43 and founded gain-based recovery on an extended, or 
‘abnormal’, negotiorum gestio.44 But on 15 June 1892, the Chambre des requêtes 
decided the Boudier case. The court held:45 
                                               
41 CBM Toullier, Droit civil français, vol XI (4th edn, Warée & Warée 1824) no 112; C Aubry and CF 
Rau, Cours de droit civil français, traduit de l’allemand de M CS Zacharie, revu et augmenté, avec 
l’agrément de l’auteur, vol IV (1st edn, Lagier 1844) no 576 note 10; repeated after the work assumed 
a more original form in C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français: d’après l’ouvrage allemand 
de C-S Zachariae, vol V (3rd edn, LDJ 1857) no 576 note 10: ‘the Code Napoléon contains several 
provisions which presuppose the acceptance of the principle of équité on which the action de in rem 
verso is founded: nemo cum damno alterius locupletior fieri debet’. 
42 Civ, 14 March 1870; [1870] S, I, 291; Civ, 2 December 1891; [1892] D, I, 161, conclusions by A 
Desjardins AG, noted by L Sarrut; [1892] S, I, 92. An even earlier example is Trib cass, Sect civ, 18 
August 1813; Journal du palais, vol XI (3rd edn, Patris, 1838) 650, noted by P-A Merlin, applying ‘the 
maxim of natural law, that nobody may enrich himself at another’s expense’. 
43 Civ 12 March 1850; [1850] S, I, 257. 
44 Req, 18 June 1872; [1872] DP, I, 471: unjustified enrichment redressed by holding that gestion 
d’affaires arose from the law and the fact of intervention alone, not intention to manage another’s affairs. 
See also Req, 19 December 1877; [1878] S, I, 57; Req, 16 July 1890; [1891] DP, I, 49, noted by M 
Planiol; [1894] S, I, 19. The latter case declared that even involuntary management entitled the 
intervenor to expenses. 
45 Req, 15 June 1892; [1892] DP, I, 596; [1893] S, I, 281, noted by J-E Labbé. 
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‘[T]hat this action [de in rem verso], deriving from the principle of équité 
which forbids enrichment at the expense of another and not having been 
regulated by any legislative provision, [is] not subject to any fixed condition; 
that it suffices, to render it admissible, that the claimant allege and offer to 
prove the existence of a benefit which he has, by sacrifice or act, conferred 
on the person against whom he claims […]’ 
 
In rejecting one of the grounds of appeal, the court further noted approvingly that: 
 
‘[T]he judgment under appeal explicitly declares that the defendants’ right 
[to restitution] is not based upon [article 548 of the Code civil], which is only 
mentioned [by the court below] as an example and as one of the 
applications of the principle established tacitly [consacré virtuellement] by 
the Code, that nobody may enrich himself at another’s expense […]’ 
 
This was thought too wide. Following leading commentators,46 the Cour de cassation 
soon imposed a further condition that the defendant’s enrichment at the claimant’s 
expense be without legal basis or legal ground (sans cause légitime).47 And the action 
has been entrenched in French law ever since. The same is true of the principle 
against unjustified enrichment, declared a general principle of law (principe général du 
droit) in a widely commented-upon decision of the Cour de cassation’s Première 
chambre civile.48 
 
The juridical basis of the action de in rem verso was fiercely debated. Candidates 
included, for example, abnormal negotiorum gestio, adopted in academia and by the 
                                               
46 See, eg, the criticisms of Joseph-Émile Labbé in his note on Boudier: [1893] S, I, 281, 281, 282 
(second column); and the prior suggestion by C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français d’après 
la méthode de Zachariae, vol VI (4th edn, LDJ 1873) no 578(4). In this edition, Aubry and Rau referred 
explicitly to D 50.17.206, though they invert the final two words of that passage, which was checked 
against A Watson (ed), The Digest of Justinian (UPP 1985). 
47 For an early case, see Civ, 18 October 1898, [1899] DP, I, 105, noted by LS. 
48 Although the Court actually used the phrase s’enrichir injustement (unjustly), rather than s’enrichir 
sans cause (without legal ground): Civ 1re, 4 April 2001, pourvoi no 98-13285, Bull civ I, no 105; [2001] 
Defrénois 721, observations by J-L Aubert; [2001] D 1824, observations by M Billiau; [2002] LPA 2 April 
no 66, 9, noted by A Gosselin-Gorand; [2002] JCP G, I, 134, no 18, observations by A-S Barthez. 
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Cour de cassation;49 straightforward delictual liability;50 enrichment as an unlawful act, 
albeit not delictual;51 risk-based delictual liability requiring profit plus causation;52 
delictual liability for damage causing profit;53 the correction of an imbalance between 
patrimonies, with additional reliance on équité;54 and a moral rule, deriving from équité, 
custom and jurisprudence.55 However, many have recognised that they are dealing 
simply with the receipt of an undue advantage.56 
 
Despite this development, the much criticised quasi-contractual category remains.57 
The Cour de cassation has never felt bound to hold that the action de in rem verso is 
quasi-contractual.58 And a lone, unreported, decision of the Première chambre civile 
does note that an obligation arising from unjustified enrichment has nothing to do with 
contract; and that the ‘outdated word “quasi-contract” can cast no doubt upon this’.59 
But the action was often attached to ex article 1371 of the Code civil to provide it with 
                                               
49 F Laurent, Principes de droit civil français, vol XX (Bruylant-Christophe 1876) no 333ff; C Demolombe, 
Cours de code Napoléon, vol XXXI (4th edn, Lahure 1882) no 49; and see, eg, Req, 18 June 1872 (n 
44); Req, 19 December 1877 (n 44); Req, 16 July 1890 (n 44). 
50 M Planiol, Traité élémentaire de droit civil (1st edn, Cotillon-Pichon 1900) no 976. 
51 M Planiol, ‘Classification des sources des obligations’ (1904) 33 Rev crit lég jur 224, 227-229; M 
Planiol, Traité élémentaire de droit civil, vol II (9th edn, LGDJ 1923) no 937. 
52 G Ripert and R Teisseire, ‘Essai d’une théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause en droit civil français’ 
[1904] RTD Civ 727, 754-765. 
53 H Loubers, ‘L’action «de in rem verso» et les théories de la responsabilité civile I and II’ (1912) 41 
Rev crit lég jur 396, 462. 
54 Aubry and Rau, Cours, 4th edn (n 46) no 578-4; R Demogue, Les notions fondamentales du droit 
privé (Rousseau 1911) 481-487. 
55 G Ripert, La règle morale dans les obligations civiles (4th edn, LGDJ 1949) no 145; L Josserand, 
Cours de droit civil positif français, vol II (3rd edn, Sirey 1939) nos 564-566. See also, advocating an 
entire category of enrichissement injuste, under which are grouped the condictio indebiti, negotiorum 
gestio, and the action de in rem verso, based on ‘general rule of équité that nobody may enrich himself 
without a right to do so at another’s expense’, Ambroise Colin and Henri Capitant’s Cours élémentaire 
de droit civil français, vol II (7th edn, Dalloz 1932) 217, 223-229. (This was the last edition by them 
alone.) 
56 For a full analysis, see E Descheemaeker, ‘Quasi-contrats et enrichissement injustifié en droit 
français’ [2013] RTD Civ 1. The modern revivor of this idea seems to be Jean Carbonnier. See, eg, his 
Théorie des obligations (PUF 1963) nos 198, 203. But Descheemaeker shows that it goes back much 
further. 
57 For critiques of quasi-contract in France, see, notably, Toullier (n 41) nos 15-20; H Vizioz, La Notion 
de quasi-contrat, étude historique et critique (Cadoret 1912) no 55ff esp 75; Descheemaeker (n 56). 
Compare, eg, Demolombe (n 49) nos 1-447 esp 5-6, 17-21, 25ff, 33-42, 48-49, 51-55, 230-236; M 
Douchy, La notion de quasi-contrat en droit positif français (Economica 1997). 
58 See, eg, and ex multis, Civ, 6 July 1927; [1928] S, I, 19; Civ 1re, 19 January 1988, pourvoi no 85-
17618, Bull civ I, no 16. In the latter case, the court simply cited ‘the principles which govern unjustified 
enrichment’. 
59 Civ 1re, 15 December 1976, pourvoi no 75-12883. 
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a legislative base.60 The abolition of an entire category, approved by the legislator, 




The current French law of unjustified enrichment is found in subtitle III of title III of book 
III of the Code civil, entitled ‘Other sources of obligations’.61 The first provision, article 
1300, reads:62 
 
‘Quasi-contracts are purely voluntary actions which result in a duty in a 
person who benefits from them without having a right to do so, and 
sometimes a duty in the person performing them towards another person. 
The quasi-contracts governed by this sub-title are management of 
another’s affairs, payment of a debt which is not due, and unjustified 
enrichment.’ 
 
Management of another’s affairs and undue payments are governed, respectively, by 
articles 1301 to 1301-5 and 1302 to 1302-3. Unjustified enrichment is dealt with by 
articles 1303 to 1303-4. These are so succinct that it is as well to set them out in full: 
 
‘1303 – Outwith the situations of management of another’s affairs and 
undue payment, a person who benefits from an unjustified enrichment at 
the expense of another person must make restitution to the person who is 
thereby impoverished, of an amount equal to the enrichment or the 
impoverishment, whichever is the lesser. 
 
                                               
60 See, eg, in multiple chambers of the Cour de cassation: Civ 3e, 1 April 1971, pourvoi no 69-11939, 
Bull civ III, no 239; Civ 3e, 5 January 1972, pourvoi no 70-12910, Bull civ III, no 1; Civ 1re, 22 October 
1974, pourvoi no 73-11612, Bull civ I, no 272; Com, 4 October 1976, pourvoi no 75-12689, Bull civ IV, 
no 242. 
61 All codal translations in this study borrow heavily where possible from J Cartwright, B Fauvarque-
Cosson and S Whittaker, The new provisions of the Code civil created by Ordonnance n° 2016-131 of 
10 February 2016 and including revisions made to the text by Loi no 2018-287 of 20 April 2018 
translated into English (Ministère de la Justice 2018). 
62 For criticism, see, eg, JS Borghetti, ‘Article 1300: les quasi-contrats’ [2015] RDC 792; R Libchaber, 
‘Le malheur des quasi-contrats’ [2016] Dr et patr, n° 258, May, 73, May 2016, 73, 73-74. 
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1303-1 – An enrichment is unjustified where it stems neither from the 
fulfilment of an obligation by the person impoverished nor from his intention 
to confer a gratuitous benefit. 
 
1303-2 – There is no restitution where the impoverishment stems from an 
act done by the impoverished person with a view to his personal benefit. 
The court may reduce the quantum of a restitutionary award if the 
impoverishment stems from the fault of the person impoverished. 
 
1303-3 – The impoverished person has no action on this basis where 
another action is open to him or is barred by an obstacle of law, such as 
prescription. 
 
1303-4 – Impoverishment established on the day that it occurred, and 
enrichment such as it subsists on day of the claim, are valued on the day 
that the court gives judgment. If the enriched person was in bad faith, 
restitution is equal to the higher of these two values.’ 
 
These provisions will require bold interpretation to provide continuity in French law’s 
approach to unjustified enrichment. In particular, article 1303-1 is too narrowly 
drafted.63 Given its strident original approach in the unjust enrichment context,64 the 
Cour de cassation will likely rise to this challenge. 
 
III. SCOTS LAW 
 
This section addresses the Scottish principle against unjustified enrichment and Scots 
law’s general approach to unjustified enrichment claims. 
 
 
                                               
63 For criticism, see M Mignot, ‘Commentaire article par article de l’ordonnance du 10 février 2016 
portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations (VII)’ [2016] 
LPA 13 April no 74, 7. 
64 And others, eg, the Blieck case: Ass plén 29 March 1991, pourvoi no 89-15231, Bull ass plén, no 1; 
[1991] D 324, noted by C Larroumet; [1991] RTD Civ 541, observations by P Jourdain; [1991] Defrénois 
729, observations by J-L Aubert. 
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A. Principle 
 
In Scots law, ‘[t]he precise contours of unjustified enrichment remain to be mapped’.65 
But the underlying idea is established by the highest authority. Important decisions in 
the 1990s marked ‘the generalisation of the obligation to reverse unjustified 
enrichment’.66 In Shilliday v Smith,67 Lord Rodger gave the leading opinion, with which 
Lord Kirkwood and Lord Caplan agreed. It deserves to be quoted at length. His 
Lordship said: 
 
‘[A] person may be said to be unjustly enriched at another’s expense when 
he has obtained a benefit from the other’s actings or expenditure, without 
there being a legal ground which would justify him in retaining that benefit. 
The significance of one person being unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is that in general terms it constitutes an event which triggers a right 
in that other person to have the enrichment reversed. As the law has 
developed, it has identified various situations where persons are to be 
regarded as having been unjustly enriched at another’s expense and where 
the other person may accordingly seek to have the enrichment reversed. 
The authorities show that some of these situations fall into recognisable 
groups or categories. Since these situations correspond, if only somewhat 
loosely, to situations where remedies were granted in Roman law, in 
referring to the relevant categories our law tends to use the terminology 
which is found in the Digest and Code. The terms include condictio indebiti; 
condictio causa data, causa non secuta and – to a lesser extent – condictio 
sine causa. […] [R]epetition, restitution, reduction and recompense are 
simply examples of remedies which the courts grant to reverse an unjust 
enrichment, depending on the way in which the particular enrichment has 
arisen […].’ 
                                               
65 Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Patersons of Greenoakhill Ltd [2015] CSOH 137, 2015 GWD 34-548 [29] 
(Lord Woolman). For modern developments, see M Hogg, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Scots Law Twenty 
Years On: Where Now?’ [2006] RLR 1; HL MacQueen, ‘The Future of Unjustified Enrichment in 
Scotland’ [2017] RLR 14. 
66 Robertson Construction Central Ltd v Glasgow Metro LLP [2009] CSOH 71, 2009 GWD 19-304 [18] 
(Lord Hodge). 
67 1998 SC 725 (IH) 727-728 (the Lord President [Rodger]), 732 (Lord Kirkwood), 734 (Lord Caplan) 
(emphasis added). See also Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian RC 1995 SC 151 (IH); 
Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90. 
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This summarises Scots law’s principle against unjustified enrichment. One who is 
enriched at another’s expense must restore its enrichment to that other if the 
enrichment is without legal ground. Remedies follow, unless there is a defence in 




The shape of the Scots law of unjustified enrichment is becoming clearer. An approach 
similar to English law’s was flirted with,70 amid strong hints at civilian leanings.71 The 
law now is structured along the latter general lines.72 There is growing consensus, 
which currently remains academic,73 that underneath a general enrichment principle, 
the law is organised according to the manner in which enrichments are received.74 
Caution is therefore required whilst looking south of the Border for inspiration.75 A brief 
sketch of the legal landscape follows. 
 
First, there is enrichment by what has been called ‘deliberate conferral’, or ‘by 
transfer’:76 the intentional causing of money, other property, or the benefit of services, 
                                               
68 On equity in Scots enrichment law, see generally DJ Carr, Ideas of Equity (ELET 2017) ch 3. There 
appears to be a slight trend to treat equity in unjustified enrichment as importing a general discretion to 
do what seems fair and just on the facts of a case. See, eg, MacKays Stores Ltd v Toward Ltd [2008] 
CSOH 51 [28] (Lord Drummond Young); Advocate General for Scotland v John Gunn and Sons Ltd 
[2018] CSOH 39 [62] (Lord Uist). This cannot be addressed here, except to say that it would be better 
forgotten. See further M Campbell, ‘Equity Flailing? Against Ad Hocery in Unjustified Enrichment’ (2018) 
22 Edinburgh L Rev 393. 
69 Morgan Guaranty (n 67) 166 (the Lord President [Hope], with whom Lord Mayfield and Lord Kirkwood 
agreed); Compagnie Commerciale Andre SA v Artibell Shipping Company Ltd (No 2) 2001 SC 653 
(OH) [23] (Lord Macfadyen); Corrie v Craig unreported 31 October 2012 (Sh Ct, Kirkcudbright), 2013 
GWD 1-55 [16] (Sheriff Brown). 
70 WJ Stewart, The Law of Restitution in Scotland (W Green 1992) ch 3 esp [3.9]-[3.10]; building upon 
P Birks, ‘Six Questions in Search of a Subject – Unjust Enrichment in a Crisis of Identity’ [1985] JR 227; 
P Birks, ‘Restitution: A View of the Scots Law’ [1985] CLP 57. 
71 Eg N Whitty, ‘Some Trends and Issues in Scots Enrichment Law’ [1994] JR 127, 132-134. 
72 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 
AC 558 [153], [155], [158] (Lord Walker). 
73 And ‘not yet fully reflected in the decisions of the Scottish courts’: MacQueen (n 65) 21; R Evans-
Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W Green 2013) [1.52]. 
74 See, eg, N Whitty and D Visser, ‘Unjustified Enrichment’ in R Zimmermann, K Reid and D Visser 
(eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and 
South Africa (OUP 2004) 411-432; and the leading short account in HL MacQueen and Lord Eassie 
(eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland (14th edn, W Green 2017) ch 24. 
75 See Joint Liquidators of Simclar (Ayrshire) Ltd v Simclar Group Ltd [2011] CSOH 54, 2011 SLT 1131 
[31]-[34] (Lord Hodge). 
76 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, I: Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio (W Green 
2003) [2.15]-[2.17]; M Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn, Avizandum 2006) [4.45]. See further J du Plessis, 
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to pass from one patrimony to another. This category of unjustified enrichment is 
comprised of sub-types of claim, often designated by Latin tags,77 like condictio 
indebiti,78 condictio causa data, causa non secuta,79 condictio ob causam finitam,80 
condictio ob turpem vel injustam causam,81 or condictio sine causa.82 The last of these 
permits this category of enrichment claim to welcome novel cases under the general 
enrichment principle. 
 
Secondly, there is enrichment by imposition. This category of unjustified enrichment 
can be divided in two. In the first place, there is enrichment by the imposition of benefits 
on another’s property.83 This sub-category of enrichment by imposition does not 
directly concern us in this study. So we do not further dwell on it here. 
                                               
‘Labels and Meaning: Unjust Factors and Failure of Purpose as Reasons for Reversing Enrichment by 
Transfer’ (2014) 18 Edinburgh L Rev 416, esp 426-430. 
77 Despite terminology, the claims are not always seen as watertight and constant. See, eg, on the 
condictio ob causam finitam, Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd [2003] ZASCA 64, 2003 
(5) SA 193 [15] (Navsa and Heher JJA, with whom Harms, and Farlam JJA, and Shongwe AJA agreed): 
‘an offshoot of the condictio sine causa specialis’. Griffiths v Janse van Rensburg NO [2015] ZASCA 
158, 2016 (3) SA 389 [22] (Gorven AJA, with whom Shongwe, Pillay, and Saldulker JJA agreed): ‘one 
of the enrichment actions’. 
78 Transfer on the basis of an obligation which does not exist, in the existence of which there must be 
a mistaken belief by the pursuer (a liability mistake). Recognised in Morgan Guaranty (n 67) 155 (the 
Lord President [Hope], with whom Lord Mayfield and Lord Kirkwood agreed), 168 (Lord Clyde). Their 
Lordships also relegated the question whether the pursuer’s error is excusable to the status of a factor 
to be considered if raised by the defender in balancing the equities. See also Alliance Trust Savings 
Ltd v Currie [2016] CSOH 154, 2016 GWD 35-628 [34] (Lord Tyre). 
79 Transfer on the shared basis of a lawful future state of affairs, outwith contract, which fails to 
materialise at all. Recognised in Shilliday (n 67) 727-729 (the Lord President [Rodger]), 732-733 (Lord 
Kirkwood), 734 (Lord Caplan). Two points. (1) In the presence of a valid and subsisting contract, the 
parties’ rights and duties are regulated by their agreement; (2) after the termination of a contract, it 
appears in Scots law that restitution is based upon the mutuality of parties’ counter obligations under 
the agreement: Stork Technical Services (RBG) Ltd v Ross’s Executor [2015] CSOH 10A, 2015 SLT 
160 [34]-[35] (Lord Tyre); M Hogg, ‘Restitution Following Termination of Contract: A Contractual or 
Enrichment Remedy?’ (2015) 19 Edinburgh L Rev 269. 
80 Transfer on the basis of a current state of affairs, which subsequently falls away. Recognised obiter 
in Thomson v Mooney [2013] CSIH 115, 2014 Fam LR 15 [11], [13] (Lord Eassie, with whom Lord 
Bracadale, and Lord Wheatley agreed). 
81 Transfer on the basis of an illegal or immoral purpose. See Stair, The Institutions of the Law of 
Scotland (2nd edn, Anderson 1693) I, 7, 8; AM Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland (Fleming 
1751) I, 8, 22; J Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland (1st edn, (1773) ELET 2014) III, 1, 10. For 
old Scots authority, see Cuthbertson v Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073 (IH) 1074-1075 (the Lord President 
[Inglis]). 
82 Transfer without a legal justifying ground, whether the fact pattern has close links with nominate 
condictiones (eg a condictio donandi causa or new variation on the condictio ob turpem vel injustam 
causam) or more abstract analytical links with the general unjustified enrichment principle. Recognised 
as probably applicable in Mactaggart & Mickel Ltd v Hunter [2010] CSOH 130, 2010 GWD 33-683 [99] 
(Lord Hodge); terminology used in Shilliday (n 67) 727 (the Lord President [Rodger]). 
83 Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 73) ch 5; Hogg, Obligations (n 76) [4.69]-[4.71]. 
The paradigm case is that of the possessor in good faith of land who builds upon it or otherwise 
improves it (eg by effecting repairs and saving the true owner an expense), who turns out to have no 
right to the land, such that the true owner is enriched to the value of the possessor’s actings. 
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In the second place, there is enrichment by the imposed discharge of another’s 
monetary or non-monetary obligation.84 That is, A either pays B’s debt to C; or A 
performs a service that B is obliged to perform. In both cases, B is saved an expense. 
This sub-category of unjustified enrichment is inherently open to expansion, since the 
discharge of an obligation can occur on so many sets of facts.85 But this poses no 
difficulty for our purposes. Though one of the key Scots cases involving the supposed 
subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment, Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council,86 was one 
of enrichment by the performance of another’s non-monetary obligation, nothing turns 
upon this, such that further general elaboration is unnecessary here. 
 
Thirdly, there is enrichment by interference. This category of unjustified enrichment 
usually deals with the taking, use, consumption, disposal, or acquisition (by operation 
of law), of another’s property.87 Behaviour which amounts to the denial of another’s 
property rights is generally unjustified (subject to questions of public utility, for 
example). Any benefit generated thereby must usually be given up. This category of 
unjustified enrichment can expand by reference to the unjustified enrichment 
principle.88 For example, patents, a kind of intellectual property, are granted for the 
sole benefit of their holders. Profits derived from patent infringements may be taken 
by patent holders.89 This might suggest that other rights, such as personality rights, 
                                               
84 Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 73) ch 6; Hogg, Obligations (n 76) [4.61]-[4.68]. 
See further S Meier, ‘Performance of an Obligation by a Third Party’ in A Burrows, D Johnston and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (OUP 2013).  
85 This is perhaps confirmed by the fact that Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 73) ch 
6, contains no explicit discussion of analytically similar situations which could expand the field of cases 
in which unjustified enrichment will operate. 
86 [2005] CSOH 76, 2005 SLT 958. 
87 Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 73) ch 4; Hogg, Obligations (n 76) [4.72]-[4.79]. 
See further J Blackie and I Farlam, ‘Enrichment by Act of the Party Enriched’ in R Zimmermann, D 
Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations 
in Scotland and South Africa (OUP 2004). For a relevant statement of principle, see Merchandise Funds 
Co Ltd v Maxwell 1978 SLT (Sh Ct) 18, 19 (Sheriff Principal Robert Reid QC): ‘There is inherent in the 
legal idea of ownership, a right on the part of the owner to demand his property from any person into 
whose hands it may come or to recover the value of the property from any possessor who has sold it 
knowing that he had not acquired a good title to it from his author.’ 
88 Since this is a developing area, much of the discussion in Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other 
Manner (n 73) ch 4, centres on relaxations of the paradigm criteria of, eg, ownership rights proper, or 
tangible property. 
89 Patents Act 1977 (UK) ss 31(2), 61(1)(d). See also the recognition in principle, but failure on the facts, 
of a claim in unjustified enrichment for disgorgement following a breach of confidence (not in the 
technical Common Law sense): Pine Energy Consultants Ltd v Pine Energy (UK) Ltd [2008] CSOH 10, 
2008 GWD 4-60 [30] (Lord Glennie). 
 - 25 - 
should be sanctioned by unjustified enrichment, also.90 But these fascinating 




How the law of unjustified enrichment meets novel cases is important, and will be 
discussed in a little more detail later in this study. So a primer is given here. The 
following observations of Lord Hodge in the context of enrichment by transfer are 
instructive:91 
 
‘An analysis of the condictiones may be useful to ascertain some of the 
circumstances in which the law will treat enrichment as unjustified. But 
fundamentally the questions for the court are (i) whether there has been 
enrichment of A at B’s expense and, if so, (ii) whether A’s retention of that 
enrichment is justified on some legal ground. […] [S]ome situations 
correspond only loosely to the circumstances in which Roman law provided 
causes of action in the condictiones. It appears to me that it would be 
unnecessarily rigid if our law were to require a precise match with a Roman 
law cause of action and that the establishment of a unitary principle of 
unjustified enrichment […] does not demand such rigidity.’ 
 
On this approach, Scots law can move beyond the nominate condictiones and 
paradigm imposition or interference cases.92 The gradual, careful relaxation of those 
categories, which Lord Hodge seems to endorse,93 will keep developments controlled, 
and hopefully, principled. However, it is not right ‘that one should focus on the principle 
rather than the categories, either of causes of action or of remedies’.94 Rather, 
                                               
90 E Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (W Green 2010) [16.07]; Hogg, 
Obligations (n 76) [4.79]. 
91 Mactaggart & Mickel (n 82) [99]. 
92 See generally Evans-Jones, Condictio (n 76) [2.08]-[2.10], [6.01]-[6.05]; Evans-Jones, Enrichment in 
Any Other Manner (n 73) [2.14], [2.27], [3.13]-[3.14], [3.32], [3.35], [5.50]-[5.74]. 
93 And has been accepted can happen in South African law: Bowman, De Wet & Du Plessis NNO v 
Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 35 (AD) 40 (Harms JA, with whom van Heerden, Eksteen, Nienaber, and 
Zulman JJA agreed); First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA) [28] 
(Schutz JA, with whom Hefer ACJ, Zulman JA, and Brand, and Nugent AJJA agreed). 
94 Corrie (n 69) [20] (Sheriff Brown). 
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development centres on a balance.95 There is the general principle against unjustified 
enrichment and the desirability (or not) of applying it to a new case. There is how the 
new case fits analytically alongside the condictiones and already emerged modern 
solutions. And there is the important point that it is not essential to the recognition of 
a new case that a similar one have been decided.96 
 
IV. TWO SPECIFIC POINTS 
 
For clarity and convenience, this part of the chapter outlines the position taken in this 
study on two issues in enrichment law. 
 
A. An enrichment-impoverishment distinction in France? 
 
It is submitted that no useful work is done in French law by a distinction between 
justifications for enrichments and impoverishments, or any requirement that both be 
unjustified. Such matters also go unheeded by the legislator and the courts. This study 
should be free from the outset of potential objections to broad arguments about legal 
grounds for enrichments. 
 
Articles 1303-1 and 1303-2 of the Code civil partially separate justifications for 
enrichments, and justifications for impoverishments. But the Code civil’s distinction is 
not clean.97 Otherwise, intention to confer a gratuitous benefit would more logically be 
a justification for impoverishments, and belong in article 1303-2. The Cour de 
cassation does not consistently impose the distinction, either. Several cases hold 
                                               
95 R Evans-Jones, ‘Thinking About Some Scots Law: Lord Rodger and Unjustified Enrichment’ in A 
Burrows, D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger 
of Earlsferry (OUP 2013) 444-445. 
96 South African authority endorses this approach: Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 
1994 (3) SA 283 (AD) 332-333 (Botha JA, with whom Kumleben, Grosskopf, and Nienaber JJA, and 
Kannemeyer AJA agreed). 
97 For criticism, see F Chénedé, Le nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) 
[134.22]-[134.24], accepting nevertheless the possibility of the requirement denied here. 
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against the need for an impoverishment, as against an enrichment, to be unjustified.98 
And noted French authors are content simply to differ on the matter.99 
 
B. No entitlement requirement 
 
It is not necessary for a particular legal mechanism to confer a right to an enrichment 
in order for it to constitute a good justification for that enrichment. The real question is 
whether letting a given defendant keep an enrichment is in conformity with the law. 
Common law cases,100 and some writers,101 are against the necessity of a right or 
entitlement. So are the Scots cases,102 and several leading writers from mixed legal 
systems.103 The Code civil is of no help. If its provisions were exhaustive, there would 
be no way to deny unjustified enrichment actions in many established cases. Some 
French cases are against us.104 But others may be read in favour of the position taken 
                                               
98 The clearest case was one in which the Cour de cassation allowed an unjustified enrichment action 
against relatives of the deceased user of a care home and noted specifically that the contract between 
the deceased and the home justified the home’s impoverishment vis-à-vis the deceased but not the 
enrichment of the family members obliged to step into the deceased’s shoes as debtor: Civ 1re, 25 
February 2003, pourvoi no 00-18572, Bull civ I, no 55; [2003] RTD Civ 297, observations by J Mestre 
and B Fages; [2003] JCP G, II, 10124, noted by P Lipinski; [2004] D 1766, noted by M-P Peis. See also 
Civ 1re, 14 January 2003, pourvoi no 01-01304, Bull civ I, no 142; [2003] Defrénois 259, noted by J-L 
Aubert; [2003] RTD Civ 297, observations by J Mestre and B Fages; Civ 1re, 24 October 2006, pourvoi 
no 05-18023, Bull civ I, no 439, suggesting that donative intent, if proved, justifies enrichments, not 
impoverishments; Civ 1re, 12 January 2011, pourvoi no 09-71572. Compare, eg, Civ 3e, 31 January 
1969, Bull civ III, no 98. Language has long been mixed in lower courts. See, eg, Cour de Bordeaux, 30 
May 1929; [1929] DP, II, 151, 157 (eighth case). 
99 J Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol II (final def edn, PUF 2004) no 1228(a): justifications for enrichments 
include gratuitous intent and self-interest but separate from fault; F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil 
de H, L et J Mazeaud, vol II/1 (9th edn, Montchrestien 1998) nos 700-705: justifications for enrichments 
separate from sui generis conditions of fault and self-interest; P Esmein, Traité pratique de droit civil 
français par Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert, vol VII (P Esmein, J Radouant and G Gabolde eds, 
2nd edn, LGDJ 1954) no 760: intention to confer gratuitous benefit and acts in self-interest constitute 
justifications for enrichments. 
100 Re Beppler & Jacobson Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 763 [63] (Gloster LJ, with whom Singh LJ, and Sir 
Jack Beatson agreed); Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd v Glenalla Properties Ltd [2018] UKPC 7 (Gue) 
[144]-[151] (Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Sumption, and Lord Carnwath agreed), [194] (Lord Mance, 
dissenting on other grounds), [237] (Lord Briggs, dissenting on other grounds). In both these cases, 
contracts were silent about rights to payment: they conferred no relevant rights at all; their construction 
impliedly excluded unjust enrichment. The shared, non-entitling state of affairs in contemplation of 
which a benefit is transferred, can also justify a person’s enrichment: Rotam Agrochemical Company 
Ltd v GAT Microencapsulation GmBH [2018] EWHC 2765 (Comm) [194]-[195] (Butcher J). 
101 Edelman and Bant (n 27) 166-167; Smith (n 27) 291-300. 
102 Previous uncertainty was resolved in Scotland by Thomson (n 80) [7]-[10] (Lord Eassie, with whom 
Lord Bracadale and Lord Wheatley agreed). 
103 Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 73) [3.18]; D Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (Juta 
2008) 174-175; J du Plessis, The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (Juta 2012) 56. 
104 See, eg, decisions designating contracts as a mode of acquiring rights justifying enrichments: Civ 
3e, 16 March 1977, pourvoi no 75-13840, Bull civ III, no 130; Civ 3e, 26 November 1979, pourvoi no 78-
12225, Bull civ III, no 207. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that these cases mean that there is 
what is here called an ‘entitlement requirement’, but they seem to be what favour it most. 
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here.105 An entitlement requirement is also incompatible with several academic 
accounts.106 Some, however, disagree with the view put forward. So to anticipate its 
elaboration in later chapters, general support is offered here, in the context of unjust 
enrichment and statute. 
 
Sometimes, as will be seen in chapter 4, legislative provisions do not confer rights to 
enrichments. They simply exclude or modify unjust enrichment claims. Some 
commentators analyse these situations separately from rules that grant rights to 
enrichments. They say that such provisions speak to the idea that unjust enrichment 
cannot circumvent rules of positive law. Otherwise, there would be a fraud on the law 
– une fraude à la loi.107 If unpacked, this argument disappoints. The disturbance of 
existing legal institutions is the problem. No unjustified enrichment actions contrary to 
law is the solution. But the reason why is absent. Does the law say: ‘yes, the 
defendant’s enrichment is unjustified, but that does not matter and there is no claim’? 
Does the law say: ‘it does not matter whether the defendant’s enrichment is unjustified 
or not and there is no claim’? It is submitted that there is a better view. The law says: 
‘the defendant’s enrichment is not unjustified, because the relevant rules impliedly 
approve it’. It is not enough to say, without more, that an unjustified enrichment claim 
would make a mockery of a given legislative scheme: ‘the defendant’s enrichment is 
unjustified but the claimant’s claim is against the law’. A better reply is owed to the 
claimant, who says: ‘but I still think the defendant’s enrichment is unjustified’. The reply 
is: ‘no, it is not; carefully read, the law says so’. It is difficult to disagree with Professor 
René Demogue: the entitlement requirement is ‘a useless abstraction, which hardly 
clarifies matters’.108 
 
                                               
105 As where the operation of a matrimonial property regime, ‘one of the lawful modes of acquiring 
rights’, simply ‘excluded’ unjustified enrichment: Civ 1re, 10 May 1984, pourvoi no 83-12370, Bull civ I, 
no 153. Or where the will of the party impoverished was (correctly) included in a list of potential justifying 
grounds: CA Aix-en-Provence, 9 October 2018, RG no 17/03699. 
106 P Roubier, ‘La position française en matière d’enrichissement sans cause’, L’enrichissement sans 
cause – La représentation dans les actes juridiques, Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant, IV: 
Journées néerlandaises (Dalloz 1949) 49-54 esp 50 in fine, 52 in fine; J Chevallier, ‘Observations sur 
la répétition des enrichissements non causés’, Le droit privé français au milieu du XXe siècle[:] études 
offertes à Georges Ripert, vol II (LGDJ 1950) 242, 245 in fine; G Marty and P Raynaud, Droit civil: Les 
obligations, vol I (2nd edn, Sirey 1988) nos 396 in medio, 397 in fine; B Starck, H Roland and L Boyer, 
Droit civil: Les obligations, vol II (6th edn, Litec 1998) no 2198; Carbonnier (n 99) no 1228(a). 
107 Josserand (n 55) nos 572-573, 574 bis; Esmein (n 99) nos 756(1), 761-762. 
108 Traité des obligations en général, vol III (LNDJ 1923) nos 163-164. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has briefly surveyed essential features relevant to this study of unjust 
enrichment, principally in England, France and Scotland. It has also addressed two 
points of detail to provide clarity in later chapters. We can now consider subsidiarity, 
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This chapter addresses subsidiarity. As mentioned briefly in the Introduction to this 
study, the language of subsidiarity is often invoked in unjust enrichment law and 
scholarship to explain unjust enrichment’s relations with other areas of law, or legal 
regimes. The history of this practice and the reasons for it are addressed in chapter 3. 
For now, subsidiarity is analysed outwith the unjust enrichment context. 
 
Subsidiarity’s linguistic and conceptual roots are centuries old. The historical and 
theoretical literature is large.1 Views reasonably differ on subsidiarity’s contours and 
application.2 An exhaustive account is not possible here. This chapter aims more 
modestly to formulate part of subsidiarity’s irreducible core: what are some of its 
undeniable elements which must be respected before anything can be called, or be, a 
relationship or rule of subsidiarity? 
 
To answer this question, this chapter proceeds in two parts. First, a linguistic 
perspective is adopted. Dictionary definitions of the noun subsidiarity and the adjective 
subsidiary in Latin, English, and French are set out. From them are extracted points 
about the correct usage of subsidiarity. These are used as a framework in the second 
part of this chapter, which examines subsidiarity in three contexts – Roman Catholic 
social doctrine, European Union law, European human rights law – and draws on other 
material, including writing on subsidiarity in French private law. The conclusion of this 
chapter draws the threads together by setting out six principles to be respected by 
users of subsidiarity. These principles will be applied to the law and scholarship on the 




                                               
1 See, inter alia, C Delsol, L’État subsidiaire ((1992) repr, Cerf 2015); K Endo, ‘The Principle of 
Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors’ (1994) 44 Hokkaido L Rev 652; J Barroche, 
État, libéralisme et christianisme: critique de la subsidiarité européenne (Dalloz 2012); N Aroney, 
‘Subsidiarity in the Writings of Aristotle and Aquinas’ in M Evans and A Zimmermann (eds), Global 
Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014). 
2 For one survey among others, see A Føllesdal, ‘Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity’ in JE Fleming 
and JT Levy (eds), Federalism and Subsidiarity (NYUP 2014). 
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I. LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
This first section sets out a linguistic analysis of subsidiarity in Latin, English and 
French. The value of such a perspective is briefly explained before proceeding. Words 
do not bear the same meaning whenever they appear. Walter Wheeler Cook 
colourfully cautioned that the contrary assumption ‘has all the tenacity of original sin 
and must constantly be guarded against’.3 However, words do have ordinary 
meanings. These are usually the starting points for the development of legal concepts, 
and there are limits to the meaning which language may bear.4 It is submitted that 
dictionaries may inform as to these limits. The law sometimes accepts this, as in the 
context of contractual interpretation, for instance. In each main legal system under 
consideration in this study, words used in contracts may have ordinary meanings, even 
if they are context dependent.5 Courts may use dictionaries as a starting point in their 
search for the meaning of words in context.6 ‘[E]ven if they do not speak with one 
voice’, they are valuable because they ‘may offer a reasonably authoritative source for 
describing the range of meanings of a word, […] recognise that usage varies from time 
to time and place to place’, and can ‘illustrate usage in context’.7 It is submitted that 
                                               
3 WW Cook, ‘“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws’ (1933) 42 Yale LJ 333, 337. 
4 F Gény, Science et technique en droit privé positif, vol III (Sirey 1921) 460-461; AWB Simpson, ‘The 
Analysis of Legal Concepts’ (1964) 80 LQR 535, 545-548, 554-555. For demonstration of, and 
agreement with, the former point in this sentence, see, respectively, SFC Milsom, ‘Reason in the 
Development of the Common Law’ (1965) 81 LQR 498, 501-504; D Ibbetson, ‘Milsom’s Legal History’ 
[2017] CLJ 360, 369: ‘[S]o long as we are careful, the Milsomian insight that words originally had their 
normal general meanings is very valuable. I suspect that it is something that we all tend to assume in 
our own work today.’ A word may draw all of its meaning from legal discourse itself: G Cornu, 
Linguistique juridique (3rd edn, LGDJ 2005) 62-68. But this is not the case here. 
5 Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [14]-[23] esp [15](i), [19], [20] (Lord Neuberger, with 
whom Lord Sumption and Lord Hughes agreed), [76]-[77] (Lord Hodge), [109], [144] (Lord Carnwath, 
dissenting as to the result). In French law, in claris interpretatio non fit: Code civil, art 1192; Civ, 15 April 
1872; [1872] S, I, 232; Civ, 12 January 1938; [1938] DH 197. The Scots position is the same as 
England’s: AWG Business Centres Ltd v Regus Caledonia Ltd [2017] CSIH 22 [19] (Lord Carloway, 
with whom Lord Bracadale and Lord Glennie agreed). 
6 Heronslea (Mill Hill) Ltd v Kwik-Fit Properties Ltd [2009] EWHC 295 (QB) [17]-[19], [26] (Sharp J). For 
use of a dictionary in the Supreme Court, see Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd [2010] UKSC 18, [2010] 
Bus LR 1087 [26]-[29] (Lord Clarke, with whom Lord Phillips, Lord Hope, Lord Rodger and Lord Mance 
agreed). French Courts use dictionaries to assess ambiguity, absent which interpretation is forbidden: 
Civ 2e, 9 June 2016, pourvoi no 15-20106; CA Lyon, 10 May 2011, RG no 09/07919. The Scots position 
is the same as England’s: Autolink Concessionaires (M6) Plc v Amey Construction Ltd [2009] CSIH 14, 
[2009] BLR 411 [29]-[31] (Lord Kingarth, Lord Eassie and Lord Menzies). 
7 House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 (NSWCA) [28] (Mason P, 
with whom Stein and Giles JJA agreed). This was a statutory interpretation case. For similar remarks 
in the contractual interpretation context, see Mills v Cannon Brewery Co Ltd [1920] 2 Ch 38 (Ch) 44-45 
esp 44 (PO Lawrence J): ‘One of the main objects of every dictionary […] is to give an adequate and 
comprehensive definition of every word contained in it, which involves setting forth all the different 
meanings which can properly be given to the particular word.’ 
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from them, essential extra-contextual elements of a definition may be generalised, 
which set the boundaries of usage. On this basis, and without attempting a historical 
etymological (or similar) analysis,8 the worth of dictionaries and a linguistic perspective 




The following bare definitions of the word subsidium (variously declined) are given by 
the Oxford Latin Dictionary:9 
 
‘1. A body of troops with held [sic] from action as a reinforcement for the 
front line or [similarly], the reserves [...] b. additional manpower available 
as a replacement, reserves [...]; a supply kept in reserve [...] 
2. Supporting or relieving forces, reinforcements [...] b. reinforcement, 
support [...] c. the action of reinforcing [...] 
3. Assistance, help, support [...] 
4. A person or thing affording help, a resource, aid, safeguard, etc [...] b. 
a means of assistance, help [...] 
5. A place providing shelter, haven, refuge.’ 
 
The same publication gives the following definitions of the adjectival form, 
subsidiārius:10 
 
‘1. (of troops, etc) Acting as a support for the front line; (m pl as noun) 
the reserves […] b. (of a line of battle) occupied by the reserves. […] c 
[…] kept in reserve. 
[…] 
                                               
8 For a much more detailed linguistic perspective, see, eg, A Joyeux, ‘Le principe de subsidiarité, entre 
terminologie et discours: pistes pour une nouvelle histoire de la formule’ (PhD Thesis (in two vols), 
Franche-Comté, 2016). 
9 PGW Glare (ed), The Oxford Latin Dictionary (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 2038-2039 (original emphasis). 
See also DP Simpson, Cassell’s Latin Dictionary (5th edn, (1968) repr, Cassell 1984) 578. 
10 Glare (n 9) 2038 (original emphasis). See also Simpson (n 9) 578. 
 - 34 - 
2. actio ~a, An action enabling a ward to claim compensation from a 
magistrate who appointed an unsuitable guardian […] dig 27.8.1 […] 
27.8.1.4.’ 
 
The first point of interest is about the different entities or groups referred to. They are 
all assumed to exist: the potential replacer and the not yet replaced; the reinforcer and 
the reinforced; the safeguard and the safeguarded. There is no suggestion inherent in 
the mere description of something as a subsidiary entity that it might not exist before, 
when, or after it is subsidiary. Furthermore, if the non-subsidiary entity were at some 
point no longer to exist, it could not receive subsidium. It seems imprecise, even 
meaningless, to describe an entity as subsidiary to something which does not exist. 
Suppose, for example, all of the front line troops in an army are dead. Only the 
reserves are left. The latter might still be called ‘the reserves’, but only because that 
is what they are according to the abstract order of battle. In concreto, they are no 
longer reserves at all. They are the entire army, which is no longer composed of two 
groups – front liners and reservists – but one. 
 
A second point of interest is that, in the above definitions, we are almost constantly in 
the presence of clear pluralities: the reserves and the front-liners; the assistant and 
the assisted; the shelter and the sheltered. But the last usage set out above is not so 
simply analysed: an action which lay only when another, against an errant tutor,11 did 
not.12 The actions cannot co-exist, other than in the abstract – in the system of the 
                                               
11 See D 28.3. The version relied on is A Watson (ed), The Digest of Justinian (UPP 1985). 
12 D (n 11) 27.8.1, 27.8.1.12 (emphasis added): ‘In ordinem subsidiaria actio non dabitur, sed in 
magistratus, ned in fideiussorus eorum: hi enim rem publicam saluam fore promittunt, non pupilli.’ > ‘An 
additional action is given against magistrates but not against the whole board nor against their 
guarantors; for these have promised to insure state property not that of the pupillus.’ After cases in 
which guarantors were and were not obtained for tutors, it is said: ‘Sed et si satis non exegit, idoneus 
tamen tutor eo tempore fuit, quo tutelae agi potest, sufficit.’ > ‘But although security was not provided, 
if the tutor proves sound, when the action on tutelage can be brought, it is enough.’ 
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Digest, or indeed, the Codex,13 or Justinian’s Institutes.14 Once one allows oneself to 
think about the law as applied to a set of real life facts, there is never the potential for 
more than one of these actions to lie. It is not possible for something to be subsidiary 
to another thing if one or the other thing does not exist. So on this point, the use of 
subsidiarity here appears inapt. 
 
A third point of interest is that the different entities or groups of entities referred to 
above are all assumed to be capable of doing the same thing on at least some level. 
‘The same thing’ must be understood broadly. The term overlap is perhaps better. For 
example, soldiers can have any number of duties. Narrowly, two or more groups of 
soldiers can engage the enemy. But groups of troops might do different things in 
pursuit of a wider objective. One group assists the other, by building a bridge, say, yet 
with one goal in mind, perhaps the arrival of the other group at a given location. On 
this wider understanding, there is overlap in what the groups of soldiers are doing. The 
other definitions help to make the point. To take those referring to help and support, 
one does not seek assistance with something in the form of an action inapt to aid the 
resolution of a problem. And something which does not do this is not help or support. 
 
A fourth point of interest relates to the standing of subsidiary and non-subsidiary 
entities in relation to each other. It appears that if these entities are capable of 
independent action, then there may exist a reason, unconnected with those entities, 
which mandates one’s subsidiarity to another. Units of troops are capable of 
movement or other action under their own steam and according to the orders of their 
respective commanders. But the subsidiarity of one group to another is dictated by 
some authority higher than each of the groups themselves – perhaps a standing order, 
                                               
13 See C 5.59.5 (with editorial note by FH Blume). The version relied on is T Kearly (ed), Annotated 
Justinian Code (FH Blume tr, 2nd edn, George William Hopper Law Library 2009) 
<http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/>. Under reference to D 27.8, C 5.75.1, C 
5.33.1 and a headnote to C 5.42, Blume opines that the ‘subsidiary action’ referred to in the passage 
of the Codex cited here was the same as that in D 27.8. A more recent edition has also been consulted, 
but it omits Blume’s note: BW Frier (ed), The Codex of Justinian[:] A New Annotated Translation, with 
Parallel Latin and Greek Text [–] Based on a Translation by Justice Fred H Blume, vol II (CUP 2016). 
On the economical approach to annotation in this version, see BW Frier, ‘Revising Justice Blume’s 
Translation of Justinian’s Codex’ in BW Frier (ed), The Codex of Justinian[:] A New Annotated 
Translation, with Parallel Latin and Greek Text [–] Based on a Translation by Justice Fred H Blume, vol 
I (CUP 2016) lxxxvi-xci. 
14 Inst 1.24. The version relied on is P Birks and G McLeod (eds), Justinian’s Institutes (Duckworth 
1987). 
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or other rule. So, in Roman warfare, overall control of reserve troops did not fall to the 
commander of the reserve units themselves. Nor did it fall to an officer in the front line. 
It fell to another officer (let us assume a general), who commanded both the front line 
units and reserves.15 Another example is wholly speculative, because it is impossible 
to know what a Roman lawyer, for whom categorisation was likely not particularly 
important,16 would have thought of a rule that organised the relationship between two 
actions. But let us ask: is such a rule part of one of those actions, or does it stand 
separately? If the latter, then we are in the presence of a meta-rule.17 And it might be 
said that but for that meta-rule, which states that the action against the blameworthy 
magistrate applies only where the action against the errant tutor does not,18 then those 
actions might avail the pupil, or the pupil’s heirs,19 at random. They have their own 
conditions and could each simply attach or not to a given set of facts if nothing – no 
meta-rule – prevented it. 
 
A fifth point of interest might follow from the fourth. If in a relationship of subsidiarity, 
entities which are free and capable (as this is understood in the preceding paragraph) 
appear not to regulate that relationship directly by themselves. What does regulate 
their relationship is on a different footing from that on which they themselves sit. One 
entity may not dominate the other, because there are conditions on which it will receive 
subsidium. Yet the other entity, though not directly subservient to the first, may be 
unable to decide alone whether it renders subsidium or not. Return to our reserve and 
front line troops. They have no choice as to their deployment. The general, or other 
overall commander, decides that. If a relationship of subsidiarity between free and 
capable entities is described precisely, it appears that, in relation to the exercise of 
                                               
15 AK Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War: 100 BC – AD 200 (OUP 1996) 161; J Thorne, ‘Battle, 
Tactics, and the Emergence of the Limites in the West’ in P Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman 
Army (Blackwell 2007) 224; P Rance, ‘Battle’ in P Sabin, H van Wees and M Whitby (eds), The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, II: Rome from the Late Republic to the Late Empire 
(CUP 2007) 364-365. 
16 PG Stein, ‘The Quest for a Systematic Civil Law’ (1996) 90 Proc Brit Acad 147, 153. See also WW 
Buckland and AD McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (FH Lawson ed, 2nd edn, CUP 1952) 21: 
Roman law was not ‘a coherent intellectual system’. 
17 For the ‘meta’ terminology, see, eg, D Burbidge, ‘The Inherently Political Nature of Subsidiarity’ (2017) 
62 Am J Juris 143, passim, eg, 162: ‘the principle of subsidiarity is on the one hand used to explain how 
perceived lower groups should not have their decision-making authority usurped unnecessarily and, on 
the other hand, is used as a meta-explanation for how authority is distributed within a constitutional 
order’. 
18 D (n 11) 27.8.1.12. The detached, ‘meta-nature’ of the rule can also be read into Inst (n 14) 1.24.2. 
19 D (n 11) 27.3.1.17, 27.8.1.4. 
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their functions, no entity is sovereign over another. Yet, recalling our fourth point of 
interest, neither entity is totally at liberty to do what it would do if unrestrained, either. 
 
A sixth point of interest also arises. In each of the definitions given above, it is clear 
that the subsidiary entity does not overlap randomly with the non-subsidiary entity, if it 
overlaps at all. The  helper does not help until sent to do so. The reserves – specifically 
said to be held back initially – do not fight until sent in. The subsidiary action is only 
allowed when the non-subsidiary action is ineffective. It appears that subsidiarity 




According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, the noun subsidiarity reached the 
English language after French welcomed subsidiarité, and German Subsidiarität, and 
is defined as follows:20 
 
‘The quality of being subsidiary; spec the principle that a central authority 
should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which 
cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level.’ 
 
There is one special point of interest in this definition. It appears to include something 
– here, a principle – with the ability to cause and maintain the subsidiarity of, say, x to 
y, standing separately from both. This independent cause must be capable, then, of 
conferring a particular status on both x and y, and conditioning the former’s service to 
the latter. One sees here an echo of the fourth point of interest about the definitions of 
subsidium and subsidiārius: meta-authority. 
 
Upon inspection, the other points of interest appear to be present. The subsidiarity of 
x implies nothing about whether it, or y, should exist, only that they do. The point about 
pluralities is manifest. The point about overlap appears clearly, as do those about the 
prevention of that overlap through subsidiarity, and that management of the 
                                               
20 ‘Subsidiarity, N.’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193007> accessed 23 January 2016 (original 
emphasis). The entry also observes: ‘[o]riginally a principle in the RC [Roman Catholic] Church, 
subsidiarity has been an executive principle of the European Union since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992’. 
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relationship between the subsidiary and non-subsidiary things does not take place via 
the sovereignty of one entity over another. 
 
Further investigation is now necessary of the OED’s general definitions of the adjective 
subsidiary, deriving from the latin subsidium and its adjectival form subsidiārius:21 
 
‘1. a. That provides assistance; supplementary. (a) Without construction. 
Chiefly of a thing: that serves to help, assist, or supplement; providing 
assistance or supplementary supplies; (also) auxiliary, tributary, 
supplementary. (b) With to. 
b. Of a river, stream, or other effluence: tributary. Similarly of a valley, 
etc. 
c. [Mathematics]. Of an angle, symbol, quantity, etc: introduced into a 
problem solely in order to aid its solution. 
2. Subordinate, secondary. 
3. a. Consisting of a subsidy or subsidies. b. Maintained or retained by 
subsidies.’ 
 
These definitions tend to confirm the findings made thus far. First, to say that 
something is subsidiary is to assume that it, and the thing to which it is subsidiary, both 
exist. Nothing can be subsidiary to something which is not there. Something which is 
not there cannot be subsidiary. This implies, secondly, that a plurality of entities must 
exist, so that one or more things might be subsidiary to one or more others. Thirdly: 
overlap. Let us notice again the breadth of this idea: helping someone or something 
with the same problem; water flowing in the same direction, eventually mixing in the 
same main channel. 
 
Fourthly comes meta-authority. So clearly appearing from the English noun 
subsidiarity, meta-authority might seem more difficult to tease from the adjective. But 
it is present. In the first place, nothing here implies that a subsidiary entity is secondary 
to the non-subsidiary entity because of the authority of the non-subsidiary entity. The 
                                               
21 ‘Subsidiary, Adj. and N.’ <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/193008#eid20101240> accessed 23 
January 2016. 
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main channel of water does not subordinate tributaries to itself. What tributaries are is 
partly a matter of raw fact and partly a human construction – of geographers and the 
like – who have interpreted the facts. The same goes for the example given from 
mathematics. These specific examples help us to appreciate that the general 
definitions about assistance and supplement are not referring to such actions as 
mandated by a non-subsidiary entity. And in the second place, if it were the subsidiary 
entity which forced its assistance or supplement upon the non-subsidiary entity, then 
it would seem inaccurate to describe it as subsidiary, which still means ‘secondary or 
subordinate’, as we are told. Given these two points, if neither the subsidiary nor non-
subsidiary entity controls their total relations, something else must be in the equation 
which does this. And this, it is submitted, must be a meta-authority. 
 
Fifthly, the lack of one entity’s sovereignty over another when each stands in a 
relationship of subsidiarity follows from the presence of meta-authority. And sixthly, 
the order provided by the latter prevents overlap, or at least analyses it away, as in 




The Trésor de la langue française informatisé is the online version of a sixteen volume 
French dictionary, originally published between 1971 and 1994.22 It gives the following 
definitions for the French noun subsidiarité, the adjective subsidiaire, and the adverb 
subsidiairement:23 
 
Subsidiarité. ‘Caractère de ce qui est subsidiaire.’ 
 
Subsidiaire. ‘A. Qui vient à l’appui d’une chose plus importante, qui 
constitue un élément accessoire. Synon[yme] secondaire; anton[ymes] 
essentiel, principal. […] B. Destiné à suppléer ce qui viendrait à faire 
défaut.’ 
                                               
22 See generally G Gorcy, ‘Le Trésor de la langue française (TLF), trente ans après; bilan et 
perspectives’ (1992) 82 Études de Linguistique Appliquée 75. 
23 Trésor de la langue française informatisé <http://atilf.atilf.fr> (original emphasis). It is not possible to 
link to specific entries. A search must be conducted from the home page of the website. 
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Subsidiairement. ‘De manière subsidiaire, accessoire; venant en second 
lieu. Anton[ymes] essentiellement, principalement.’ 
 
These are translated as follows. 
 
Subsidiarity. The quality of that which is subsidiary. 
 
Subsidiary. A. That which comes to support a more important thing, that 
which constitutes an accessory [or ancillary] element. Synon[ym] 
secondary; anton[yms] essential, principal [or main]. […] B. Intended to 
make up for that which might fail. 
 
Subsidiarily. In a subsidiary, accessory [or ancillary] way [or manner]; 
coming secondly [or in second place]. Anton[yms] essentially, principally 
[or mainly]. 
 
Here, the entities supposedly in a relationship of subsidiarity are assumed to exist – 
the more and less important things, for example. It is also true that just because 
something might fail does not mean that it disappears before it is made up for. 
 
Secondly, the question of a plurality of entities is also answered by the reference to 
more and less important things. But one can also point out that, logically, something 
can only be accessory to something else. If that latter something else does not exist, 
then that former something is not accessory at all. 
 
Thirdly, as to overlap in the role or abilities of entities in a relationship of subsidiarity, 
something can only make up for something else that fails if it can do what that 
something else might fail to do. We also see overlap in functions in the phrase ‘support 
a more important thing’ (emphasis added).  
 
Fourthly, and again, meta-authority is more difficult to discern. But it appears to follow 
from what is absent. There is no trace of thinking in terms of the non-subsidiary entity’s 
authority over the subsidiary one, which is nevertheless ancillary or secondary. Nor is 
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it hinted that the subsidiary entity forces itself on the entity which is aided or supported. 
If the entities themselves do not manage their own relations, something else must, 
with the power to do this: meta-authority. 
 
Fifthly, there can be no relationship of straightforward sovereignty between two entities 
which are governed by meta-authority.  
 
And sixthly, the latter provides order and prevents unrestrained overlap which would 
be inimical to a relationship of subsidiarity. 
 
The following definitions for the same words are given by a leading French legal 
dictionary, Gérard Cornu’s Vocabulaire juridique, now compiled by the Association 
Henri Capitant:24 
 
Subsidiarité. ‘1. Caractère de ce qui est subsidiaire. Ex. Subsidiarité de 
l’action de in rem verso. 2 (eur.). Caractère imprimé à l’un des modes 
d’action de la Communauté européenne. – (principe de). Règle 
directive en vertu de laquelle la Communauté n’agit – en dehors des 
domaines de sa compétence exclusive – que si et dans la mesure où les 
objectifs de l’action envisagée ne peuvent être réalisés de manière 
suffisante par les États membres, tant au niveau central qu’à l’échelon 
régional ou local, et peuvent donc être mieux réalisées au niveau de 
l’Union (art. 3B trait. CE anc., ins. par traité Maastricht, TUE, a. 5).’ 
 
Subsidiaire. ‘Adj. Lat. jur. Subsidiaria, dér de subsidium: 1. Qui a 
vocation à venir en second lieu (à titre de remède, de garantie, de 
suppléance, de consolation), pour le cas où ce qui est principal, 
primordial, vient à faire défaut (cependant un ordre à plusieurs degrés 
peut comporter un subsidiaire du subsidiaire, etc., jusqu’à l’ultimum 
subsidium). […] 2. Par ext., secondaire, accessoire, auxiliaire (à titre de 
renfort). – (action). a/ Celle qui ne peut être exercée, à titre de garantie, 
                                               
24 G Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique (Association Henri Capitant ed, 12th edn, PUF 2018) 995. These 
entries are unchanged in substance from their originals: G Cornu (ed), Vocabulaire Juridique (1st edn, 
PUF 1987) 762. 
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qu’après échec d’une action principale (son exercice prématuré se 
heurterait à une exception dilatoire). b/ Celle qui ne s’ouvre qu’en 
l’absence de toute autre action, lorsque cette absence d’action ne 
provient pas d’une cause légitime (autorité de la chose jugée, forclusion, 
etc., cas dans lesquels son exercice se heurterait à une fin de non-
recevoir). Ex. action de in rem verso. – (débiteur). […] – (demande). 
Celle qui a pour objet de procurer un avantage considéré comme un pis-
aller pour le cas où la prétention principale serait rejetée. – (moyen). 
Celui qui est invoqué par une partie (ou développé par le juge), soit pour 
renforcer un moyen principal, soit pour suppléer celui-ci au cas où il 
serait écarté. – (obligation). Celle dont le paiement ne devient exigible 
que dans le cas où le créancier ne peut obtenir du débiteur principal (par 
ex. insolvable) l’exécution de la dette principale. […]’ 
 
Subsidiairement. ‘À titre subsidiaire (sens 1); s’emploie surtout dans les 
écritures du palais pour la présentation des objets et fins de la demande 
(et parfois dans un ordre croissant de surabondance de droit; ex. plus 
subsidiairement encore…).’    
 
These are translated as follows. 
 
Subsidiarity. 1. The quality of that which is subsidiary. Eg, Subsidiarity 
of the action de in rem verso. 2 (Eur). Character ascribed to one of the 
modes of action of the European Community. – (principle of). Guiding 
rule by virtue of which the Community only acts – outwith the bounds of 
its exclusive competence – if and in so far as the objectives of a 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, and so can be better 
achieved at Union level […]. 
 
Subsidiary. Adj[ective]. Leg[al]. Lat[in]. Subsidiaria, der[ived] from 
subsidium. 1. That which is intended to come in second place (for the 
purpose of remedy, guarantee, supplement, consolation), should that 
which is principal, primordial, fail (however, a multi-level order may 
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contain a sub-subsidiary element, etc., down to an ultimum subsidium). 
[…] 2. By ext[ension], secondary, accessory [or ancillary], auxiliary 
(intended to reinforce). – (action). a/ That which can only be brought, by 
way of guarantee, after the failure of a principal action (its premature 
exercise would be prevented by a delaying obstacle [free translation]. b/ 
That which is only open in the absence of any other action, when this 
absence […] does not stem from a legitimate cause (res judicata, 
foreclosure, etc., cases in which its exercise would be barred). Ex[ample] 
action de in rem verso. – (debtor). […] – (claim). That which aims to 
procure an advantage considered to be a last resort should the principal 
argumentation be rejected. – (ground). That which is invoked by a party 
(or developed by the judge) either in order to reinforce a principal ground, 
or to supplement the latter should it be set aside. – (obligation). That 
[obligation] the satisfaction of which only becomes exigible if the creditor 
cannot obtain performance by the principal debtor ([who may be] 
insolvent, for example) [in respect] of the principal debt [or performance 
of the primary obligation]. […] 
 
Subsidiarily. On a subsidiary basis ([in subsidiary’s] first meaning); used 
especially in court documents for the presentation of the objects and 
ends of claims (and sometimes in a growing series of [grounds in] law; 
eg, yet more subsidiarily [or on a yet further subsidiary level]…). 
 
Firstly, the existence of subsidiary and non-subsidiary entities is usually assumed 
throughout these definitions. The second instance of the noun subsidiarité, setting out 
the relevant principle of European Union law (further analysed below), is a good 
example of this, along with the emphasis on coming in second place in the first 
definition of the adjective subsidiaire. So, too, is definition 2a of subsidiaire: the action 
which fails does not appear to cease to exist. The examples given under subsidiaire, 
and the elaboration on subsidiary claims under the adverb subsidiairement, are also 
instructive. Debtors – legal persons – and claims, and obligations, and legal arguments 
placed in front of a court, do not just disappear into thin air because they are unable 
to perform, ineffective, or unenforceable. They would have to be stripped of 
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personhood, or set aside, or struck from the court’s record, or legally extinguished, in 
order that they might cease to exist. Their being subsidiary does not bear on that. 
 
However, definition 2b of subsidiaire appears to be imprecise. It does not seem 
possible for one thing to be subsidiary to something else, when that something else 
does not exist. It is like saying that one shelf is underneath another shelf on a wall, 
and the latter shelf is not there. It makes no sense. The usage reflected in definition 
2b of subsidiaire must be rejected for this reason. 
 
Secondly, everything here except definition 2b of subsidiaire would also seem to 
support the inherence in a relationship of subsidiarity of a plurality of entities: one or 
more which are to be subsidiary to one or more which are not. The usage in definition 
2b must also be rejected in this respect. It is not possible for A to be subsidiary to B if 
B does not exist. Subsidiarity stops once a plurality disappears. 
 
Thirdly, the requirement that entities in a relationship of subsidiarity have the potential, 
without subsidiarity’s presence, to overlap, also appears clearly. The European Union 
and its Member States’ competences must be shared for subsidiarity to be relevant; 
two debtors in respect of the same debt; two claims in respect of the same set of facts; 
two obligations in respect of the same debt. Subsidiarity is about the prevention of this 
overlap. It would be pointless if no overlap were possible. 
 
Fourthly, where is meta-authority here? The clearest hint of it is in the reference to 
European Union law, which will be analysed further below. For the most part, it is 
present by the omission of clear declarations that subsidiarity entails the direct 
subordination of one entity to the non-subsidiary entity by the former’s authority, or 
that the subsidiary entity forcibly renders itself subsidiary to another entity. Something 
must cause and maintain a relationship of subsidiarity. If it is not one of the entities in 
that relationship, it must be something else. And that something else must possess 
authority over the relevant entities in order to impose a relationship of subsidiarity. As 
appears from the above examples, subsidiarity as meta-authority prevents overlap 
and imposes order on the entities which it governs, at least initially, until those entities 
are allowed to overlap. We might here instance the admission of several arguments 
at once, some subsidiary to others, as each is progressively set aside but does not 
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cease to exist. A clearer example, however, is the idea of a subsidiary obligation 
(obligation subsidiaire). What would make a non-subsidiary obligation? What would 
make a subsidiary obligation? It seems unlikely that each could just decide for itself 
what it could do in relation to the other. There would have to be a separate meta-rule 
which definitively regulated their interaction.25 
 
Fifthly, in the absence of any indication in the examples above that a non-subsidiary 
entity is in control of an entity which is subsidiary to it, and in the presence of the 
conclusion therefrom that meta-authority must regulate relationships of subsidiarity, it 
appears that no entity in a relationship of subsidiarity is sovereign over any other entity 
in that relationship.  
 
Sixthly, it appears to flow from these definitions that the existence of a relationship of 
subsidiarity discounts the possibility of overlap between entities in that relationship. 
This is the very object of subsidiarity. 
 
D. Bringing out meta-authority 
 
It will be apparent from the foregoing that the most difficult feature to discern in the 
above definitions is meta-authority. It has been argued thus far that its presence is 
suggested by the subordinate or secondary nature of subsidiary entities, but which 
nature appears not to be due to traits which inhere, either in subsidiary entities, or non-
subsidiary ones. This view might be objected to: if the source of control over a 
relationship of subsidiarity is not mentioned, there might be no reason to reach the 
conclusion favoured here; perhaps the source of control could be meta-authority, a 
subsidiary entity, or the non-subsidiary entity – precisely which might not matter. 
 
To this objection, it might first be replied that meta-authority is clearly present in the 
Latin definition of subsidiarity set out above. And although teasing it from the English 
                                               
25 A possible example in French law is one kind of personal surety, le cautionnement, or personal 
guarantee. Its subsidiary nature is debated in France. But it is instanced here because it is a particularly 
accessible illustration of what, it is submitted, would be a correct use of subsidiarity, were French law 
so to think of it. The Code civil, art 2288, stipulates, outwith the rules on the contract of guarantee itself, 
that the guarantor under this regime is only obliged to the creditor if the debtor does not perform. For 
the minority view that this kind of guarantee is subsidiary, see, with contrary references, F Rouvière, 
‘Le caractère subsidiaire du cautionnement’ [2011] RTD Com 689. 
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adjective requires more work with the practical examples given, meta-authority can be 
extracted easily from the English noun. The same is possible in French thanks to the 
examples given in the Vocabulaire juridique, which ameliorate the sparsity of the 
Trésor de la langue française informatisé. This is a good deal of evidence in meta-
authority’s favour. Conversely, if no inference about meta-authority is to be drawn, 
only a little need be added to the ideas of relief, support, help, second order and 
subordination to scotch all ambiguity: relief at the behest; secondary and subordinate 
to the non-subsidiary entity. It is difficult to believe that the diligent lexicographer, the 
‘harmless drudge, that busies himself in tracing the original, and detailing the 
signification of words’,26 would deliberately omit such small details in the face of what, 
if meta-authority were meant to be excluded, is a considerable body of evidence in its 
favour. 
 
A second response to the objection stems from an analysis of the English noun 
subsidiary. Relevant definitions are set out here:27 
 
‘1. a. A subsidiary or subordinate thing; something which provides 
additional support or assistance; an auxiliary, an aid. b. A body or 
organization which is controlled by another, esp. a subsidiary company 









subsidiary company  n. a company controlled by a holding company (cf. 
sense […] 1b [set out above]).’ 
 
                                               
26 As defined by Samuel Johnson in his A Dictionary of the English Language ((1755) Times Books 
1983). 
27 ‘Subsidiary, Adj. and N.’ (n 21). 
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Definition 1a here is in line with the non-special definitions of the adjective subsidiary 
and the noun subsidiarity: no mention of what subordinates one thing to another opens 
the door to the inference that meta-authority is responsible, and the evidence in favour 
of meta-authority under the noun subsidiarity and adjective subsidiary. What appears 
to differentiate the idea of a subsidiary company, defined in 1b, is that the non-
subsidiary company is sovereign over the subsidiary company. The current United 
Kingdom companies legislation juxtaposes subsidiary and holding companies, and 
subsidiary and parent undertakings.28 Those who hold assets control them. Parents 
tell children what to do.29 And it is worth noting that the equivalent commercial entity 
in French law is simply called a société contrôlée.30 
 
The special nature of the English compound subsidiary company helps us to perceive 
meta-authority in the general definition of subsidiarity. Meta-authority is excluded in 
the former. It is hard to see in what other way this definition could justifiably be called 
a ‘special use’. First, the subsidiary and non-subsidiary company would co-exist. 
Secondly, we would be in the presence of a plurality of entities. Thirdly, the companies 
could, at least in principle, be capable of doing the same thing – overlapping. They 
might, for example, make the same investments, contract the same obligations, or be 
exposed to the same liabilities. Fourthly, their actions would not randomly concur with 
each other. The holding or parent company would see to that, and tell the subsidiary 
what to do. Of the features distilled from the general definitions of subsidiarity in each 
language above, we are really left only with the points of interest about meta-authority 
and sovereignty on which the special definition of the noun subsidiary can stand out 
when compared with the general definitions. It seems reasonable to conclude that 





                                               
28 Companies Act 2006 (UK) ss 1159, 1162. 
29 For the standard English definition of parent company in the OED Online, see ‘Parent, n. and Adj.2’ 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/137816> accessed 22 August 2017: ‘Compounds […] C 2 […] parent 
company n. Commercial Law a company or organization which owns or controls a number of subsidiary 
companies or organizations.’ 
30 Code de commerce, arts L-233-3, L-233-4. 
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II. CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Having examined key ideas in linguistic definitions of subsidiarity in the first part of this 
chapter, we now turn to three contexts in which subsidiarity is used and has 
developed. It will be recalled that the six points of interest extracted above relate to: 
the non-determination by a rule of subsidiarity of the existence of any entity in a 
relationship of subsidiarity; the presence of at least two entities for a relationship of 
subsidiarity to exist; the potential for those entities to overlap, absent any rule of 
subsidiarity; the regulation of that relationship via an independent rule possessing 
meta-authority over the relevant entities; an absence of sovereignty in all entities said 
to be in a relationship of subsidiarity over others in that relationship; and a lack of free 
concurrence between entities said to be in that relationship. 
 
These ideas are the framework for discussion, in this part of the chapter, of subsidiarity 
in Roman Catholic social doctrine, European Union law, European human rights law, 
after an overview of subsidiarity in these contexts. The small but relevant literature on 
subsidiarity in French private law is cited ambulando,31 along with other supplementary 
material. 
 
It is helpful before proceeding to illustrate from a neutral context a key point, which is 
manifest in what follows: subsidiarity is fundamentally about the allocation of 
competence among entities, or groups of entities, on a conditional basis. This appears 
from the following observation by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Subsidiarity is:32 
 
                                               
31 Unfortunately, one contribution’s approach is too practical to be of theoretical assistance, so it is 
omitted from developments below: C David, ‘Le principe de subsidiarité: droits privé et fiscal français et 
droit communautaire’ in A Lévi (ed), Droit et vie des affaires: Études à la mémoire d’Alain Sayag (Litec 
1997). 
32 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town) [2001] SCC 40, [2001] 2 
SCR 241 [3] (L’Heureux-Dubé J, with whom Gonthier, Bastarache and Arbour JJ agreed), emphasis 
added. The judgment was given in English. Conditionality appears from the French translation in the 
form of suitability, or not, to perform a given action (emphasis added): ‘Ce principe [de subsidiarité] veut 
que le niveau de gouvernement le mieux placé pour adopter et mettre en œuvre des législations soit 
celui qui est le plus apte à le faire, non seulement sur le plan de l’efficacité mais également parce qu’il 
est le plus proche des citoyens touchés et, par conséquent, le plus sensible à leurs besoins, aux 
particularités locales et à la diversité de la population.’ 
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‘[T]he proposition that law-making and implementation are often best 
achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also 
closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, 
to local distinctiveness, and to population diversity.’ 
 
Several scholars agree that subsidiarity is characterised by the operation of a 
‘rebuttable presumption’ as to where competence or authority lies.33 As John Finnis 
says, subsidiarity’s force is ‘substantial but presumptive and defeasible’.34 The 
conditionality of subsidiarity should be borne in mind throughout this part of the 
chapter. If it is absent on a given analysis, we should suspect spuriousness. 
 
A. Summarising subsidiarities 
 
To avoid repetition in succeeding sections, the positions on subsidiarity of Roman 
Catholic social doctrine, European Union law, and European human rights law, are 
outlined here. 
 
In Centesimus Annus, John Paul II summarised Roman Catholic subsidiarity as 
follows:35 
 
‘[T]he principle of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of a 
higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a 
lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support 
it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of 
the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.’ 
                                               
33 T Horsley, ‘Space to Breathe: Subsidiarity, the Court of Justice and EU Free Movement Law’ (PhD 
Thesis, Edinburgh, 2011) 12-13, 29, 58; J Contesse, ‘Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System’ (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 123, 125; A Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and 
International Human-Rights Courts: Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights – or 
Neither?’ (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 147, 148-149; N Aroney, ‘Federalism and Subsidiarity: 
Principles and Processes in the Reform of the Australian Federation’ (2016) 44 Fed L Rev 1, 4 (word 
‘rebuttable’ not used); M Cahill, ‘Theorizing Subsidiarity: A Rejoinder to Gareth Davies’ (2017) 15 Int J 
Const L 231, 232. 
34 J Finnis, ‘Subsidiarity’s Roots and History: Some Observations’ (2016) 61 Am J Juris 133, 134. 
35 Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus (1991) [48] (original emphasis). See further M Evans, ‘The 
Principle of Subsidiarity as a Social and Political Principle in Catholic Social Teaching’ (2013) 3 
Solidarity 44; P Brennan, ‘Subsidiarity in the Tradition of Catholic Social Doctrine’ in M Evans and A 
Zimmermann (eds), Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014). 
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This principle concerns the allocation of authority to act to the best level of society, 
with a presumption in favour of smaller associations – the smallest one(s) capable of 
performing a given action.36 An accessible example is the Church’s endorsement of 
families’ helping other families, with careful state intervention when ‘families cannot 
fulfil their responsibilities’.37 One can also instance economic regulation, stimulation 
and support by the state in times of crisis, for the benefit of the economy’s users.38 
 
Subsidiarity is also a principle of the European Union’s legal order. So far as relevant, 
article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) provides:39 
 
‘3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but 
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level. 
 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as 
laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out 
in that Protocol.’ 
 
Here, there is a default presumption in favour of competence in the Member States. 
The Union may act in cases of shared competence for reasons of effectiveness. Union 
action is reviewable on subsidiarity grounds before the Court of Justice of the 
                                               
36 John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Mater et Magistra (1961) [52]-[53]. 
37 Catechism of the Catholic Church (2nd rev ed, USSC 1997) §§2208-2209.  
38 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Burns and Oates 2005) §§351-355. 
39 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202/1. From a large literature, 
see, eg, P Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’ (2012) 50 JCMS 72; GA Moens and J 
Trone, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in EU Judicial and Legislative Practice: Panacea or Placebo?’ 
(2015) 41 J Legislation 65. For a situation of subsidiarity within the wider context of competence and 
authority in the EU, see R Schütze, ‘EU Competences: Existence and Exercise’ in D Chalmers and A 
Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2015). 
 - 51 - 
European Union (‘CJEU’).40 A notable example of a reviewed initiative is legislation at 
Union level, aimed at regulating the market for tobacco products and improving public 
health by reducing tobacco usage, through restrictions on the ingredients of tobacco 
products and their external packaging. This initiative was unsuccessfully challenged 
by tobacco companies on the ground that the matter was one for Member States 
alone.41 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has held that ‘[s]ubsidiarity is at the 
very basis’ of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (‘ECHR’ / ‘the Convention’), ‘stemming as it does from a joint reading of 
Articles 1 and 19’.42 These provisions, which confirm that both contracting parties and 
the ECtHR are bound by the ECHR framework, respectively state: 
 
‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention. 
 
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there 
shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights […]. It shall function 
on a permanent basis.’ 
 
One manifestation of subsidiarity within the ECHR framework is highlighted by the 
following observation of the ECtHR:43 
                                               
40 Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [2016] OJ 
C202/206, para 8; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] 
OJ C202/47, art 263; Estonia v Parliament and Council [2015] CJEU C-508/13 [41]-[55]. 
41 Philip Morris Brands v Secretary of State for Health [2016] CJEU C-547/14, [2017] QB 327 [186], 
[213]-[228]. 
42 Austin v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 459, (2012) 55 EHRR 14 [61]. See also A v United Kingdom 
[2009] ECHR 301, (2009) 49 EHRR 29 [154], [174]; Protocol No 15 amending the Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art 1 (not yet in force). See generally F Sudre 
(ed), Le principe de subsidiarité au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Anthemis 
2014); A Mowbray, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 15 HRLR 313. 
For a situation of subsidiarity in human rights law as a whole, see GL Neuman, ‘Subsidiarity’ in D 
Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013). 
43 De Souza Ribiero v France [2012] ECHR 2066, (2014) 59 EHRR 10 [77]. See N Bamforth, ‘Articles 
13 and 35(1), Subsidiarity, and the Effective Protection of European Convention Rights in National Law’ 
(2016) 5 EHRLR 501. 
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‘By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the primary responsibility for 
implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid 
on the national authorities. The machinery of complaint to the Court is 
thus subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights. This 
subsidiary character is articulated in Article 13 and Article 35 § 1 of the 
Convention.’ 
 
These provisions state: 
 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting 
in an official capacity. 
 
The Court may only deal with [a] matter after all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of 
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on 
which the final decision was taken.’ 
 
The ECtHR has discussed these provisions many times.44 Whilst the default position 
is that ECHR violations will be dealt with domestically, the ECtHR may examine a 
complaint if there are no effective domestic remedies, or if these have been exhausted. 
For example, the ECtHR has proceeded to examine alleged Convention violations in 
relation to inhumane prison conditions, even when legal recourse was in theory 
available from the contracting state, because domestic remedies were not sufficiently 
available in practice.45 
 
                                               
44 See, eg, McFarlane v Ireland [2010] ECHR 1272, (2011) 52 EHRR 20 [107]-[108], [112]; Ananyev v 
Russia [2012] ECHR 21, (2012) 55 EHRR 18 [93]-[99]; Chiragov v Armenia [2015] ECHR 587, (2016) 
63 EHRR 9 [115]-[116]; Ninos v Greece (French text) [2018] ECHR 473 [33]-[34]. 
45 Varga v Hungary [2015] ECHR 256, (2015) 61 EHRR 30 [44]-[65]. 
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This subsection has briefly outlined subsidiarity in the contexts discussed below. We 
can now turn, in succeeding subsections, to the six points of interest derived from the 
linguistic analysis in the first part of this chapter. 
 
B. Assumed existence of entities 
 
It appears that, once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not 
concerned to determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. This 
is simply assumed by a rule of subsidiarity. If, instead of simply conferring on a set of 
entities subsidiary and non-subsidiary statuses, a rule ‘disappeared’ one or more of 
those entities, it would become difficult to argue that the rule was one of subsidiarity. 
To be a rule of subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or 
put an end to, a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one 
or more of the entities the interaction of which it is supposed to manage might be 
thought to prevent it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. It would 
also seem to deal with a question of overlap in a less then conditional manner. Once 
an entity does not exist, there is no way for it eventually to become competent, even 
if a subsidiarity analysis suggests that it should. These intuitions are borne out in the 
contexts under consideration. 
 
Let us first see what is the view of the Roman Catholic Church about the entities to 
which its principle of subsidiarity applies. Francis recently addressed the common 
good. He affirmed that its central concern is ‘respect for the human person as such’, 
and that ‘[i]t has also to do with the overall welfare of society and the development of 
a variety of intermediate groups, applying the principle of subsidiarity’.46 It has also 
been said that:47 
 
‘Subsidiarity is first and foremost a form of assistance to the human 
person via the autonomy of intermediate bodies. Such assistance is 
                                               
46 Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ (2015) [157] (emphasis added). On the common good, see further John 
XIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (1963) [53]-[79]; Catechism of the Catholic Church (n 37) §§1905-
1912. 
47 Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate (2009) [57]. 
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offered when individuals or groups are unable to accomplish something 




‘It is not, therefore, a question of whether there shall be group persons, 
or whether they are efficient or immediately useful to the state. Rather, 
the question is how these groups stand to one another and to the state.’ 
 
Catholic social doctrine therefore presumes the existence all the while of the 
individuals, groups, and associations, which subsidiarity regulates. The principle of 
subsidiarity is certainly not capable of making these beings and bodies disappear. 
 
The same is true of subsidiarity in European Union law. Article 5(3) TEU cannot be 
applied so as to dissolve the Union. It would be strange if a provision which said 
nothing about that could undo a treaty and put an end to a legal person – the Union – 
created ‘for an unlimited period’,49 to say nothing of all the Member States. Other 
material suggests that subsidiarity is not about wiping them from the face of the map, 
either.50 
 
A like impression is gleaned from European Human rights law. The ECtHR ‘function[s] 
on a permanent basis’.51 And ‘under the subsidiarity principle it falls first to the national 
authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention’.52 It would seem 
implausible for a principle which has the aim of delegating to contracting states 
responsibility for protecting Convention rights simultaneously to be concerned with 
deciding upon their existence. Articles 13 and 35(1) of the Convention, set out above, 
say nothing about doing that at all. 
                                               
48 R Hittinger, ‘The Coherence of the Four Basic Principles of Catholic Social Doctrine: An Interpretation’ 
in M Archer and P Donati (eds), Pursuing the Common Good: How Solidarity and Subsidiarity Can 
Work Together (Vatican City 2008) 109. 
49 TEU arts 47, 53. 
50 See, eg, the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ 
C326/391: ‘This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and for the 
principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States […]’. 
51 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art 19. 
52 Mikhno v Ukraine [2016] ECHR 723 [116]. 
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One French author recognises the argument set out in this subsection, but seems 
simultaneously to contradict himself. Antoine Gouëzel says:53 
 
‘Subsidiarity conditions the liberation of the subsidiary element on the 
failure of the primary element. […] The subsidiary element can […] 
remain blocked, which entails that any [legal, ie statutory] action which 
would implement it must be rejected. This does not mean, however, that 
the subsidiary element must be considered to be non-existent as long 
as the primary element does not fail: its presence is an indisputable fact 
which must be taken into account […].’ 
 
There is some difficulty here. Gouëzel seems to say that his subsidiarity can lead to 
the rejection, ie, to the disappearance, of an action before a court. He next declares a 
more general principle: that what he calls subsidiary elements continue to exist, even 
if his primary elements are properly performing their functions. An inconsistency 
appears. Gouëzel accepts that an action can itself be a relevant subsidiary element.54 
He also accepts that subsidiarity can make this action disappear. In affirming this 
ability of subsidiarity to evaporate an action at law – a subsidiary entity – Gouëzel 
gainsays his own basic principle. The latter, it is submitted, is entirely correct, and is 
borne out by the linguistic and contextual analyses thus far in this chapter. 
 
As an idea, subsidiarity may provide arguments for any number of actions, like 
preserving the existence of some agents,55 or their pre-existing internal power 
structures.56 It can justify centralisation of power in some scenarios where this is 
appropriate, or even the creation of new agents with authority, for example, to 
                                               
53 A Gouëzel, La subsidiarité en droit privé (Economica 2013) no 319. My translation: ‘La subsidiarité 
subordonne le déblocage de l’élément subsidiaire à la défaillance de l’élément premier. […] L’élément 
subsidiaire peut […] rester bloqué, ce qui impose que toute action tendant à en obtenir la mise en 
œuvre soit rejetée. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que l’élément subsidiaire doive être considéré 
comme inexistant tant que l’élément premier n’est pas défaillant: sa présence et un fait indiscutable qui 
doit être pris en compte […].’ 
54 He accepts that France’s action de in rem verso is subsidiary: ibid, nos 106-107. 
55 M Cahill, ‘Sovereignty, Liberalism and the Intelligibility of Attraction to Subsidiarity’ (2016) 61 Am J 
Juris 109, 120-122. 
56 GA Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ (1994) 94 Columbia L Rev 331, 342-343. 
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represent local concerns in the face of overcentralisation.57 However, these matters 
are simply expressions of subsidiarity’s more general preoccupation, and the only 
thing that it actually does as an operative rule: to allocate competence or authority on 
a conditional basis. It is unconcerned with whether the entities to which authority might 
be allocated exist. 
 
C. Plurality of entities 
 
This is a relatively short point. Most scholars tacitly assume its correctness,58 though 
some are explicit about it.59 Analysis of the dictionaries disclosed that a relationship of 
subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, or groups of 
entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible at all in a given 
context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie unconditionally with 
the only relevantly extant entity. 
 
The Roman Catholic Church teaches that:60 
 
‘Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a 
subject who is always capable of giving something to others. […] It is 
able to take account both of the manifold articulation of plans – and 






                                               
57 NW Barber, ‘The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 Eur LJ 308, 314, 319-320. 
58 See, eg, PS Berman, ‘Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing Global 
Legal Pluralism’ (2013) 20 Indiana J Global LS 665, 670, 688-690; T Endicott, ‘Comity among 
Authorities’ [2015] CLP 1, 8-11, 20-21. 
59 T Horsley, ‘Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity 
Jigsaw?’ (2012) 50 JCMS 267, 268: ‘subsidiarity is premised on the existence of at least two 
autonomous decision-making bodies, unified through the pursuit of a common objective’. 
60 Benedict XVI (n 47) [57] (emphasis added). 
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Hittinger says:61 
 
‘As a principle regulating and coordinating a plurality of group-persons, 
subsidiarity presupposes a plurality of such persons, each having 
distinct common ends, kinds of united action, and modes of authority. 
[…] Take away social plurality and there is nothing that can correspond 
to the principle of subsidiarity.’ 
 
This seems difficult to disagree with. If the Member States of the European Union did 
not exist as a group, then there would be nothing for the Union to be subsidiary to. If 
the Union did not exist, then even if the Member States were ‘non-subsidiary’ in 
relation to other things, they could not be ‘non-subsidiary’ in relation to the Union. 
These points also hold true for relations between the states party to the ECHR, and 
the ECtHR. French private law scholars agree – more than one entity is required for 
subsidiarity to be relevant in a given context.62 
 
D. Potential for overlap 
 
This goes to the central purpose of subsidiarity. For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant 
in any context, at least two entities in that context must be capable of overlapping if 







                                               
61 Hittinger (n 48) 109, 119. See further R Hittinger, ‘Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social 
Doctrine’ (2002) 16 Annales theologici 385; J Chaplin, ‘Subsidiarity and Social Pluralism’ in M Evans 
and A Zimmermann (eds), Global Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014). 
62 J Raynard, ‘A propos de la subsidiarité en droit privé’ in C Atias and others (eds), Mélanges [à la 
mémoire de] Christian Mouly (Litec 1998) 132, 136; P Casson, ‘Le subsidiaire et le droit privé’ [2001] 
RRJ 143, 153; Gouëzel (n 53) nos 36, 47; C Habre, La subsidiarité en droit privé (LGDJ 2015) no 122 
(tacitly). 
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When setting out the ‘principle of subsidiary function’,63 the Encyclical Quadragesimo 
Anno states:64 
 
‘Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil 
and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.’ 
 
Catholic social doctrine therefore assumes that subsidiarity is about resolving overlap 
in the activities of which individuals and associations of different sizes are capable. 
Were this not true, a principle like that set out in Centesimus Annus, above, would 
serve no purpose. 
 
In the European Union context, it seems clear as a matter of fact that there are things 
which both Union and Member States are capable of doing. The arrangement between 
them is also premised upon their both being able, at least to some extent, to ‘assist 
each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties’.65 
 
We see the same assumption in European Human rights law. Articles 1 and 19 of the 
ECHR oblige both contracting states and the ECtHR to secure the Convention rights 
of those over whom the latter have jurisdiction. Subsidiarity establishes default 
competence in the contracting states and the case law of the ECtHR elaborates on 
when this position shifts. It would not need to do this unless both contracting states 
and the ECtHR could enforce Convention rights. And if that were not possible, there 
would be no need for subsidiarity, ‘a fundamental feature of the machinery of 
protection established by the Convention’.66 
 
                                               
63 Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quadragesimo Anno (1931) [80]. 
64 ibid, [79]. 
65 TEU art 4(3). 
66 MC and AC v Romania [2016] ECHR 359 [57]. 
 - 59 - 
The French writers on subsidiarity in private law agree on this point: the potential for 
overlap is the raison d’être of subsidiarity.67 
 
It is again noted that overlap can occur in various ways, as the dictionaries showed. 
Thinking in terms of the allocation of competence or authority, it may be useful to 
highlight two possible modalities of overlap. The first has been called ‘substantive’ 
subsidiarity. That is where a question of initial allocation of competence or authority to 
two or more entities is to be answered using a subsidiarity principle. The second 
situation has been called ‘instrumental’ subsidiarity. That is where a question of 
subsequent overlap in the exercise of competence or authority by two or more agents, 
to which some competence or authority has already been allocated, is to be answered 
using a subsidiarity principle.68 These understandings of subsidiarity evenly split the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 2010.69 Both involve overlap. In the first situation, it is 




The linguistic analysis in the first part of this chapter suggested that for a rule of 
subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it must bind the 
relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in relation to them. If 
this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their relations without an 
                                               
67 Gouëzel treats this at some length: (n 53) nos 43-46. See also Raynard (n 62) 134: ‘[l]a subsidiarité 
apparaît […] comme une technique prévenant un risque de contradiction de règles aux domaines 
concurrents’; Casson (n 62) 151: ‘[l]e subsidiaire joue un rôle essentiel dans la régulation des conflits 
générés par la coexistence de règles de droit ayant vocation à régir une même situation de fait’; Habre 
(n 62) no 1193 (original emphasis): ‘la subsidiarité vise à instaurer un ordre dans un système de droit 
[…] en empêchant le concours entre des normes incompatibles ou contradictoires’. One author disputes 
that this is the only function of subsidiarity in its managing the relationship between obligations. But her 
analysis still commits her to the proposition that, at a higher level of generality than her account, 
constraints upon a plurality of entities in a subsidiarity regime prevent their overlapping: C Aubry de 
Maromont, ‘Les obligations subsidiaires’ [2018] RTD Civ 305. 
68 For the vocabulary, D Halberstam, ‘Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary’ in GA 
Caldiera, RD Kelemen and KE Whittington (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 
152-154. For accord in substance, see A Mills, ‘Federalism in the European Union and the United 
States: Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws’ (2010) 32 U PA J Intl L 369, 378-384; N 
Aroney, ‘Subsidiarity: European Lessons for Australia’s Federal Balance’ (2011) 39 Fed L Rev 213, 
216-218; A Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and the Global Order’ in M Evans and A Zimmermann (eds), Global 
Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014) 208. 
69 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act [2010] SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457 [72] (McLachlin 
CJ, with whom Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ agreed), [183] (LeBel and Deschamps JJ, with whom Abella 
and Rothstein JJ agreed). 
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independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be the case if one of them 
were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), there would be no need 
for subsidiarity. This is the subsidiarity as meta-authority point.70 By this, it is meant 
that a rule of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained.71 And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. These points are borne out in the contexts under examination. 
 
Roman Catholic social doctrine sees subsidiarity as a ‘universal authority’, which, in 
the eyes of the Church, governs conditions within states, and across the world 
between states.72 More generally, Catholic social doctrine, of which subsidiarity is part, 
emanates from the Church. The latter considers itself independent of society, 
especially the state, and capable of intervening authoritatively in social affairs, in 
particular those of the state.73 So the Church is a meta-authority in relation to the 
individuals and associations the interaction of which it seeks to manage with 
subsidiarity. 
 
In the European Union, member states and the Union are bound by the treaties and 
European Union law in general.74 In particular, the principle of subsidiarity binds the 
Union.75 And neither Union nor Member States can just amend the treaties, where 
subsidiarity is found. There is a procedure for that in article 48 of the TEU. European 
Union subsidiarity thus sits higher than, and separately, from the entities the 
interaction of which it manages. 
 
                                               
70 The search for adequate meta-authority to mediate the overlap of various layers of entities can prove 
endless and fruitless: S Banner, ‘Please Don’t Read the Title’ (1989) 50 Ohio St LJ 243, 250, 253–254. 
But, if problematic, the issue of eventual self-reference by a given authority in order to claim legitimacy 
does not arise here, since only one level of meta-authority is ever sought, and the legitimacy of that 
meta-authority is not at issue. 
71 It is conceded that the entities to which a rule of subsidiarity applies may engage with the framing of 
the premise on which the rule operates. For the argument that they should, see Burbidge (n 17). 
72 John XIII (n 46) [140]-[141]. 
73 Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio (1922) [65]; Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Gaudium et 
Spes (1965) [76]. 
74 For the Union, see, eg, TFEU art 263. For the Member states, see Costa v Ente Nazionale per 
l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL) [1964] EUECJ C-6/64, [1964] ECR 585, 593. 
75 Estonia v Commission [2009] EUECJ T-263/07 [52]. 
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Under the ECHR, the relevant function of contracting states and the ECtHR – securing 
convention rights – is not framed as optional in nature by articles 1 and 19 of the 
Convention. There is a constant line of cases affirming the subsidiarity of the ECtHR 
to the member states in fulfilling their central objective, and how important this 
arrangement is.76 The principle also features in a Protocol no 15 amending the 
Convention, which is not yet in force.77 Once it is fully ratified, subsidiarity will be 
present in the Convention as a matter of language, not just interpretation. Even now, 
however, subsidiarity seems secure in practice. It is unlikely that either a disgruntled 
contracting state or the ECtHR could reverse their respective positions in the 
relationship of subsidiarity without amending the Convention. Rather, it would probably 
require a fully negotiated protocol or other Convention amendment. After all, this is 
what was thought necessary for Protocol 15, which was addressed at several 
conferences and requires unanimous assent.78 
 
Scholars have not seized on the argument made in this sub-section. Some do, 
however, appear to recognise that, when operating as a rule or principle of allocation, 
as opposed to a simple political or philosophical idea,79 subsidiarity needs to bind the 
entities to which it applies. This is clear, for example, when writers ask questions like: 
‘[w]hat does subsidiarity require?’80 The French subsidiarity scholarship is inexplicit on 
this point. But it is possible to draw on work about the interaction in France of the droit 
commun with the droit spécial (or droits spéciaux), ie, general law and special legal 
regimes. Anglophone lawyers will be familiar with this dichotomy through the Latin 
                                               
76 In addition to the passages already set out above, see Vučković v Serbia [2014] ECHR 303, (2014) 
59 EHRR 19 [69]; Bahmanzadeh v United Kingdom [2014] ECHR 1050, (2016) 63 EHRR SE2 [46]; 
Gherghina v Romania [2015] ECHR 807, (2015) 61 EHRR SE15 [83]. 
77 Protocol No 15 art 1: ‘Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention 
and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.’ 
78 ibid, preamble and arts 6-7. 
79 Subsidiarity’s operation as an idea is addressed briefly in section B of this part of the chapter. But the 
former kind of operation is the more usually discussed. M Jachtenfuchs and N Krisch, ‘Subsidiarity in 
Global Governance’ (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 1, 9-10: ‘Subsidiarity is typically understood 
primarily as a principle for allocating powers to different levels of governance, yet it may also provide 
guidance on how powers are to be exercised.’ For example, it may ‘find expression in procedural 
mechanisms, such as […] certain forms of veto rights for lower levels as against potential 
encroachments’. However, ‘[a]s a default rule for the distribution of decision-making powers, subsidiarity 
is primarily an allocative principle’. 
80 NW Barber and R Ekins, ‘Situating Subsidiarity’ (2016) 61 Am J Juris 5, 8. 
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maxim specialia generalibus derogant.81 Some authors affirm that the droit commun 
is subsidiary to the droits spéciaux.82 But this is only possible because that state of 
affairs is caused, and relations between the two categories of laws are regulated, by 
something.83 This something must possess authority in relation to the categories the 
interaction of which it controls,84 and so be independent of them. There could be no 
relationship of subsidiarity if this something were just an element of one of the 
categories in the relationship. Such a relationship would simply be one of sovereignty 
or subjection, depending on one’s point of view. A group of entities capable of 
organising their own relations does not need subsidiarity. In French law, there seems 
to exist an independent norm, potentially sans texte, according to which the droit 
commun applies in default of the droits spéciaux.85 The norm also features in some 
legislation. One can instance article 1105 (ex art 1107) of the Code civil,86 which 
assures the default application of general rules of contract law.87 Its independence 
from the general and special rules is clear by its placement in the first chapter of the 
relevant title of the relevant book of the Code civil, headed ‘Preliminary provisions’ 
(dispositions liminaires). The maxim specialia generalibus derogant in French law, 
which can be conceived in terms of subsidiarity, is a meta-authority in relation to the 
general and special rules to which it applies. 
                                               
81 On which, see H Roland and L Boyer, Adages du droit français (4th edn, Litec 1999) no 418. The 
maxim obviously conceals much complexity; the literature cited in this paragraph should be consulted 
for detail. 
82 C Goldie-Genicon, Contribution à l’étude des rapports entre le droit commun et le droit spécial des 
contrats (LGDJ 2009) no 6; S Mauclair, Recherche sur l’articulation entre le droit commun et le droit 
spécial en droit de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle (Fondation Varenne 2012) no 115ff esp 
146ff; C Goldie-Genicon, ‘Droit commun et droit spécial’ (2013) 7 RD Assas 29, 30, 36; Habre (n 62) 
nos 1003-1008; N Balat, Essai sur le droit commun (LGDJ 2016) nos 82-101 esp 84-87. 
83 Contra, it seems, claiming that the subsidiarity of the droit commun follows from its nature, or as of 
right (‘de plein droit’) is Balat (n 82) no 92. For the author, this is because droit commun is law, which 
applies mandatorily, so its subsidiarity does not need to be recalled or, it would seem, based on any 
legislative text. 
84 For accord, see Raynard (n 62) 134: ‘le classement hiérarchique qu’elle [la subsidiarité] présuppose 
procure d’ailleurs à la subsidiarité une franche neutralité, donc d’autant d’autorité’; Casson (n 62) 169: 
‘[l]e subsidiaire institue une hiérarchie, un ordre que les sujets de droit n’ont pas la faculté de 
méconnaître ou d’écarter’; Gouëzel (n 53) no 91: ‘la subsidiarité met en relation deux éléments 
possibles en indiquant lequel doit être préféré’. See also C Pérès-Dourdou, La règle supplétive (LGDJ 
2004) nos 400-401 and note 334, no 435 and note 518. 
85 Among many other decisions, see Civ 1re, 7 December 2004, pourvoi no 01-10271, Bull civ I, no 307; 
[2005] RDC 681, observations by D Mazeaud: contracts; Civ 1re, 11 January 2005, pourvoi no 02-
19016, Bull civ I, no 13; [2005] RTD Civ 375, observations by J Hauser: delictual liability; Com, 31 
January 2012, pourvoi no 10-24731, Bull civ IV, no 23; [2012] D 493, observations by X Delpech: 
prescription. 
86 For its qualification as a rule of subsidiarity, see, eg, N Balat, ‘Réforme du droit des contrats: et les 
conflits entre droit commun et droit spécial?’ [2015] D 699, nos 1-2. 
87 On which, see N Blanc, ‘Contrats nommés et innomés, un article disparu?’ [2015] RDC 810; J Huet 
and A Ghozi, ‘L’article 1105 nouveau du Code civil: modification suggérée’ [2017] RDC 168. 
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F. Not sovereignty 
 
The first part of this chapter showed that, for a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no 
entity said to be part of that relationship can be sovereign over any other entity in that 
relationship. In such a situation, there would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because 
authority in that context would be allocated unconditionally. This goes against the 
essence of subsidiarity. As outlined at the start of this part of the chapter, subsidiarity 
is a conditional idea. If understood as absolute, sovereignty is antithetical to 
subsidiarity.88 If, for example, a doctrine of constitutional law renders federal 
undertakings immune from the legislative acts of provincial powers, then on the facts, 
federation and provinces are not in a relationship of subsidiarity.89 
 
The Catholic Church teaches that the violation of the principle of subsidiarity is a 
‘disturbance of right order’.90 Subsidiarity has been called a ‘most weighty principle, 
which cannot be set aside or changed, [and] remains fixed and unshaken in social 
philosophy’, pronounced under the Church’s ‘supreme authority upon social and 
economic matters’.91 There is no room for the sovereignty of any entity to which 
subsidiarity applies here, from the supra-national co-operative to the private individual. 
 
So, too, in European Union law. The letter of article 5(3) TEU and the relevant case 
law are explicit. Subsidiarity only applies in areas outwith the ‘exclusive competence’ 
of the Union.92 A subsidiarity principle to regulate competences which the Union can 
either exercise or delegate to the Member States would be pointless.93 And the binding 
nature of the subsidiarity principle, demonstrated in the immediately preceding 
                                               
88 It is not, of course, argued that state sovereignty works in absolute terms. It does not: N MacCormick, 
‘On Sovereignty and Post-Sovereignty’, in his Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth (OUP 1999). And it might never have done so: L Bretherton, ‘Sovereignty’ in 
N Adams, G Pattison and G Ward (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European 
Thought (OUP 2013). 
89 Canadian Western Bank v Alberta (Province) [2007] SCC 22, [2007] 2 SCR 3 [45] (Binnie and LeBel 
JJ, with whom McLachlin CJ, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ agreed): ‘[t]he asymmetrical effect of 
interjurisdictional immunity can also be seen as undermining the principles of subsidiarity’. 
90 Pius XI (n 63) [80]. 
91 ibid, [41], [79]. 
92 British American Tobacco Investments and Imperial Tobacco (Approximation of laws) [2002] EUECJ 
C-491/01, [2002] ECR I-11453 [179]; Vischim v Commission [2009] CJEU T-420/05, [2009] ECR II-
3841 [223]. 
93 TFEU art 2(1): ‘When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only 
the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so 
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.’ 
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subsection of this chapter, would be irreconcilable with the Union’s exclusive 
competence.  
 
Moreover, in European Human Rights law, neither the contracting states nor the 
ECtHR are exclusively competent to secure the protection of convention rights. That 
appears to be one of the bases upon which the Convention itself sits. 
 
The French writers on subsidiarity in private law appear not to have addressed this 
point. But in other areas, many scholars believe that it is correct.94 So, it has been said 
that ‘subsidiarity is an alternative to sovereignty’;95 and that ‘[a]s pure concepts, 
sovereignty and subsidiarity are irreconcilable’.96 
 
G. Not concurrence 
 
The linguistic analysis in part one of this chapter suggested that an extant relationship 
of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the entities said to be part 
of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a situation, since 
competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point of subsidiarity is 
to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen, in the sense explained 
in sub-section D of this part of the chapter. It is unsurprising that we find this borne out 
in each context under consideration. 
 
As we have seen, Roman Catholic subsidiarity is premised on there being an ideal, or 
best, level of society at which a given function may be discharged.97 Article 5(3) TEU 
is clearly framed on the assumption that the overlaps in initiatives by the European 
                                               
94 PD Marquardt, ‘Subsidiary and Sovereignty in the European Union’ (1994) 18 Fordham Intl LJ 616, 
635; N MacCormick, ‘Democracy and Subsidiarity in the European Commonwealth’, in his Questioning 
Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP 1999) 142; P Carozza, 
‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 Am J Intnl Law 38, 
58, 62-63, 66; I Roele, ‘Sidelining Subsidiarity: United Nations Security Council “Legislation” and Its 
Infra-Law’ (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 189, 190-199; M Kumm, ‘Sovereignty and the Right to 
Be Left Alone: Subsidiarity, Justice-Sensitive Externalities and the Proper Domain of the Consent 
Requirement in International Law’ (2016) 79(2) Law & Contemp Probs 239, passim; P Carozza, ‘The 
Problematic Applicability of Subsidiarity to International Law and Institutions’ (2016) 61 Am J Juris 51, 
60-63 esp 62. 
95 Cahill, ‘Attraction to Subsidiarity’ (n 55) 123. 
96 M Cahill, ‘Theorizing Subsidiarity: Towards an Ontology-Sensitive Approach’ (2017) 15 Int J Const L 
201, 216. 
97 See also Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (n 38) §§185-188. 
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Union and Member States, which would ensue in subsidiarity’s absence, need to be 
regulated. The articulation of articles 13 and 35(1) ECHR is perhaps the clearest 
example on the point. The order in which contracting states and the ECtHR may hear 
alleged Convention violations is explicitly regulated by those provisions, as interpreted 
by the ECtHR. But it should be remembered that this is only the default position. It 
seems not antithetical to subsidiarity for there to be overlap – perhaps in the form of 
co-operation – in the exercise of competence by entities, once it has been decided 
that a subsidiary entity is allowed to act. The reserve troops under the Latin dictionary 
definition will be recalled here: it would be better to deploy them before those in the 
front line are dead. 
 
Many scholars, including the French private lawyers writing on subsidiarity,98 assume 
the correctness of the claim in this sub-section.99 At least one, however, is explicit in 
agreement. As Golemboski puts it in an analysis of subsidiarity and constitutional 
federalism, both:100 
 
‘[P]rescribe cooperation, not competition between state-level and 
national-level entities. […] [T]hey both reject an assumption of 





                                               
98 Raynard (n 62) 134: ‘une méthode de résolution de conflits de normes par voie prophylactique’; 
Casson (n 62) 152: ‘en cas d’antagonisme entre plusieurs règles de droit ou entre plusieurs modalités 
d’application d’une même norme susceptibles d’être utilisées, [c’est l’objet du subsidiaire] de départager 
ces concurrents en indiquant lequel doit la priorité à l’autre’; Gouëzel (n 53) nos 46-47; Habre (n 62) no 
20. 
99 DZ Cass, ‘The Word That Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers 
within the European Community’ (1992) 29 CMLR 1107, 1128-1134; K Duncan, ‘Subsidiary and 
Religious Establishments in the United States Constitution’ (2007) 52 Vill L Rev 67, 72-74; J Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 145-147; A von Staden, ‘The Democratic 
Legitimacy of Judicial Review beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of 
Review’ (2012) 10 Int J Const L 1023, 1034-1038, 1048-1049; LD Weinberger, ‘The Relationship 
Between Sphere Sovereignty and Subsidiarity’ in M Evans and A Zimmermann (eds), Global 
Perspectives on Subsidiarity (Springer 2014) 59-60; SG Calabresi and LD Bickford, ‘Federalism and 
Subsidiarity: Perspectives from US Constitutional Law’ in JE Fleming and JT Levy (eds), Federalism 
and Subsidiarity (NYUP 2014) 148-158. 
100 D Golemboski, ‘Federalism and the Catholic Principle of Subsidiarity’ (2015) 45 Publius 526, 538, 
540-541. 
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CONCLUSION: 
PRINCIPLES OF SUBSIDIARITY 
 
This chapter has addressed subsidiarity from linguistic and contextual perspectives, 
and formulated six principles which must be respected by users of the language of 
subsidiarity for that usage to be correct. This was done as follows. Firstly, this chapter 
suggested some limits to the linguistic meaning of subsidiarity. These limits were then 
used to explore subsidiarity in context in the second part of the chapter, in which it was 
suggested that the linguistic limits are confirmed by an examination of subsidiarity in 
Roman Catholic social doctrine, European Union law, and European human rights law. 
Thirdly, it was suggested throughout the second part of this chapter that conditionality 
goes to the essence of subsidiarity, and that its presence or absence indicates whether 
subsidiarity suitably describes a posited state of affairs. The overall analysis has 
permitted the formulation of six principles of subsidiarity relating to: first, the fact that 
a rule of subsidiarity is unconcerned with the existence of the entities to which it 
applies; secondly, the need for more than one such entity; thirdly, the potential, absent 
subsidiarity, for those entities to overlap in their actions or spheres of competence; 
fourthly, the possession by a rule of subsidiarity of meta-authority over, and 
independence from, the entities to which it applies; which leads, fifthly and sixthly, to 
a lack of sovereignty in the entities in a relationship of subsidiarity over each other, 
and an absence of concurrence between them. These principles may be collapsed 
into a three-pronged statement for ease of reference: subsidiarity requires (1) the 
existence of a plurality of entities (first and second principles); (2) which are capable 
of overlapping (third principle); (3) which overlap is dealt with by subsidiarity as meta-
authority (fourth principle, with fifth and sixth principles as logical consequences 
thereof). 
 
After the next chapter, which addresses the history and reasons for subsidiarity in 
unjust enrichment, the theory developed here will be applied to the law and scholarship 
on the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment. The key idea of conditionality will feature 
prominently in discussion. The principles will be the framework for that discussion, of 
key claims that unjust enrichment is somehow subsidiary. They may be stated as 
follows. 
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(1) Existence. Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not 
concerned to determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. 
 
(2) Plurality. A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least 
two entities, or groups of entities. 
 
(3) Overlap. For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities 
in that context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. 
 
(4) Meta-authority. For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of 
allocation and overlap, it must bind the relevant entities by constituting an 
independent, higher authority in relation to them. 
 
(5) Not sovereignty. For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part 
of that relationship can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. 
 
(6) Not concurrence. An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free 
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CHAPTER 3 
SUBSIDIARITY IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this study examined unjust enrichment and subsidiarity 
separately. This chapter addresses subsidiarity within unjust enrichment. This is an 
ancient issue,1 and the position elsewhere is interesting.2 But we focus on modern 
sources in our main jurisdictions. The key questions are, first, what is the status of 
subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment; and secondly, what 
reasons underpin that status? 
 
I. ENGLISH LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Whilst not endorsed by English courts, the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment has a 
substantial foothold in mainstream commentary. 
 
A. English law 
 
English law does not explicitly recognise that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to other 
legal institutions. At most, the courts have endorsed some subsidiarity-like thinking, 
                                               
1 For example, Urich Huber granted a ‘subsidiary’ actio de in rem verso to A against C if A’s contractual 
counterparty, B, were insolvent: Praelectiones Juris Civilis, vol II (1st edn, Franeker 1690) XV, III, 2. 
See further R Feenstra, ‘Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation: Its Origin 
and Its Influence in Roman-Dutch Law’ in EJH Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative 
Legal History of the Law of Restitution (2nd edn, Duncker & Humblot 1999) 222-228. 
2 Other jurisdictions embracing versions of subsidiarity, not considered here, include Louisiana and 
Québec. See Louisiana Civil Code, art 2298: ‘[t]he remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not be 
available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule’; and, 
for a summary of the law, Zaveri v Condor Petroleum Corporation (2014) 27 F Supp 3d 695 (La West 
Dist Ct) 700-703 (Hill J); Civil Code of Québec, art 1494: ‘[e]nrichment or impoverishment is justified 
where it results [...] from the failure of the person impoverished to exercise a right of which he may avail 
himself or could have availed himself against the person enriched’; and, for a summary of the law, 
Giroux v Hopson [2012] QCCA 1718 [22]-[27], [53] (Rochette, Kasirer, and Fournier JJA). An action 
available to A against B which is useless due to B’s insolvency does not prevent an unjustified 
enrichment action against C: Pavage Rolland Fortier Inc v Caisse populaire Desjardins de La Plaine 
[1998] RJQ 1221 (QCSC) [30]-[31] (Trudel J); affirmed [2001] CanLII 40171 (QCCA). But there remains 
general doubt whether routes to redress against B must be taken by A before A can sue C in unjustified 
enrichment. No: Placements Triar Inc v Salama [2002] JQ No 4320; [2002] CanLII 41174 (QCCA) [54]-
[57] (Robert CJ, with whom Chamberland JA agreed). Yes: Ultramar Ltd v Rimers [2006] QCCQ 12349 
[37]-[42] (Pisonnault J). Mere failure by the claimant to avail itself of other available remedies does not 
bar unjust enrichment in common law Canada: Neles Controls Ltd v Canada [2002] FCA 107 [14]-[16] 
(Malone JA, with whom Décary and Dharlow JJA agreed). Contra: Elmford Construction Co v South 
Winston Properties Inc (1999) 45 OR (3d) 588 (ONSC) [36] (Dunnet J); leave to appeal dismissed 
(2001) 59 OR (3d) 111 (ONCA). 
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minus the language. Sedley LJ once remarked that unjust enrichment is a weak legal 
doctrine.3 Weaker than what, his Lordship did not say. He later stated: ‘the law of 
restitution is […] in its nature […] a residual remedy’.4 What inspired these statements 
is unknown.5 Absent the vocabulary of subsidiarity, they cannot fairly be taken as a 
claim about it. 
 
There is also a dictum of Lord Goff in The Trident Beauty,6 a case denying an unjust 
enrichment claim by the hirer of a vessel against the assignee (by way of security for 
a loan) of the owner’s right to hire, when the charterparty provided that the owner 
would refund all overpaid hire:7 
 
‘[A]s between [the] shipowner[, Trident] and charterer[, Pan Ocean], there 
is a contractual regime which legislates for the recovery of overpaid hire. It 
follows that, as a general rule, the law of restitution has no part to play in 
the matter; the existence of the agreed regime renders the imposition by 
the law of a remedy in restitution [against the assignee, Creditcorp,] both 
unnecessary and inappropriate.’ 
 
Some have cited this passage to support the view that unjust enrichment is subsidiary 
to contract law.8 Had he meant to invoke subsidiarity, his Lordship’s command of 
                                               
3 Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd (No 1) [2003] EWCA Civ 1446, [2004] QB 985 
[192] (Butler-Sloss P agreeing) a contrario: restitution deals with cases left aside by ‘stronger doctrine[s] 
of law’; cited with approval in Commerzbank AG v Gareth Price-Jones [2003] EWCA Civ 1663 [86] 
(Munby J). 
4 Boake Allen Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs [2006] EWCA Civ 25, [2006] STC 606 [98]. 
5 Though it has been suggested that they may have been influenced by Ross Grantham and Charles 
Rickett’s views, discussed below, and criticised in later chapters: C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson 
(eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [2-03]. 
6 Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 1 WLR 161 (HL). 
7 ibid, 164. Lord Lowry agreed with Lord Goff. Lord Woolf (with whom Lord Keith and Lord Slynn agreed) 
held that Creditcorp (i) was not responsible for Trident’s non-repayment, (ii) had an unqualified right to 
the hire, and (iii) was not a party against which Pan Ocean should have a claim ‘merely because’ of the 
assignment by Trident ‘merely because’ of Trident’s assignment: ibid, 170-172. 
8 R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event’ [2003] CLJ 717, 741-744 
and notes 112, 118; R Havelock, ‘A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit’ (2016) 132 LQR 470, 
473-474 and notes 33-34. 
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pertinent literature suggests that he would have done so.9 Instead, Lord Goff reasoned 
that Creditcorp’s enrichment was justified by its contract with Trident:10 
 
‘[S]erious difficulties arise if the law seeks to expand the law of restitution 
to redistribute risks for which provision has been made under an applicable 
contract. Moreover, it would in any event be unjust to do so in a case such 
as the present where the defendant, Creditcorp, is not the mere recipient of 
a windfall but is an assignee who has purchased from Trident the right to 
receive the contractual debt which the plaintiff, Pan Ocean, is now seeking 
to recover from Creditcorp in restitution despite the facts that the relevant 
contract imposes on the assignor (Trident) an obligation of repayment in 
the circumstances in question, and that there is nothing in the assignment 
which even contemplates, still less imposes, any additional obligation on 
the assignee (Creditcorp) to repay.’ 
 
So The Trident Beauty is not about subsidiarity. One other judicial pronouncement is 
noteworthy. Lord Sumption once mentioned the general English preferences for 
concurrent liability in contract and tort, and an option between kinds of unjust 
enrichment claim. His Lordship cited textbook discussion about the subsidiarity of 
France’s action de in rem verso, and described the two jurisdictions’ approaches as 
‘divergent’.11 The vocabulary of subsidiarity was not used. 
 
                                               
9 In the last edition of the great work which his Lordship co-authored with Professor Gareth Jones, The 
Law of Restitution (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1986) 12, note 58, a long footnote refers to comparative 
work analysing, and often criticising, unjust enrichment’s supposed subsidiarity (page references 
provided by the present writer): HC Gutteridge and RJA David, ‘The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment’ 
[1934] CLJ 204, 212, 218-221, questioning wholesale the subsidiarity of the French general unjustified 
enrichment action; W Friedmann, ‘The Principle of Unjust Enrichment in English Law: A Study in 
Comparative Law, Part I’ (1938) 16 Can Bar Rev 243, 261; JP Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A 
Comparative Analysis ((1951) repr, Hein 1999) 106 and notes 118-120, noting that the meaning of 
subsidiarity ‘in modern French law is far from clear’; B Nicholas, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law 
and Louisiana Law, I’ (1961) 36 Tulane L Rev 605, 633-641, calling subsidiarity ‘a much debated and 
still obscure requirement’, and commenting that a then-leading case could ‘not be taken to mean what 
it apparently says’. 
10 The Trident Beauty (n 6) 166 (emphasis added). 
11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] UKSC 
19, [2012] 2 AC 337 [196]. 
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In sum, England has seen rare judicial intuitions about a secondary status for unjust 
enrichment, and awareness of the position elsewhere. But, as a matter of authority, 
unjust enrichment is not subsidiary. 
 
B. English scholarship 
 
Critical comparative scholarship on the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment has been 
available to English lawyers since the 1930s.12 The standout piece is Lionel Smith’s 
review of civil and common law approaches from 2002, which relevantly concludes:13 
 
‘The relationship between unjustified enrichment and other claims is 
complex. Understanding it depends not only upon an understanding of the 
overall function of the law of unjustified enrichment, but also upon the 
history and philosophy underlying the structure of private law in a particular 
system. The common law does not know “subsidiarity” by that name, but 
elements of that relationship appear to be embedded in the law.’ 
 
Lord Wright lamented shortly that unjust enrichment had ‘too long been depressed, at 
least in England, to the level of a subsidiary and dependent status’.14 But the first 
serious, and most important, positive claims about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity in 
                                               
12 See the works cited by Goff and Jones (n 9) 12, note 58, referred to above. See also, eg, B Dickson, 
‘Unjust Enrichment Claims: A Comparative Overview’ [1995] CLJ 100, 113, 116-117, generally 
dissatisfied with French law. For neutral accounts, see, eg, K Zweigert and K Kötz (T Weir tr), An 
Introduction to Comparative Law, vol II ((1969) 1st edn, North-Holland 1977) 221-222; ((1984) 2nd rev 
edn, Clarendon 1987) 589-590; ((1996) 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 550-551; J Bell, S Boyron and S Whittaker, 
Principles of French Law (1st edn, OUP 1998) 417-418, though noting ‘a degree of disagreement as to 
quite what [subsidiarity] means’. The latter authors later repeated their puzzlement, but further 
sympathised with calls for subsidiarity’s abandonment ‘as a control mechanism of enrichissement sans 
cause’ in French law: Principles of French Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 437-438 and note 1135, citing 
[1998] JCP G, II, 10102, observations by G Viney on Civ 1re, 3 June 1997, calling subsidiarity a ‘hazy 
notion’. 
13 L Smith, ‘Property, Subsidiarity and Unjust Enrichment’ in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), 
Unjustified enrichment: key issues in comparative perspective (CUP 2002) 623. 
14 Lord Wright, ‘Book Review: Unjust Enrichment, A Comparative Analysis’ (1952) 100 U Pa L Rev 612, 
612. 
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English law (or the common law more generally) were made by Ross Grantham and 
Charles Rickett. In their deepest study,15 they define subsidiarity as:16 
 
‘[T]he relationship between two claims or doctrines where the scope and 
operation of one claim are constrained by another claim, even where all 
the elements of the former claim are made out. At its weakest, 
subsidiarity denotes the subordination of one claim where another claim 
in fact offers the plaintiff a basis of recovery. At its strongest, subsidiarity 
denies the availability of a claim because another claim is in principle 




‘Restorable or unjust enrichment […] is subsidiary in the sense that the 
scope and operation of the principle of unjust enrichment are necessarily 
constrained by the scope and operation of the other core doctrines of 
the private law, being consent-based obligations (dominantly but not 
solely the law of contract), the law of property, and the law of wrongs 
(dominantly but not solely the common law of torts). […] [U]njust 
enrichment is not a primary regulator of rights and duties. Rather, it is 
one that operates either to supplement these primary doctrines or in the 
interstitial spaces between the primary doctrines. This results from the 
very doctrinal structure of unjust enrichment itself.’ 
 
It is unclear what led Grantham and Rickett to adopt the language of subsidiarity, or 
draw on comparative scholarship.18 But in the piece under discussion, they commit to 
the former, and rely heavily on the latter to support, for example, their definition of 
                                               
15 See also, eg, Grantham and Rickett, ‘Property Rights’ (n 8) 741-744; R Grantham, ‘The Equitable 
Basis of the Law of Restitution’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook 
Co 2005) 365-371. 
16 R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 117 LQR 273, 273 
(emphasis added). 
17 ibid, 273-274. 
18 See, eg, R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or 
Unnecessary Complexity?’ [1997] NZ L Rev 668, 679-679: no language of subsidiarity; R Grantham 
and C Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart 2000) 51-53: language of subsidiarity; 
no comparative scholarship. 
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subsidiarity;19 their view that unjust enrichment is ‘necessarily supplementary of other 
doctrines of the private law, particularly contract and property’;20 and the lack of a ‘role 
to play’ for unjust enrichment ‘where the consequences of a defect in subjective 
consent are already regulated, such that the restoration of the status quo ante is 
already provided for’ by law.21 In a concluding comparative detour, they state that it is 
‘instructive to note that the operation of unjust enrichment in other jurisdictions is tied 
closely to a notion of its subsidiarity’, mention the French position, and cite 
comparative commentary.22 However, the authors ignore the inevitable complexity 
behind the assertion that a given jurisdiction embraces a version of subsidiarity to 
control unjust enrichment.23 Nor do they mention the comparatists’ reproaches of 
subsidiarity. So, Barry Nicholas maintained, always,24 that subsidiarity in French 
enrichment law is ‘one area […] in which clarity and simplicity are noticeably lacking’;25 
and that the structure of the subsidiarity rules controlling the action de in rem verso in 
France is unhelpful, and does not serve the main policy behind it, which is a poor one, 
anyway.26 Despite liberal reference to Nicholas, and others, Grantham and Rickett 
                                               
19 Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 273, note 2; citing, for ‘the meaning of subsidiarity, and in 
particular the distinction between its weak and strong senses’, B Nicholas, ‘Unjust Enrichment and 
Subsidiarity’, Scintillae Iuris: studi in memoria di Gino Gorla, vol III (Giuffrè 1994) 2038; L Smith, 
‘Property, Subsidiarity, and Unjust Enrichment’ [2000] Oxford U Comparative L Forum 6 at 
ouclf.iuscomp.org (this being the original online version of the 2002 book chapter, discussed above). 
20 Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 289, note 94; citing, inter alia, B Nicholas, ‘Modern 
Developments in the French Law of Unjustified Enrichment’ in PWL Russell (ed), Unjustified 
Enrichment: A Comparative Study of the Law of Restitution (VUUP 1996) 92. Other work cited in this 
footnote includes, in first place, D Laycock, ‘The Scope and Significance of Restitution’ (1989) 67 Texas 
L Rev 1277, 1278. 
21 Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 291, note 103; citing Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments’ (n 
20) 94. 
22 Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 296-297 and notes 131-135; citing, inter alia, Gutteridge 
and David (n 9); B Nicholas, ‘The Louisiana Law of Unjustified Enrichment Through the Act of the 
Person Enriched’ (1991) 6/7 Tulane Civ L Forum 3; Nicholas, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Subsidiarity’ (n 
19); Dickson (n 12); EJH Schrage and B Nicholas, ‘Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Restitution: A 
Comparison’ in EJH Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of 
Restitution (Duncker & Humblot 1995); Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments’ (n 20); K Zweigert and H 
Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, (1996) 3rd edn, OUP 1998). 
23 As masterfully demonstrated by Smith, ‘Property, Subsidiarity, and Unjust Enrichment’ (n 19); cited 
with Nicholas’ work for ‘the meaning of subsidiarity’ by Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 273, 
note 2.  
24 For his final views, see his contribution to the subsidiarity chapter in J Beatson and EJH Schrage 
(eds), Cases, Materials and Text on Unjustified Enrichment (Hart 2003) ch 7, 427-440. 
25 Nicholas, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Subsidiarity’ (n 19) 2038; cited by Grantham and Rickett, 
‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 273, note 2, 297, note 131. 
26 Nicholas, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Subsidiarity’ (n 19); and Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments’ (n 20) 
87-93; the latter piece being cited by Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 273, note 2, 281, note 
52, 289, note 94, 291, note 103, 297, note 132. 
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simply accept that subsidiarity is the best name for what they discuss, and that other 
jurisdictions’ approaches are desirable. As this study will show, this is unfortunate. 
 
Grantham and Rickett’s views have been criticised by the editors of Goff & Jones.27 
First, they say, ‘this terminology is unstable’. They instance the variety of regimes to 
which the language can refer, citing comparative work, such as Nicholas’.28 Secondly, 
they opine that ‘in common law systems the relationship between mutually 
interdependent bodies of law such as contract and unjust enrichment is more complex 
and more subtle than is suggested by the idea of a hierarchy of rights’, implied by the 
language of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘primacy’.29 
 
These remarks, along with Professor Jones’ earlier note of caution,30 may have 
prevented Grantham and Rickett’s account from being accepted universally in 
England. It has nevertheless influenced at least two authors’ views that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary,31 and others who support the concept are aware of it.32 
Grantham and Rickett may fairly claim responsibility for subsidiarity’s substantial place 
in modern English unjust enrichment scholarship. Before moving on, we should note 
why the authors endorse subsidiarity. They say that the subsidiarity of unjust 
enrichment must be articulated ‘because of two pressures on the common law of 
unjust enrichment’:33 
                                               
27 See also, eg, M McInnes, ‘The Equitable Action in Unjust Enrichment: Ambiguity and Error’ (2007) 
45 Can Bus LJ 253, 276-279. 
28 Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 5) [2-04] and note 5; citing, eg, Nicholas, ‘Unjust Enrichment and 
Subsidiarity’ (n 19); Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments’ (n 20); G van Maanen, ‘Subsidiarity of the Action 
for Unjustified Enrichment – French Law and Dutch Law: Different Solutions for the Same Problem’ 
(2006) 14 ERPL 409. 
29 Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 5) [2-04] and note 7; citing S Waddams, ‘Contract and Unjust 
Enrichment: Competing Categories, or Complementary Concepts?’ in C Rickett and R Grantham (eds), 
Structure and Justification in Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (OUP 2008). 
30 To the effect that, though some decisions can be analysed in terms of subsidiarity, Grantham and 
Rickett’s account does not reflect the ‘more pragmatic’ approach of the English courts, and that Lionel 
Smith’s view, discussed above, is more accurate: ‘English law does not know the doctrine of subsidiarity 
by name. Its work is done through different concepts […].’ G Jones (ed), Goff & Jones: The Law of 
Restitution (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) [1-061], note 78; (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) [1-
061], note 78. 
31 See G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 133-134, note 5, citing 
the piece in support; and the heavier reliance upon it by Havelock (n 8) 476-477 and note 49, setting 
out Grantham and Rickett’s definition of subsidiarity. 
32 See, eg, its citation by A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 194, n 114, during his 
discussion of the relationship between unjust enrichment and property. Professor Burrows endorses 
subsidiarity in his A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2012) 151. 
33 Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 298-299. 
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‘The first pressure is from outside the common law system. It is the 
invitation to adopt the German technique, which is a particular challenge 
for England.[34] It is not clear, however, that, once subsidiarity is out in 
the open, that technique offers anything “better”. The second pressure 
is from within the system, and it is more subtle and dangerous. The 
dominant model of unjust enrichment threatens to create all types of 
overlaps with, and even takeovers of, areas which belong to other core 
doctrines of the private common law. Subsidiarity is a key to “containing 
the beast”.[35]’ 
 
Their primary reason for subsidiarity is unjust enrichment’s disruptive potential. This 
reflects the trend in subsidiarity-favouring scholarship.36 The fear is understandable. 
Expressed generally since at least the burgeoning of money had and received,37 it 
survives today, in both law,38 and commentary.39 
 
C. A note on Australia 
 
If only to forestall criticism for avoiding difficulties via choice of jurisdictions, something 
must be said about certain antipodean utterances. In his well known judgment in 
Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd,40 Gummow J footnoted Grantham 
and Rickett’s main article in second place, supporting his vision of ‘the gap-filling and 
auxiliary role of restitutionary remedies’. Grantham has suggested (i) that this 
                                               
34 Footnote 142 cites Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 408-411, where 
Lord Hope summarised differences between common law and civilian approaches to unjust enrichment; 
and S Meier and R Zimmermann, ‘Judicial Development of the Law, Error Iuris, and the Law of 
Unjustified Enrichment – a View from Germany’ (1999) 115 LQR 556. 
35 Footnote 144 cites K Barker, ‘Unjust Enrichment: Containing the Beast’ (1995) 15 OJLS 457. 
36 See Virgo (n 31) 133-134 (explicitly); Havelock (n 8) 475-477 (implicitly). 
37 Longchamp v Kenny (1779) 1 Doug KB 137; 99 ER 91 (KB) 91 (Lord Mansfield): money had and 
received ‘must not be carried beyond its proper limits’. On money had and received, see J Baker, ‘The 
History of Quasi-Contract in English Law’ in W Cornish and others (eds), Restitution, Past, Present and 
Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart 1998) 34-35, 47-53. 
38 See, eg, Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176 [31] (Lord Clarke, with 
whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson agreed on this point): in determining whether an 
enrichment has been indirectly conferred on a defendant at the claimant’s expense, ‘it is important not 
to take a narrow view of what […] would conflict with contracts between the parties or with a relevant 
third party in a way which would undermine the contract’. 
39 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (ALI 2011) §1 cmts a, d, rep note d. 
40 [2001] HCA 68, (2001) 208 CLR 516 [75] and notes 113-114; citing, in order, J Dietrich, Restitution: 
A New Perspective (Federation 1998) 28-35; Grantham and Rickett, ‘Subsidiarity’ (n 16) 289-293. 
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constituted an endorsement of the view that ‘restitutionary claims are subsidiary in 
nature’ (ii) by the High Court of Australia.41 As to (i), that Gummow J did not elevate 
the vocabulary from his footnotes to his main text suggests that he did not consider it 
important. Proposition (ii) is incorrect,42 because Gummow J wrote alone, with 
concurrence only in his orders,43 and his statement was obiter:44 
 
‘It is fundamental to the ascertainment of the binding rule of a judicial 
decision that it should be derived from (1) the reasons of the judges 
agreeing in the order disposing of the proceedings; (2) upon a matter in 
issue in the proceedings; (3) upon which a decision is necessary to arrive 
at that order.’ 
 
Moreover, as a noted restitution sceptic,45 if Gummow J had accepted subsidiarity to 
constrain unjust enrichment, he would likely have adopted it more forthrightly. 
 
Though not an individual or per curiam reference to the subsidiarity of ‘restitutionary 
remedies’, it is right to concede that Gummow J’s dictum has bedded down in 
Australia.46 Its most significant citation is by a unanimous New South Wales Court of 
Appeal, presided over by Mason P, in Nikolic v Oladaily Pty Ltd:47 
 
‘A second difficulty with the restitutionary claim [in this case] stems from 
the principle that a claim of this nature cannot be made where a valid 
contract covers the field. […] This subsidiarity doctrine means that the 
contractual allocation of risk cannot be subverted by alleging a cause of 
                                               
41 R Grantham, ‘Restitutionary Recovery Ex Æquo Et Bono’ [2002] Sing JLS 388, 397-398. 
42 As Grantham knows, since he reproaches others in identical fashion: (n 15) 350, note 8; discussing 
the opinion of the judgments in Roxborough of B Kremer, ‘Restitution and Unconscientiousness: 
Another View’ (2003) 119 LQR 118. 
43 Roxborough (n 40) [31] (Gleeson CJ, and Gaudron and Hayne JJ). Kirby J dissented; Callinan J 
simply concurred. 
44 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 (HCA) [56] (Kirby J) emphasis added; cited 
in, eg, Idya Pty Ltd v Anastasiou [2008] NSWCA 102 [30] (Beazley JA, with whom Mason P agreed). 
45 See E Bant, ‘The Evolution of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution Law in the High Court of Australia’ 
[2017] RLR 121, 125-130. 
46 Referring to it, see, eg, Haxton v Equuscorp Pty Ltd [2010] VSCA 1, (2010) 28 VR 499 [123] (Dodds-
Streaton JA, with whom Ashley and Neave JJA agreed); affirmed [2012] HCA 7, (2012) 246 CLR 498. 
Setting it out with footnotes: Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v The Dog Depot Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 
6, [2006] V ConvR 54-713 [44] (Nettle JA). 
47 [2007] NSWCA 252 [101] (Mason P, Campbell JA and Handley AJA), emphasis added. 
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action stemming from unjust enrichment covering the same conduct (see 
generally Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 
CLR 516 at 545 [75] [(Gummow J)], 577 [166] [(Kirby J)]; Coshott v Lenin 
[2007] NSWCA 153).’  
 
Mason P was not seriously invoking subsidiarity to explain restitution’s relationship 
with contract.48 In Zavodnyik v Alex Constructions Pty Ltd,49 his Honour sat on a bench 
which explained a comparable proposition without it. And in Coshott v Lenin,50 his 
Honour cited the Roxborough passage, and omitted the language, in stating that ‘[i]n 
and around contract restitution operates in a gap-filling role’. The usage is too 
inconsistent for subsidiarity’s appearance to be significant. The leading Australian 
practitioners’ text (of which Keith Mason is an author) also uses the language which 
concerns us: ‘[r]estitution generally respects other legal transactions if and while they 
subsist and it operates in a subsidiary or gap-filling manner’.51 And in successive 
sentences, both Roxborough, and Nikolic are cited,52 a little before the following:53 
 
‘Restitution nevertheless has a significant gap-filling role supplementing 
and complementing the operation of contract law, for example, in respect 
of money overpaid due to a mistaken understanding of a contract’s 
operation. This subsidiarity principle is really an aspect of a broader 
concept, that (even when a claim for restitution is properly brought) 
primacy is to be given to any legal relationship that exists between the 
parties.’ 
 
                                               
48 Sitting at first instance, his Honour also mentioned Grantham and Rickett’s article whilst recounting 
a submission by counsel that no ‘general principle about the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment, especially 
the idea that restitution cannot be invoked to trump a contractual allocation of risk’, had been infringed: 
Concrete Constructions Group v Litevale Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 411 [16]. 
49 [2005] NSWCA 438, (2005) 67 NSWLR 457 [30] (Handley JA, with whom Mason P and Latham J 
agreed): contract and restitution were ‘alternative and inconsistent […]. If there was an enforceable 
contract there could be no recovery in restitution and vice versa.’ 
50 [2007] NSWCA 153 [10] (Mason P, with whom Spiegelman CJ and Campbell JA agreed). 
51 K Mason, JW Carter and GJ Tolhurst, Mason & Carter’s Restitution Law in Australia (3rd edn, Lexis 
Nexis 2016), [109] (emphasis added). 
52 ibid, [215] and notes 103-104; citing, ex multis, Roxborough (n 40) [75], [95] (Gummow J), [166] (Kirby 
J), for the proposition that ‘[o]nly rarely will the law of restitution operate in the context of an ineffective 
contract’; and, ex multis, Nikolic (n 47) [101] (Mason P, Campbell JA and Handley AJA), observing that 
‘builders seeking to be remunerated at non-contractual rates will fail so long as an enforceable contract 
with the proprietor covers the relevant field and remains on foot’. 
53 Mason, Carter and Tolhurst (n 51) [215] (emphasis added). 
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Here, subsidiarity is not considered important, or even fully distinct. And it seems 
unlikely that Mason, a chief rehabilitator of restitution in Australia, would reach 
consciously for a stricture in subsidiarity which does not target the flaws he perceives 
in the law. Broadly, these relate, first, to the status of unjust enrichment as a concept 
in Australia,54 and secondly, to equity and unconscionability’s role in founding and 
conditioning restitutionary claims.55 Subsidiarity does not feature in Mason’s 
arguments about these matters, either solo,56 or, perhaps as importantly, in relevant 
passages of Restitution Law in Australia.57 To the extent that he might have influenced 
the content of the quoted passages, Mason may even have been against subsidiarity, 
if he turned his mind to it at all. 
 
II. FRENCH LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
In France, the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso is well established in both law 
and commentary.  
 
A. French law 
 
The essentials of the law are addressed here. Detail comes later.58 Article 1303-3 of 
the Code civil provides: 
 
‘The impoverished person has no action on this basis [ie, in unjustified 
enrichment] where another action [1.] is open to him or [2.] is barred by an 
obstacle of law, such as prescription.’ 
 
                                               
54 Some features of which were expressed in Roxborough (n 40) [70]-[100] esp [72]-[74] (Gummow J); 
and approved in, eg, Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2014] 
HCA 14, (2014) 253 CLR 560 [73]-[74], [97] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
55 A recent working out of which is in AFSL (n 54) esp [68], [74], [78] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and 
Keane JJ). 
56 See, eg, K Mason, ‘What Has Equity to Do with Restitution? Does It Matter?’ [2007] RLR 1; K Mason, 
‘Strong Coherence, Strong Fusion, Continuing Categorical Confusion: The High Court’s Latest 
Contributions to the Law of Restitution’ (2015) 39 Aust Bar Rev 284. 
57 Mason, Carter and Tolhurst (n 51) [120]-[123], [139]. 
58 In particular, the permission to use the action en enrichissement injustifié even if one fails in 
negotiorum gestio, contained in the Code civil, art 1301-5, is left aside until chapter 9. 
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The report accompanying the 2016 reforms confirms that this provision enshrines the 
‘subsidiary character’ of the action en enrichissement injustifié.59 The Cour de 
cassation seems not yet to have addressed it. But lower courts have quickly got to 
grips. The Cour d’appel of Paris has referred to article 1303-3, and observed that ‘the 
so-called “action de in rem verso” […] had and retains to this day a subsidiary 
character’.60 It has also been said that ‘the subsidiary character of the action for 
unjustified enrichment’ is ‘reaffirmed and set out in’ article 1303-3,61 and ‘appears from 
a settled line of case law [une jurisprudence constante]’.62 So, where a delictual action 
remains open to a claimant, engaging article 1303-3’s first limb,63 or a contractual 
action is barred by an obstacle of law, such as the failure to satisfy rules of proof, 
engaging article 1303-3’s second limb,64 the action en enrichissement injustifié cannot 
be invoked instead. 
 
The third main subsidiarity rule is that if an obstacle, not of law, but of fact, renders an 
action other than in unjustified enrichment practically useless, unjustified enrichment 
may avail a claimant instead. Where, for example, person A enriches person B 
pursuant to a statutory obligation, and person C is enriched in turn, then A may sue C 
de in rem verso if B is insolvent.65 The courts have not yet confirmed this rule post-
2016. But distinguished commentators preserve it with an a contrario reading of article 
1303-3.66 This rule, which we will call the obstacle of fact permission, is addressed in 
chapter 8. 
 
                                               
59 Ministère de la justice, ‘Rapport au Président de la République relatif à l’ordonnance no 2016-131 du 
10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations’ 
[2016] JORF no 0035, 11 February 2016, text no 25 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/rapport/2016/2/11/JUSC1522466P/jo/texte>, under the title 
‘L’enrichissement injustifié’. On the modest authority of the report, see P Puig, ‘L’autorité des rapports 
relatifs aux ordonnances’ [2017] RTD Civ 84. 
60 CA Paris, 27 June 2018, RG no 16/17641: ‘l’action dite “de in rem verso” présentait et présente 
d’ailleurs toujours à ce jour un caractère subsidiaire’. 
61 CA Aix-en-Provence, 26 October 2017, RG no 13/12920. 
62 CA Agen, 9 May 2018, RG no 16/00044, referring also to article 1303-3. 
63 CA Paris, 22 December 2017, RG no 14/19086. 
64 CA Agen, 9 May 2018 (n 62); CA Lyon, 13 March 2018, RG no 16/05982. 
65 Civ 1re, 1 February 1984, pourvoi no 82-15496, Bull civ I, no 45; [1984] D 388, noted by J Massip; 
[1984] RTD Civ 712, observations by J Mestre. 
66 O Deshayes, T Genicon and Y-M Laithier, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la 
preuve des obligations – Commentaire article par article (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2018) 634. See also F 
Chénedé, Le nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) [134.34]. 
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For completeness, we examine briefly the sporadic softening of subsidiarity by the 
courts, which occasionally grant unjustified enrichment actions despite the lack of 
proof (an obstacle of law) of certain contracts between persons in informal 
relationships. Take cases where a contract of ad hoc partnership,67 or a management 
mandate,68 between former cohabitants, could not be proved, and actions de in rem 
verso succeeded. The clear counterexample is where a loan contract (contrat de prêt), 
subject to particular rules of evidence (ad hoc partnership being provable by any 
means),69 goes unproved. As with other contracts,70 the courts will not then allow an 
unjustified enrichment action, whatever the parties’ situation,71 though some cases 
decide the contrary.72 
 
The Cour de cassation has also ignored the subsidiarity rule in familial contexts, and 
granted unjustified enrichment actions to deserving claimants. Take the descendant 
of a rural tradesman (un artisan rural) working for him for free, but whose affairs were 
not a farming business (une exploitation agricole);73 or the spouse of the descendant 
of a farmer who had worked for free, not for the family farming business, but that of 
                                               
67 A contrat de société de fait: Civ 1re, 15 October 1996, pourvoi no 94-20472, Bull civ I, no 357; [1997] 
D 177, noted by R Libchaber; [1997] RTD Civ 657, observations by J Mestre; Civ 1re, 4 May 2017, 
pourvoi no 16-15563, Bull civ I, forthcoming; [2017] JCP G 790, noted by Y Dagorne-Labbe; [2017] D 
1591, noted by A Gouëzel. See further A Gouëzel, ‘Retour sur la subsidiarité de l’enrichissement sans 
cause en cas d’échec de l’action principale faute de preuve’ [2017] D 1591. 
68 A mandat de gestion: Civ 1re, 25 June 2008, pourvoi no 06-19556, Bull civ I, no 185; [2008] RDC 
1138, observations by Y-M Laithier; [2008] Defrénois 1980, observations by R Libchaber; [2008] 
Defrénois 2421, observations by J Massip. 
69 Code civil, art 1359; Civ 1re, 19 June 2008, pourvoi no 07-13912, Bull civ I, no 176. Ad hoc partnership: 
Code civil, arts 1832, 1873; Com, 13 March 1984, pourvoi no 82-11866, Bull civ IV, no 99. See further 
V Simon, ‘L’affectio societas’ [2016] RDC 343; A Couret, ‘Faut-il réécrire les articles 1832 et 1833 du 
code civil?’ [2017] D 222. 
70 Civ 3e, 15 May 1973, pourvoi no 72-11513, Bull civ III, no 342; [1974] RTD Civ 148, observations by 
Y Loussouarn: option; Civ 1re, 2 November 2005, pourvoi no 02-18723, Bull civ I, no 398; [2006] D 842, 
observations by F Garron: services; CA Dijon, 31 August 2017, RG no 14/02082: consumer credit. 
71 Com, 2 November 2005, pourvoi no 04-11946, Bull civ IV, no 216; [2005] D 2943, noted by A Lienhard; 
Civ 1re, 2 April 2009, pourvoi no 08-10742, Bull civ I, no 74; [2009] Defrénois 1285, observations by E 
Savaux; [2009] RTD Civ 321, observations by B Fages; Civ 1re, 31 March 2011, pourvoi no 09-13966, 
Bull civ I, no 67; [2011] Cont conc consomm no 6, June, comm 136, commentary by L Leveneur; [2011] 
LPA 13 July no 138, 21, noted by Y Dagorne-Labbe. 
72 Civ 1re, 5 July 2006, pourvoi no 04-19256: enrichment action allowed, despite a loan unproved for 
want of signature; Civ 3e, 11 February 2014, pourvoi no 12-23322: enrichment action allowed, despite 
an unproved loan, but after sharp practice by the defendant, a commercial entity, towards the claimant, 
a private individual. 
73 Civ 1re, 20 December 1993, pourvoi no 92-10134, Bull civ I, no 383; [1994] JCP G, II, 22307, noted 
by F Roussel; [1994] RTD Civ 914, observations by J Patarin. On farming (les activités agricoles) see 
now Code rural et de la pêche maritime, art L311-1ff; and N Olszak, ‘Agriculture’, Rép dr comm Dalloz 
(2018). What qualifies as an artisan rural seems not to be the subject of a general legislative definition. 
See generally N Dissaux, ‘Artisan’, Rép dr comm Dalloz (2017). 
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her in-laws, and after her husband left the farm:74 people a priori denied legislative 
recourse, falling as they did outwith special provisions granting a deferred wage (une 
créance de salaire différé) against the estates of those for whom they did unpaid 
work.75 
 
In these softer solutions, some see a new subsidiarity: unjustified enrichment is only 
excluded when it would circumvent the regime normally applicable to a given situation, 
with exceptionally applicable regimes not excluding the action de in rem verso.76 This 
is vague, and does not improve on the current position.77 A less controversial 
explanation for the courts’ flexibility is the need to ensure a certain équité,78 in informal 
contexts, unregulated by specific legislative regimes.79 Some situations will likely 
continue to be treated à part, when the judges consider that justice requires it. 
 
The reason for the courts’ usually stringent enforcement of the subsidiarity rules is a 
policy favouring order in the legal system. The Cour de Lyon once observed that ‘all 
la jurisprudence wanted to do in imposing a subsidiary character upon the action de 
in rem verso is prevent its being used as cover to bring about a change in the legal 
order, […] in other words, to prevent fraud on the law [fraude à la loi]’.80 Though French 
courts decide cases shortly, the same sentiment can be found elsewhere, as when an 
                                               
74 Civ 1re, 14 March 1995, pourvoi no 93-13410, Bull civ I, no 130; [1996] D 137, noted by V Barabé-
Bouchard; [1995] JCP G, II, 22516, noted critically by F Roussel; [1996] RTD Civ 160, favourable 
observations by J Mestre; [1996] RTD Civ 215 guarded observations by J Patarin; [1996] Defrénois 
468, noted by J-L Fillette. Roussel’s note suggests that the conditions of a créance de salaire différé 
were satisfied on the facts, but would have entitled the claimant to far less than on the enrichment claim. 
This might evidence the Cour de cassation’s concern for équité in individual cases. 
75 See now Code rural et de la pêche maritime, arts L321-13 - L 321-21-1. Rejecting an action de in 
rem verso by a descendant failing to succeed within these provisions, see Civ 1re, 26 September 2007, 
pourvoi no 06-14422, Bull civ I, no 307; [2007] Droit rural no 358, December, comm 353, noted by F 
Roussel. 
76 J Mestre and B Fages [2001] RTD Civ 591, observations on Com, 10 October 2000; B Fages [2009] 
RTD Civ 321, observations on Civ 1re, 2 April 2009. Around the turn of the century, this view gained 
some support from jurisprudential fluctuations: J Nguebou Toukam, ‘Réflexions sur les applications 
contemporaines du principe de la subsidiarité dans l’enrichissement sans cause’ [1997] RRJ 923, 929-
931; L Chakirian, ‘Vers une redéfinition du principe de subsidiarité de l’action de in rem verso’ [2000] 
RRJ 1407, 1421-1423. 
77 J Flour, JL Aubert and E Savaux, Les obligations, II: Le fait juridique (14th edn, Sirey 2011) no 54. 
78 On which, see generally, C Albiges, ‘Equité’, Rép civ Dalloz (2017). 
79 V Barabé-Bouchard [1996] D 137, note on Civ 1re, 14 March 1995; R Libchaber [2008] Defrénois 
1980; J Massip [2008] Defrénois 2421, observations on Civ 1re, 25 June 2008; E Savaux [2009] 
Defrénois 1285, observations on Civ 1re, 2 April 2009. 
80 Cour de Lyon, 27 June 1934; [1934] S, II, 219: ‘tout ce qu’a voulu la jurisprudence en imposant à 
l’action de in rem verso un caractère subsidiaire c’est que, sous son couvert, ne pût se réaliser un 
changement de l’ordre juridique, […] qu’en d’autres termes ne pût se commettre la fraude à la loi […].’ 
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action de in rem verso was denied, because to have allowed it would have 
‘circumvented the rules of the contract invoked in the first instance’.81 This is a specific 
reflection of longstanding general angst, about the ‘supreme injustice’ which an 
unbridled principle against unjustified enrichment could cause.82 
 
B. French scholarship 
 
As this study will show, scholarly references to the subsidiarity of the action de in rem 
verso are numerous.83 Here, we simply note that, though denied or criticised 
periodically,84 the proposition that the action is subsidiary is firmly established in 
mainstream literature. The dominant justification is the same as is (more rarely) found 
in the cases: the prevention of fraude à la loi.85 Article 1303-3 of the Code civil ‘restricts 
[…] the scope of unjustified enrichment by preventing it from allowing the 
circumvention of other legal rules’.86 The ‘subsidiarity of the action in unjustified 
enrichment is explained by its potential to disturb legal certainty’.87 Averting ‘disorder’ 
                                               
81 Civ 1re, 8 December 1987, pourvoi no 85-15767, Bull civ I, no 335; [1988] RTD Civ 745, observations 
by J Mestre; CA Paris, 7 February 2007, RG no 06/09844. 
82 Cour Royale de Grenoble, 12 August 1836; [1837] S, II, 330; appeal dismissed Req, 6 November 
1838; [1839] S, I, 160. 
83 Some early studies omit to consider it, eg, CC Stoïcesco, De l’enrichissement sans cause (Chevalier-
Marescq 1904); D Budishtéano, De l’enrichissement sans cause (Sagot & Cie 1920). 
84 For denials, see G Raynaud, De l’action «de in rem verso» en droit civil français (LNDJ 1899) 82-95, 
145, note 2; J Tartanson, L’action ‘de in rem verso’ en droit civil français (Chaspoul 1909) 111-115; and 
the tantalising one sentence repudiation of subsidiarity in a respected treatise: G Ripert and J 
Boulanger, Traité de droit civil d’après le traité de Planiol, vol II (5th edn, LGDJ 1957) no 1286. For 
criticism without denial, see A Colin and H Capitant, Cours élémentaire de droit civil français, vol II (6th 
edn, Dalloz 1931) no 240(4); P Roubier, ‘La position française en matière d’enrichissement sans cause’, 
L’enrichissement sans cause – La représentation dans les actes juridiques, Travaux de l’Association 
Henri Capitant, IV: Journées néerlandaises (Dalloz 1949) 54-55; J Chevallier, ‘Observations sur la 
répétition des enrichissements non causés’, Le droit privé français au milieu du XXe siècle[:] études 
offertes à Georges Ripert, vol II (LGDJ 1950) 246-247. For a modern denial, see, eg, A Gouëzel, La 
subsidiarité en droit privé (Economica 2013) nos 106-141 esp 135-140, and the references there given, 
advocating the abandonment of subsidiarity in direct enrichment cases due to a total overlap between 
that concept and the requirement that an enrichment be unjustified. As will be seen (in particular in 
chapters 4-6), this argument does not follow its own logic to conclude that where an enrichment is 
justified, the issue of subsidiarity does not arise. Also invoking the overlap argument, see P Rémy, ‘Le 
principe de subsidiarité de l’action de in rem verso en droit français’ in V Mannio and C Ophèle (eds), 
L’enrichissement sans cause – La classification des sources des obligations (LGDJ 2007). Rémy further 
argues that fluctuations in the cases, such as Civ 1re, 14 March 1995 (n 74), render subsidiarity worthy 
of rejection in favour of a more concrete approach. 
85 For a sceptical view, see A Posez, ‘La subsidiarité de l’enrichissement sans cause: étude de droit 
français à la lumière du droit comparé’ (2014) 91 Rev dr int et comp 185, no 25. 
86 L Andreu and N Thomassin, Cours de droit des obligations (3rd edn, Gualino/Lextenso 2018) no 
1752: ‘Ce texte restreint […] la portée de l’enrichissement sans cause en évitant qu’il permette un 
contournement d’autres règles juridiques’. 
87 R Cabrillac, Droit des obligations (13th edn, Dalloz 2018) no 214: ‘Cette subsidiarité de l’action en 
enrichissement sans cause s’explique par son caractère perturbateur pour la sécurité juridique’. 
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is the ‘obvious’ reason for subsidiarity here.88 Again, this specifically reflects general 
worries about unjustified enrichment’s power. An unrestrained general rule has been 
described as ‘[t]his great current of équité which would cut across the law [and] would 
demolish institutions which protect interests like a house of cards’;89 it could ‘explode 
the legal system’;90 ‘[t]o admit an unconditional action de in rem verso would upset all 
legal rules, and lead to permanent anarchy.’91 
 
However, the addition of a new member, François Chénedé, to the editorial team of a 
leading textbook on obligations produced, in late-2018, a forceful, important critique, 
of the subsidiarity of the action en enrichissement injustifié.92 Though accepting the 
dominant justification for subsidiarity,93 the book now attacks the obstacle of law bar 
as ‘excessive and useless’.94 Excessive, because the lack of proof element surpasses 
the rationale of subsidiarity (enrichissement injustifié can ‘hardly upset the rules 
applicable to a contract’ or other legal phenomenon ‘which does not exist’),95 and goes 
beyond subsidiarity’s most obvious meaning: having no other route to redress, ‘it is 
perfectly normal for the claimant to be able to invoke, “on a subsidiary basis”, the 
action de in rem verso’. The uselessness argument extends to the other examples of 
obstacles of law, given in a 1971 decision of the Cour de cassation, addressed below. 
Each ‘constitutes a legal reason […] liable to justify the benefit obtained by the 
defendant, to give a “legal ground [cause]” for his enrichment’. The book now 
concludes:96 
                                               
88 The final view of B Starck, H Roland and L Boyer, Droit civil: Les obligations, vol II (6th edn, Litec 
1998) no 2207. For the last words of other noted authors, see L Josserand, Cours de droit civil positif 
français, vol II (3rd edn, Sirey 1939) no 574; F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, 
vol II/1 (9th edn, Montchrestien 1998) nos 706-709; J Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol II (final def edn, PUF 
2004) no 1228(c). For modern mainstream agreement, see A Bénabent, Droit des obligations (17th 
edn, LGDJ 2018) no 489; F Terré et al and F Chénedé, Droit civil: Les obligations (12th edn, Dalloz 
2018) no 1309. Agreeing, whilst surveying other justifications put forward over time (which space does 
not permit here), see CP Filios, L’enrichissement sans cause en droit privé français (Bruylant 1999) nos 
534, 544. 
89 G Ripert, La règle morale dans les obligations civiles (4th edn, LGDJ 1949) no 133: ‘Ce grand courant 
d’équité qui traverserait le droit abattrait comme château de cartes les institutions qui abritent les 
intérêts’. 
90 J Flour, ‘Pot-pourri autour d’un arrêt’ [1975] Defrénois, I, art 10845, 145, 186. 
91 P Malaurie, L Aynès and P Stoffel-Munck, Droit des obligations (10th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 1056. 
92 The Précis Dalloz, commenced by Alex Weill, and helmed by François Térre since the former’s early 
death (see the second edition’s preface): A Weill, Droit civil: Les obligations (1st edn, Dalloz 1971); A 
Weill and F Terré, Droit civil: Les obligations (2nd edn, Dalloz 1975). 
93 Terré et al and Chénedé (n 88) no 1309. 
94 ibid, no 1313. 
95 For agreement, but in only one sentence, see Bénabent (n 88) no 489. 
96 Terré et al and Chénedé (n 88) no 1313. 
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‘Ultimately, it appears that, as simplistic as it might seem, the formulation 
suggested by Aubry and Rau, adopted initially by the Cour de cassation [(a 
process addressed below)], better reflects the meaning and scope of the 
subsidiarity principle.’ 
 
These criticisms differ slightly from this study’s. Excess and uselessness are distinct 
from impossibility. However, some of the above is partially reflected later, especially 
in chapters 4-6. The weight of these authors’ authority cannot be underestimated in 
pondering what may happen to the French law on point in future. 
 
C. A note on the history 
 
To aid understanding later, three important movements towards the modern law are 
presented. In doing this, we add some detail to the history of the subsidiarity of the 
action de in rem verso. 
 
First, germinal versions of both limbs of article 1303-3 appear in two decisions of the 
Chambre civile of the Cour de cassation from 1914 and 1915, the arrêts Clayette and 
Briauhant: 
 
‘Considering that [1. – other action open:] the action de in rem verso, 
founded on the principle of équité which forbids one to enrich oneself at 
the expense of another, must be granted whenever the patrimony of one 
person is enriched at the expense of that of another without legal ground, 
and the other, to obtain what is due to him, has no other action arising 
from a contract, a quasi-contract, a delict or a quasi-delict; but that [2. – 
obstacle of law:] it [the action] cannot, during proceedings, replace a 
different action, originally founded on a contractual obligation of which 
the claimant finds it impossible to produce proof […].’97 
                                               
97 Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull somm, I, 86; [1918] S, I, 41, noted by 
E Naquet (emphasis added): ‘Attendu [1.] que l’action de in rem verso, fondée sur le principe d’équité 
qui défend de s’enrichir au détriment d’autrui, doit être admise dans tous les cas où, le patrimoine d’une 
personne se trouvant, sans cause légitime, enrichi aux dépens de celui d’une autre personne, cette 
dernière ne jouirait, pour obtenir ce qui lui est dû, d’aucune action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-
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‘Considering that [1. – other action open:] the action de in rem verso 
must only be granted in cases in which, the patrimony of one person is 
enriched without legal ground at the expense of that of another, and the 
latter, to obtain what is due to him, has no other action arising from a 
contract, a quasi-contract, a delict or a quasi-delict, and that [2. – 
obstacle of law:] it [the action] cannot be brought with a view to 
escaping the rules by which statute [la loi] has expressly defined the 
effects of a specific contract, nor, as a result, [can it be brought] by a 
contractor to disguise a claim for extra costs, forbidden […] in the 
presence of a fixed price contract […].’98 
 
Secondly, in the arrêt Gorge of 1940, the Cour de cassation lent its imprimatur to the 
obstacle of fact permission, when a party impoverished had a practically useless 
contractual action against an insolvent individual, and was allowed to sue a third party 
de in rem verso.99 
 
Thirdly, in 1971, the Troisième chambre civile restated the subsidiarity rules:100 
 
‘Considering that [1.] the action founded on unjustified enrichment can 
only be admitted if no other action is open to the claimant; that [2.] it 
cannot be admitted, notably, to supplement another action which the 
claimant cannot bring as a result of prescription, a forfeiture, a time bar, 
                                               
contrat, d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit ; mais [2.] qu’elle ne peut pas être substituée, en cours d’instance, 
à une action différente, originairement fondée sur une obligation contractuelle dont le demandeur serait 
dans l’impossibilité légale de rapporter la preuve […].’ 
98 Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] DP, I, 102 (first case) (emphasis added): 
‘Attendu [1.] que l’action de in rem verso ne doit être admise que dans les cas où le patrimoine d’une 
personne se trouvant sans cause légitime enrichi au détriment de celui d’une autre personne, celle-ci 
ne jouirait, pour obtenir ce qui lui est dû, d’aucune action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-contrat, d’un 
délit ou d’un quasi-délit, et [2.] qu’elle ne peut être intentée en vue d’échapper aux règles par lesquelles 
la loi a expressément défini les effets d’un contrat déterminé, ni, par suite, par un entrepreneur, pour 
servir à déguiser une demande en supplément de prix prohibée […] en cas de marché à forfait […].’ 
99 Req, 11 September 1940; [1940] Gaz Pal, II, 114; [1941] S, I, 121, noted by P Esmein. 
100 Civ 3e, 29 April 1971, pourvoi no 70-10415, Bull civ III, no 277; [1970-1971] Rapport annuel C cass 
37; [1971] Gaz Pal, II, 554; [1971] RTD Civ 842, observations by Y Loussouarn: ‘[1.] [L]’action fondée 
sur l’enrichissement sans cause ne peut être admise qu’à défaut de toute autre action ouverte au 
demandeur; [2.] qu’elle ne peut l’être, notamment, pour suppléer à une autre action que le demandeur 
ne peut intenter par suite d’une prescription, d’une déchéance ou forclusion ou par l’effet de l’autorité 
de la chose jugée ou parce qu’il ne peut apporter les preuves qu’elle exige ou par suite de tout autre 
obstacle de droit […].’ 
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or because of the effect of res judicata or because he cannot produce 
the necessary proof or because of any other obstacle of law […].’ 
 
In the first limb of this formula, the court linguistically shortened but legally broadened 
the first branch of the Clayette-Briauhant holdings. In the second limb, the court 
generalised the second branch of those holdings into the obstacle of law bar, and gave 
useful examples thereof. This all looks much like today’s article 1303-3. 
 
But how do we get subsidiarity out of these decisions? 
 
Not from Clayette or Briauhant, for starters. The first half of their formulae appeared 
in lower courts nearly a decade previously.101 Borrowed from the noted Cours de droit 
civil français by Charles Aubry and Charles-Frédéric Rau,102 it existed in its essentials, 
without elaboration or justification,103 from their first edition.104 But because they do 
not put the vocabulary to the rules, their editions of the Cours cannot be the origin of 
the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso. For the same reason, and contrary to 
what some say,105 nor can Clayette or Briauhant. Moreover, Karl Salomo Zachariä von 
                                               
101 Trib civ de Lyon, 2 August 1899; [1899] Mon jud de Lyon, 2 August; [1897-1902] Tables quinq Gaz 
Pal 429. 
102 For the last edition before the arrêts Clayette and Briauhant, see C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de 
droit civil français d’après la méthode de Zachariae, vol VI (4th edn, LDJ 1873) no 578(4): ‘L’action de 
in rem verso, dont on ne trouve au Code civil que des applications spéciales, doit être admise d’une 
manière générale, comme sanction delà règle d’équité, qu’il n’est pas permis de s’enrichir aux dépens 
d’autrui, dans tous les cas où le patrimoine d’une personne se trouvant, sans cause légitime, enrichi au 
détriment de celui d’une autre personne, celle-ci ne jouirait, pour obtenir ce qui lui appartient ou ce qui 
lui est dû, d’aucune action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-contrat, d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit.’ 
103 See, commenting on the fourth edition, P Chaine, L’enrichissement sans cause dans le droit civil 
français (Waltener & Cie 1909) 77-78. Chaine does not analyse the relevant passage in more detail or 
further address subsidiarity. This is understandable, since he thought that enrichissement sans cause 
was constituted by an enrichment which occurred outwith contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict, 
or any other method provided for by law: ibid, 6, 182. 
104 C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français, traduit de l’allemand de M CS Zacharie, revu et 
augmenté, avec l’agrément de l’auteur, vol IV (1st edn, Lagier 1844) no 576; and in volume II of the 
second edition (Meline, Cans et Cie 1850) no 576: action de in rem verso allowed if the claimant ‘n’aurait 
à exercer aucune action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-contrat, d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit’. The 
formula was identical in the third edition, the title of which changed when the Cours took on a more 
independent form from the German work which inspired it: Cours de droit civil français: d’après l’ouvrage 
allemand de C-S Zachariae, vol V (3rd edn, LDJ 1857) no 576. 
105 Terré et al and Chénedé (n 88) no 1310: ‘formulée pour la première fois en 1914 et en 1915, cette 
exigence [de subsidiarité] peut être interprétée de manière plus ou moins restrictive’; Posez (n 85) no 
37, note 104, designating Clayette as ‘l’origine de la notion’; Gouëzel (n 84) no 107; P Drakidis, ‘La 
“subsidiarité”, caractère spécifique et international de l’action d’enrichissement sans cause’ [1961] RTD 
Civ 577, 580-581; F Goré, L’enrichissement aux dépens d’autrui (Dalloz 1949) 92-94, 188-192, even 
acknowledging that the cases do not put the word to the rules. Other cases similarly fail as candidates, 
eg, Civ, 18 October 1898, [1899] DP, I, 105, noted by LS; cited erroneously by, eg, J-M Augustin, 
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Lingenthal is not the rules’ progenitor.106 His Handbuch des französischen Civilrechts, 
which Aubry and Rau in part simply translated,107 then further adapted,108 to form their 
Cours, contains no formula like theirs, or the vocabulary which interests us.109 Instead, 
the language of subsidiarity was imposed on Aubry and Rau by others,110 notably in 
the fifth (1917) edition of their Cours, annotated by Etienne Bartin.111 Bartin does not 
cite the arrêts Clayette or Briauhant, perhaps because they were not fully reported 
until 1918 and 1920 respectively.112 Later commentators imposed the language of 
subsidiarity on those cases;113 and the Cour de cassation only put it to the first half of 
the Clayette-Briauhant formula in 1951.114 
 
                                               
‘Introduction historique à l’enrichissement sans cause en droit français’ in V Mannio and C Ophèle 
(eds), L’enrichissement sans cause – la classification des sources des obligations (LGDJ 2007) 39-40. 
106 Contra: Posez (n 85) no 4, stating that Zachariä presented subsidiarity and Aubry and Rau translated 
it; Drakidis (n 105) 581, stating the Aubry and Rau borrowed from Zachariä in turn. 
107 Eugène Gaudemet suggests that Aubry and Rau first worked on Zachariä’s fourth edition: ‘Aubry et 
Rau’ [1923] RTD Civ 65, 76. But they probably took Zachariä’s third instead. Aubry and Rau say that 
Zachariä’s fourth edition was in the course of publication (‘paraît en ce moment’) when, in 1837, when 
they wrote the preface to their first edition; and that (i) in confining themselves to a straight translation 
of his third edition (1827), they would not have produced an up-to-date book for French lawyers; (ii) this 
was why, with Zachariä’s agreement, they had also updated his work. See C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours 
de droit civil français, traduit de l’allemand de M CS Zacharie, revu et augmenté, avec l’agrément de 
l’auteur, vol I (1st edn, Lagier 1839) v, xi-xii: ‘En nous astreignant à la reproduction exacte de l’original, 
sans nous permettre d’y apporter aucune modification, le Cours, dont nous publions la traduction, et 
dont la troisième édition date de 1827, n’aurait point été, en 1837, au courant des progrès de la science. 
[…] [N]ous avons préféré soumettre l’ouvrage de M Zachariae à un remaniement qui pût faire 
considérer notre traduction comme une nouvelle édition française de cet ouvrage. Nous ne pouvions 
entreprendre un semblable travail que du consentement de l’auteur, qui a daigné nous l’accorder avec 
une bienveillance dont nous le prions de recevoir nos remercîmen[t]s publics.’ 
108 Greater independence came in their third edition. See the relevant title change and prefatory 
remarks: C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français: d’après l’ouvrage allemand de C-S 
Zachariae, vol I (3rd edn, Cosse 1856) esp v-vii. 
109 Take, for example, KS Zachariä von Lingenthal, Handbuch Des Französischen Civilrechts, vol III 
(5th edn, Mohr 1853) no 576, this edition being the basis for Aubry and Rau’s second, as confirmed by 
relevant front matter: C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français, traduit de l’allemand de M CS 
Zacharie, revu et augmenté, avec l’agrément de l’auteur, vol I (2nd edn, Meline, Cans et Cie 1850). 
110 Eg, T Théodoroff, De l’Enrichissement sans cause (Rapide 1907) 168 and note 42. 
111 E Bartin (ed), Cours de droit civil français d’après la méthode de Zachariae par C Aubry et C Rau, 
vol IX (5th edn, LDJ 1917) no 578(4) note 10. 
112 Also missing the cases before the full reports, see eg, A Colin and H Capitant, Cours élémentaire 
de droit civil français, vol II (1st edn, Dalloz 1915) 405-409. Compare, however, the citation of a 
summary of Briauhant (containing the phrase ‘action subsidiare’ in its keywords), and the imposition 
upon it of the vocabulary of subsidiarity, by J Maury, Essai sur le rôle de la notion d’équivalence en droit 
civil français, vol II (Jouve 1920) 264-266 and note 5. It is not actually easy to say whether Maury 
accepts subsidiarity. See ibid, 264-274. 
113 See, eg, A Rouast, ‘L’enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile’ [1922] RTD Civ 35, 82; 
H Capitant, Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence civile (1st edn, Dalloz 1934) no 108. 
114 Civ, 29 January 1951, Bull civ I, no 34. See, later, Civ 1re, 17 June 1997, pourvoi no 95-17442; CA 
Pau, 14 November 2017, RG no 15/04720; CA Nîmes, 22 February 2018, RG no 16/04746. 
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As for the Gorge case, it is the first French decision in which the Cour de cassation 
used the expression ‘subsidiary character’ in relation to the action de in rem verso. But 
the court had used it the year before, too.115 Ruling on the codified action de in rem 
verso of Moroccan law, the Chambre des requêtes distinguished its status expressly 
from that of its subsidiary French analogue, though it is hard to discern precisely what 
was meant by this. And as we shall see momentarily, the vocabulary arrived in the 
French courts some time earlier than 1939. 
 
Turning to the 1971 decision of the Troisième chambre civile, the language of 
subsidiarity was again imposed upon it by contemporary commentators without 
question.116 Several judgments have subsequently copied the formula, accompanied 
by the language.117 It comes from a casenote on the Gorge decision by Paul 
Esmein,118 whose views on the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso are discussed 
in chapter 4. 
 
It is uncertain when the vocabulary of subsidiarity entered French unjustified 
enrichment discourse. But we can say, first, that it arrived earlier than the arrêts 
Clayette and Briauhant: the oldest scholarly mention of the adjective subsidiaire in 
relation to unjustified enrichment seems to be in Alphonse Berliner’s 1852 doctoral 
thesis, in which he states that ‘the action de in rem verso is only a subsidiary ground, 
granted in the absence of all other routes to redress’.119 This view was contradicted 
as early as 1899.120 Among the better-known early twentieth century authors, Marcel 
Planiol was perhaps the first to invoke the adjective subsidiaire, in describing the 
relationship between the action de in rem verso and vindication,121 an issue addressed 
in chapter 5. 
                                               
115 Req, 20 April 1939; [1939] Gaz Pal, II, 102; [1940] RTD Civ 286, critical observations by H and L 
Mazeaud: ‘[A]ttendu que, contrairement à ce qui est pour la métropole, l’action de in rem verso en 
territoire du Protectorat de la République française au Maroc est codifiée par [des dispositions] qui n’en 
font à aucun titre une action d’un caractère essentiellement subsidiaire […].’ 
116 See the casenote by Y Loussouarn, [1971] RTD Civ 842. See also Weill and Terré (n 92) no 823 
and note 4; J Carbonnier, Droit civil, IV: Les obligations (9th edn, PUF 1976) no 121. 
117 CA Pau, 5 March 2009, RG no 08/03017; CA Toulouse, 15 September 2009, RG no 08/01040; CA 
Nancy, 9 May 2011, RG no 09/01683; CA Besançon, 20 March 2013, RG no 10/01034. 
118 P Esmein [1940] S, I, 141. 
119 A Berliner, De l’action de in rem verso (Silberman 1852) 31: ‘l’action de in rem verso n’est qu’un 
moyen subsidiaire, accordé à défaut de toute autre voie de revendication’. 
120 Raynaud (n 84) 82-93, 145, note 2, using the language of subsidiarity to refer to previous discussion. 
121 M Planiol, Traité élémentaire de droit civil, vol II (3rd edn, LGDJ 1905) no 935. Compare M Planiol, 
Traité élémentaire de droit civil, vol II (2nd edn, Cotillon-Pichon 1902) no 935. 
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We can also say, secondly, that subsidiarity arrived later than the arrêts Clayette and 
Briauhant, thanks to lower courts. The oldest judicial endorsement of the ‘caractère 
subsidiaire’ of the action de in rem verso which it has been possible to trace is in a 
1934 decision of the Cour de Lyon,122 in which the obstacle of fact permission was 
applied, and an example of what we now know as the obstacle of law bar (a person’s 
letting a contractual action go by) was endorsed in an obiter dictum.123 In 1936, the 
Tribunal de St-Jean-d’Angely applied a version of the obstacle of law bar, where a 
person had let a statutory route to redress go by her, holding that, ‘indeed, the action 
de in rem verso has only a subsidiary character’.124 And in 1937, the Cour d’appel of 
Paris stated, obiter, that letting another route to redress go by would exclude an 
unjustified enrichment action. It then rejected such an action in the presence of an 
open contractual action, setting out the first Clayette-Briauhant limb almost verbatim. 
Crucially, for our purposes, it described the action de in rem verso as ‘subsidiary’.125 
So before the Cour de cassation had even endorsed the obstacle of fact permission 
in terms of subsidiarity, judges in lower courts had done this for all the modern rules. 
Their contribution to the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso remains substantial, 
as demonstrated by discussion and footnotes throughout this study. 
 
III. SCOTS LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Though Scottish judges have accepted subsidiarity, whereas their English 
counterparts have not, they are not so enamoured with it as their French cousins. In 
scholarship, subsidiarity is strong, but commentators are often quite critical. 
 
A. Scots law 
 
Subsidiarity’s foothold in the cases is modest: there are really only two relevant 
decisions. Three other cases, often cited as having employed the doctrine, must briefly 
be examined, too. 
                                               
122 CA Lyon, 27 June 1934 (n 80). 
123 For a rare consideration of this phenomenon from a French perspective, see S Tournaux, ‘L’obiter 
dictum de la Cour de cassation’ [2011] RTD Civ 45. 
124 Trib de St-Jean-d’Angely, 27 February 1936; [1936] S, II, 173. 
125 CA Paris, 21 April 1937; [1937] Gaz Pal, II, 426. 
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In the first real subsidiarity case, Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council,126 the pursuer 
failed in unjustified enrichment for recompense of outlay in performing the defender’s 
statutory obligation to keep up a bridge.127 ‘[T]he parties did not dispute the subsidiarity 
of the remedy of recompense’, and, following Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Burgh 
Council,128 Lord Hodge accepted a ‘general rule excluding recompense if the pursuer 
[fails] to pursue another remedy either at common law or under statute’.129 This was 
subject to the establishment by the pursuer of ‘special and strong circumstances to 
justify an action of recompense where there was, or had been, an alternative remedy 
open to the pursuer’.130 Transco had not proved that the repairs were urgent or that 
consulting the Council before conducting works was impracticable. And it had not, as 
was its right, sued the Council for implement of its repairing obligation. In simply 
commissioning the repairs, then suing in unjustified enrichment, Transco deprived the 
Council of the opportunities to de-list the bridge, and escape its obligation; and to 
assess whether it was really obliged to do the works. 
 
Lord Hodge clearly imposed the language of subsidiarity on Varney, and discussed 
four other decisions under that rubric, none of which invoked it.131 Overall, Transco is 
an imposed enrichment case, rationalising as an example of unjustified enrichment’s 
subsidiarity the denial of an unjustified enrichment claim for the remedy of 
recompense, when another (statutory) route to redress was concurrently available to 
the pursuer at the time of the enrichment claim. The clear rationale for this decision 
was the protection of the council’s freedom of choice, and the public finances.132 
 
                                               
126 [2005] CSOH 76, 2005 SLT 958. 
127 The defender’s obligation had to be assumed: ibid, [2] (Lord Hodge). 
128 1974 SC 245 (IH). 
129 Transco (n 126) [16]. 
130 ibid, [16], [18]-[19] (Lord Hodge); citing Varney (n 128) esp 259-260 (Lord Fraser); and Property 
Selection & Investment Trust Ltd v United Friendly Insurance Plc 1999 SLT 975 (OH) 985 (Lord 
Macfadyen). 
131 Transco (n 126) [17], [19]; citing, in the order in which they appear in Lord Hodge’s opinion, City of 
Glasgow DC v Morrison McChlery & Co 1985 SC 52 (IH); Property Selection (n 130); Northern 
Lighthouses Commissioners v Edmonston (1908) 16 SLT 439 (OH); and Lawrence Building Co Ltd v 
Lanarkshire CC 1978 SC 30 (IH). 
132 Transco (n 126) [17]-[18]. 
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In the second real subsidiarity case, Courtney’s Executors v Campbell,133 the pursuers 
failed in unjustified enrichment for restitution and recompense of money and non-
money benefits conferred during the deceased’s cohabitation with the defender. The 
relationship ended in 2013; the case started in 2016.134 Statute provides for the 
discretionary financial redress of economic advantage or disadvantage during 
cohabitation, but under a strict one year time limit following its cessation.135 The 
executors failed to establish the ‘special and strong circumstances’ required to 
proceed late in unjustified enrichment.136 The deceased could have sought legal 
advice earlier than he did, and his circumstances would obtain in many financial 
redress claims. None of this displaced the policy of discouraging stale claims, implicit 
in the short time limit. 
 
Lord Beckett’s discussion took place beneath the subheading of ‘Subsidiarity’.137 The 
vocabulary was used extensively, and imposed on several cases.138 This lends 
legitimacy to discussion in conceptual terms of subsidiarity. And unlike in Transco, 
Lord Beckett confirmed that, absent ‘special and strong circumstances’, all types of 
unjustified enrichment claim are ‘available only when no other legal remedy is or has 
been available’.139 
 
Overall, Courtney’s is an enrichment by transfer case, which rationalises as an 
example of unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity the denial of unjustified enrichment 
claims in general, where another statutory route to redress was barred at the time of 
an enrichment claim. The reason for the decision was the need to preserve the policy 
behind the one year statutory time limit.140 
 
                                               
133 [2016] CSOH 136, 2017 SCLR 387. 
134 ibid, [1], [12], [41]. Lord Beckett does not say exactly when Courtney died. 
135 And not breakdown of the relationship: Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, ss 28, 29A. See Courtney’s 
Executors (n 133) [49]-[50]; citing Simpson v Downie [2012] CSIH 74, 2013 SLT 178, on the strict time 
limit. 
136 Courtney’s Executors (n 133) [66]-[70] (Lord Beckett). 
137 ibid, [47]-[71]. 
138 ibid, [53]-[59], [62]-[64], [66]; discussing (in the order in which they appear in Lord Beckett’s opinion) 
Varney (n 128); Transco (n 126); Lawrence, Inner House (n 131); Newton v Newton 1925 SC 715 (IH); 
Bennett v Carse 1990 SLT 454 (OH); Devos Gebroeder NV v Sunderland Sportswear Ltd (No 2) 1990 
SC 291 (IH); Morrison McChlery (n 131). Of the decisions cited, only Transco mentions subsidiarity. 
139 Courtney’s Executors (n 133) [52]-[54], [57]-[58], [60]. 
140 ibid, [69]. 
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Subsidiarity’s presence in Scots enrichment law is exaggerated by discussion, in the 
above cases, and much scholarship, of authorities which do not use the vocabulary. 
Where possible, such decisions are highlighted in subsequent chapters, and the error 
of rationalising them in terms of subsidiarity explained (whether in main text or 
footnotes). This is done now, though, for three notable cases which are not addressed 
later. 
 
First, in Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Burgh Council,141 a burgh was bound by 
statute at least to reimburse for work done by the pursuer, who claimed unsuccessfully 
in recompense when unpaid. The Lord Justice Clerk (Wheatley) referenced a passage 
from Lord Kames’ Principles of Equity in holding that ‘the doctrine of recompense 
cannot be invoked when another legal remedy is available to the pursuers’.142 This is 
addressed below. His Lordship further cited Stewart v Steuart143 as ‘a case in point’, 
but it is simply a decision denying recompense for want of loss. Light on authority, his 
Lordship’s opinion makes a policy decision against foisting an uncosted liability onto 
another obliged to cover it, when performance of the relevant obligation could be 
compelled. Lord Kissen ‘did not find much assistance in’ the Kames passage.144 He 
could not ‘see how an equitable remedy [might] be invoked when another remedy 
given by statute or, indeed, by common law was available and was not used’, and 
incorrectly cited the Stewart case, also. Lord Fraser’s opinion has lasted better. It 
identifies benefit, loss and absence of donative intent as ‘clearly essential’ factors in 
recompense, and holds that ‘the whole circumstances of the case must be such that 
it would be equitable for the pursuers to be reimbursed by the defenders on the basis 
of quantum lucrati’.145 The pursuer failed here.146 It ‘took the risk of being able to pin 
legal liability on the’ burgh, and could not be allowed to sue in recompense upon 
                                               
141 Varney (n 128). 
142 ibid, 250, 252-253. 
143 (1878) 6 R 145 (IH). There, the pursuer inherited land to which water rates had accrued in respect 
of a supply from it to other land held by the defender (both plots having belonged to another, deceased, 
who had diverted water to create the supply and obtained the court’s approval to charge rates). The 
defender did not pay the pursuer; rightly, it was held, because there was neither statutory nor 
contractual right in the pursuer to charge rates. So the pursuer claimed in recompense instead. This 
claim was denied because the pursuer had suffered no loss. He had expended nothing on the water 
supply, and could only cut it off to the defender’s land: ibid, esp 148-149 (Lord President Inglis, with 
whom Lord Deas agreed in the result, adding his own reasoning, Lord Shand simply agreeing with both 
of them). 
144 Varney (n 128) 255. 
145 ibid, 258. 
146 ibid, 259-260. 
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finding this impossible. To do otherwise ‘would open the door very wide for any party 
to short-cut proper procedure’. His Lordship cited the Kames passage for the view that 
the absence of a ‘common law’ remedy was at least ‘important’, and continued:147 
 
‘I do not know that it is absolutely essential to the success of an action 
for recompense that the pursuer should not have, and should never have 
had, any possibility of raising an action under the ordinary law, but in my 
opinion it would at least require special and strong circumstances to 
justify an action of recompense where there was, or had been, an 
alternative remedy open to the pursuer. […] In the present case the 
common law did afford relief, but the pursuers did not avail themselves 
of it, and in the circumstances of this case that is, in my opinion, enough 
to prevent their relying on the equitable remedy.’ 
 
Many consider this case to be the modern root of subsidiarity.148 The absence of the 
vocabulary from the decision suggests that this is incorrect. 
 
For the same reason,149 also irrelevant to this study is Lawrence Building Co Ltd v 
Lanarkshire CC.150 Sewers vested in a council after work on them was completed by 
the pursuers, in line with a practice already judicially approved.151 But, departing from 
that practice, payment was never made. The pursuers claimed in implied contract and, 
alternatively, in recompense. The Lord President (Emslie) addressed the requirement 
in recompense that ‘in all the circumstances it would be equitable for the pursuers to 
be reimbursed’.152 It was argued that if the defender was obliged to construct the 
sewers, the pursuer should have followed the pre-approved practice, and petitioned 
                                               
147 ibid, 259-260. 
148 WDH Sellar, ‘Obligations’ in R Black (ed), The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 
XV (Lexis Nexis 1995) [68]; HL MacQueen and WDH Sellar, ‘Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law’ in EJH 
Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (Duncker & 
Humblot 1995) 312-314; J Blackie, ‘Enrichment, Wrongs and Invasion of Rights in Scots Law’ [1997] 
Acta Juridica 284, 289-290; N Whitty, ‘Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council: Developing Enrichment 
Law after Shilliday’ (2006) 10 Edinburgh L Rev 113, 122-123. 
149 And pace, eg, Sellar (n 148) [69]; MacQueen and Sellar (n 148) 313-314; Whitty (n 148) 122-123 
and note 61. 
150 Lawrence, Inner House (n 131); upholding 1978 SC 30 (OH). 
151 See T Docherty Ltd v Monifieth Town Council 1970 SC 200 (IH) 206-207 (the Lord President [Clyde]). 
In that case, a petition for declarator was presented ab initio. 
152 Lawrence, Inner House (n 131) 42, 44-45. 
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ab initio for implement or declarator of that obligation. His Lordship forbore to decide 
Varney’s correctness, and distinguished the defender’s duty in that case from the 
council’s in this: ‘it is by no means clear that there would have been a duty on the 
defenders to construct the sewers at the stage when the […] petition was presented 
in Docherty’s case[153] or that it would have been either reasonable or practicable for 
the pursuers to have the question of liability for the cost of the sewers determined 
before the work of construction began’.154 Lord Cameron agreed with this in 
substance, and Lord Grieve agreed with both other opinions. The case is not about 
subsidiarity. 
 
Nor155 is McGraddie v McGraddie.156 There, the Inner House made observations on 
the basis that the second defender was enriched without legal ground at the pursuer’s 
expense:157 
 
‘As for Varney […], there it was held that a pursuer who has, say, a 
statutory or contractual remedy against a defender, must use that 
remedy rather than resorting to an equitable remedy such as restitution 
or recompense based on unjustified enrichment. But in the present case, 
so far as the second defender is concerned, the pursuer would have had 
no remedy against her other than an equitable one. We are not therefore 
persuaded that the ratio in Varney […] would have prevented the pursuer 
from enforcing that equitable remedy against the second defender.’ 
 
The reference to contractual remedies puzzles: Varney says nothing about them. We 
cannot know whether the court was exposed to the language of subsidiarity, yet 
omitted it. Nevertheless, and significantly, it is absent from this recent high-level 
discussion of the interaction of unjustified enrichment claims with other routes to 
redress provided by law. 
 
                                               
153 Docherty (n 151). 
154 Lawrence, Inner House (n 131) 44. 
155 Pace R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W 
Green 2013) [7.10]. 
156 McGraddie v McGraddie [2012] CSIH 23, 2012 GWD 15-310; overruled on other grounds [2013] 
UKSC 58, 2014 SC (UKSC) 12; upholding [2010] CSOH 60, 2010 GWD 21-404. 
157 ibid, [54] (Lady Paton, Lord Bonomy and Lord Malcolm). 
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In summary, the subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment is gaining  ground in Scots 
cases. The Outer House has embraced the language to explain the rules discussed 
above, which exist to preserve autonomy and order in the legal system. But it remains 
arguable in the Inner House that the doctrine affirmed in Varney and subsequent cases 
is simply not about subsidiarity. 
 
B. Scots scholarship 
 
Numerous Scottish scholarly endorsements, to varying extents, of the subsidiarity of 
unjustified enrichment, are addressed in this study. As in English and French 
scholarship, a common reason for this is a perceived need to prevent unjustified 
enrichment’s upsetting solutions provided by other legal rules.158  
 
It has been suggested that ‘in 1974 the subsidiarity rule was plucked from a little known 
and hitherto uninfluential passage in Kames’s Principles of Equity and affirmed as part 
of Scots law in the Varney case’.159 We must absolve Lord Kames of responsibility for 
subsidiarity at once. Not only does he not use the language, his account of the 
application of the maxim ‘[n]emo debet locupletari aliena jactura’ to the case of the 
bona fide improver-possessor of land cannot bear the weight placed upon it.160 Kames 
simply stated that the ‘common law affords no relief’ to the pursuer in the form of a 
vindicatio. He seems not even to have meant that the lack of a ‘legal’ remedy for the 
bona fide possessor was a factor which favoured the application of his maxim.161 
Rather, since what Kames saw as legal remedies are useless, equity – unjustified 
enrichment – had to step in. 
 
Their willingness to explain too many cases in such terms aside, modern Scottish 
writers are generally cautious when studying subsidiarity, perhaps due to strong 
engagement with comparative material. This is seen in very early discussion of 
                                               
158 EM Clive, Draft Rules on Unjustified Enrichment and Commentary – Appendix to Scottish Law 
Commission Discussion Paper No 99 (HMSO Scot 1994) 85-87; Whitty (n 148) 126; Evans-Jones (n 
155) [3.39], [7.05]. 
159 Whitty (n 148) 123. 
160 Lord Kames, Principles of Equity [by] Henry Home, Lord Kames, vol I (M Lobban ed, 3rd edn, (1778) 
Liberty Fund 2014) 141-142. 
161 It is respectfully submitted that Lord Fraser went too far even to suggest in Varney (n 128) 260, that 
‘[w]hile Lord Kames did not say that the absence of a remedy under the common law was essential, he 
evidently regarded it as important’. 
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subsidiarity in Scotland by native scholars.162 In 1993,163 the Scottish Law Commission 
explained that subsidiarity did not then extend beyond actions for recompense, noted 
similarities with the French position, and remained studiously neutral on subsidiarity 
in principle.164 
 
Although, in highly regarded work,165 at least one earlier author was more enthusiastic 
about subsidiarity,166 a circumspect approach to the need for subsidiarity across 
enrichment law generally is evident in other commentary.167 Even ready acceptance 
of the concept and language was accompanied in the 1990s by talk of ‘damage’, and 
‘an urgent need for further clarification’.168 
 
The 2000s have seen stronger critical and comparative notes, and even an outright 
rejection of subsidiarity.169 Hector MacQueen’s important 2009 work is examined in 
chapter 6.170 His earlier survey,171 drawing, especially, on Louisiana and Québec law, 
concludes:172 
                                               
162 But see, eg, W de Vos, ‘Liability Arising from Unjustified Enrichment in the Law of the Union of South 
Africa, II’ [1960] JR 226, 252, advocating a gap-filling, ‘subsidiary’ general enrichment action in South 
African law. This piece was probably widely read, and may have inspired others. It was (i) praised as 
‘an admirable survey […] with particular relevance for Scots law’ by TB Smith, A Short Commentary on 
the Law of Scotland (W Green 1962) 624 and note 7; (ii) cited by, eg, HL MacQueen, ‘Unjustified 
Enrichment and Breach of Contract’ [1994] JR 137, 155 and note 78; K Reid, ‘Unjustified Enrichment 
and Property Law’ [1994] JR 167, 186 and note 85; and (iii) appears in the further reading list of Lord 
Rodger’s enrichment chapter in WA Wilson and A Forte (eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland 
(10th edn, W Green 1995) ch 29. (de Vos’ switch in favour of a non-subsidiary general action is 
explained in English by D Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (Juta 2008) 58-59.) 
163 And beaten marginally to the use of the word (in a one-liner) by WJ Stewart, The Law of Restitution 
in Scotland (W Green 1992) [8.19]. 
164 Scottish Law Commission, Recovery of Benefits Conferred Under Error of Law, vol I (Scot Law Com 
DP no 95, 1993) [3.107]-[3.108] and note 2; citing, for French law, D Friedmann and N Cohen, ‘Payment 
of Another’s Debt’ in P Schlechtriem (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol X (Mohr 
/ Siebeck / Nijhoff 1991) [84]. 
165 See Burrows, Restitution (n 32) 8: ‘worthy of close attention […] is [Clive’s] formidable work’. 
166 Discussed, in particular, in chapter 4: Clive (n 158) rule 11 and commentary, 86-88 and note 72; 
citing, eg, F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, vol II/1 (8th edn, Montchrestien 
1991) no 706, and drawing on the French position. 
167 See N Whitty, ‘Indirect Enrichment in Scots Law, I’ [1994] JR 200, 217. 
168 MacQueen and Sellar (n 148) 314. See similarly Sellar (n 148) [71]: ‘A review of the subject as a 
whole is urgently required’. 
169 By Martin Hogg in Obligations (2nd edn, Avizandum 2006) [4.111]-[4.121]. 
170 HL MacQueen, ‘Unjustified Enrichment, Subsidiarity and Contract’ in V Palmer and E Reid (eds), 
Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland (EUP 2009). 
171 HL MacQueen, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal Systems’ [2005] RLR 21, 24-27 and notes 
18-27; citing, eg, B Nicholas, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, Parts I and II’ 
(1961) 36 Tulane L Rev 605; (1962) 37 Tulane L Rev 49; Smith, ‘Property, Subsidiarity and Unjust 
Enrichment’ (n 13); and cases such as Coastal Environment Specialists Inc v Chem-Lig International 
(2001) 818 So 2d 12 (La CA 1st Cir). 
172 MacQueen, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal Systems’ (n 171) 31. 
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‘It is significant […] that there is controversy as to the need for (or scope 
of) this subsidiarity, even if one’s ambition is to fence in enrichment 
liability within the overall structure of the law. Can the limitations imposed 
by subsidiarity be worked out better, and more in accord with coherent 




‘A general test of subsidiarity seems to pose more questions than 
answers: how far the exploration of alternative possible remedies must 
go, and whether or not they must give rise to successful claims.’ 
 
Also worthy of mention is Niall Whitty’s long 2006 note on the Transco case. He 
cautions against the judicial abrogation of subsidiarity, because ‘judicial discretion 
dissolves the common law’. Instead, he advocates ‘a minimalist solution’, limiting 
subsidiarity ‘to the particular category of causes of action involved in the Varney and 
Transco cases, namely imposed enrichment arising from performance of another’s 
obligations’.174 Yet he immediately askes: ‘why stop there?’175 We realise that, subject 
to an exception, considered in chapter 6, Whitty would probably abolish subsidiarity if 
his view of the judicial role allowed. Like his colleagues, Whitty also uses comparative 
material, and agrees with:176 
 
‘[A] widespread view among comparatists that “the rule of subsidiarity is 
no more than a particular application of the policy of avoiding a fraud on 
the law and should be interpreted in that light” […] [I]t is a “control device” 
restraining the inherent expansiveness of enrichment law so that it does 
not disrupt or undermine the operation of other equally useful branches 
of law.’ 
 
                                               
173 ibid, 33. 
174 Whitty (n 148) 125-126. 
175 ibid, 126. 
176 ibid, 126 and n 80; citing Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments’ (n 20) 93. 
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Whitty’s minimalist view is now reflected in the leading short account of Scots 
enrichment law.177 These contributions may form a bulwark against further expansion 
of subsidiarity, should the Inner House of the Court of Session ever be called upon to 
decide the correctness of the approach taken in Transco and Courtney’s case.178 But 
the work of Robin Evans-Jones, analysed in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 9, favours 
subsidiarity in explaining unjustified enrichment’s relations with contract law,179 and 
the interaction with each other of different kinds of unjustified enrichment claim.180 




In England, subsidiarity is absent from the law of unjust enrichment. But some writers 
endorse it fairly unquestioningly. In France, subsidiarity is the firm orthodoxy, though 
some now contend harder to reduce its hold over enrichissement injustifié. In Scotland, 
subsidiarity’s purchase in enrichment law is slight. Though widespread in scholarship, 
it has not been received blindly. Across jurisdictions, the shared reason for accepting 










                                               
177 Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland (12th edn, W Green 2007) [25.19] and note 137; (13th 
edn, W Green, 2012) [24.19] and note 139; (14th edn, W Green 2017) [24.19] and note 143; the latter 
adding that Courtney’s Executors (n 133), ‘(a transfer case) is a misapplication of the subsidiarity rule’. 
Subsidiarity and the performance of another’s obligation is discussed from a different angle in chapters 
4 and 6. 
178 See also, talking partly of Courtney’s Executors (n 133), and partly more generally: Law Society of 
Scotland, The Scottish Law Commission’s Consultation on the Tenth Programme of Law Reform: 
Consultation Response (2017) 9-11: ‘The common law remedy should be restored and clarified now by 
providing that the doctrine of subsidiarity shall not apply to unjustified enrichment’. 
179 Eg, in R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, I: Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio (W 
Green 2003) [1.99]. 
180 Evans-Jones (n 155) [3.09]-[3.10], [3.37]-[3.39]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, SUBSIDIARITY, AND STATUTE 
 
Previous chapters in this study provide background on the law of unjust enrichment, 
introduce a definition and principles of subsidiarity, and sketch the history of, and 
reasons for, subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment. This chapter 
is the first to put those general chapters to use. Its first part surveys material in the law 
and literature about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity in situations where its operation 
is somehow precluded by statute. In the second part of this chapter, this material is 
tested against the theory of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this study. It will be 
seen that none of the law and scholarship can correctly be characterised as entailing 
unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to statute. The third part of this chapter re-analyses 
the sources, in order better to explain unjust enrichment’s relations with statute. 
 
I. THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter presents claims about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to 
statute. They are found in French and Scots law and scholarship. 
 
A. England  
 
Nothing in English law suggests that unjust enrichment is there subsidiary to statutory 
regimes. The scholarship is nearly as sparse. Lionel Smith appears to accept that, in 
principle, enrichment can be subsidiary to statute. However, his conclusion is limited: 
‘[t]he common law does not know “subsidiarity” by that name, but elements of that 
relationship appear to be embedded in the law’.1 This cannot be fairly taken as a claim 





                                               
1 L Smith, ‘Property, Subsidiarity and Unjust Enrichment’ in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), 
Unjustified enrichment: key issues in comparative perspective (CUP 2002) 613-614, 623. 
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B. France 
 
As shown in chapter 3, article 1303-3 of the Code civil, and the Cour de cassation’s 
formulae from which it derives, are claims or rules about the subsidiarity of the action 
de in rem verso in France. Though they do not themselves use the language of 
subsidiarity, many other sources, referred to earlier, do put it to the now-codified rules. 
Article 1303-3 encompasses open or legally barred statutory actions. Through its 
‘obstacle of law’ bar, found in earlier cases, it further catches statutory regimes which 
do not themselves confer rights of action, but are inconsistent with unjustified 
enrichment actions. Statute was specifically added to the original Clayette / Briauhant 
formula by the Cour de cassation in 1951,2 before this was linguistically shortened but 
legally broadened twenty years later.3 Further specific claims that unjustified 
enrichment is subsidiary to statute exist. Four examples from the cases are addressed, 
before brief mention of some relevant scholarship. 
 
First, take unjustified enrichment’s supposed subsidiarity to delict in French law. 
Claims that this is true double as claims about unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity to 
statute. French law’s general principle of delictual liability is found in the Code civil, 
article 1240 (formerly the famous article 1382). And as will be shown in more detail in 
chapter 7, many cases explain the interaction of unjustified enrichment and delict in 
terms of subsidiarity,4 with both open and barred delictual actions discounting recourse 
to unjustified enrichment. The same approach has been taken with other statutory 
regimes. 
 
                                               
2 ‘[L]’action de in rem verso ne doit être admise que dans les cas où le patrimoine d’une personne se 
trouvant enrichi au détriment de celui d’une autre, celle-ci ne jouirait, pour obtenir ce qui lui est dû, 
d’aucune action naissant d’un contrat, quasi-contrat, délit, quasi-délit ou de la loi […]’: Civ, 29 January 
1951, Bull civ I, no 34, also mentioning the ‘caractère subsidiaire’ of the action. See, previously, but 
introducing statute differently, CA Paris, 21 April 1937; [1937] Gaz Pal, II, 426: the action de in rem 
verso ‘est subsidiaire et ne peut être exercée lorsque le demandeur peut obtenir satisfaction par une 
autre action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-contrat ou d’un délit, ou a omis d’exercer, pour la 
sauvegarde de ses droits, une autre action que la loi mettait à sa disposition’. 
3 In part one of the Troisième Chambre civile’s well known formula. See Civ 3e, 29 April 1971, pourvoi 
no 70-10415, Bull civ III, no 277; [1970-1971] Rapport annuel C cass 37; [1971] Gaz Pal, II, 554; [1971] 
RTD Civ 842, observations by Y Loussouarn: ‘[1.] [L]’action fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause ne 
peut être admise qu’à défaut de toute autre action ouverte au demandeur; [2.] qu’elle ne peut l’être, 
notamment, pour suppléer à une autre action que le demandeur ne peut intenter par suite d’une 
prescription, d’une déchéance ou forclusion ou par l’effet de l’autorité de la chose jugée ou parce qu’il 
ne peut apporter les preuves qu’elle exige ou par suite de tout autre obstacle de droit […].’ 
4 In advance, see, for example, Civ 1re, 20 March 2014, pourvoi no 12-28318. 
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Secondly, let us examine a case showing the use of subsidiarity in relation to 
unjustified enrichment’s interaction with an open, that is, unbarred, statutory recourse, 
which a claimant could have used, but did not. In a 1960s decision, statute obliged a 
mining company to pay subscriptions into a scheme to finance grants to miners with 
families. But a miners’ union paid four years’ worth of those grants directly to miners, 
instead. The union then sued the company for unjustified enrichment in respect of this 
outlay. It failed. The statute obliged the company, not to make the actual grants 
themselves, but only to pay its subscriptions. And it seems that the union could have 
forced the company to do this, because the Cour de cassation approved the court 
below for holding that ‘the action de in rem verso has a subsidiary character, and is 
set aside when the party impoverished has the advantage of another route to redress 
which it has neglected to use’.5 
 
Thirdly comes an example of subsidiarity’s use in relation to unjustified enrichment’s 
interaction with a barred statutory recourse. In a case from the 1970s, a woman 
worked for twenty-one years on her parents’ farm without a formal salary. She left to 
get married, and so became ineligible for a deferred wage under a special statutory 
regime. Knowing this, she claimed in unjustified enrichment. The Tribunal de grande 
instance of Dieppe denied that action:6 
 
‘Considering that the action de in rem verso is a subsidiary route 
allowing a person who has no other action to vindicate its rights, but 
not to supplement another action refused by the legislator […]; that 
the claimant insists herself that she falls within [a statutory] case of 
exclusion; […] considering that she cannot [therefore] supplement the 
action so refused by the action de in rem verso […].’ 
 
                                               
5 Civ 2e, 1 December 1966, Bull civ II, no 943: ‘l’action de in rem verso a un caractère subsidiaire et se 
trouve écartée lorsque celui qui s’est appauvri a la disposition d’une autre voie de droit dont il a négligé 
d’user’. For another more recent example of the exclusion of the action de in rem verso due to the 
availability of a statutory action (based on the Code civil, art 555), see CA Colmar 22 February 2018 
RG no 126/2018. 
6 TGI Dieppe, 31 March 1977; [1977] JCP G, II, 18702: ‘Attendu que l’action de in rem verso est une 
voie subsidiaire permettant à qui ne dispose d’aucune autre action de faire valoir son droit, mais non 
de suppléer une action que le législateur refuse [...]; que la demanderesse insiste elle-même sur le fait 
qu’elle entre dans ce cas [légal d’exclusion dans le régime du contrat de salaire différé]; [...] Attendu 
qu’elle ne peut suppléer l’action ainsi refusée par l’action de in rem verso [...].’ 
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Fourthly, we turn to a case on commercial facts from the 1990s. It involved a statutory 
regime which provided for no recourse at all in respect of the benefit conferred. Rather, 
the statute was simply inconsistent with an unjustified enrichment action. The Cour de 
cassation’s judgment is left to speak for itself here:7 
 
‘Considering that, apart from exceptions provided for by [statute], 
directors can receive from the[ir] company no remuneration, whether 
permanent or not; that, therefore, a director cannot base a claim for 
compensation for work done in the service of the company on the 
latter’s unjustified enrichment, since the action de in rem verso cannot 
be used to supplement another action barred by an obstacle of law; 
given that, in affirming the claim for compensation made by Mme X, 
the court of appeal held that recourse to unjustified enrichment was 
legitimate in principle; given that, in so holding, whereas it appears 
from the judgment [below] that Mme X was fulfilling the functions of a 
company director when she provided the services in respect of which 
she pursues payment, the court of appeal has violated [the relevant 
statutory provisions] […].’ 
 
A later decision dealt with an identical claim more explicitly in terms of subsidiarity: ‘a 
director in post cannot receive any remuneration other than that authorised [by 
statute], with the result that an action in unjustified enrichment, which has a subsidiary 
character, is barred in this case by an obstacle of law’.8 
 
                                               
7 Com, 16 May 1995, pourvoi no 93-14709, Bull civ IV, no 149; [1996] Rev sociétés 95, observations by 
C Gerschel; [1996] RTD Civ 160, observations by J Mestre: ‘Attendu que sauf exceptions prévues par 
la loi […], les administrateurs ne peuvent recevoir de la société aucune rémunération, permanente ou 
non; que dès lors, un administrateur ne peut fonder une demande d’indemnité pour le travail accompli 
au service de la société sur l’enrichissement sans cause de celle-ci, l’action de in rem verso ne pouvant 
être introduite pour suppléer à une autre action qui se heurte à un obstacle de droit; Attendu que pour 
accueillir la demande en indemnisation formée par Mme X, la cour d’appel a retenu que le principe du 
recours à l’enrichissement sans cause était légitime; Attendu qu’en statuant ainsi, alors qu’il résulte des 
énonciations de l’arrêt que Mme X exerçait des fonctions d’administrateur de la société à l’époque où 
elle a fourni à celle-ci les prestations dont elle poursuit le paiement, la cour d’appel a violé les textes 
[pertinents] […].’ 
8 Soc, 5 November 2009, pourvoi no 08-43177; [2010] Bull Joly Soc 462, observations by P Le Canu: 
‘un administrateur en fonction ne peut percevoir aucune autre rémunération que celles autorisées par 
[la loi], en sorte qu’une action pour enrichissement sans cause, qui présente un caractère subsidiaire, 
se heurte en ce cas à un obstacle de droit’. 
 - 105 - 
A good deal of earlier scholarship also contains claims that unjustified enrichment is 
subsidiary to statute. The earliest that it has been possible to track down is from 1852.9 
In a noted 1922 article, André Rouast criticised the Cour de cassation’s Clayette-
Briauhant formulation of subsidiarity, as he saw it,10 because it omitted statutory 
actions – ‘actions nées de la loi’. He then proposed a new basic formula and developed 
the distinction between obstacles of law and fact.11 In 1926, in what remains one of 
the lengthiest treatments of unjustified enrichment in French law, Joseph Bonnecase 
largely endorsed Rouast’s view of subsidiarity, and specifically affirmed that it 
extended to statute.12 Similar specific claims exist in later writing.13 But they are more 
difficult to find, following the courts’ firm commitment to analysing subsidiarity based 
on open and barred enrichment actions, coupled with the distinction between 
obstacles of law and fact.14 This is perhaps because unjustified enrichment’s 
subsidiarity to statute tended from then onwards to be collapsed into, or encompassed 
by, the law-fact distinction, or other models based on different factual situations in 
which subsidiarity will operate.15 For this reason, French scholarship on enrichment, 
subsidiarity and statute, is often of historical and scholarly interest only. It is not 




Unjustified enrichment’s relations with statute in Scots law have been analysed using 
subsidiarity. Take first Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council,16 about repairs to a bridge 
carrying gas pipes. Overall, it is an imposed enrichment case, rationalising the denial 
                                               
9 A Berliner, De l’action de in rem verso (Silberman 1852) 31-32, giving the example of Code civil, art 
548. 
10 It was argued in chapter 3 that the arrêts Clayette and Briauhant were not strictly about subsidiarity 
at all. See Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull somm, I, 86; [1918] S, I, 41, 
noted by E Naquet; Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] DP, I, 102 (first case). 
11 A Rouast, ‘L’enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile’ [1922] RTD Civ 35, 83-84. 
12 J Bonnecase, Supplément au Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil par G Baudry-Lacantinerie et 
L-J Barde, vol III (Sirey 1926) nos 146, 149-150, 152. 
13 P Drakidis, ‘La “subsidiarité”, caractère spécifique et international de l’action d’enrichissement sans 
cause’ [1961] RTD Civ 577, 613: first proposition a contrario. 
14 See, most clearly in the Cour de cassation, Civ 3e, 29 April 1971 (n 3). 
15 For a clear modern example of this, see F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, 
vol II/1 (9th edn, Montchrestien 1998) no 706-710, esp 709. See also, eg, B Starck, H Roland and L 
Boyer, Droit civil: Les obligations, vol II (6th edn, Litec 1998) nos 2207-2210; F Terré, P Simler and Y 
Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (11th edn, Dalloz 2013) no 1073-1; (12th edn, with F Chénedé, 
Dalloz 2018) nos 1309-1314; AM Romani, ‘Enrichissement sans cause’, Rép civ Dalloz (2017) nos 278-
358. 
16 [2005] CSOH 76, 2005 SLT 958. 
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of an unjustified enrichment claim for the remedy of recompense, when another 
(statutory) route to redress was concurrently available to the pursuer at the time of the 
enrichment claim, as an example of unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity. The 
‘determining issue’ was that the pursuers had not ‘averred strong and special 
circumstances to take themselves out of the general rule of the subsidiarity of the 
remedy of recompense’.17 
 
Take next Courtney’s Executors v Campbell,18 about a late claim for financial redress 
under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 for financial redress. Overall, it is an 
enrichment by transfer case, rationalising the denial of unjustified enrichment claims 
in general where another statutory route to redress was barred at the time of an 
enrichment claim, as an example of unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity: absent 
‘special and strong circumstances’, unjustified enrichment claims are ‘available only 
when no other legal remedy is or has been available’.19 The effect of these authorities 
is that, absent special and strong circumstances, all unjustified enrichment claims are 
subsidiary to statutory routes of redress which either are concurrently available to a 











                                               
17 ibid, [18] (Lord Hodge). 
18 [2016] CSOH 136, 2017 SCLR 387. 
19 ibid, [52]-[54], [60], [65]. 
20 In particular, see ibid, esp [53], [58], [60]. Here, Lord Beckett said that the subsidiarity ‘principle arises 
wherever an equitable remedy is sought on the ground of unjustified enrichment’; that authority did ‘not 
support the view that the pursuers have no problem arising from the subsidiarity principle on the basis 
that the statutory remedy is no longer available’; and that ‘as it ha[d] been presented to [him], the 
subsidiarity principle applies not just in cases where recompense is the remedy sought but in all cases 
of unjustified enrichment’. 
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Scots enrichment scholarship has given less attention to unjustified enrichment’s 
subsidiarity to statute than it has to the issue of subsidiarity in other contexts examined 
in this study. But rule eleven of Eric Clive’s Draft Rules,21 headed ‘Bars to 
Proceedings’, provides: 
 
‘(1)(a) An action for unjustified enrichment cannot be brought under 
these rules if there is, or was, 
(i) a special statutory or contractual procedure for dealing with the 
situation giving rise to the enrichment or  
(ii) another legal remedy for the enrichment 
and if the claimant could reasonably have been expected to use that 
procedure or remedy.’ 
 
We are interested in sub-rule (1)(a)’s prohibition on an unjustified enrichment claim ‘if 
there is, or was (i) a special statutory procedure […] for dealing with the situation giving 
rise to the enrichment […] and if the claimant could reasonably have been expected 
to use that procedure […]’. It seems that, for Clive, this was a rule of subsidiarity. This 
is suggested by remarks and citations justifying rule eleven with policy.22 Clive says 
that this was ‘the existing Scottish law in relation to recompense’, and that France’s 
action de in rem verso is ‘subsidiary’. He also cites a translation of article 2042 of the 
Italian Civil Code headed ‘Ancillary character of the action’ in unjustified enrichment.23 
The original is headed ‘Carattere sussidiario dell’azione’. 
 
                                               
21 EM Clive, Draft Rules on Unjustified Enrichment and Commentary – Appendix to Scottish Law 
Commission Discussion Paper No 99 (HMSO Scot 1994). 
22 ibid, 85-86: special regimes and remedies must not be ‘bypassed by resort to the general law on 
unjustified enrichment’; it is necessary ‘to prevent a flood of attempts to re-open settled transactions’; 
and ‘unjustified enrichment is designed to deal with unforeseen situations’, not ‘provide an alternative 
remedy for an enrichment situation which is already regulated by a statute or a contract or an 
established rule of the common law’. 
23 ibid, 86 and notes 71-73; citing F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, vol II/1 
(8th edn, Montchrestien 1991) no 706, discussing subsidiarity; M Beltramo, GE Longo and JH 
Merryman (trs), The Italian Civil Code (Oceana 1969). But the Scottish cases cited by Clive do not 
support subsidiarity because they do not mention it. See Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Burgh Council 
1974 SC 245 (IH); City of Glasgow DC v Morrison McChlery & Co 1985 SC 52 (IH).   
 - 108 - 
There appear to be no other relevant, and extensive, positive claims in Scots 
enrichment scholarship. What of negative claims? Prior to Courtney’s case, Hector 
MacQueen made the following observations:24 
 
‘The policy behind the [subsidiarity] requirement [ie keeping the 
remedy of recompense within its proper bounds] can be fulfilled by 
observing the other requirements of enrichment law itself: for 
example, that enrichments which have a legal basis, having been 
gained through contract or gift, are irrecoverable; or by working 
through the rules relating to recoverable enrichments arising from 
transfers, impositions and takings, which will generally ensure that 
enrichment is kept within bounds. […] The Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006 does not explicitly prevent the common law from applying to any 
of the situations within its purview; nor, it is submitted, should 
enrichment claims be seen as subsidiary to, or excluded by, the 
existence of statutory ones.’ 
 
MacQueen notes that subsidiarity is often unnecessary, given the requirement, 
internal to enrichment law, that an enrichment be received without legal basis. But, 
turning to the relationship between enrichment and statute, MacQueen seems to leave 
the redundancy argument behind. Over it, he prefers the slightly different tack of 
reliance on the absence of any express exclusion of unjustified enrichment claims in 
the 2006 Act, and a straightforward submission that enrichment claims should not be 
subsidiary to statutory ones. That submission was rejected in Courtney’s case.25 The 
extra power which the redundancy argument needs is provided below. 
 
 
                                               
24 HL MacQueen, ‘Unjustified Enrichment and Family Law’ [2010] U Edinburgh L Sch Working Paper 
01, 4. 
25 Courtney’s Executors (n 18) [34], [60] (Lord Beckett): ‘Whilst it is true, as counsel for the pursuers 
observed, that the 2006 Act does not explicitly exclude an action based on unjustified enrichment being 
raised after the period specified in section 28(8), and I note Professor M[a]cQueen’s view on the matter, 
I am not persuaded that it follows that an equitable remedy will always remain open following the expiry 
of the 12 month period [instituted by section 28]. Parliament, and particularly the parliamentary 
draftsmen on whom it relies, are expected to be aware of the common law. If, as it has been presented 
to me in this case, the subsidiarity principle applies not just in cases where recompense is the remedy 
sought but in all cases of unjustified enrichment, then parliament would be expected to know that.’ 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
In this second part of the chapter, the claims set out above are analysed. The 
framework for discussion is the principles of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this 
study. The background is the conditional nature of subsidiarity, also developed in 
chapter 2, and both the law of unjust enrichment, and the general question of its 




Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to 
determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. To be a rule of 
subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or put an end to, 
a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one or more of the 
entities, the interaction of which it is supposed to manage, might be thought to prevent 
it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. It would also seem to deal 
with a question of overlap in a less then conditional manner. And as argued in chapter 
2, subsidiarity is an inherently conditional idea. Once an entity does not exist, there is 
no way for it eventually to become competent. Here, the relevant entities are, on one 
side, statutory regimes and the routes to redress that they provide, modify, or exclude, 
and on the other, the law of unjust enrichment and unjust enrichment claims. The 
above French and Scots accounts infringe the instant principle. 
 
The general claim found in French law (now in the Code civil, art 1303-3) and 
scholarship that enrichissement injustifié is subsidiary to open and legally barred 
statutory claims, or inconsistent statutory regimes which do not yield claims, fails. 
Focusing particularly on the Code civil, the rule clearly makes the enrichment action 
disappear (the claimant ‘has no action’).26 So it is not a rule of subsidiarity. The same 
reasoning applies to the more specific claims, found in particular cases. 
 
                                               
26 The partial exception to the obstacle of law bar, for negotiorum gestio in the Code civil, art 1303-5, 
makes no difference to the basic principle here. This issue is discussed further in chapter 9. 
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The French courts freely use the language of subsidiarity to describe unjustified 
enrichment’s relations with statute. Enrichment claims must be ‘set aside’ in the face 
of open statutory routes to redress.27 And, in a formula which covers both barred 
statutory actions and straightforwardly inconsistent regimes, the Cour de cassation 
has held that unjustified enrichment, ‘cannot be used to supplement another action 
barred by an obstacle of law’.28 It seems that the rules endorsed by the courts 
determine the existence of any unjustified enrichment claims when a statute relevantly 
exists, too. They are not about subsidiarity. 
 
Turning to Scots law, it is clear from the cases that subsidiarity is a rule ‘excluding’ 
unjustified enrichment if its operation would be inconsistent with a statute.29 If it would 
be, then, absent special and strong circumstances, unjustified enrichment will not 
‘remain open’, or, procedurally, ‘be relevant’.30 Since this rule determines the 
existence of unjustified enrichment on a given set of facts, it cannot be one of 
subsidiarity. The same objection applies to Clive’s rule 11(1)(a)(i) – which is a rule of 




A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, 
or groups of entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible 
at all in a given context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie 
unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. The above law and scholarship 
do not satisfy this principle. 
 
In French law, both under the Code civil, article 1303-3, and in the cases, the existence 
of open and barred statutory actions, and inconsistent statutory regimes, clearly 
means that there can be no action in enrichissement injustifié. One thing cannot be in 
a relationship with another thing, if one of those things does not exist. An enrichment 
                                               
27 Civ 2e, 1 December 1966 (n 5). 
28 Com, 16 May 1995 (n 7). 
29 Transco (n 16) [16] (Lord Hodge), referring to ‘the subsidiarity of the remedy of recompense’ and ‘the 
general rule excluding recompense if the pursuer had failed to pursue another remedy either at common 
law or under statute’.  
30 Courtney’s Executors (n 18) [60], [66]. 
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claim cannot be subsidiary to a statutory regime (whether or not it confers any right to 
redress) if it does not exist. 
 
To like effect are the Scots cases, and Clive’s rule. If applied, then in the face of an 
open, barred, or inconsistent statutory route to redress, unjustified enrichment, or an 
unjustified enrichment claim, will never join statutory rules to form part of a relevant 




For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that 
context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. The above French and Scots law 
and scholarship does not satisfy this principle. 
 
This is a short point. It makes no difference whether the above analyses canvassed 
here address it. None which favours enrichment’s subsidiarity to statute relevantly 
admits that the former can coexist with the latter. So none admits that they might 
concur. If none admits that, then none leaves any role for subsidiarity. Accounts which 




For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it 
must bind the relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in 
relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their 
relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be 
the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), 
there would be no need for subsidiarity. This is subsidiarity as meta-authority. A rule 
of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained. And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. The above French and Scots law and scholarship do not 
satisfy the instant principle. 
 - 112 - 
 
The rule in article 1303-3 of the Code civil is not a meta-authority in relation to the 
action en enrichissement injustifié or other statutes. It is placed in the chapter of the 
Code on that enrichment action, of which it is an ‘inherent condition’.31 This is clearly 
reflected in the more specific reasoning addressed above, also.32 So the rule is not 
sourced independently of the action de in rem verso, one of the entities to which it is 
supposed to apply. And it does not actually govern any potential statutory regime 
which might come under its formula, either. It works by making the action en 
enrichissement injustifié disappear in the face of statutes. The statute decides for itself, 
so to speak, what it is, or is not, going to do, and there is nothing in article 1303-3 that 
can change that. The same objection also applies to the French jurisprudence, 
addressed above. All of it is incorrect on the meta-authority point. Rules which are not 
independent, and cannot actually govern the things to which they apply, are not rules 
of subsidiarity. 
 
In the Transco case, Lord Hodge seemed to view subsidiarity to statute as part of the 
Scots law of unjustified enrichment:33 
 
‘[C]auses of action such as recompense are now treated as remedies 
which apply in various situations where redress of unjustified 
enrichment is sought. In my opinion the redefinition of the law of 
unjustified enrichment has not superseded the old rules relating to the 
law of recompense such as the general rule that the remedy is not 
available where a pursuer had a legal remedy whether under the 
common law or under statute and had chosen not to exercise it.’ 
 
                                               
31 See Civ 1re, 4 April 2006, pourvoi no 03-13986, Bull civ I, no 194; [2006] RLDC, no 28, 11, observations 
by S Doireau: ‘le caractère subsidiaire reconnu à l’action fondée sur le principe de l’enrichissement 
sans cause ne constitue pas une fin de non recevoir au sens de l’article 122 du nouveau Code de 
procédure civile mais une condition inhérente à l’action’; CA Rennes, 18 December 2007, RG no 
06/00867; CA Nîmes, 8 January 2008, RG no 04/01413; CA Basse-Terre, 5 January 2009, RG no 
05/01889; CA Douai, 26 October 2009, RG no 08/06633; CA Limoges, 4 March 2013, RG no 12/00560; 
CA Metz, 21 September 2017, RG no 17/00339. 
32 See, especially, Soc, 5 November 2009 (n 8). 
33 Transco (n 16) [12]-[13]. 
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This position was not questioned in Courtney’s case.34 But it means that what are seen 
as rules about the subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment in Scots law are not meta-
authorities in relation, either to unjustified enrichment, or institutions with which it might 
have a boundary dispute. They are part of enrichment law. And rather than exercising 
any control over the application of conflicting statues, they ensure unconditionally that 
unjustified enrichment gives way in the face of them. They are not rules of subsidiarity. 
 
E. Not sovereignty 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship 
can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there 
would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because authority in that context would be 
allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence of subsidiarity – as argued 
in chapter 2, subsidiarity is a conditional idea. The above law and scholarship does 
not satisfy this principle. 
 
This is another short point, which applies to all of the material above favouring unjust 
enrichment’s subsidiarity to statute. Whenever there is conflict, the above law and 
scholarship holds that statute always wins against unjustified enrichment. Which is 
sovereign is obvious. There is no condition which can be satisfied to produce another 
result. There is no unjustified enrichment on the field on which statute is relevantly at 
play.  
 
F. Not concurrence 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the 
entities said to be part of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a 
situation, since competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point 
of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen without 
it, as argued in chapter 2. 
 
                                               
34 Courtney’s Executors (n 18) [52] (Lord Beckett). 
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The law and scholarship discussed here which favours unjust enrichment’s 
subsidiarity to statute infringe the five foregoing principles of subsidiarity. Neither 
admits that unjust enrichment and conflicting statutes can co-exist, or concur when 
not restrained by a meta-authority. Neither, therefore, breaches the instant principle of 
subsidiarity. This is only a small consolation, of course. If there is no concurrence to 
prevent, subsidiarity is redundant, assuming that it is correct to say that subsidiarity 
exists in the first place, which, on the accounts here surveyed, it does not. 
 
III. RE-ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter suggests a better explanation than subsidiarity for unjust 
enrichment’s contingency on the operation of statues that exclude or limit unjust 
enrichment claims. It is that statutes which do this justify enrichments, to which extent, 
there is no unjust enrichment to be subsidiary to anything. This argument is presented 
and related to the principles of subsidiarity developed in this study. That statutes justify 
enrichments is then demonstrated comparatively. Finally, in separate sections, 
relevant French and Scots material is analysed more closely. 
 
A. The argument 
 
If, on a given set of facts, an enrichment is justified, then an enrichment claim is 
impossible on those facts. And the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment is impossible on 
those facts. Principles of subsidiarity, developed in chapter 2 of this study, and applied 
to unjustified enrichment and statute in part II of this chapter, are infringed by the 
contrary argument. Statutes can justify enrichments. To the extent that they do, unjust 
enrichment claims cannot overlap with any statutory claim, because the former do not 
exist. If they do not exist, they cannot join a plurality of actions or claims, which could 
be in a relationship of subsidiarity, or overlap or concur, with any other claims which 
do exist. That unjust enrichment removes itself from the field of play in the face of 
inconsistent statutes – through its own justification requirement – means that any 
argument as to enrichment’s subsidiarity to statute also infringes this study’s 
proposition that rules of subsidiarity are rules which possess meta-authority over the 
entities the relationship of which they govern. In sum, enrichment claims cannot be 
subsidiary to statutory claims. Where, as a matter of statutory interpretation, there is 
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an inconsistent statutory claim, arguments about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity do 
not get off the ground. In fact, there is pro tanto no unjust enrichment to be subsidiary 
in the first place. The same analysis applies where a statutory regime provided a claim, 
but does no longer, or where a regime simply excludes the operation of unjust 
enrichment whilst providing no other redress. 
 
B. Statute as a justification for enrichments in general 
 
What, then, of the law in comparative perspective? Sometimes, a statutory regime will 
justify a person’s enrichment by requiring that an enrichment be transferred.35 
 
Example.36 Half Full Ltd abstracts water from Half Empty Ltd’s waterways for many 
years. Half Empty looks over correspondence between the parties and thinks it is owed 
money in respect of Half Full’s activities. It transpires that Half Full has licences to 
abstract water from Half Empty’s waterways under a statutory scheme. Half Full 
therefore has a right to the water and its enrichment is justified. 
 
There are also cases in which a statute confers no entitlement to any enrichment, but 
alters a person’s claim for restitution against another, to which extent the latter’s 
enrichment is justified.37 
                                               
35 As where rules of succession confer rights to a person’s property: Civ 1re, 28 May 1991, pourvoi no 
89-20258, Bull civ I, no 167; [1992] RTD civ 96, observations by J Mestre. Or where a tax liability must 
be complied with failing the exercise of any lawful option(s) to avoid it: Test Claimants In the FII Group 
Litigation v HM Revenue & Customs [2008] EWHC 2893 (Ch), [2009] STC 254 [275] (Henderson J); 
Commissioner of State Revenue v ACN 005057349 Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 6, (2017) 341 ALR 46 [87] (Bell 
and Gordon JJ, with whom Kiefel, Keane and Gageler JJ agreed). See also Soc, 3 May 1974, pourvoi 
no 73-10689, Bull civ V, no 276; Soc, 12 February 1987, pourvoi no 85-11975, Bull civ V, no 74; Clive (n 
21) §5(1)(a); Advocate General for Scotland v John Gunn and Sons Ltd [2018] CSOH 39 [61] (Lord 
Uist), though in that case, the statute was declared unlawful retrospectively under European Union law; 
KBA Canada Inc v Supreme Graphics Ltd [2014] BCCA 117, (2014) 372 DLR (4th) 303 [38]-[42] 
(Groberman J, with whom Low and Nielson JJ agreed). 
36 With much simplified facts, this example is based on Canal & River Trust v Thames Water Utilities 
Ltd [2016] EWHC 1547 (Ch) [87] (Asplin J); affirmed on other grounds [2018] EWCA Civ 342. 
37 As where a statute excludes inconsistent claims, or extinguishes any rights that contravene it: R (on 
the application of Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] UKSC 
54, [2011] 2 AC 15 [15] (Lord Brown, with whom Lord Phillips and Lord Kerr agreed), [35] (Sir John 
Dyson, with whom Lord Phillips and Lord Kerr agreed), [39] (Lord Rodger); Littlewoods Ltd v HM 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 70, [2017] 3 WLR 1401 [40] (Lord Reed and Lord 
Hodge, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke and Lord Carnwath agreed); Adrenaline Pty Ltd v 
Bathurst Regional Council [2015] NSWCA 123, (2015) 322 ALR 180 [69]-[73] (Leeming JA, with whom 
MacFarlan and Ward JJA agreed). Or where legislation forbids claims for price increases in relation to 
fixed price contracts and an unjustified enrichment claim which would circumvent this is denied: Civ, 5 
November 1934; [1934] DH 587; [1934] Gaz Pal, II, 848. Or where the remuneration of company 
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Example.38 Rogue Traders Authority fines Cowboys Ltd under a statutory penalty 
regime. The regime contains an appeal mechanism, providing for a full rehearing and 
re-quantification on the merits. Cowboys pays its fine. Cowgirls Ltd does not pay, but 
pursues a successful statutory appeal, the time limit for which subsequently expires. 
Realising this, Cowboys attempts to claim in unjust enrichment against Rogue 
Traders. But the true construction of the statutory regime reveals that it was intended 
to be the only way to dispute the imposition of penalties. Rogue Traders’ enrichment 
is justified. 
 
That, in a nutshell, is the law on statutes as justification for enrichments. In the light of 
it, the third object of this part of the chapter is to examine more closely the French and 
Scots sources. 
 
C. French law 
 
The Code civil is unhelpful for present purposes.39 But the jurisprudence points the 
way forward. One noted decision of the Première chambre civile from 1973 clarifies 
that ‘the rules concerning the action de in rem verso’ are ‘applicable when there exist 
no special provisions’ to govern a given situation.40 In a 1995 case, the Première 
chambre civile rejected a lower court’s subsidiarity-based reasoning, and granted an 
                                               
directors is confined to cases provided for by law, and an unjustified enrichment claim for remuneration 
of work outwith those cases is denied: Com, 16 May 1995 (n 7). Or where an estate agent must have 
a written contract of mandate to intervene in any transaction and is denied an unjustified enrichment 
claim if not: Civ 1re, 18 June 2014, pourvoi no 13-13553, Bull civ I, no 110; [2014] RTD Civ 671, 
observations by P-Y Gautier; [2014] RTD Com 685, observations by B Bouloc; [2015] AJDI 136, 
observations by M Thioye. For Scots law, see, semble, Cullen v Advocate General for Scotland [2016] 
CSOH 170, 2017 SLT 1 [34]-[44] esp [37] (Lord Armstrong). See also Gladstone v Canada (Attorney 
General) [2005] SCC 21, [2005] 1 SCR 325 [19] (Major J, with whom McLachlin CJ, and Bastarache, 
Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ agreed). 
38 This example is based on Lindum Construction Co Ltd v The Office of Fair Trading [2014] EWHC 
1613 (Ch), [2015] 2 All ER 177 [120]-[121] (Morgan J). 
39 Code civil, arts 1303-1 and 1303-2(1), were set out in chapter 2. For criticism, see F Chénedé, Le 
nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) [134.22]-[134.24].  
40 Civ 1re, 15 February 1973, pourvoi no 68-13698, Bull civ I, no 61; [1975] D 509, noted by R Savatier; 
[1975] Defrénois, I, art 10845, 145, long commentary by J Flour: ‘selon les règles concernant l’action 
de in rem verso, applicables lorsqu’il n’existe pas de dispositions particulières, l’indemnité due à 
l’appauvri est égale à la moins élevée des deux sommes représentatives, l’une de l’enrichissement, 
l’autre de l’appauvrissement’. See also Civ 1re, 29 December 1953; [1953] D, somm, 22: ‘it is forbidden 
to appeal to the idea of unjustified enrichment in an attempt to correct the normal run of legal relations 
flowing from a contract’; cited by G Marty and P Raynaud, Droit civil: Les obligations, vol I (2nd edn, 
Sirey 1988) no 398, for a proposition substantially identical to that expressed in the 1973 case. 
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unjustified enrichment action to a person falling outwith a special remuneration regime, 
on the ground that the statute ‘[could] not have aimed to exclude’ her ‘from the benefit 
of all compensation’.41 The first pronouncement suggests that, often, where there is a 
relevant statute, there can be no unjustified enrichment action, because any 
enrichment would be justified thereby. The second pronouncement suggests that the 
policy of a statute may be relevant to its effect on an unjustified enrichment claim. 
These ideas can anchor our thinking as we examine examples. 
 
Both ideas apply easily where statutes require that enrichments be transferred. So, 
where an employer transferred holiday pay directly to his employees for a period 
during which a regional scheme did not pay out, he could not resist a claim for his 
statutorily obligatory subscriptions to the scheme itself on the ground of unjustified 
enrichment, because the scheme’s claim ‘resulted from statutory provisions exclusive 
of the rules of unjustified enrichment’.42 So, too, where an enrichment was ordained 
by a legislative matrimonial property regime, ‘which excluded unjustified enrichment’ 
as well.43 To take a final example, a genealogist could not claim in unjustified 
enrichment against the heirs of a deceased person, who had benefitted because he 
uncovered the relation between them, thus allowing them to inherit:44 
 
‘[T]he heirs X draw their enrichment from one of the lawful modes of 
acquiring rights, in the instant case in the statutory rules [les règles 
légales] governing the transfer of their ascendant’s estate; […] Mr Y 
                                               
41 Civ 1re, 14 March 1995, pourvoi no 93-13410, Bull civ I, no 130; [1996] D 137, noted by V Barabé-
Bouchard; [1995] JCP G, II, 22516, noted critically by F Roussel; [1996] RTD Civ 160, favourable 
observations by J Mestre; [1996] RTD Civ 215 guarded observations by J Patarin; [1996] Defrénois 
468, noted by J-L Fillette: ‘l[e] décret […] n’a pu avoir pour objet de l’exclure du bénéfice de toute 
indemnisation; qu’il s’ensuit que l’action de in rem verso lui demeure ouverte, faute pour ce conjoint de 
disposer d’une autre action; […] l’arrêt attaqué énonce que l’obstacle de droit au paiement […] ne 
saurait être tourné par le biais de l’action de in rem verso; [e]n quoi la cour d’appel a violé [l’ancien 
article 1371 du Code civil] […].’ 
42 Soc, 12 February 1987 (n 35): ‘les juges d’appel […] ont exactement énoncé que la créance de la 
Caisse résultait de dispositions réglementaires exclusives des règles de l’enrichissement sans cause’. 
43 Civ 1re, 10 May 1984, pourvoi no 83-12370, Bull civ I, no 153: ‘ce qui excluait l’enrichissement sans 
cause’. 
44 Civ 1re, 28 May 1991 (n 35): ‘les héritiers X puisent leur enrichissement dans l’un des modes légaux 
d’acquisition des droits, en l’occurrence dans les règles légales régissant la dévolution de la succession 
de leur auteur; que M Y n’était pas fondé, dans ces conditions, à exercer l’action de in rem verso pour 
obtenir la rémunération de ses diligences’. Compare, previously, the opposite solution, in a case in 
which a sans cause argument does not appear to have been raised: Cour de Poitiers, 2 December 
1907; [1908] DP, II, 332; [1908] RTD Civ, observations by R Demogue. 
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could not, therefore, use the action de in rem verso to obtain 
remuneration for his work.’ 
 
However, where statutes do not confer rights to enrichments, but are simply 
inconsistent with unjustified enrichment claims, the account proposed in this chapter 
conflicts more openly with subsidiarity-based explanations of unjustified enrichment’s 
relations with statute. Several cases are now reanalysed to show that the view taken 
here is better than subsidiarity. To proceed, recall the 1971 formula of the Troisième 
chambre civile, important in the development of unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity 
in France:45 
 
‘Considering that [1.] the action founded on unjustified enrichment can 
only be admitted if no other action is open to the claimant; that [2.] it 
cannot be admitted, notably, to supplement another action which the 
claimant cannot bring as a result of prescription, a forfeiture, a time bar, 
or because of the effect of res judicata or because he cannot produce 
the necessary proof or because of any other obstacle of law […].’  
 
To flesh out the argument in this section, prescription and time bars, two relevant 
elements of the second limb of this holding, are analysed initially, before a look at three 
more examples in the cases. Take prescription, first, the only specific example of what 
will attract the subsidiarity rule which survived into the Code civil, article 1303-3.46 
Whether prescription falls under the heading of subsidiarity receives no definitive 
answer in the cases. Even if they do not always use the vocabulary of subsidiarity,47 
most reason in terms clearly denoting a subsidiarity analysis when prescription of one 
action bars an action in unjustified enrichment.48 However, the Chambre sociale of the 
Cour de cassation held in 2011 that the prescription of an action for payment justified 
                                               
45 Civ 3e, 29 April 1971 (n 3). The second limb of the holding is reproduced in French here for 
convenience: ‘qu’elle ne peut l’être, notamment, pour suppléer à une autre action que le demandeur 
ne peut intenter par suite d’une prescription, d’une déchéance ou forclusion ou par l’effet de l’autorité 
de la chose jugée ou parce qu’il ne peut apporter les preuves qu’elle exige ou par suite de tout autre 
obstacle de droit’. 
46 Code civil, art 1303-3: ‘The impoverished person has no action on this basis where another action is 
open to him or is barred by an obstacle of law, such as prescription.’ 
47 For a case which does, see CA Aix-en-Provence, 4 December 2008, RG no 07/20133. 
48 See Civ 3e, 14 November 2002, pourvoi no 01-10691; CA Versailles, 21 April 2005, RG no 04/01199. 
 - 119 - 
the defendant’s enrichment for the purposes of an unjustified enrichment action.49 It is 
suggested that this is the better view.50 As shown in part III(B) of this chapter, statutory 
justifications for enrichments need not actually confer legal entitlements to them. And 
any such rule was rejected in chapter 1. Rather, it is simply a matter of policy-based 
justification. The law says: ‘whatever happened, it is no longer unjust’. The law could 
say, as it might if subsidiarity were an accepted analysis: ‘the defendant’s enrichment 
is unjustified, but that does not matter – the claimant’s enrichment action is still is 
against the law, because its other action prescribed’. The former response is more 
satisfying for the claimant who says: ‘but I still think the defendant’s enrichment is 
unjustified’. We should be able to reply: ‘no, it is not; carefully read, the law says so’.51 
To stop short would leave the law in a startling state of contradiction, and in need of a 
basic lesson in irony: injustice in the stultification of the legal order, dealt with by 
subsidiarity; but no injustice in leaving unjustified enrichments unresolved by the legal 
system. Only aversion to analysis could produce such a result. 
                                               
49 Soc, 12 January 2011, pourvoi no 09-69348, Bull civ V, no 21; [2011] D 1198, noted by F Khodri; 
[2011] JCP S 1167, noted by T Lahalle: ‘la cause […] tenant à la prescription instituée par la loi’. 
50 We may leave aside here the question whether prescription is substantively extinctive or merely 
procedurally extinctive – that is, does it extinguish the right along with the action (though, interestingly, 
an action is also defined in France’s Code de procédure civile, art 30, (emphasis added)), as ‘the right 
[…] to be heard on the substance’)? The Code civil, art 2219, suggests that prescription is substantively 
extinctive. But article 2224 suggests the opposite. The debate about this is longstanding in French law. 
Luckily, it is sidestepped here by the simple assertion, elaborated in the main text, that it is the policy 
of the prescription statute, not prescription itself, which justifies relevant enrichments. For cases giving 
conflicting answers to the substantive-procedural question, see Civ 3e, 5 September 2012, pourvoi no 
11-19200, Bull civ III, no 110; [2013] ADJI 200, observations by J-P Blatter; Civ 2e, 9 July 2009, pourvoi 
no 08-16894, Bull civ II, no 194; [2009] AJ fam 347, noted by F Chénedé. For a parcours of the debate, 
see further A Collin, Pour une conception renouvelée de la prescription (Defrénois 2010) nos 561-572. 
51 In English law, limitation is not generally extinctive: Norwegian Government v Calcutta Marine 
Engineering Co Ltd [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431 (QB) 442 (Diplock J); compare, speaking of a 
substantively extinctive regime, Bua International Ltd v Hai Hing Shipping Co Ltd (The Hai Hing) [2000] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 300 (QB) 310 (Rix J). But argument that limitation is simply a policy-based justification 
for enrichments could conceivably apply in England, too; and in Scotland, if the law there barred 
enrichment actions because others prescribe (it seems not yet to have done this). Since the ‘unjust 
question’ in unjust enrichment is unconcerned with entitlements to enrichments (see chapter 1 on this 
point), whether limitation or prescription take away enrichment actions, or obligations to reverse unjust 
enrichments (concomitant with rights to their reversal), or both, is strictly irrelevant in both jurisdictions. 
But it should be noted that, unlike the general position in English law, and more certainly than in French 
law, personal obligations in Scots law are substantively extinguished on the expiry of prescription 
periods. For the example of obligations to reverse unjustified enrichment, see Prescription and 
Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 6(1)-(2) and sch 1, 1(b)-(c). See further D Johnston, Prescription and 
Limitation (2nd edn, W Green 2012) [6.14]-[6.21]. The period starts to run when a person is both 
enriched, and unjustifiably so: Thomson v Mooney [2013] CSIH 115, 2014 Fam LR 15 [6], [8], [10]-[11] 
(Lord Eassie, with whom Lord Bracdale and Lord Wheatley agreed). See further EJ Russell, 
Prescription and Limitation of Actions (7th edn, W Green 2015) [3.18]. For commentary on earlier 
confusion, see M Hogg, ‘Unjustified Enrichment Claims: When Does the Prescriptive Clock Begin to 
Run?’ (2013) 17 Edinburgh L Rev 405. So the prescription of an unjustified enrichment action justifies 
any enrichment which might have been reclaimed before the prescription period expires. 
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Take time bars, secondly. It is well-established that non-extinctive statutory time bars 
on any action, to recover property,52 or to obtain compensation from the state in 
respect of the loss of certain rights over land,53 for example, take enrichment actions 
with them. It is submitted that to them applies the same analysis as is put forward 
about cases in which actions other than those in unjustified enrichment prescribe. 
 
What of some different examples? Another famous case is the arrêt Marty. There, a 
building contractor failed to comply with the statutory publicity requirements of a 
security he wanted in respect of payment for work. He therefore failed to obtain any 
priority as creditor in the bankruptcy of the owner of the building on which he had 
worked. And he was denied an unjustified enrichment action, introduced to circumvent 
the mishap. The Cour de cassation said that he could not ‘elude’ the statutory regime 
governing distributions from the estate to other unsecured creditors with his claim 
(though it must be admitted that the operation of the regime to grant rights to the value 
which he contributed to the estate, such that the other creditors were also 
straightforwardly entitled to it, was also mentioned directly after this remark).54 In his 
note on the decision, André Rouast forcefully argued that it is a case in which the 
obstacle of law limb of subsidiarity applied.55 But it is suggested that, in common with 
the situation addressed above, in which an action other than one in unjustified 
enrichment prescribes, such that the latter is inadmissible, the better view is that any 
relevant enrichment is justified. In effect, both the justification and subsidiarity 
analyses accept that an enrichment can be approved impliedly by the law, which would 
be stultified if the enrichment action were allowed. But the subsidiarity analysis seems 
                                               
52 Civ, 18-19 July 1910 (four arrêts); [1910] Gaz Pal, I, 189, 343; [1911] DP, I, 355; Civ, 22 February 
1922; [1923] S, I, 153; prefigured by, eg, Trib civ de Limoges, 16 December 1904; [1905] Gaz Pal, I, 
128. For a recent debate on forclusion, as against prescription, see N Balat, ‘Forclusion et prescription’ 
[2016] RTD Civ 751; F Rouvière, ‘Prescription et forclusion: différence de nature ou de degré?’ [2017] 
RTD Civ 529. 
53 Civ 3e, 3 January 1978, pourvoi no 76-13996, Bull civ III, no 3. In that case, claimants had a right to 
put their animals out to pasture on land which was expropriated. There was a one week period within 
which the claimants had to make their right known to the state in order to obtain compensation. The 
claimants let this period elapse, and claimed in unjust enrichment. The action was rejected. The Cour 
de cassation held: ‘the court of appeal rightly observes that having neglected to obtain compensation 
from the expropriating authority according to [the relevant regulatory provisions], [the claimants] cannot 
invoke the action de in rem verso’ (‘la cour d’appel observe à bon droit qu’ayant négligé de se faire 
indemniser par l’autorité expropriante dans les conditions prévues par l’ordonnance [pertinente], [les 
demandeurs] sont irrecevables à invoquer le bénéfice de l’action de in rem verso’). 
54 Civ, 12 February 1923; [1924] D, I, 129, noted by A Rouast. 
55 [1924] D, I, 129. 
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to leave the private injustice recognised by unjustified enrichment in existence. There 
is little point to this, especially given the objections to which the subsidiarity analysis 
is open, seen in part II of this chapter. The more legally coherent analysis, and the one 
which provides the best response to disappointed claimants, is the justification 
explanation. 
 
Let us next look at the scenario which gave rise to the famous arrêt Briauhant.56 Article 
1793 of the Code civil provides:57 
 
‘When an architect or a contractor has undertaken to erect a building 
at a fixed price, according to plans settled and agreed upon with the 
owner of the land, he cannot ask for any increase in the price, either 
under the pretext of an increase in the cost of labour or materials, or 
under that of changes or additions made in the plans, unless those 
changes or additions have been authorized in writing and the price 
agreed with the owner.’ 
 
In Briauhant, a town conferred the use of its thermal baths and casino to a 
businessman. It contracted with him that improvement works could be done, on the 
express condition that it would pay only a fixed price. The businessman ordered the 
works. Costs exceeded the stated sum. So one of the contractors claimed in unjustified 
enrichment against the (indirectly) commissioning town, for what to him amounted to 
extra work. In the second limb of its holding,58 the Chambre civile of the Cour de 
cassation said that the action de in rem verso ‘cannot be brought with a view to 
escaping the rules by which statute [la loi] has expressly defined the effects of a 
                                               
56 Civ, 2 March 1915 (n 10). 
57 Code civil, art 1793: ‘Lorsqu’un architecte ou un entrepreneur s’est chargé de la construction à forfait 
d’un bâtiment, d’après un plan arrêté et convenu avec le propriétaire du sol, il ne peut demander aucune 
augmentation de prix, ni sous le prétexte de l’augmentation de la main-d’œuvre ou des matériaux, ni 
sous celui de changements ou d’augmentations faits sur ce plan, si ces changements ou augmentations 
n’ont pas été autorisés par écrit, et le prix convenu avec le propriétaire.’ The translation relied on here 
is DW Gruning (tr), Code Civil as of 1 July 2013 (Juriscope 2014) 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Media/Traductions/English-en/code_civil_20130701_EN>. 
58 The first limb was, of course, as follows. ‘[T]he action de in rem verso must only be granted in cases 
in which, the patrimony of one person is enriched without legal ground at the expense of that of another, 
and the latter, to obtain what is due to him, has no other action arising from a contract, a quasi-contract, 
a delict or a quasi-delict’: Civ, 2 March 1915 (n 10). 
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specific contract, nor, as a result, [can it be brought] by a contractor to disguise a claim 
for extra costs, forbidden […] in the presence of a fixed price contract’.59 
 
Now, it was mentioned in chapter 3 that this judgment is supposed to be a turning 
point in, or is perhaps part of the start of, subsidiarity’s story in French enrichment 
law.60 As a matter of history, it was shown to be nothing of the sort. But as a matter of 
substance, too, it is better analysed as a case in which the defendant town’s 
enrichment represented by the claimant contractor’s perceived overperformance was 
justified. The court’s language speaks, albeit softly, to the policy behind article 1793, 
of providing certainty for contracting parties.61 It seems reasonable to bring this to bear 
on the justice of the town’s enrichment, and not merely stop at whether the enrichment 
claim is admissible, as do subsidiarity-based analyses. Clearer evidence exists in 
other cases that policy specifically influences the application of article 1793 to the 
exclusion of unjustified enrichment. In 1925, the Cour d’Ameins held that, since it was 
clear that the contracts before it fell under article 1793, ‘no equitable tempering [could] 
be afforded’ to a contractor ‘based on the action de in rem verso’.62 The Cour de 
cassation remarked in 1934 that ‘fixed price agreements are contracts of strict 
interpretation’, and that ‘the allegation of an unjustified enrichment cannot disguise a 
                                               
59 ibid: ‘qu’elle ne peut être intentée en vue d’échapper aux règles par lesquelles la loi a expressément 
défini les effets d’un contrat déterminé, ni, par suite, par un entrepreneur, pour servir à déguiser une 
demande en supplément de prix prohibée […] en cas de marché à forfait’. 
60 The similarly vaunted arrêt Clayette was also cited earlier in this chapter: Civ, 12 May 1914 (n 10). 
61 A policy evidenced, by, eg, Civ 3e, 11 May 2006, pourvoi no 04-18092, Bull civ III, no 118: art 1793 
prevailed over standard form; Civ 3e, 20 November 2002, pourvoi no 00-14423, Bull civ III, no 230; 
[2003] Defrénois 318, observations by H Périnet-Marquet: regulatory changes increasing costs, and 
strikes affecting the works, do not permit the non-application of art 1793 by ignoring the fixed-price 
nature of the contract; Civ 3e, 20 November 1991, pourvoi no 89-21858, Bull civ III, no 281: serious and 
precise document with contractual force required for the exception in art 1793 to apply. But because of 
these strictures, the courts ensure that art 1793 is applied precisely. See, eg, Civ 3e, 29 October 2003, 
pourvois nos 02-13460, 02-16542, Bull civ III, no 185 (two arrêts); [2004] Defrénois 447, observations 
by H Périnet-Marquet: orca tank and swimming pool not buildings to which art 1793 applies; Civ 3e, 23 
June 1999, pourvoi no 98-10276, Bull civ III, no 147; [1999] Defrénois 1127, observations by H Périnet-
Marquet: occasional renovation not the construction of a building, to which art 1793 applies. Compare 
Civ 3e, 3 July 1991, pourvoi no 89-20299, Bull civ III, no 200: electrical works on a hotel under 
construction are building works to which art 1793 applies. 
62 Cour d’Ameins, 18 May 1925; [1926] DP, II, 52: ‘que le tempérament d’équité ne peut être apporté, 
basé sur l’action de in rem verso’. 
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claim for extra costs, explicitly forbidden by art[icle] 1793’.63 The Tribunal civil de 
Bordeaux once observed:64 
 
‘[T]he very rigorous conditions of art[icle] 1793 would become a dead 
letter if, in the absence of the two conditions which this article requires 
most strictly, a [price] increase were granted via the misuse of the 
action de in rem verso; considering that, put shortly [en un mot], 
art[icle] 1793 must be interpreted such that, when, following the 
conclusion of a fixed price contract with an architect or a contractor, 
there have been additional works without written authorisation or an 
agreed price, there is a legal presumption incapable of being rebutted 
by proof to the contrary, that the additional works have been done 
without a price increase […].’ 
 
That position is a small step from the analysis proposed in this chapter, that, as a 
matter of policy, the codal provision is justifying the relevant enrichment here. The 
Cour de cassation held in the 1970s, citing article 1793, that a fixed price contract 
could constitute a legal ground for an enrichment represented by extra works.65 It 
would surprise if the Code itself could not do likewise, especially when the justification-
by-statute analysis enjoys a considerable advantage over, and suffers none of the 
defects of, the subsidiarity approach. 
 
As a third more general example, we turn to a decision of the Première chambre civile 
of the Cour de cassation from 2014. A company instructed an estate agent to find it 
land on which to build. No written contract was concluded for this purpose. The agent 
                                               
63 Civ, 5 November 1934 (n 37): ‘que l’entreprise à forfait est un contrat de droit strict; [...] l’allégation 
d’un enrichissement sans cause ne [peut] servir à un entrepreneur pour déguiser une demande en 
supplément de prix formellement prohibée par l’art[icle] 1793 [du Code civil], en cas de marché à forfait 
[...]’ 
64 Trib civ de Bordeaux, 10 February 1909; [1909] Gaz Pal, I, 745: ‘les prescriptions, cependant très 
rigoureuses de l’art[icle] 1793 deviendraient lettre morte si, en l’absence des deux conditions que cet 
article exige impérieusement, une augmentation était accordée par le moyen détourné de l’action de in 
rem verso; [a]ttendu, en un mot, que l’art[icle] 1793 doit s’entendre en ce sens que, lorsqu’après un 
marché à forfait avec un architecte ou un entrepreneur, il y a eu des travaux supplémentaires sans 
autorisation écrite ou sans un prix convenue, il y a présomption légale non susceptible d’être combattu 
par la preuve contraire, que les travaux supplémentaires ont été accordées sans supplément de prix’. 
65 Civ 3e, 23 April 1974, pourvoi no 73-10643, Bull civ III, n° 162. See previously, but without directly 
citing article 1793, Civ, 21 February 1944; [1944] Gaz Pal, I, 249. 
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found land and drew up an agreement between its client and the landowner. But the 
deal never went through. And the client passed the opportunity on to another 
company, which bought the land at the same price and according to the same 
conditions as the initial deal. The estate agent sued this other company in unjustified 
enrichment, for having benefited from the work it did on the aborted original 
transaction. The Cour de cassation quashed the court of appeal, which had allowed 
the enrichment action to succeed:66 
 
‘Having seen article 1371 of the Code civil, along with articles 6-I of 
law [loi] n° 70-2 of 2 January 1970, and 72 of decree [décret] n° 72-
678 du 20 juillet 1972; 
 
Considering that the rules of unjustified enrichment cannot disrupt the 
provisions of the latter two texts, which are a matter of public policy 
[dispositions d’ordre public], and which condition the lawfulness of the 
intervention of an estate agent in any land transaction, and, 
consequently, its right to remuneration and compensation, upon its 
possessing a written delivered for this purpose by one of the parties 
to the transaction; […] 
 
Considering that […] the judgment below, in ordering [the defendant] 
to pay to [the claimant] the sum of 50,000 euros on the basis of the 
action de in rem verso, holds that the exercise of this action […] is not 
intended to circumvent the provisions of law n° 70-2 of 2 January 1970 
since the parties could not have been bound by any mandate, the 
benefit which the [defendant] purchaser drew from the work of the 
                                               
66 Civ 1re, 18 June 2014 (n 37): ‘Vu l’article 1371 du Code civil, ensemble les articles 6-I de la loi n° 70-
9 du 2 janvier 1970 et 72 du décret n° 72-678 du 20 juillet 1972; Attendu que les règles de 
l’enrichissement sans cause ne peuvent tenir en échec les dispositions d’ordre public de ces deux 
derniers textes, lesquels subordonnent la licéité de l’intervention d’un agent immobilier dans toute 
opération immobilière, et partant, son droit à rémunération comme à indemnisation, à la détention d’un 
mandat écrit préalablement délivré à cet effet par l’une des parties à l’opération;  […] Attendu qu[e] […] 
l’arrêt, pour condamner [le demandeur] à payer [au défendeur] la somme de 50.000 euros sur le 
fondement de l’action de in rem verso, retient que l’exercice de cette action […] n’a pas vocation à 
contourner les dispositions de la loi n° 70-9 du 2 janvier 1970 puisque les parties ne pouvaient pas être 
liées par un mandat, le bénéfice que [le défendeur] a tiré gratuitement du travail de l’agent immobilier 
lui ayant été transmis par un tiers […]; Qu’en statuant ainsi, la cour d’appel a violé les textes susvisés, 
le premier par fausse application, les deux derniers par refus d’application […].’  
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[claimant] estate agent without providing anything in return 
[gratuitement] having been transferred to it by a third party [ie the 
company which initially engaged the estate agent]; 
 
That in so holding, the court of appeal has violated the above-cited 
texts, incorrectly applying the first, and failing to apply the latter pair 
[…].’ 
 
This continues the Cour de cassation’s strict interpretation of the regime containing 
the provisions referred to in the extract above. The court has also held, for example, 
that it cannot be circumvented using delict,67 an implied contract of mandate (mandat 
apparent),68 or the doctrine of negotiorum gestio.69 At work here seems to be a 
legislative policy of protecting people against wily estate agents. This policy was 
recognised by a Chambre mixte of the Cour de cassation, when concerned with a 
different point of interpretation arising from the same statute.70 Indeed, though some 
see the above case as a decision on subsidiarity,71 it contains no subsidiarity-based 
reasoning at all. And in a reiteration of that 2014 decision, the Première chambre civile 
recounted, but ignored, subsidiarity-based reasoning in the arguments before it. 
Instead, the court analysed the circumstances in public policy terms.72 This 
demonstrates that there is no need for subsidiarity to reach conclusions desired by the 
courts, even if statutes do not actually confer rights to enrichments. As in England, or 
                                               
67 Civ 1re, 3 February 2004, pourvoi no 01-17763, Bull civ I, no 2; [2004] ADJI 484, observations by M 
Thioye; [2004] RTD Com 587, observations by B Bouloc. 
68 Civ 1re, 31 January 2008, pourvoi no 05-15774, Bull civ I, no 30; [2008] D 485, observations by Y 
Rouquet; [2008] AJDI 879, observations by M Thioye; Civ 1re, 5 June 2008, pourvoi no 04-16368, Bull 
civ I, no 163; [2008] ADJI 882, observations by M Thioye. 
69 Civ 1re, 22 March 2012, pourvoi no 11-13000, Bull civ I, n 72; [2012] ADJI 613, observations by M 
Thioye; [2012] RTD Civ 528, observations by B Fages. 
70 Ch mixte, 24 February 2017, pourvoi no 15-20411, Bull mixte, forthcoming; [2017] D 793, with 
explanatory note by the Cour de cassation, and case note by B Fauvarque-Cosson; [2017] RDC 415, 
observations by T Genicon: ‘par la loi du 2 janvier 1970 réglementant les conditions d’exercice des 
activités relatives à certaines opérations portant sur les immeubles et les fonds de commerce, dite loi 
Hoguet, le législateur a entendu, tout à la fois, réguler la profession d’agent immobilier et protéger sa 
clientèle […].’ 
71 See, eg, G Chantepie and M Latina, La réforme du droit des obligations – Commentaire théorique et 
pratique dans l’ordre du Code civil (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) 691 and note 6; P Malaurie, L Aynès and P 
Stoffel-Munck, Droit des obligations (10th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 1071 and note 49. 
72 Civ 1re, 31 January 2018, pourvoi no 17-10340. Subsidiarity-based arguments were before the court 
in its 2014 decision, also. But these were not reproduced or addressed in the actual judgment. 
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Australia, and Canada,73 the policy behind a given statutory regime can exclude 
unjustified enrichment claims in France.74 To provide the best answer to disappointed 
claimants, and avoid the illogical muddle caused by subsidiarity, we should explain 
statute’s ability to do this is on the basis that it can render enrichments just. 
 
To round off this section, we will see that unjustified enrichment discourse in France 
does contain the conceptual thinking required for the view put forward to work. This 
might render it more palatable to a French audience. 
 
As far back as 1899, Georges Raynaud said that ‘the action de in rem verso can only 
be brought if it does not violate any principle of law’, and referred on the same page 
as that statement to the idea of its possibly being against ‘some text’ (quelque texte), 
ie, legislation.75 Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, Constantin Stoïcesco 
agreed, similarly shortly, but a little more clearly.76 Raynaud was against subsidiarity.77 
Stoïcesco did not address it at all. Their affirmations did not come under any treatment 
of a sans cause requirement, either.78 However, in discussing what will justify an 
enrichment, and before he lengthily surveys German theorists (in the contemporary 
absence of French law and scholarship), Stoïcesco stated simply that (i) enrichments 
which occur because use has been made of a right will be justified, whereas (ii) those 
which occur wrongly, in the broad sense that they should not have left a person’s 
patrimony, will not.79 To at least some extent, these propositions amount to saying that 
enrichments approved by the law will not be reversed: the second leaves open the 
                                               
73 CPAG (n 37) [15] (Lord Brown, with whom Lord Phillips and Lord Kerr agreed), [35] (Sir John Dyson, 
with whom Lord Phillips and Lord Kerr agreed), [39] (Lord Rodger); Adrenaline (n 37) [69]-[73] (Leeming 
JA, with whom MacFarlan and Ward JJA agreed); Gladstone (n 37) [19] (Major J, with whom McLachlin 
CJ, and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ agreed). 
74 Or, of course, contribute to their success, as in Civ 1re, 14 March 1995 (n 41), discussed above. 
75 G Raynaud, De l’action «de in rem verso» en droit civil français (LNDJ 1899) 92: ‘l’action de in rem 
verso ne peut s’exercer que si elle ne viole aucun principe de droit’. 
76 CC Stoïcesco, De l’enrichissement sans cause (Chevalier-Marescq 1904) 144: ‘l’enrichissement 
illégitime peut toujours être répété à l’aide de la condictio sine causa, à moins d’un texte de loi contraire 
[...].’ 
77 Raynaud (n 75)  89-93, 145 and note 2 (the latter reference containing the language of subsidiarity).  
78 ibid, 81-87; Stoïcesco (n 76) 73-97. 
79 Stoïcesco (n 76) 74: ‘Si l’enrichissement est obtenu d’une façon légitime, en usant simplement d’un 
droit, personne ne peut songer à en réclamer la restitution [...]. Pour que l’enrichissement soit 
susceptible d’être répété, il faut qu’il soit survenu à tort au profit de quelqu’un, alors que la valeur qui le 
représente n’aurait point dû quitter le patrimoine d’un autre. Autrement dit, il faut que cet enrichissement 
n’ait pas de fondement légitime, qu’il soit dépourvu de cause.’ We see here that Stoïcesco probably 
thought that justifications for enrichments much confer rights to them. But this analysis of the 
requirement that an enrichment be unjustified was rejected in chapter 1. 
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possibility that the law will only implicitly approve a person’s impoverishment, rather 
than grant a right to it. The argument in this chapter is, of course, that enrichments 
which are expressly or impliedly approved by statute are not unjustified, such that 
unjust enrichment does not exist in such a situation. The above two authors, working 
over a century ago, provide clear tangential support for this view. It survives through 
time to the present day. 
 
Emile Bouché-Leclercq’s 1913 thesis on unjustified enrichment reads futuristically. His 
definition of the sans cause requirement could appear in the latest French accounts:80 
 
‘One must, then, […] simply ask oneself whether the defendant had a 
right to the value received or, more broadly, if, given that he has 
received it, he can make an argument of law or équité, which allows 
him to keep it. And if we want to keep the word cause, we must make 
its meaning more precise by adding to it juste, and talk of juste cause 
d’enrichissement, or, even better, of juste cause de rétention de 
l’enrichissement.’ 
 
And he clearly thought that statutes not conferring rights to enrichments, but simply 
posing rules of law which would be violated if enrichment actions were allowed, were 
justes causes for enrichments.81 This obviously supports this chapter’s argument. 
 
René Demogue’s 1923 work also supports the argument presented in this chapter.82 
In his view, statutes which do not confer rights to enrichments are simply other 
                                               
80 E Bouché-Leclercq, De l’action “de in rem verso” en droit privé (Sirey 1913) 140: ‘Il faut donc […] 
simplement se demander si le défendeur avait droit à la valeur qu’il a recueillie ou, plus largement, si, 
étant donné qu’il l’a en fait recueillie, il peut faire valoir un argument de droit ou d’équité qui l’autorise à 
la conserver. Et si l’on veut conserver le mot de cause, il faut en préciser la signification par l’épithète 
juste, et parler de « juste cause d’enrichissement » ou, mieux encore, de « juste cause de rétention de 
l’enrichissement ».’ 
81 ibid, 165-181 esp 165 in fine, 170-172, 180 in fine. 
82 It must be conceded that Demogue’s more general views were controversial. For better or worse, a 
French reader will likely be less inclined to take his word. His point of departure (quite acceptable to 
many Anglophone lawyers) was that law is surrounded by an intractable balance of competing interests, 
that no single idea of justice provides a right answer, and that some incoherence is inevitable in the 
legal system. His Les notions fondamentales du droit privé (Rousseau 1911) is arresting in places. But 
it did not meet with approval. Prominent names lauded his ‘ingéniosité’, but gave no quarter. See, eg, 
critical reviews by H Capitant, ‘Les notions fondamentales du droit privé d’après le livre de M Demogue’ 
[1911] RTD Civ 729; F Gény, ‘Compte rendu critique: R Demogue – Les Notions fondamentales du 
droit privé’ (1911) 35 Nouv Rev Hist Dr Fr & Etr 110. The latter accused Demogue of ‘nihilism’. Despite 
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justifications for enrichments. This is based on policy. Here is his general principle and 
a specific example:83 
 
‘There are cases in which the law prefers to give total security to the 
party enriched because he has acted in a manner which seems worthy 
of interest, [and] the law protects the activity. […] We must accept this 
when statute establishes a predetermined time for [the] forfeiture [of 
a right].’ 
 
Other authors, however, do not support so clearly the argument put forward in this 
chapter. The thinking is there. But it often appears in their respective treatments of 
subsidiarity, and not of the requirement that an enrichment be unjustified for an action 
de in rem verso to succeed. André Rouast, for example, believed that the latter 
requirement related to ‘social necessity’.84 And he included statutes conferring rights 
to enrichments as possible justifications for them. However, this was done in the 
context of his overall view of the sans cause requirement, namely that justifications for 
enrichment are contreparties d’enrichissements.85 That is to say, there must be a 
reciprocal return for an enrichment, in order for it to be justified.86 On a this point, then, 
Rouast’s analysis does not assist this chapter’s argument. On subsidiarity, however, 
Rouast did turn to policy. Here, we can tap into his work. He felt that subsidiarity was 
justified generally by the origin of enrichissement sans cause, not in positive law – 
                                               
the success of his Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit positif français (2nd edn, II vols, LGDJ 
1919 (1st edn by Chevalier-Marescq, 1899)), Gény was afraid enough of what he read to quest after 
even more completeness in his very cautious attempt – from which Demogue sharply diverged – to free 
French legal thought from its previously heavily exegetic methods. He went on, over more than a 
decade, to produce the mammoth Science et technique en droit privé positif (IV vols, Sirey 1914-1924). 
See, citing private correspondence, C Jamin, ‘Demogue et son temps’ (2006) 56 RIEJ 5, 11-12. Volume 
56 of the Revue interdisciplinaire des études juridiques is dedicated to Demogue, and contains 
fascinating contributions about him and his work. 
83 R Demogue, Traité des obligations en général, vol III (LNDJ 1923) nos 161-165, esp 164 and note 
2; citing Civ, 18-19 July 1910 (four arrêts) (n 52): ‘Il y a des cas dans lesquels la loi préfère donner toute 
sécurité à l’enrichi parce qu’il a agi d’une manière qui semble digne d’intérêt [et] la loi protège l’activité. 
[…] Il faut en dire autant si la loi établit un délai préfixe de déchéance.’ 
84 Rouast (n 11) 106. 
85 ibid, 78: ‘un avantage peut aussi avoir sa contre-partie dans le droit que la loi donnait à une personne 
de le recevoir’. 
86 ibid, 60-81, esp 76 (original emphasis): ‘La cause dont l’absence est indispensable à l’exercice de 
l’action de in rem verso est donc simplement la contre-partie soit de l’appauvrissement soit de 
l’enrichissement, contre-partie qui consiste dans la considération d’une contre-prestation, d’un 
avantage personnel ou d’un motif moral, et que l’agent estime compenser son appauvrissement.’ 
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legislation – but in natural law:87 to avoid chaos, doctrines sourced in the latter cannot 
circumvent those sourced in the former. Yet further practical reasoning applied to more 
specific problems. So, Rouast explained the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso 
in cases where other actions prescribe on the social need, pursued by the legislator, 
to protect the institution of prescription.88 And, after giving other examples,89 he 
concluded:90 
 
‘The action de in rem verso can never, then, allow [a person] to 
circumvent a statutory obstacle blocking resort to a [given] action. It 
cannot authorise any fraud on the law, whatever the consequences may 
be.’ 
 
Julien Bonnecase’s 1926 work also requires some interpretation if it is to support this 
chapter’s argument. For him, subsidiarity meant that ‘if, in the presence of an 
enrichment and a correlative impoverishment or, more precisely, a transfer of value 
from one person to another, we are led to conclude that the situation is embraced by 
the framework of a given institution of positive law, one must indisputably [résolument] 
abandon any reliance on the notion of unjustified enrichment’.91 And the sans cause 
element of the action de in rem verso was ‘the non-justification by law of the 
enrichment’.92 But what is the latter, if not the former? Such confusion plays to this 
chapter’s advantage. 
                                               
87 ibid, 95-96, 104-107. 
88 ibid, 85: ‘Je n’ai relevé aucun arrêt relatif à l’action civile prescrite; le refus de l’action de in rem verso 
en pareil case ne paraît pas pouvoir être sérieusement discuté. Si on admettait l’action, le but social 
poursuivi par le législateur dans l’institution de la prescription serait compromis; la prescription 
deviendrait une institution inutile, d’effet illusoire. Aucune législation, aucune jurisprudence[,] ne saurait 
tolérer pareille situation.’ 
89 ibid, 85, addressing the example provided by Code civil, art 1793. 
90 ibid, 86: ‘L’action de in rem verso ne peut donc jamais permettre de tourner un obstacle légal qui 
s’oppose à l’exercice d’une autre action. Elle ne saurait autoriser aucune fraude à la loi, quelles que 
soient les circonstances.’ 
91 Bonnecase (n 12) nos 145-156 esp 153: ‘si, en présence d’un enrichissement et d’un 
appauvrissement corrélatifs ou, plus exactement, en face d’un déplacement de valeur de la tête d’une 
personne sur celle d’une autre, on est amené à constater que la situation rentre dans le cadre d’une 
institution de droit positif déterminée, il faut résolument abandonner tout appel à la notion 
d’enrichissement sans cause.’ 
92 ibid, nos 176-185 esp 176, 180: ‘la non-justification en droit de l’enrichissement’. It is conceded that 
Bonnecase probably thought that it was necessary that justifications confer rights to enrichments, given 
his view that what is sans cause ‘boils down to determining the element to which the law attaches to 
convert into a legal relation the factual relation between two persons the circumstances in which one 
has been enriched at the other’s expense’ (‘sans cause, se ramène donc à déterminer l’élément auquel 
le droit s’attache pour convertir en relation de droit la relation de fait issue entre deux personnes de la 
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The only book-length consideration of the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso, 
from 1931, can also be read to support the view taken here. It views the sans cause 
requirement as straightforwardly requiring a moral, natural law evaluation, of an 
enrichment’s propriety, and rejects the idea, under any single formula, of cause, 
source d’obligation – that is, of justifications conferring rights to enrichments, such as 
gifts, wills, contracts, delicts (enrichments being retained against money damages), 
and so on.93 As to subsidiarity, this is justified by the avoidance of fraud on the law.94 
And for Almosnino, a principal limit to the action de in rem verso under the heading of 
subsidiarity, is respect for other legal institutions: no enrichment actions against any 
imperative rule of law (‘disposition impérative de la loi’).95 But it would be more ‘moral’ 
simply to say that cases in which an action de in rem verso would infringe a rule of law 
are not cases of unjustified enrichment at all. This argument seems doubly to apply to 
George Ripert’s account, which bases both the sans cause condition and subsidiarity 
straightforwardly on moral duty (‘le devoir moral’).96 
 
In his refonte of Marcel Planiol and George Ripert’s influential Traité pratique,97 Paul 
Esmein clearly separates legal grounds from subsidiarity. Legal grounds arise when 
enrichments or impoverishments (these are distinguished, too) occur in the 
performance of a contract, with donative intent, via a statutory or natural obligation, 
and where the party impoverished acts in its own interest or with the intention 
necessary to engage the doctrine of negotiorum gestio.98 Esmein’s view of 
subsidiarity, first expressed in his note on the Gorge case,99 is restrictive. For him, it 
only bars the action de in rem verso in cases of indirect enrichment, unless there is no 
                                               
circonstance que l’une s’est enrichie au détriment de l’autre’): ibid, no 176 in fine (original emphasis). 
But this analysis of the requirement that an enrichment be unjustified was rejected in chapter 1. 
93 N Almosnino, Le caractère subsidiaire de l’action de in rem verso (LGDJ 1931) 56-71. 
94 ibid, 89-92, 128-134, 176. 
95 ibid, 128-134. 
96 La règle morale dans les obligations civiles (4th edn, LGDJ 1949) nos 133-147 esp 143-147. Earlier 
editions of this work appeared from the same publisher in 1925, 1927, and 1935.  
97 For a brief explanation in English of its weight, and a comparison with contemporary work, see A 
Tunc, ‘Book Review’ (1956) 69 Harvard L Rev 1157. 
98 P Esmein, Traité pratique de droit civil français par Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert, vol VII (P 
Esmein, J Radouant and G Gabolde eds, 2nd edn, LGDJ 1954) nos 756(1), 757-760. 
99 Req, 11 September 1940; [1940] Gaz Pal, II, 114; [1941] S, I, 121, noted by P Esmein. It will be 
recalled from chapter 3 that the formula of subsidiarity which Esmein there expressed was adopted in 
what stood as a major decision on the requirement until the 2016 recodification: Civ 3e, 29 April 1971 
(n 3). 
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legal ground for a given enrichment, and the primary (usually contractual) debtor of 
the party impoverished is insolvent. But there is a distinct, third rule in Esmein’s 
account.100 From the arrêts Clayette and Briahuant,101 he extrapolates, not 
subsidiarity, but a rule that the action de in rem verso is barred where ‘definite rules of 
positive law would be frustrated by its being allowed’.102 ‘It is unacceptable’, says 
Esmein, ‘that these rules, even when their effect is to approve an enrichment without 
return [sans contrepartie], might be abrogated by such roundabout means’ as use of 
the action de in rem verso, for this would be a ‘manoeuvre amounting to fraud on the 
law’.103 However, this approach does allow, in Esmein’s view, a more relaxed attitude 
to the admissibility in principle of actions de in rem verso when others fail: as long as 
there is no fraud on the law, Esmein does not see why, for example, negotiorum gestio 
or delictual actions should not be backed up by unjustified enrichment in case they 
fail, but he would continue vigorously to protect the institution of prescription.104 
 
Esmein’s account is sophisticated. But it is submitted that it is still open to the basic 
objection in this chapter. From the interpretation of legislative intent to discover fraud 
on the law, it is but a small and more satisfying step to legal grounds. This applies 
equally to other work by Esmein which takes the same approach,105 and all other 
modern accounts using legislative intent to apply subsidiarity in cases where 
unjustified enrichment potentially conflicts with statute. Notable more recent 
proponents of this method include François Chabas, continuing the brothers 
                                               
100 Esmein (n 98) nos 756(2), 761-762 suite. 
101 Civ, 12 May 1914 (n 10); Civ, 2 March 1915 (n 10). 
102 Esmein (n 98) no 761. 
103 ibid, no 761: ‘Il n’est pas admissible que ces règles, même quand elles ont pour effet de consacrer 
un enrichissement sans contre-partie, soient abrogées par cette voie détournée, que, par exemple, la 
prescription extinctive ne puisse libérer entièrement un emprunteur d’argent sous prétexte qu’en ne 
remboursant pas la somme prêtée il s’enrichit sans cause. On peut envisage de supprimer, dans notre 
droit, la prescription extinctive […]. Mais le faire par la voie détournée de l’action de in rem verso, 
constituerait une manœuvre s’appartenant à la fraude à la loi.’ 
104 ibid no 762 suite. 
105 See, eg, his slightly earlier treatment of the action de in rem verso in his continuation of Charles 
Aubry and Charles-Frédéric Rau’s Cours: P Esmein (ed), Aubry & Rau: Cours de droit civil français, vol 
IX (6th edn, Libraries Techniques 1953) nos 577-578(2)-(5). 
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Mazeauds’ Leçons de droit civil,106 and Eric Savaux, continuing Jacques Flour and 
Jean-Luc Aubert’s Fait juridique.107 
 
We now come full circle from early twentieth century work by the more progressive 
writers, Bouché-Leclercq and Demogue, to note a final detail. Some modern 
commentators do indeed openly use policy to justify more generally the requirement 
that an enrichment must be unjustified before its restitution will be ordered. Their 
respective treatments of the legal rules in play vary in both details and depth. But it is 
still interesting that eliminating ‘internal contradiction’ and promoting legal certainty,108 
or the maintenance of economic activity,109 for example, are sometimes freely invoked 
to underpin them. To promote these ideas, and others, French lawyers might consider 
salvaging defensible policy-based thinking from its discredited subsidiarity-based 
cradle. It could then be used more explicitly, and on the more stable basis of the 
justification condition. 
 
D. Scots law 
 
In Scots law, though a recent decision suggests that enrichments to which rights are 
conferred by statute are not unjustified,110 the weight of what few cases exist supports 
dealing with unjustified enrichment’s conflicts with statute by way of subsidiarity. That 
is the effect of Transco, and Courtney’s case. But the argument in this chapter can still 
                                               
106 Chabas (n 15) no 709; cited with approval by CP Filios, L’enrichissement sans cause en droit privé 
français (Bruylant 1999) no 543, who makes clear his wholehearted support; and by Romani (n 15) no 
336, who states: ‘Le résultat de l’objection de subsidiarité, afin d’être incontestable, devrait être 
conforme aux vues du législateur, pour le cas visé.’ 
107 J Flour, J-L Aubert and E Savaux, Les obligations, II: Le fait juridique (14th edn, Sirey 2011) no 56. 
See also J Nguebou Toukam, ‘Réflexions sur les applications contemporaines du principe de la 
subsidiarité dans l’enrichissement sans cause’ [1997] RRJ 923, 935-937. 
108 A Bénabent, Droit des obligations (17th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 485: ‘La « cause » peut être ici définie 
comme la justification juridique de l’enrichissement. Si le bénéficiaire s’enrichit grâce à un mécanisme 
de droit, même aux dépens d’autrui, on ne peut lui demander de restituer cet enrichissement: ce serait 
ouvrir dans le système juridique une sorte de contradiction interne et porter une grave atteinte à la 
sécurité de ceux qui se sont fiées à telle ou telle règle de droit. L’article 1303-1 exprime cette idée…’ 
109 L Andreu and N Thomassin, Cours de droit des obligations (3rd edn, Gualino/Lextenso 2018) no 
1750: ‘La réunion des conditions matérielles ne suffit pas, sans quoi l’enrichissement sans cause 
paralyserait toute activité économique: il obligerait toute personne qui reçoit une prestation à la 
restitution, même lorsque le transfert de valeur est juridiquement causé. Pour donner lieu à une créance 
quasi-contractuelle, l’enrichissement doit ainsi être injustifié, « sans cause ».’ 
110 John Gunn (n 35) [61] (Lord Uist), though not on the facts as the statute was retrospectively declared 
unlawful under European Union law. 
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be made. It must first be shown that Scots law does not require that a legal ground 
entitle a defender to an enrichment. 
 
In his Rules, Clive listed several examples of ‘legal cause’. Two were ‘enactment’ and 
‘rule of law’. Elaborating, Clive said that he had in mind ‘an enactment or rule of law 
which confers rights directly and not […] in so far as it operates indirectly by regulating 
the effects of court decrees, contracts, wills, trusts, gifts or other legal causes’ (these 
latter matters being listed separately as specific legal causes).111 This entitlement 
requirement was justified by Clive as follows:112 
 
‘This sub-rule is inserted to meet the quibbling criticism that if 
enactments and rules of law are referred to as legal causes there is 
no need to refer to anything else. Enactments and the common law 
may be direct sources of rights as well as sources of law and it is as 
direct sources of rights that they are referred to in rule 5(1).’ 
 
This also allows his rule 11(1)(a), discussed in parts I and II of this chapter as a claim 
about unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity to statute, to operate on a conceptually 
independent basis. At a glance, this approach is discerning. But it does not meet the 
central objection in this chapter: what does it mean to say that an enrichment is 
approved by the law, if it does not mean that it is not unjustified, and, therefore, that 
unjustified enrichment does not exist? Clive might say: ‘quite a lot’. This chapter says: 
‘very little’. Let us clear the ground. 
 
Some Scottish cases favour a conception of legal ground as entitlement.113 This may 
be encouraged by language in the leading authorities. In Shilliday v Smith,114 for 
                                               
111 Clive (n 21) rule 5(1)(a)-(b), (5)(1)(2). 
112 ibid, 49. 
113 Virdee v Stewart [2011] CSOH 50, 2011 GWD 12-271 [24] (Lady Smith); Thomson v Mooney [2012] 
CSOH 177 [12]-[14] (Lord Drummond Young); overruled [2013] CSIH 115, 2014 Fam LR 15 [7]-[10] 
(Lord Eassie, with whom Lord Bracadale and Lord Wheatley agreed). See also Gibson v Gibson 
unreported 4 August 2010 (Sh Ct, Peterhead), 2010 GWD 30-614 [18]; reviving a dictum in Shilliday v 
Smith 1998 SC 725 (IH) 734 (Lord Kaplan): ‘The governing equitable principle is that a party ought not 
to be permitted to remain enriched in respect of a benefit in property or money which he has no legal 
rights to retain against the party from whom it derived.’ 
114 Shilliday (n 113) 727 (Lord Kirkwood and Lord Kaplan agreeing): ‘[A] person may be said to be 
unjustly enriched at another’s expense when he has obtained a benefit from the other’s actings or 
expenditure, without there being a legal ground which would justify him in retaining that benefit. […] As 
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example, Lord Rodger’s language of general principle seems to suggest at first blush 
that a true entitlement is required. His Lordship’s opinion was, furthermore, so 
important in pushing Scots enrichment lawyers to analyse in terms of fact situations in 
which an enrichment will be unjustified (transfer, imposition, taking), rather than a list 
of legal grounds. This may itself distract from thinking abstractly about the latter.115 
That may explain. But it does not justify. It cannot possibly be right that legal grounds 
must amount to entitlements in Scots enrichment law. Otherwise, the condictio causa 
data causa non secuta, for example, would be incomprehensible as an enrichment 
action.116 The Inner House has confirmed this view, ending any doubt.117 
 
So, the response to Clive’s criticism that ‘enactment’ or ‘rule of law’ as justifications for 
enrichments swallow everything is: this is not a concern for the Scots law of unjustified 
enrichment. The concept of legal ground embraces non-entitling reasons for which an 
enrichment might have to lie where it falls. Non-entitling statutes must, then, take their 
place among these reasons alongside entitling statutes.118 Were it not for Transco and 
Courtney’s case, this would be a small thing. But the only authority on which the 
argument hangs is comparatively slender. All that can be done here is to set it out, 
and suggest that the point be recognised in Scotland, following its lengthier 
demonstration, using the more voluminous French legal sources immediately above 
in part III(C), and, more generally, in part III(B). 
                                               
the law has developed, it has identified various situations where persons are to be regarded as having 
been unjustly enriched at another's expense and where the other person may accordingly seek to have 
the enrichment reversed.’ 
115 General evidence of this is in the leading short account of unjustified enrichment in Scotland, HL 
MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland (14th edn, W Green 2017) 
[24.07], giving a short list of legal grounds, at the end of which appears an example from which it 
requires to be presumed that statute figures among them: ‘[e]xamples of legal grounds justifying the 
retention of an enrichment are those which arise under a valid and subsisting contract, or under an 
unconditional gift or donation, or a benefit conferred under a trust or legacy, or a payment received as 
the result of an order made by a court or following a lawful taxation demand’. Specific evidence that 
transfer-imposition-taking thinking devalues legal grounds in themselves: N Whitty and D Visser, 
‘Unjustified Enrichment’ in R Zimmermann, K Reid and D Visser (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (OUP 2004) 414-417 
esp 414-415: ‘It seems sensible to accept this time-honoured classification as the typical fact-situations 
in which enrichment is prima facie said to be sine causa or unjustified.’ 
116 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W Green 
2013) [3.18]-[3.30]. 
117 See, not cited by Evans-Jones, Thomson (n 51) [7]-[10] esp [8] (Lord Eassie, with whom Lord 
Bracadale and Lord Wheatley agreed); overruling the decision at first instance (n 113): ‘so long as the 
cause in contemplation of which the enrichment was conferred is still in contemplation or still to be 
provided, and its accomplishment has not yet failed, the enrichment cannot be said to be sine causa 
and thus cannot be said to be unjustified’. 
118 For entitling statutes, see John Gunn (n 35), mentioned above. 
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In Cullen v Advocate General for Scotland,119 the question was whether a statutory 
obligation to repay social security payments was an obligation arising from unjustified 
enrichment, with the result that it had prescribed in five years under the Prescription 
and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 6(1)-(2) and its schedule 1, paragraph 1(b). This 
was answered in the negative by Lord Armstrong.120 The repayment regime was not 
subject to the prescription period, because it created rights and obligations which were 
different creatures to those created by unjustified enrichment at common law. In 
essence, at common law, prescription would by the time of the Outer House’s decision 
have turned an unjustified enrichment into a justified enrichment. But the statutory 
regime’s repayment obligation, and with it, the potential unlawfulness – one might say, 
the unjustifiable character – of the social security recipient’s enrichment, was 
preserved. If a statute can maintain the unlawfulness of a given enrichment, then it 
should be able to maintain, pro tanto, the lawfulness of a given enrichment, too. And 
since, as shown above, Scots enrichment law does not require that a legal ground 
confer an entitlement to an enrichment, an a contrario reading of Cullen supports this 
chapter’s argument. It is therefore open to Scots law to adopt a legal ground analysis 
to explain unjustified enrichment’s relations with statute. As shown throughout this 
chapter, this approach is better than subsidiarity. The former should be embraced, and 




This chapter first surveyed English, French, and Scots law, for claims that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to statute. Only French and Scots law and scholarship 
disclose findings to evaluate. English law has not considered the question specifically. 
 
The second part of this chapter suggested that the accounts which claim that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to statute are all wrong. First, what the French and Scots law 
and scholarship addressed in part I of this chapter take to be rules of subsidiarity 
determine the existence of unjustified enrichment, an entity said to be in a relationship 
                                               
119 Cullen (n 37). 
120 ibid, [34]-[44] esp [38], [41], [43]. 
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of subsidiarity. Rules of subsidiarity do not do that. Secondly, the material canvassed 
in part I of this chapter does not admit that unjustified enrichment and statutory relief, 
or express or implied statutory bars to enrichment claims, can exist at the same time, 
such that there is never a relevant plurality of entities, required for a relationship of 
subsidiarity. Thirdly, the French and Scots law and scholarship addressed in part I of 
this chapter do not admit that unjust enrichment and statute can overlap, without the 
possibility of which subsidiarity is redundant. Fourthly, meta-authority is absent from 
all of the claims surveyed in part I of this chapter, which it cannot be, if the rules under 
consideration are truly rules of subsidiarity. Fifthly, the French and Scots law and 
scholarship surveyed see statute as somehow sovereign over unjustified enrichment 
– something antithetical to subsidiarity. It is conceded that this study’s sixth principle 
of subsidiarity is not infringed. But that is only because the material discussed does 
not successfully surmount hurdles logically prior to its relevance. 
 
The third part of this chapter suggests a better explanation of unjust enrichment’s 
relations with statute. Statutory relief inconsistent with unjustified enrichment claims 
may apply to a given enrichment. So might statutory rules which, though they provide 
no relief, either expressly or impliedly approve a given enrichment. In such cases, 
unjust enrichment does not exist on the facts, because any relevant enrichment is pro 
tanto justified by statute. 
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CHAPTER 5 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, SUBSIDIARITY, AND PROPERTY 
 
Previous chapters in this study provide background on the law of unjust enrichment, 
introduce a definition and principles of subsidiarity, and sketch the history of, and 
reasons for, subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment. This chapter 
is the second to put those general chapters to use. Part I addresses arguments in the 
law and literature made about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to the law of property, 
or property claims. After these are set out, they are tested, in part II of the chapter, 
against the theory of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this study. It will be seen 
that no account surveyed can correctly be characterised as entailing unjust 
enrichment’s subsidiarity to property. Part III of the chapter attempts better to explain 
the sources, such that their basic positions can be left standing without subsidiarity. 
 
I. THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter presents claims about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to 
property in the broadly formulated rules of French law. Such claims also exist in 
English and French scholarship. It is suggested that Scotland is free from such 
arguments. 
 
A. England  
 
In England, and other common law jurisdictions, it is not the law that unjust enrichment 
is subsidiary to the law of property, or that unjust enrichment claims are subsidiary to 
those based on a claimant’s property rights. No case puts the language to any such 
rule. The most developed academic account favouring unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity 
to the law of property is in Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett’s 2001 Law Quarterly 
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Review article.1 They define subsidiarity, and the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment, as 
follows:2 
 
‘Subsidiarity describes the relationship between two claims or doctrines 
where the scope and operation of one claim are constrained by another 
claim, even where all the elements of the former claim are made out. […] 
Restorable or unjust enrichment […] is subsidiary in the sense that the 
scope and operation of the principle of unjust enrichment are necessarily 
constrained by the scope and operation of the other core doctrines of 
the private law […].’ 
 
One of these ‘core doctrines of the private law’ is ‘the law of property’. For unjust 
enrichment to operate, the authors understand that there must occur an effective 
transfer of wealth that vests title to an asset in the defendant, accompanied by a defect 
in the claimant’s subjective consent.3 From this, they say, follow two things. First, 
unjust enrichment supplements other private law doctrines, ‘particularly contract and 
property’.4 Only after the operation of those other areas of law can there be anything 
for unjust enrichment to modify: some manifestation of objective consent that 
transpires to be subjectively defective.5 The protection of persons by undoing transfers 
which were not truly voluntary is the concern of unjust enrichment.6 Under the 
subheading, ‘A subsidiary doctrine’, Grantham and Rickett put forward a second 
consequence of unjust enrichment’s essential requirements: unjust enrichment ‘has 
no role to play where the consequences of a defect in subjective consent are already 
                                               
1 This is used as a key example. See also, eg, John H Baker’s brief observations, explaining in terms 
of subsidiarity the relationship between the action for ejectment in ‘The History of Quasi-Contract in 
English Law’ in W Cornish and others (eds), Restitution, Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour 
of Gareth Jones (Hart 1998) 52. One account must be mentioned due to its omission from what follows. 
In characteristically sensitive fashion, Lionel Smith has discussed whether subsidiarity can be used to 
understand the relationship between unjust enrichment and property in the common law. But, since this 
study addresses explicit invocations of subsidiarity, it would be wrong to impute anything objectionable 
to him, for his overall conclusion is that ‘[t]he common law does not know “subsidiarity” by that name, 
but elements of that relationship appear to be embedded in the law’: L Smith, ‘Property, Subsidiarity 
and Unjust Enrichment’ in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified enrichment: key issues in 
comparative perspective (CUP 2002) 619-621, 623. 
2 R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 117 LQR 273, 273.  
3 ibid, 288, 296. 
4 ibid, 289. 
5 ibid, 289. 
6 ibid, 290-291. 
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regulated, such that the restoration of the status quo ante is already provided for’.7 
This is the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment.8 The authors’ second illustrative example 
is unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to the law of property – the situation in which the 
claimant ‘retains title to an asset that passes into the defendant’s possession’:9 
 
‘[T]he mechanism for recovery is the right, inherent in [the claimant’s] 
title, to the wealth represented by that asset. While it is possible to 
describe the defendant in such a case as enriched in lay terms, as a 
matter of legal doctrine there is no enrichment. The defendant’s receipt 
was always encumbered with an obligation, arising from the [claimant]’s 
title, to return the property. That obligation means that there is nothing 
calling for the intervention of the law of unjust enrichment.’ 
 
The authors’ claims may be summarised as follows. Unjust enrichment is subsidiary 
to the law of property. This is an example of the rule of subsidiarity that where the 
consequences of a defect in subjective consent are already provided for, unjust 
enrichment has no role to play. A claimant may retain title to an asset in a defendant’s 
possession. The defendant is not enriched by the asset’s value. The possession is not 
unjust, either.10 Unjust enrichment has no role in such a case. For Grantham and 




In France, the action de in rem verso is a ‘personal action’.11 The Cour de cassation 
has held that a submission by claimants that they should ‘keep [certain] bags without 
paying compensation was fully justified by their undisputed status as owners, which 
prevented their being considered as having been enriched, without legal ground, at 
the defendant’s expense’.12 Property precludes unjustified enrichment, therefore. For 
                                               
7 ibid, 291. 
8 ibid, 291, 291-293. 
9 ibid, 291-292 and notes 107-108; citing, inter alia, Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL). The 
language of subsidiarity is absent from that case. 
10 For confirmation, see Grantham and Rickett (n 2) 292, set out in part III(A) of this chapter. 
11 Civ, 13 November 1912; [1912] Gaz Pal, II, 548; [1913] DP, I, 433, noted by P de Loynes. 
12 Civ, 23 April 1912; [1912] S, I, 513; [1912] Gaz Pal, I, 635: ‘la prétention [des demandeurs] de 
conserver les sacs dont il s’agit sans payer aucune indemnité trouvait sa pleine justification dans leur 
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example, title prevents enrichment at one’s expense, both when another benefits from 
one’s property,13 and when one receives the fruits of one’s property rights.14 There is 
clear lower court authority on the denial of unjustified enrichment when a regime for 
the vindication of assets is open – that is, available –  though relevant pronouncements 
by the Cour de cassation appear quite oblique.15 This is perhaps because the point is 
seen as self-evident by French lawyers. In contrast, in situations where property claims 
become barred – that is, where they used to be available – under special statutory 
regimes, it has been clearly held, for example, that time bars (forclusions) on actions 
to recover property take actions de in rem verso with them.16 
 
It seems that neither French law nor jurisprudence explicitly say that the action de in 
rem verso is ‘subsidiary’ to property law or property claims. Not to be forgotten, 
however, are the Cour de cassation’s Clayette-Briauhant and April 1971 formulae, the 
latter being replicated in truncated form in the Code civil’s article 1303-3. As seen in 
chapter 3, the language of subsidiarity has been put to all of the limbs in these sources. 
The 1971 formula and article 1303-3 are broad enough to encompass extant and 
                                               
qualité incontestée de propriétaires, qui ne permettait pas de les considérer comme s’étant enrichis, 
sans cause légitime, au détriment’ du défendeur. 
13 CA Montpellier, 23 June 2016, RG no 13/03280: ‘L’action de in rem verso n’est pas plus recevable, 
la propriété des parcelles [de terre] n’ayant pas encore été transférée dans le patrimoine de la 
prétendue débitrice’. 
14 CA Paris, 5 June 2018, RG no 16/10684; [2018] Juris tourisme, no 210, 10, noted by X Delpech: 
owner taking rents from lessee obtained via sublease not unjustifiably enriched at first lessee’s expense 
due to right to fruits inherent in ownership. 
15 Trib civ de Caen, 9 June 1936; [1936] Gaz Pal, II, 394: the sale of a film projector by a shopkeeper 
to a commune was nul for want of compliance with statutory formalities regulating such transactions by 
communes, with the result that the shopkeeper remained the owner of the machine and could bring an 
action en revendication, but not, therefore, an action de in rem verso, effectively to obtain the price of 
the sale (the mayor of the commune had offered to return the projector in any event). In the Cour de 
cassation, take first Civ, 11 February 1931; [1931] DP, I, 129, noted by R Savatier: owner of lost or 
stolen property must reimburse eventual possessor in order to recover it, but cannot then claim against 
intermediate possessor who duly sold property to eventual possessor, either by drawing on the 
vindication regime itself, or in unjustified enrichment, the sale providing a justification for the 
intermediate possessor’s enrichment, and the only possible action against that person being delictual 
(unavailable on the facts for lack of fault). See also Com, 24 June 1953, Bull civ III, no 240: owner of 
wine which the town mayor ordered four wine merchants to take and sell to the inhabitants of the town 
to prevent its being looted or taken by enemy troops (the facts took place in 1940) cannot claim in 
unjustified enrichment against the merchants because, ‘by the very fact of the irregular requisition, he 
had an action against the mayor whose orders the merchants had only obeyed’. The action against the 
mayor – and, one assumes, the town – was likely vindicatory. 
16 See, eg, Civ, 18-19 July 1910 (four arrêts); [1910] Gaz Pal, I, 189, 343; [1911] DP, I, 355; Civ, 22 
February 1922; [1923] S, I, 153; prefigured by, eg, Trib civ de Limoges, 16 December 1904; [1905] Gaz 
Pal, I, 128. For a recent debate on forclusion, as against prescription, see N Balat, ‘Forclusion et 
prescription’ [2016] RTD Civ 751; F Rouvière, ‘Prescription et forclusion: différence de nature ou de 
degré?’ [2017] RTD Civ 529. 
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barred actions based on property rights. It should further be noted that statutory 
actions – which may be designed to vindicate property rights – have explicitly been 
included in subsidiarity formulae by the courts.17 It is reasonable to say that, in French 
law, the claim exists that the action de in rem verso is subsidiary to any available 
property-based action, or one which is barred by obstacle of law, such as prescription. 
 
Specific claims about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to property actions are found in 
French scholarship.18 When sole author of his well-known Traité élémentaire, Marcel 
Planiol maintained that the action de in rem verso should be called the ‘condictio sine 
causa, because it is nothing other than a condictio subsidiary to vindication and 
replacing the real action, when it becomes impossible because the thing claimed has 
been mixed, though still exists as value in the possessor’s patrimony’.19 Planiol would 
probably have accepted, with the Cour de cassation, that retention of title to an asset 
prevents unjustified enrichment. This quoted observation survived, alongside a more 
general one about the action de in rem verso’s subsidiary character, into the Traité’s 
continuation by both Planiol and Georges Ripert.20 It is gone from a later edition by 
                                               
17 As seen in chapter 4. Recall the following statements. ‘Mais attendu que l’action de in rem verso ne 
doit être admise que dans les cas où le patrimoine d’une personne se trouvant enrichi au détriment de 
celui d’une autre, celle-ci ne jouirait, pour obtenir ce qui lui est dû, d’aucune action naissant d’un contrat, 
quasi-contrat, délit, quasi-délit ou de la loi […]’: Civ, 29 January 1951, Bull civ I, no 34, also mentioning 
the ‘caractère subsidiaire’ of the action. See, previously, but introducing statute differently, CA Paris, 
21 April 1937; [1937] Gaz Pal, II, 426: the action de in rem verso ‘est subsidiaire et ne peut être exercée 
lorsque le demandeur peut obtenir satisfaction par une autre action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-
contrat ou d’un délit, ou a omis d’exercer, pour la sauvegarde de ses droits, une autre action que la loi 
mettait à sa disposition’. 
18 Against is CP Filios, L’enrichissement sans cause en droit privé français (Bruylant 1999) no 542, but 
only in relation to the classic action for vindication of stolen corporeal moveables. This, he says, 
technically has no statutory base and is actually modelled on the condictio indebiti. Even if correct, this 
is a weak argument. Other vindicatory actions in France are clearly based in legislation (see, eg, Code 
de la propriété intellectuelle, arts L612-16 - L612-7), to which most authors, if asked, would probably 
say that unjustified enrichment is subsidiary. (The provisions referred to here concern the vindication of 
a priority over previously granted patent.) 
19 M Planiol, Traité élémentaire de droit civil, vol II (3rd edn, LGDJ 1905) no 935: ‘Avec un peu plus de 
science du droit romain, on lui aurait donné le nom de condictio sine causa, car elle n’est pas autre 
chose qu’une condictio subsidiaire à la revendication et remplaçant l’action réelle, lorsque celle-ci est 
devenue impossible parce que la chose reclamée a perdu son individualité, tout en figurant encore en 
valeur dans le patrimoine du possesseur.’ This appears without reference to Roman law, with a slightly 
different ending, in Traité élémentaire de droit civil, vol II (9th edn, LGDJ 1923) no 935. 
20 M Planiol and G Ripert, Traité élémentaire de droit civil, vol II (11th edn, LGDJ 1931) nos 935, 937; 
the latter paragraph citing, inter alia, Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull 
somm, I, 86; [1918] S, I, 41, noted by E Naquet; Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] 
DP, I, 102 (first case). 
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Ripert and Jean Boulanger, and so this editorial duo is not taken to make the claim 
under discussion.21 
 
Other commentators link subsidiarity, the action de in rem verso, and property actions. 
Discussing subsidiarity, Louis Josserand said: ‘whoever can vindicate, cannot sue for 
restitution of enrichment’.22 André Rouast,23 and Gabriel Marty and Pierre Raynaud, 
put it similarly briefly.24 A more developed, though still short, account, is in the Leçons 
de droit civil by the brothers Mazeaud. Under the subheading of ‘le caractère de 
subsidiarité de l’action « de in rem verso », the Cour de cassation’s Clayette-Briauhant 
and April 1971 formulae are applied thus: ‘the existence of actions designed to 
vindicate property rights, also bars the action « de in rem verso »’. And commenting 
on the manifestation of subsidiarity involving the prescription of an action, it is said that 
‘the action de in rem verso cannot be used to circumvent the rules of [ex] article 2279’ 
of the Code civil, on the action for the return of stolen corporeal moveables with a 
three-year prescription period.25 So the Leçons would forbid an action de in rem verso 
if a vindicatio were available, or barred by an obstacle of law. It is important to notice, 
with Planiol, above, and two other authors,26 that once property to which title is 
retained ‘has been mixed’, a vindicatio is impossible, but this does not take the action 
de in rem verso with it. In modern language, this might be explained on the basis that 
an obstacle of fact, not law, is what blocks the enrichment action. 
                                               
21 This duo accepts that unjust enrichment must not interfere with the rest of the legal system, and that 
‘it is in this sense that the action has been called subsidiary’, but remarks that ‘the expression is bad, 
precisely because there is no subsidiarity’: G Ripert and J Boulanger, Traité de droit civil d’après le 
traité de Planiol, vol II (5th edn, LGDJ 1957) nos 1268, 1286 (original emphasis): ‘Il ne faut pas faire 
appel à la notion générale d’enrichissement sans cause pour tenter de corriger les rapports juridiques 
qui peuvent avoir pour effet l’enrichissement de l’une des parties ou de causer l’appauvrissement d’une 
autre […]. C’est en ce sens que l’action a été dite subsidiaire. Mais l’expression est mauvaise, car 
justement il n’y a pas de subsidiarité.’ 
22 L Josserand, Cours de droit civil positif français, vol II (3rd edn, Sirey 1939) no 574 (original 
emphasis): ‘l’action de in rem verso a un caractère subsidiaire […] qui peut revendiquer, ne saurait agir 
en récupération d’enrichissement’. 
23 A Rouast, ‘L’enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile’ [1922] RTD Civ 35, 83-84; 
approved by F Goré, L’enrichissement aux dépens d’autrui (Dalloz 1949) 315-316. 
24 G Marty and P Raynaud, Droit civil: Les obligations, vol I (2nd edn, Sirey 1988) no 398. In a footnote, 
the authors say that the terminology of subsidiarity ‘is criticised, however, because that which is 
subsidiary in [legal] procedure is not necessarily excluded by the principal’ (‘le subsidiaire en procédure 
n’est pas nécessairement exclu par le principal’). The authors’ views were long-held. See Droit civil: 
Les obligations, vol I (1st edn, Sirey 1962) no 354. 
25 F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, vol II/1 (9th edn, Montchrestien 1998) nos 
706, 708 (emphasis altered). See now Code civil, art 2276. 
26 R Demogue, Traité des obligations en général, vol III (LNDJ 1923) no 82 in principio, but without 
linking this in any way to the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso to the vindicatio, discussed later, 
no 175; N Almosnino, Le caractère subsidiaire de l’action de in rem verso (LGDJ 1931) 124-126. 
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The jurisprudence and doctrine surveyed here may be summarised as follows. The 
retention by a claimant of title to an asset in a defendant’s possession precludes any 
question of a personal action in unjustified enrichment. A vindicatio is available to the 
claimant in such a case. An open vindicatio bars an action de in rem verso. A vindicatio 
may become time-barred, prescribe, or (by extension) be blocked by another obstacle 




Turning to Scotland, Robin Evans-Jones thinks that ‘in practice an enrichment claim 
may be raised in circumstances in which, in law, all that is at stake is whether [the 
defendant] should reconvey detention or legally protected possession or the extent of 
the enrichment that was derived from physical possession of property’.27 He does not, 
however, use the language of subsidiarity to deny that unjustified enrichment is 
subsidiary to the law of property. His is not a claim about subsidiarity. In enrichment 
by transfer cases, Niall Whitty says that ‘that there is no overlap of the causes of action’ 
in unjustified enrichment and vindication, ‘and that therefore subsidiarity cannot 
arise’.28 Whitty also rejects the potential subsidiarity to property claims of those based 
on enrichment by the act of the party enriched. But he sets up a straw man in the form 
of a case which contains obiter remarks to the effect that enrichment came after 
contractual and property remedies – for the decision does not mention subsidiarity at 
                                               
27 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, I: Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio (W Green 
2003) [1.94]. 
28 N Whitty, ‘Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council: Developing Enrichment Law after Shilliday’ (2006) 10 
Edinburgh L Rev 113, 129-130 and note 100; citing K Reid, ‘Unjustified Enrichment and Property Law’ 
[1994] JR 167, 169. 
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all.29 In sum, Scots law and scholarship do not appear to contain significant positive 
claims about unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity to property.30 
 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
In this second part of the chapter, the claims set out above are analysed. The 
framework for discussion is the principles of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this 
study. The background is the conditional nature of subsidiarity, also developed in 
chapter 2, and both the law of unjust enrichment, and the general question of its 
subsidiarity, surveyed in chapters 1 and 3. Since France is the only jurisdiction with 
law (and jurisprudence) on point, its material will be considered first under each 




Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to 
determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. To be a rule of 
subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or put an end to, 
a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one or more of the 
                                               
29 In City of Glasgow DC v Morrison McChlery & Co 1985 SC 52 (IH); cited by Whitty (n 28) 129-130 
and note 107, the council’s appeal against the Sheriff’s dismissal of its action for recompense was 
refused for irrelevancy, because there had been a lease between the parties: the council had failed 
properly compulsorily to purchase the company’s interest. But the Inner House agreed that, even if the 
council had succeeded, applying the special and strong circumstances test in Varney (Scotland) Ltd v 
Lanark Burgh Council 1974 SC 245 (IH), the other remedies available to the council would have 
rendered it unable to claim for recompense: Morrison McChlery, 64 (the Lord-Justice Clerk [Wheatley], 
with whom Lord Dunpark agreed), 68 (Lord Hunter). In so holding, Lord Wheatley agreed with Morrison 
that ‘if the appellants were correct in maintaining that the tenants’ interest under the lease had passed 
to them, and that the respondents had remained in possession of the tenancy until its expiry in due term 
and by tacit relocation thereafter for the period condescended upon, the appellants had various 
remedies available to them to protect their interests. For instance, they could have entered into a new 
lease with the respondents with a new rental; they could have taken an action for removing if the 
respondents refused to move; they could have pursued an action against the respondents for violent 
profits.’ If there had been a tacit relocation of the lease, then a lease would always have subsisted 
between the parties: there could have been no claim for recompense in any event, as Morrison’s 
enrichment (via occupation of the premises) would have been justified. 
30 Some examples illustrating the application of Eric Clive’s rule eleven, on subsidiarity, bar an 
unjustified enrichment action when there is a remedy in property law: Draft Rules on Unjustified 
Enrichment and Commentary – Appendix to Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 99 (HMSO 
Scot 1994) 89-90. But they all undo themselves. Clive’s examples 6-8 and 10 presuppose that there is 
no enrichment to redress; examples 9 and 11 presuppose that the relevant enrichment is not unjustified; 
and in example 12, an enrichment action is allowed, despite the fact that Clive accepts that there is no 
enrichment if title to the asset transferred is retained by the pursuer). For these reasons, it would be 
unfair to subject Clive’s account to any scrutiny. 
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entities the interaction of which it is supposed to manage might be thought to prevent 
it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. It would also seem to deal 
with a question of overlap in a less then conditional manner. And as argued in chapter 
2, subsidiarity is an inherently conditional idea. Once an entity does not exist, there is 
no way for it eventually to become competent. Here, the relevant entities are, on one 
side, the law of property and property claims, and on the other, the law of unjust 
enrichment and unjust enrichment claims. None of the above English and French 
claims satisfies the instant principle of subsidiarity. 
 
In French law, the supposed subsidiarity of the action en enrichissement injustifié is 
now confirmed by the Code civil’s article 1303-3. This rule is what determines the 
action’s existence in the face of an available or legally barred vindicatio.31 It says that 
the claimant ‘has no action’ in such a case. So whatever it is, it cannot be a rule of 
subsidiarity. The same argument applies to the academic statements putting the 
language to a rule according to which the mere (non-)existence of a vindicatio bars an 
action de in rem verso. 
 
According to Grantham and Rickett’s account, there is a rule that unjust enrichment 
has no role where the restoration of the status quo prior to a defect in subjective 
consent is already provided for, and it is a rule of subsidiarity. A specific application of 
this rule of subsidiarity is that unjust enrichment has no role to play where the 
claimant’s title provides for the relevant restoration. At neither level of generality can 
subsidiarity be at play here. The rule determines the existence of any unjust 




A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, 
or groups of entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible 
at all in a given context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie 
unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. None of the above English and 
                                               
31 The partial exception to the obstacle of law bar, for negotiorum gestio in the Code civil, art 1303-5, 
makes no difference to the basic principle here. This issue is discussed further in chapter 9. 
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French claims satisfies this principle. This is because on none of the accounts can 
unjust enrichment and property, or enrichment claims and property claims, co-exist. 
Entities which do not co-exist cannot be in a relationship of subsidiarity. 
 
In French law, and for the commentators above who favour subsidiarity in the context 
under discussion, the existence of an open vindicatory action means that there can be 
no action en enrichissement injustifié. The same is true when the former action is 
legally barred. In neither situation will more than one action relevantly exist. One thing 
cannot be in a relationship with another thing if one of those things does not exist. An 
enrichment claim cannot be subsidiary to a property claim if the former does not exist. 
 
On Grantham and Rickett’s account, if property provides ‘the mechanism for recovery’, 
then there is never any unjust enrichment: there is no enrichment, and whatever 
happens is not unjust, they say. Where property exists, unjust enrichment does not. 
They are not talking about the latter’s subsidiarity to property here. There can be no 
relationship of subsidiarity between enrichment and property on the envisaged facts, 
because the doctrines would have to be capable of co-existing for that to be possible. 
Grantham and Rickett define subsidiarity as a ‘relationship between two claims or 
doctrines’ (emphasis added). Their enrichment-property example does not comply 




For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that 
context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. None of the above English and 
French claims satisfies this principle. 
 
As in chapter 4, this is a short point. If none of the accounts above admits that 
enrichment and property can co-exist, then none of them admits that they might 
overlap – that is, concur. If none admits that, then none leaves any role for subsidiarity. 
Accounts which leave no role for subsidiarity cannot sensibly be said to be about 
subsidiarity. 
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D. Meta-authority 
 
For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it 
must bind the relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in 
relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their 
relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be 
the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), 
there would be no need for subsidiarity. This is subsidiarity as meta-authority. A rule 
of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained. And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. None of the above English and French claims satisfies the 
instant principle. 
 
The rule in article 1303-3 of the Code civil is not a meta-authority in relation to the 
action en enrichissement injustifié or property actions. It is placed in the chapter of the 
Code on the enrichment action, of which it is an ‘inherent condition’.32 So the rule is 
not sourced independently of the action de in rem verso, one of the entities to which it 
is supposed to apply. And it does not actually govern any potential property action 
which might come under its formula, either. It works by making the action en 
enrichissement injustifié disappear in the face of a property claim, whether open or 
legally barred. The property claim decides for itself, so to speak, what it is, or is not, 
going to do, and there is nothing in article 1303-3 that can change that. French 
commentary referred to above also appears to accept that subsidiarity is part of the 
action de in rem verso. This suffices to declare all of it incorrect on the meta-authority 
point. Rules which are not independent, and cannot actually govern the things to which 
they apply, are not rules of subsidiarity. 
 
                                               
32 See Civ 1re, 4 April 2006, pourvoi no 03-13986, Bull civ I, no 194; [2006] RLDC, no 28, 11, observations 
by S Doireau: ‘le caractère subsidiaire reconnu à l’action fondée sur le principe de l’enrichissement 
sans cause ne constitue pas une fin de non recevoir au sens de l’article 122 du nouveau Code de 
procédure civile mais une condition inhérente à l’action’; CA Rennes, 18 December 2007, RG no 
06/00867; CA Nîmes, 8 January 2008, RG no 04/01413; CA Basse-Terre, 5 January 2009, RG no 
05/01889; CA Douai, 26 October 2009, RG no 08/06633; CA Limoges, 4 March 2013, RG no 12/00560; 
CA Metz, 21 September 2017, RG no 17/00339. 
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Grantham and Rickett say that ‘subsidiarity is not merely a consequence of unjust 
enrichment’s inherent doctrinal nature, but also reflects the ordering of private law in 
the common law system’.33 Since it is partially sourced in unjust enrichment itself, what 
they see as the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment to property is not independent or 
sourced on a higher plane than at least one of the entities to which it is supposed to 
apply. It is not subsidiarity at all. 
 
E. Not sovereignty 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship 
can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there 
would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because authority in that context would be 
allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence of subsidiarity – as argued 
in chapter 2, subsidiarity is a conditional idea. None of the above English and French 
claims satisfies the instant principle. 
 
This is another short point. On all of the above accounts, whenever property exists, it 
always wins against unjust enrichment, so to speak. There is no condition. There is 
no doubt. In French law, article 1303-3 of the Code civil confirms that there is no 
enrichissement injustifié on the field on which property is at play, or was, until itself 
barred by an obstacle of law. Commentators accept this, too. And Grantham and 
Rickett’s definition of subsidiarity specifically says that ‘unjust enrichment […] is 
subsidiary in the sense that the scope and operation of the principle of unjust 
enrichment are necessarily constrained by the scope and operation of the other core 
doctrines of the private law’. One of these doctrines is property law, they say.34 
 
In sum, the accounts surveyed here entail that, in some way, property is sovereign 
over unjust enrichment. So whatever unjust enrichment is to property, it cannot be 
subsidiary to it. 
 
 
                                               
33 Grantham and Rickett (n 2) 293. 
34 ibid, 273. 
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F. Not concurrence 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the 
entities said to be part of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a 
situation, since competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point 
of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen, as 
argued in chapter 2. 
 
As noted under subheadings B, C, and D, of this part of the chapter, the accounts 
discussed here do not admit that unjust enrichment and property can co-exist, or 
concur when not restrained by a meta-authority. They do not, therefore, breach the 
instant principle of subsidiarity. This is only a small consolation, of course, since if 
there is no concurrence to prevent, subsidiarity is redundant, assuming that it is correct 
to say that subsidiarity exists in the first place, which, on the accounts here surveyed, 
it does not. 
 
III. RE-ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
This third part of this chapter argues that, on the accounts surveyed above, subsidiarity 
is both impossible and redundant. 
 
A. Grantham and Rickett 
 
For these authors, unjust enrichment is subsidiary in the sense that, where the 
consequences of a defect in subjective consent are already provided for, unjust 
enrichment has no role to play. Unjust enrichment is subsidiary to the law of property 
where a claimant retains title to an asset in a defendant’s possession. The defendant 
is not enriched by the asset’s value. The possession is not unjust, either.35 Unjust 
enrichment has no role in such a case. For Grantham and Rickett, retention of title 
precludes unjust enrichment. Since we are dealing with a lone academic account, a 
short detour into the authorities is warranted to see to what extent this is accurate. 
 
                                               
35 For confirmation, see ibid 292, set out below in this section of this part of the chapter. 
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The question whether, in English law, retention of title does indeed prevent unjust 
enrichment, is most controversial.36 As to rights in intangible property, to which the tort 
of conversion does not apply,37 the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who agreed 
with Lord Millett, and the speech of Lord Millett himself, in Foskett v McKeown,38 can 
be read as answering that question positively, whilst Lord Hoffmann’s agreement with 
Lord Millett on this point is general enough to encompass the relevant part of the 
latter’s speech. In Menelaou v Bank of Cyprus UK Ltd,39 the Supreme Court 
subsequently held that there is a distinction ‘in principle’ between claims to vindicate 
property rights and in unjust enrichment by reference to Foskett. Though their 
Lordships did not specifically discuss the issue addressed in this paragraph, there are 
telling pinpoint references to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s and Lord Hoffmann’s Foskett 
speeches, and to one in Lord Millett’s, where his Lordship referred back to his own 
earlier, more relevant remarks.40 A noted first instance case also reads the authorities, 
including Foskett, and Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd,41 as holding that the retention 
of either legal and equitable property rights in an asset, tangible or intangible, prevents 
the existence of unjust enrichment.42 It is suggested that as a matter of decided 
authority, the explanation for this is that, whilst a person may be enriched by an asset 
                                               
36 For summaries of the debate, and contrary views, see A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (3rd edn, 
OUP 2011) 194-198; C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [8-12]-[8-26], [8-96]-[8-103]. 
37 OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 [97]-[107] (Lord Hoffmann), [271] (Lord Walker), [321]-
[322] (Lord Brown); Your Response Ltd v Datateam Business Media Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 281, [2015] 
QB 41 esp [13]-[15] (Moore-Bick LJ, with whom Davis and Floyd LJJ agreed). Where, under the Torts 
(Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (Eng and NI), s 3(2)(b)-(c), a claimant elects for damages 
representing the value of the goods, or the defendant elects to pay such damages instead of delivering 
up the goods, title to the goods passes to the defendant on satisfaction of the judgment. See Ellis v 
John Stenning and Son [1932] 2 Ch 81 (Ch) esp 96-97 (Luxmoore J); cited, with other authority, by M 
Bridge and others, The Law of Personal Property (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018) [32-052], note 411, 
who comment that ‘[d]amages in conversion are not so much designed to compensate the claimant for 
loss suffered, as to fix the price for a forced judicial sale of the asset.’ This might also tend to suggest 
a positive answer to the question addressed in this paragraph. 
38 Foskett (n 9) 108, 110 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 115 (Lord Hoffmann), 127, 129 (Lord Millett). 
39 [2015] UKSC 66, [2016] AC 176 [37] (Lord Clarke, with whom Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson agreed).  
40 The most important references are to Lord Millett’s remarks in Foskett (n 9) 127: Menelaou (n 39) 
[98] (Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Kerr agreed), [108] (Lord Carnwath). 
41 [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
42 Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch), [2013] Ch 156 [63], [71]-
[76], [83], [95] (Stephen Morris QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge); noted by L Chambers and 
C Buckingham, [2013] LMCLQ 296. 
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to which it holds title,43 such enrichment is not unjust for the purposes of the law of 
unjust enrichment:44 
 
‘The transmission of a claimant’s property rights from one asset to its 
traceable proceeds is part of our law of property, not of the law of unjust 
enrichment. There is no “unjust factor” to justify restitution (unless “want of 
title” be one, which makes the point).[45] The claimant succeeds if at all by 
virtue of his own title, not to reverse unjust enrichment.’ 
 
Grantham and Rickett agree:46 
 
‘[I]f at the moment of transfer, the law or the parties have already provided 
for restoration in the event of the plaintiff’s subjective consent being 
defective, the conditions which would otherwise call unjust enrichment into 
play do not arise. In such cases, the presence of a mechanism to restore 
the status quo ante, which encumbers the enrichment, denies the possibility 
both that the defendant is enriched and that such enrichment is unjust.’ 
 
If an enrichment is not unjust, there can be no unjust enrichment. If that is what is 
happening on a given set of facts, there is an explanation for why unjust enrichment 
has no role to play, but no unjust enrichment to be subsidiary to anything else. And if 
                                               
43 It may be incorrect simply to say that, according to English law, there is no enrichment at all when (i) 
title to (ii) an asset are with the same person, where, for example, a solicitors’ firm receives money from 
a client and holds it on trust for the benefit of a third party beneficiary – a creditor, to be paid over by 
way of unrestricted loan, pace the court in Bellis v Challinor [2015] EWCA Civ 59, [2016] WTLR 43 [79], 
[92], [114] (Briggs LJ, with whom Underhill and Moore-Bick LJJ agreed). To say that the firm is not in 
those circumstances enriched perhaps ignores the increase in the balance of its client account – the 
debt in its favour against its bank – to which it holds legal title. It may be possible to view both receipt 
and retention of this enrichment as justified by the legal title to the monies obtained when the trust over 
them arises. 
44 Foskett (n 9) 127 (Lord Millett, emphasis added); set out but not elaborated upon in Armstrong (n 42) 
[81] (Stephen Morris QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge); and referred to by page number but 
not discussed in Menelaou (n 39) [98] (Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Kerr agreed), 
[108] (Lord Carnwath). 
45 Looking at things in a different way, and following more recent developments, want of authority might, 
now, ‘be one’, in Lord Millett’s words: Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85, (2016) 243 
FCR 516 [52]-[69] (Jagot, Edelman and Moshinsky JJ). In that case, it was held proper to concede that 
the transfer of company assets without authority gave rise to strict liability claims to specific and for-
value restitution. A contract did not cover the unauthorised transfer on the facts. But the court further 
explained that, if one were to, restitution could follow rescission of such a contract, such that, in 
particular no question of knowing receipt would arise. 
46 Grantham and Rickett (n 2) 292, emphasis added. 
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a lack of injustice is what means that unjust enrichment does not operate on a given 
set of facts, there is no need for subsidiarity. On Grantham and Rickett’s own account, 
subsidiarity is both impossible and redundant.  
 
B. French law 
 
The view that retention of title to an asset is incompatible with the unjustified 
enrichment of the title holder is fully embedded in the French law and voluminous 
academic commentary, surveyed above, in part I(A) of this chapter. So it is 
unnecessary to address any more material. It is simply submitted that the same 
analysis as was put forward of Grantham and Rickett’s account applies to the French 
sources.   
 
C. Scots law 
 
It was established above that neither Scots law nor scholarship claims that unjustified 
enrichment is subsidiary to the law of property. However, it appears that, as a matter 
of decided authority, title to an asset precludes pro tanto the unjustified enrichment of 
the title holder. There is no injustice in wealth held pursuant to property rights. So, 
where a house was sold pursuant to proper missives, and an unenforceable 
agreement as to a supplementary payment on subsequent resale went unsatisfied, it 
was said:47 
 
‘[T]he right upon which the defenders now rely, namely to retain for 
themselves the whole free proceeds of sale of the property, is derived from 
their ownership of the property which in turn is derived from the terms of 
the missives for the sale to them of the property by the pursuer in August 
2006. In these circumstances the defenders’ enrichment can in my opinion 
indeed be seen to have been entirely justified.’ 
                                               
47 Gibson v Gibson unreported 4 August 2010 (Sh Ct, Peterhead), 2010 GWD 30-614 [16] (Sheriff 
Principal Sir Stephen Young QC). See also Crewpace Ltd v French [2011] CSOH 133, 2012 SLT 126 
[46] (Morag Wise QC): ‘[I]f the defenders are enriched, they are so enriched by selling or leasing their 
own land. Enrichment is usually only unjustified when its retention cannot be supported by a legal 
ground.’ All this presumes that the basis of the transaction subsists. See McKenzie v Nutter 2007 SCLR 
115 (Sh Ct, Dumfries and Galloway) [37]-[38] (Sheriff Principal Lockhart). 
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The same analysis as has been applied to the English and French sources in this part 
of the chapter holds good again. Any claim that unjustified enrichment in Scotland is 
subsidiary to the law of property cannot get off the ground. But the basic position 




This chapter first surveyed English, French and Scots law for claims that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to property. It highlighted only one serious academic account 
to that effect in England, before discussion of the more extensive French sources, 
which lend themselves plausibly to the claim of subsidiarity. Scots law and scholarship 
do not claim that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to property. 
 
The second part of this chapter suggested that the English and French accounts which 
claim that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to property are all wrong. First, what they 
take to be rules of subsidiarity determine the existence of unjust enrichment, an entity 
said to be in a relationship of subsidiarity. Rules of subsidiarity do not do that. 
Secondly, they do not admit that unjust enrichment and property can exist at the same 
time, such that there is never a relevant plurality of entities, required for a relationship 
of subsidiarity. Thirdly, they do not admit that unjust enrichment and property can 
overlap, without the possibility of which subsidiarity is redundant. Fourthly, they do not 
see their rules of subsidiarity as meta-authorities, which they must be if they are to be 
rules of subsidiarity. Fifthly, they all see property as somehow sovereign over unjust 
enrichment – something antithetical to subsidiarity. It is conceded that no account 
breaches this study’s sixth principle of subsidiarity. But that is only because none 
successfully surmounts hurdles logically prior to its relevance. 
 
The third part of this chapter showed that the side-lining of unjust enrichment when 
property is at play, envisaged in the material addressed, can stand. However, the 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, SUBSIDIARITY, AND CONTRACT 
 
Previous chapters in this study provide background on the law of unjust enrichment, 
introduce a definition and principles of subsidiarity, and sketch the history of, and 
reasons for, subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment. This chapter 
is the third to put those general chapters to use. Its first part addresses arguments in 
the law and literature made about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to the law of 
contract, or contract claims. In the second part of this chapter, these arguments are 
tested against the theory of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this study. It will be 
seen that no account surveyed can correctly be characterised as entailing unjust 
enrichment’s subsidiarity to contract. The third part of this chapter attempts to present 
a better, subsidiarity-free understanding, of unjustified enrichment’s relations with 
contract. 
 
I. THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter presents claims about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to 
contract. They are found in law and scholarship in both France and Scotland. They 
also exist in English scholarship. 
 
A. England  
 
In England, and other common law jurisdictions, it has not been claimed in the cases 
that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to the law of contract, or contract claims. The only 
common law cases to use the language have done so in this context.1 But, as 
explained in chapter 3, they do not make a true claim about subsidiarity. For claims 
about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to contract, we must look to the scholarship. 
Three accounts are described here as illustrative examples.2 
                                               
1 Recall, eg, Nikolic v Oladaily Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 252 [101] (Mason P, Campbell JA, and Handley 
AJA ). 
2 For other claims, unaddressed in detail in this study, see Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment (ALI 2011) §2, cmt a; W Swain, The Law of Contract 1670-1870 (CUP 2015) 136, explaining 
a case as having held that ‘the non-contractual action was subsidiary to the action in contract’, though 
no such language appears in the judgment. See Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 Term Rep 320; 101 ER 573 
(KB). 
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Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett claim that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to the 
law of contract in their 2001 Law Quarterly Review article. Their account is discussed 
in previous chapters. One of ‘the other core doctrines of private law’ which, for 
Grantham and Rickett, constrain the ‘scope and operation’ of unjust enrichment, is 
‘consent-based obligations (dominantly but not solely the law of contract)’.3 As to the 
subsidiarity of unjust enrichment to contract, the authors say that unjust enrichment’s 
lack of role appears ‘most obviously the case where the parties have dealt with the 
matter by express agreement’:4 
 
‘Thus, for example, where the parties have agreed that if, in making 
payment, the assumptions upon which the plaintiff paid later turn out to 
have been mistaken, the defendant will return the payment, the doctrinal 
basis for restoration of the payment to the plaintiff is the express 
agreement, not the law of unjust enrichment. […] This conclusion, 
furthermore, does not turn merely on some ill-defined hierarchical notion 
of the primacy of contract, but rather on the simple fact that, since the 
parties have already provided for the possibility of restoration if the 
plaintiff’s subjective consent was defective, there is no longer any call 
for the intervention of the law of unjust enrichment. The agreement 
means that it is no longer the case that, but for the imposition of a 
restitutionary obligation, the defendant would be able to retain an 
enrichment in circumstances that make it unjust to do so.’ 
 
The authors’ claims may be summarised as follows.  Unjust enrichment is subsidiary 
to the law of contract. This is an example of the rule of subsidiarity that where the 
consequences of a defect in subjective consent are already provided for, unjust 
enrichment has no role to play. Parties may choose to do this by contract. If they do, 
any enrichment which takes place under the contract will not be unjust. Grantham and 
                                               
3 R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 117 LQR 273, 273. 
4 ibid, 291 and note 105; citing Pan Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Creditcorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) [1994] 
1 WLR 161 (HL). As explained in chapter 3, this case says nothing about subsidiarity at all. Importantly, 
the vocabulary is absent from Lord Goff’s dictum ibid, 164, about the ‘contractual regime which 
legislate[d] for the recovery of overpaid hire’ by the owner of a ship, and not the assignee of the right to 
hire, which denied unjust enrichment any ‘part to play’, and rendered ‘the imposition by the law of a 
remedy in restitution both unnecessary and inappropriate’. 
 - 157 - 
Rickett’s work has been criticised,5 but also cited with approval in the subsidiarity to 
contract context.6 
 
In his Restatement, Andrew Burrows explains ‘the general subsidiarity of unjust 
enrichment to the law of contract’,7 one element of which is that ‘[i]n general, an 
enrichment is not unjust if the benefit was owed to the defendant by the claimant under 
a valid contractual […] obligation’.8 The second element is that ‘a defendant has a 
defence [to an unjust enrichment claim] if the defendant’s liability is excluded (in 
whatever terms) by a contract […]’.9 The third element is that ‘[t]he defendant has a 
defence [to an unjust enrichment claim] if (a) there has been a […] contract of 
compromise which dealt with the unjust enrichment and has not been […] set aside 
[…]’.10 It should be noted that Burrows sees no problem with concurrent liability in 
contract and unjust enrichment. This he does not link to subsidiarity, and subjects it 
only to a rule against double recovery.11 
 
In chapter seven of his book, on ‘Lawful bases’ for enrichments, Graham Virgo says 
that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to contract. Under sole reference to Grantham and 
Rickett, Virgo states:12 
                                               
5 For scepticism about their subsidiarity, see C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: 
The Law of Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [2-02]-[2-04]. For a lighter note of 
caution, see G Jones (ed), Goff & Jones: The Law of Restitution (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) [1-
061], note 78. 
6 Apart from in Graham Virgo’s work, discussed below, see R Havelock, ‘Anticipated Contracts That Do 
Not Materialise’ [2011] RLR 72, 73 and note 19; R Havelock, ‘The Valuation of Enrichment in the 
Supreme Court’ [2013] RLR 97, 97 and note 176; R Havelock, ‘A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum 
Meruit’ (2016) 132 LQR 470, 476 and note 49; all citing Grantham and Rickett (n 3) esp 273-274. None 
of the authorities cited by Havelock in his articles for the proposition that unjust enrichment is subsidiary 
to the law of contract uses that language.  
7 A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2012) 151. 
8 Burrows, Restatement of Unjust Enrichment (n 7) §3(6) and commentary, 32-35. The section also 
mentions statute and other legal obligations. Cf ibid, 91-92, considering the possibility of 
conceptualising the exclusion of liability in unjust enrichment by contract (see ibid, §32 and 
commentary, 150-152) as preventing unjust enrichment from arising in the first place. See also A 
Burrows, ‘Good Consideration in the Law of Unjust Enrichment’ (2013) 129 LQR 329, 331: ‘The 
importance of a mistaken payment being made for good consideration is not that this constitutes a 
defence but that this means that the payment is being made under a contract so that, unless the contract 
is invalid, there is no prima facie right to restitution.’ 
9 Burrows, Restatement of Unjust Enrichment (n 7) §32. The section also mentions statutory exclusion. 
10 ibid, §29(a). The section also mentions unreversed court judgments. 
11 ‘A right to restitution for unjust enrichment may be claimed concurrently with another claim (for 
example, for a tort or breach of contract) but satisfaction of more than one claim is not permitted where 
it would produce double recovery’: ibid, §1(4) and commentary, 28-29; citing Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL), which approves concurrent liability in contract and tort. 
12 G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd edn, OUP 2015) 133-134 and note 5; citing 
Grantham and Rickett (n 3). See, previously, G Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd edn, 
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‘If the parties have entered into a valid agreement which is to regulate 
their relationship it is vital that the law of unjust enrichment does not 
undermine what they have decided. It is only where the agreement does 
not operate, or has ceased to operate, that the law of unjust enrichment 
should have a role to play in any dispute between the parties. 
Consequently, the law of restitution should be considered to be 




As shown in chapter 3, article 1303-3 of the Code civil, and the Cour de cassation’s 
formulae from which it derives, are claims or rules about the subsidiarity of the action 
de in rem verso in France. Though they do not themselves use the language of 
subsidiarity, many other sources, referred to earlier, do put it to the now-codified rules. 
Article 1303-3 encompasses open or legally barred contractual actions, and holdings 
in the courts mention contract specifically.13 
 
To this general claim in French law, that enrichissement injustifié is subsidiary to open 
or legally barred actions, including contractual ones, may be added specific claims. 
First, subsidiarity has been invoked explicitly to deny an enrichment action when a 
contractual action is open.14 Secondly, it has been invoked when a contractual action 
is barred:15 
 
‘But considering that having recalled the subsidiary character of the 
action “de in rem verso”, the court of appeal held that [the claimant] had 
failed to prove the loan contract on which, principally, his action was 
                                               
OUP 2006) 40 and note 20; citing Robert Taylor v Motability Finance Ltd [2004] EWHC 2619 (Comm); 
and Grantham and Rickett (n 3). 
13 As a reminder, see, eg, Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] DP, I, 102 (first case). 
14 Civ 1re, 15 November 1988, pourvoi no 87-13356. 
15 Civ 1re, 31 March 2011, pourvoi no 09-13966, Bull civ I, no 67; [2011] Cont conc consomm no 6, June, 
comm 136, commentary by L Leveneur; [2011] LPA 13 July no 138, 21, noted by Y Dagorne-Labbe: 
‘Mais attendu qu’après avoir rappelé le caractère subsidiaire de l’action “de in rem verso”, la cour 
d’appel a constaté que M Y avait échoué dans l’administration de la preuve du contrat de prêt sur lequel 
était, à titre principal, fondée son action et en a exactement déduit qu’il ne pouvait invoquer les règles 
gouvernant l’enrichissement sans cause […].’ 
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based and properly deduced from this that he could not invoke the rules 
governing unjustified enrichment […].’ 
 
Addressed in slightly more detail in chapter 3, this latter kind of reasoning is generally 
seen in unproved contract cases. Exceptions to it were also identified earlier, in cases 
of particular contracts, such as ad hoc partnerships. But even that line of decisions 
still affirms subsidiarity as the default position.16 
 
The claim that unjustified enrichment is subsidiary to contract is also present in French 
scholarship. The doctrine which reasons on the broader bases outlined at the start of 
this subsection tacitly approves it.17 More targeted claims about enrichment’s 
subsidiarity to contract also exist. Take, for example, the following under the heading 
of subsidiarity: ‘if the impoverished person has a contractual action against the 




Only one Scots case supports unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity to contract.19 In 
Courtney’s Executors v Campbell,20 Lord Beckett held that absent ‘special and strong 
circumstances’, all types of unjustified enrichment claim are ‘available only when no 
other legal remedy is or has been available’. Whilst the case was about the effect of a 
                                               
16 Referring to ‘l’action subsidiaire fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause’, see Civ 1re, 4 May 2017, 
pourvoi no 16-15563, Bull civ I, forthcoming; [2017] JCP G 790, noted by Y Dagorne-Labbe; [2017] D 
1591, noted by A Gouëzel. 
17 See, eg, A Rouast, ‘L’enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile’ [1922] RTD Civ 35, 89-
91; or the survey and propositions put forward by P Drakidis, ‘La “subsidiarité”, caractère spécifique et 
international de l’action d’enrichissement sans cause’ [1961] RTD Civ 577, esp 595, 600-601, 613. 
18 F Terré et al and F Chénedé, Droit civil: Les obligations (12th edn, Dalloz 2018) no 1311. See also, 
among others, A Sériaux, Droit des obligations (2nd edn, PUF 1998) 333 and note 66; summarising, 
and citing with approval, Civ 1re, 8 December 1987, pourvoi no 85-15767, Bull civ I, no 335; [1988] RTD 
Civ 745, observations by J Mestre. 
19 It has been boldly stated that ‘Lord Hope was clear in Dollar Land [(Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN 
Properties Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90] that the law of unjustified enrichment is subsidiary to contract’: R 
Evans-Jones, ‘Thinking about Principles and Actions: Unjustified Enrichment in Scots and South African 
Law’ in D Bain and others (eds), Northern Lights: Essays in Private Law in Memory of Professor David 
Carey Miller (AUP 2018) 339. The lack of reference to a specific part of Lord Hope’s speech to support 
this view is unsurprising. His Lordship did not address subsidiarity at all, so Evans-Jones’ claim is not 
further addressed. 
20 Courtney’s Executors v Campbell [2016] CSOH 136, 2017 SCLR 387 [52]-[54], [60], [65] esp [60], 
where Lord Beckett said that ‘as it has been presented to me in this case, the subsidiarity principle 
applies not just in cases where recompense is the remedy sought but in all cases of unjustified 
enrichment’. 
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(by then non-existent) statutory remedy, His Lordship made this observation on two 
earlier cases:21 
 
‘In NV Devos and Bennet,[22] the courts endorsed the pleading of an unjustified 
enrichment claim as an alternative to a claim based on contract. Again I would 
not understand this to be an exception to the subsidiarity principle, rather it fits 
with it. The primary remedy is pursued and unjustified enrichment only comes 
into play if the primary cause of action fails.  In that event, it could not be said 
that the pursuer failed to employ a primary remedy.’ 
 
These remarks were obiter.23 And they relate to cases which do not concern 
subsidiarity.24 So whether they ‘fit with’ Lord Beckett’s ‘subsidiarity principle’, they do 
not support it, because they are not about subsidiarity. But it would be unfair to read 
away his Lordship’s simply expressed belief that, in the cases mentioned, a 
‘subsidiarity principle’ applied to regulate the relationship between unjustified 
enrichment actions and contractual actions. The clear claim is: no action in unjustified 
enrichment unless a primary action in contract fails. 
 
The language of subsidiarity and its attendant conceptual substance is also put to the 
relation between unjustified enrichment in a good deal of scholarship.25 Robin Evans-
Jones says: ‘[i]n principle enrichment claims are subsidiary to contractual claims. […] 
The subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment in this context is achieved by the 
understanding that a benefit acquired under a valid contract is retained “with cause”’.26 
He thinks that a case can be ‘justified on the ground of the subsidiarity of an 
                                               
21 ibid, [64]. 
22 Devos Gebroeder NV v Sunderland Sportswear Ltd (No 2) 1990 SC 291 (IH); and Bennett v Carse 
1990 SLT 454 (OH). 
23 This is confirmed in Courtney’s Executors (n 20) [62], [65]. 
24 It has, nevertheless, been suggested that ‘[s]ubsidiarity emerged’ in one case and featured in the 
second: HL MacQueen, ‘Unjustified Enrichment, Subsidiarity and Contract’ in V Palmer and E Reid 
(eds), Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland (EUP 2009) 341; 
discussing Bennett (n 22); and Devos Gebroeder (n 22) 302-303 (the Lord President [Hope]). Bennett 
simply holds that the mere lack of proof of a contract does not bar an enrichment claim. Devos 
Gebroeder was simply about the justification of an enrichment by contract. 
25 For the view that this is unnecessary, see M Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn, Avizandum 2006) [4.111]-
[4.121]. For an account not discussed in detail here, see EM Clive, Draft Rules on Unjustified 
Enrichment and Commentary – Appendix to Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 99 (HMSO 
Scot 1994) rule 11(1)(a)(i), and commentary, 85-91. 
26 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, I: Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio (W Green 
2003) [1.99]. 
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enrichment claim to a contractual claim’, even though the relevant enrichment had a 
‘cause’.27 And he argues that a claim can be ‘denied on the ground that’ one has ‘not 
suffered any loss’, where, ‘recompense being a subsidiary claim’, one has not ‘first 
raised [a] claim on [a] contract’ against a third party.28 
 
In later work, Evans-Jones says that unjustified enrichment’s relationship to contract 
is better expressed in terms of exclusion by contract’s provision of a ‘cause’ or ‘ground’ 
for an enrichment, ‘because an absolute subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment to 
contract does not exist’ and because this ‘draws attention to the fact that whether an 
enrichment claim is excluded or not depends upon the precise terms of the contract’.29 
But this is not taken seriously here, because Evans-Jones does not obey his own 
injunction: this remark appears in a half-chapter packed with the language of 
subsidiarity. Most relevantly, Evans-Jones does use subsidiarity to explain unjustified 
enrichment’s relationship with contract, and ‘the purpose of subsidiarity’ in this context 
‘is to ensure that a party to a contract cannot side-step his contractual risks by means 
of an enrichment claim’.30 
 
Finally noted is Evans-Jones’ French-inspired argument that a failed attempt to prove 
the existence of a contract will take an enrichment claim with it. ‘Unjustified enrichment 
may properly fill a gap in the law but it must not be used to bring about a fraud on the 
law by subverting its wider aims.’31 
 
                                               
27 ibid, [8.73]-[8.74]; discussing Express Coach Finishers v Caulfield 1968 SLT (Sh Ct) 11. In fact, the 
holding against the pursuer-repairer of the defender’s car who had contracted for the repairs with an 
insurer, which subsequently went insolvent and was certain not to pay, was not denied because of 
subsidiarity. The court considered that the pursuer was claiming that the defender had benefited from 
the repairer’s work, without demonstrating that this was unjust. 
28 Evans-Jones, Condictio (n 26) [8.117]; discussing Renfrewshire Council v McGinlay 2001 SLT (Sh 
Ct) 79. In that case, the pursuer had no enrichment claim against the defender who took over a property, 
over which a third party had a lease with the pursuer, which should, held the court, have been used by 
the pursuer to claim against the third party. The case is as subsidiarity-free as the other authorities cited 
by the court for its holding that, since the matter was covered by the terms of a contract, no issue of 
recompense could arise. See, eg, Devos Gebroeder (n 22) 297 (Lord Allanbridge), 303-304 (the Lord 
President [Hope]), 308 (Lord Coulsfield). 
29 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W Green 
2013) [7.05]. 
30 ibid, [7.12]-[7.14]. 
31 ibid, [7.20] and note 36; citing Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull somm, 
I, 86; [1918] S, I, 41, noted by E Naquet; ‘discussed by’ B Nicholas, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil 
Law and Louisiana Law, I’ (1961) 36 Tulane L Rev 605, 634f.  
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Niall Whitty has also written on the subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment to contract. 
In enrichment by transfer cases, he says that subsidiarity à la Varney32 ‘has a large 
overlap with the requirement of absence of legal justification’, and that if a contract 
authorises or requires a transfer, then it is justified. ‘So in that very common class of 
case, a rule of subsidiarity […] is not needed to reach the correct conclusion’.33 Whitty 
criticises the use of ‘the Varney notion of the subsidiarity of recompense claims to all 
other claims as a means of according primacy to contract’.34 
 
But Whitty’s discussion is not all against subsidiarity. In a footnote, he endorses 
Evans-Jones’ remark ‘that in principle enrichment claims are subsidiary to contractual 
claims upon the ground that a benefit acquired under a valid contract is retained with 
cause’.35 This contradicts his previous point about overlap between the concepts of 
subsidiarity and injustice (something Evans-Jones seems not to notice). He also says 
that subsidiarity might still be needed in cases such as Northern Lighthouses 
Commissioners v Edmonston,36 where A is in contract with B and performs B’s service 
itself instead of suing for specific implement.37 
 
The other significant Scots survey of unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity to contract 
is Hector MacQueen’s. Therein, the language of subsidiarity is imposed on 
recompense cases, like Edmonston, in which ‘the idea began to emerge’, MacQueen 
says, but ‘neither the word “subsidiarity”, nor any equivalent or paraphrase, 
                                               
32 Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Burgh Council 1974 SC 245 (IH). 
33 N Whitty, ‘Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council: Developing Enrichment Law after Shilliday’ (2006) 10 
Edinburgh L Rev 113, 127-128 and note 91; citing, inter alia, B Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments in the 
French Law of Unjustified Enrichment’ in PWL Russell (ed), Unjustified Enrichment: A Comparative 
Study of the Law of Restitution (VUUP 1996) 88; HL MacQueen, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal 
Systems’ [2005] RLR 21, 33. 
34 Whitty (n 33) 128 and note 92; citing Devos Gebroeder (n 22) 300-301 (the Lord President [Hope]). 
Whitty cites pages 301-302 of the Session Cases report; this is corrected here. 
35 Whitty (n 33) 128 note 93; discussing Evans-Jones, Condictio (n 26) [1.98]-[1.99] (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
36 (1908) 16 SLT 439 (OH). 
37 Whitty (n 33) 121-122, 128, 131. Whitty’s view of Edmonston is questionable. It is best explained as 
a case in which contractual allocation of risk, or gratuitous conferral, justified the defender’s enrichment. 
The defender was contractually obliged to the pursuers. The pursuers performed the defender’s 
obligation by building and keeping up a road to the defender’s lighthouse. Lord Johnston noted that the 
parties were relevantly in contract, and held that the pursuers had acted ‘incautiously’, that before the 
court was ‘neither an action of implement nor […] an action of damages. And [the pursuers were] barred 
by their volunteer action from suing it’: Edmonston (n 36) 442-443. The leading short Scots account 
also takes Edmonston as a subsidiarity case: HL MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag & 
Henderson: The Law of Scotland (14th edn, W Green 2017) [24.19] and note 142. 
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appeared’.38 This broadens subsidiarity’s domain when it might simply be declared 
absent. The latter approach would be consonant with MacQueen’s subsequent 
attempt to exclude subsidiarity from Evans-Jones’ French-inspired unproved contract 
extension.39 But subsidiarity is accorded yet further relevance in circumstances 
acknowledged as debateable. In discussing NV Devos Gebroeder v Sutherland 
Sportswear Ltd,40 MacQueen appears, with respect, not to apply his own view, that 
the absence of cause and subsidiarity concepts overlap,41 by saying that ‘[s]ubsidiarity 
emerged in the opinion of Lord Hope’:42 the passage referred to seems rather to 
concern the justification of enrichment by contract. 
 
Changing tack, MacQueen favours limiting subsidiarity with Whitty.43 He suggests that 
subsidiarity is not universally applicable in unjustified enrichment. Rather, it is confined 
to non-monetary enrichment by imposition cases,44 and strictly irrelevant to indirect 
enrichment cases.45 MacQueen concludes his paper mindful of the fact that 
subsidiarity is controversial, and that the Scots approach had until recently been 
‘unsystematic and un-thought through’. He favours neither its abolition nor its being 
treated ‘expansively’.46 
 
                                               
38 MacQueen (n 24) 339 and note 74; discussing Edmonston (n 36). 
39 See MacQueen (n 24) 330 and note 31, 341 and note 79; citing L Smith, ‘Property, Subsidiarity and 
Unjust Enrichment’ in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified enrichment: key issues in 
comparative perspective (CUP 2002); and Bennett (n 22). MacQueen says that ‘a strong form of 
subsidiarity in the law of recompense’ à la Lionel Smith was averted in Bennet, in which it was argued 
unsuccessfully that the lack of proof of a contract, which caused a contract claim to fail, took a 
recompense claim with it. 
40 Devos Gebroeder (n 22). 
41 MacQueen (n 24) 331-332 and note 36; citing with approval A Tate Jr, ‘Louisiana Action for Unjustified 
Enrichment’ (1976) 50 Tulane L Rev 883; A Tate Jr, ‘Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment: A 
Study in Judicial Process’ (1977) 51 Tulane L Rev 446; Nicholas, ‘Civil Law and Louisiana Law, I’ (n 
31); B Nicholas, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law and Louisiana Law, II’ (1962) 37 Tulane L Rev 49. 
Specific page references are provided but they are unimportant. It is to be noted that MacQueen’s page 
reference to one of Nicholas’ Tulane articles, which he says is in footnote one of his paper, leaves room 
for doubt as to whether he meant to refer to the originals from the early 1960s or his later piece: B 
Nicholas, ‘The Louisiana Law of Unjustified Enrichment Through the Act of the Person Enriched’ (1991) 
6/7 Tulane Civ L Forum 3. The page range of this article fits what MacQueen uses but is not in footnote 
1 of his paper with the earlier articles, which do not fit the page range. 
42 MacQueen (n 24) 341 and note 81; discussing Devos Gebroeder (n 22) 302-303 (the Lord President 
[Hope]). 
43 MacQueen (n 24) 343-344; citing Whitty (n 33) 130. 
44 MacQueen (n 24) 344 and notes 89-91; discussing Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council [2005] CSOH 
76, 2005 SLT 958; Lord Coulsfield and HL MacQueen (eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland 
(12th edn, W Green 2007) [25.19]; and noting the more sceptical view of Hogg (n 25) [4.111]-[4.122]. 
45 MacQueen (n 24) 349-350 and note 117; citing N Whitty, ‘Indirect Enrichment in Scots Law, I’ [1994] 
JR 200, 216-217. 
46 MacQueen (n 24) 351. 
 - 164 - 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
In this second part of the chapter, the claims set out above are analysed. The 
framework for discussion is the principles of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this 
study. The background is the conditional nature of subsidiarity, also developed in 
chapter 2, and both the law of unjust enrichment, and the general question of its 
subsidiarity, surveyed in chapters 1 and 3. Since France is the only jurisdiction with 
law (and jurisprudence) on point, its material will be considered first under each 




Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to 
determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. To be a rule of 
subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or put an end to, 
a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one or more of the 
entities the interaction of which it is supposed to manage might be thought to prevent 
it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. And as argued in chapter 
2, subsidiarity is an inherently conditional idea. Once an entity does not exist, there is 
no way for it eventually to become competent.  Here, the relevant entities are, on one 
side, the law of contract and contract claims, and on the other, the law of unjust 
enrichment and unjust enrichment claims. All but one of the above accounts fail to 
satisfy the instant principle of subsidiarity. The one does not fail because it is silent on 
the point. 
 
The general claim found in French law (now the Code civil, art 1303-3) and scholarship 
that enrichissement injustifié is subsidiary to open or legally barred contractual actions 
fails. Focusing particularly on the Code civil, the rule clearly makes the enrichment 
action disappear (the claimant ‘has no action’).47 So it is not a rule of subsidiarity. The 
same applies to the more specific reasoning in particular cases, and other academic 
accounts. 
                                               
47 The partial exception to the obstacle of law bar, for negotiorum gestio in the Code civil, art 1303-5, 
makes no difference to the basic principle here. This issue is discussed further in chapter 9. 
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According to Grantham and Rickett’s account, there is a rule that unjust enrichment 
has no role where the restoration of the status quo prior to a defect in subjective 
consent is already provided for, and it is a rule of subsidiarity. A specific application of 
this rule of subsidiarity is that unjust enrichment has no role to play where a contract 
provides for the relevant restoration. At neither level of generality can subsidiarity be 
at play here. The rule determines the existence of any unjust enrichment claims when 
a contract relevantly exists. 
 
The first limb of Burrows’ account cannot be about subsidiarity. His rule determines 
whether an enrichment is unjust, and so whether unjust enrichment exists, on any set 
of facts. To deny that the same is true of the second limb would be inconsistent, both 
with Burrows’ recognition of the possibility that unjust enrichment’s existence is 
determined thereunder,48 and the reasoning behind the first limb. As to the third limb, 
it may be argued that a contract of compromise justifies any potential enrichment in 
respect of which its aim is to settle any dispute.49 Even if that is not precisely correct, 
there will still never be an unjust enrichment claim if any such potential claim has 
already been compromised, and it will not exist to figure among any other claims 
entities – or entities – which may interact on a relevant set of facts. The third limb thus 
also infringes the instant principle of subsidiarity. 
 
For Virgo, where there is a valid contract, unjust enrichment has no ‘role to play in any 
dispute between the parties’. To that extent, Virgo’s rule determines the existence of 
unjust enrichment. Rules of subsidiarity do not do that. 
 
                                               
48 Of forfeiture, ‘non-refundable’ and ‘entire obligation’ clauses, Burrows says that ‘[o]n an alternative 
analysis, […] where those clauses apply, one does not even reach the stage of there being a cause of 
action in unjust enrichment which is then overridden (ie as a matter of construction, there is no failure 
of consideration)’: Burrows, Restatement of Unjust Enrichment (n 7) 90-91. 
49 See Brent v Slegg Construction Materials Ltd [2007] BCSC 661 [44] (Joyce J); Apotex Inc v Abbott 
Laboratories Limited [2013] ONSC 356 [194] (Quigley J); affirmed on other grounds [2013] ONCA 555; 
Lineker v Capri Insurance Services General Partnership [2013] BCSC 267 [32] (Weatherill J); Montor 
Business Corporation v Goldfinger [2016] ONCA 406 [116] (Pepall JA, with whom Cronk, and Lauwers 
JJA agreed); leave to appeal refused [2016] CanLII 89828 (SCC); Shannex Inc v Dora Construction Ltd 
[2016] NSCA 89 [58] (Fichaud JA, with whom Farrar and Bourgeois JJA agreed), and the authorities 
there cited. 
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Lord Beckett’s view in Courtney’s case is open to the same objection. His Lordship 
says that ‘the subsidiarity principle’ means that ‘unjustified enrichment only comes into 
play if the primary cause of action fails’. This removes any need for subsidiarity in its 
basic function. 
 
Evans-Jones’ account is also open to the same objection. Take his first view about 
unproved contracts’ ability to take enrichment claims with them: contract is obviously 
determining whether unjustified enrichment can be at play. His second view, that an 
enrichment claim, which is subsidiary, may be denied because a relevant contract 
justifies the impugned enrichment, is similarly problematic (the ‘subsidiarity of 
unjustified enrichment in this context is achieved by the understanding that a benefit 
acquired under a valid contract is retained “with cause”’). This view entails that there 
would be no unjustified enrichment, because contracts provide legal grounds for 
enrichments. You cannot make subsidiarity determine the existence of unjustified 
enrichment – or anything else – on a given set of facts. 
 
Whitty’s self-contradictory approval of Evans-Jones’ second view cannot be 
supported. Nor can his acceptance of subsidiarity’s continued relevance in cases like 
Edmonston. We may retrospectively understand this decision as one in which 
contractual allocation of risk, or gratuitous conferral, justified the relevant enrichment. 
Lord Johnston held that the pursuers had taken ‘volunteer action’, and noted that the 
parties were relevantly in contract.50 To insist upon subsidiarity’s pertinence, Whitty 
must accept that his rule is the same one that says: ‘the pursuer’s enrichment is 
justified, so there is no unjustified enrichment in the first place’. Determinative as it is 
of unjustified enrichment’s existence, this cannot be a rule of subsidiarity. 
                                               
50 Edmonston (n 36) 442-443 (Lord Johnston). This case deals with a situation in which the pursuer and 
defender to the enrichment claim were in contract with each other. As noted in part III(A), below, where 
an enrichment pursuer or an enrichment defender has a contract with a third party to the enrichment 
claim, that contract may also justify the third party’s enrichment. The issue of subsidiarity would not 
then surface, as explained in part III(B), below. More difficult are cases in which a third party to a contract 
performs a contractual obligation of a party to that contract, thereby enriching (i) the party whose 
obligation is performed, (ii) another party to the contract, or (iii) a fourth, non-contractual-party. In case 
(ii) the contract could easily justify the relevant enrichment, by evincing an intention that a non-party 
should not benefit from performing according to its provisions, with a non-assignment clause, for 
example. In cases (i) and (iii), though justification by contract is possible, it is less likely; and if the 
contractual allocation of risk is not upset, unjustified enrichment should be allowed to operate. In no 
case could the issue of subsidiarity arise: either contract reigns, and there is no unjustified enrichment 
to be subsidiary to anything; or it does not, and there is no overlap between contract and enrichment 
for subsidiarity to mediate. 
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A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, 
or groups of entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible 
at all in a given context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie 
unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. None of the above accounts 
satisfies this principle. 
 
In French law, and for the commentators there who favour subsidiarity in the context 
under discussion, the existence of an open contractual action means that there can 
be no action en enrichissement injustifié. The same is true when the former action is 
legally barred. In neither situation will more than one action relevantly exist. One thing 
cannot be in a relationship with another thing, if one of those things does not exist. An 
enrichment claim cannot be subsidiary to a contractual one if it does not exist. 
 
On Grantham and Rickett’s account, if a contract relevantly covers the transfer of a 
benefit, then ‘it is no longer the case’ that the enrichment is unjust. So when contract 
exists, unjust enrichment does not. They are not talking about the latter’s subsidiarity 
to contract here. There can be no relationship of subsidiarity between enrichment and 
contract on the envisaged facts, because there is no relevant plurality of entities to 
have a relationship. Grantham and Rickett define subsidiarity as a ‘relationship 
between two claims or doctrines’ (emphasis added). So their enrichment-contract 
example does not conform to their own description of subsidiarity. It will be recalled 
from chapter 5 that their enrichment-property illustration is bad, too. Their account thus 
offers no example compliant with their own definition of subsidiarity. It cannot be 
supported. 
 
All three limbs of Burrows’ account involve the non-existence of unjust enrichment 
when the rules are applied to facts. This means that in no way could subsidiarity form 
part of a plurality of entities with contract, and so be in a relationship of subsidiarity. 
The same objection applies to Virgo’s views. For him, where there is a valid contract, 
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unjust enrichment has no ‘role to play in any dispute between the parties’. To that 
extent, the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment to contract is logically impossible. 
 
The same logical impossibility affects Lord Beckett’s view of Scots law in Courtney’s 
case, according to which unjustified enrichment and contract cannot co-exist. 
 
Evans-Jones thinks that an enrichment’s justification by contract means that there is 
a relationship of subsidiarity between the laws of unjustified enrichment and contract. 
This is wrong, because where contract provides the necessary justification, whether 
by consecrating or excluding redress, for example, unjustified enrichment does not 
and cannot arise. The same is true of Evans-Jones’ opinion about unproved contracts 
when it is exposed to hypothetical facts. 
 
Whitty’s self-contradictory approval of Evans-Jones’ ‘justification of enrichment by 
contract = subsidiarity’ view cannot be supported for the further reason just given. It 
was argued in the preceding subsection that cases like Edmonston are really just 
examples of this justification view. So there will never on such facts be any unjustified 
enrichment to be subsidiary to any contract. Without such a plurality of entities, there 
can be no relationship of subsidiarity. Whitty does say that often, ‘a rule of subsidiarity 
[…] is not needed to reach the correct conclusion’. But he does not draw the logical 
consequence from the justification of enrichment by contract point: the impossibility of 
unjustified enrichment’s existence. 
 
MacQueen’s account seems incorrect to the extent that it accords relevance to 
subsidiarity when, in fact, a contract would prevent the existence of a supposedly 
subsidiary unjustified enrichment, such that it could not participate in a relationship of 
subsidiarity. It must, in fairness, be said that MacQueen is clearly open to this criticism. 
Take, first, his observations on the Devos Gebroeder case. Take, secondly, his views 
that that ‘enrichment arising from a valid contract is justified and not reversible’; but 
that Scots law recognises ‘a principle of subsidiarity which is sometimes interpreted 
as meaning that enrichment recovery is excluded whenever there is a contract’.51  
 
                                               
51 MacQueen (n 24) 350. 
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C. Overlap 
 
For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that 
context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. None of the above accounts satisfies 
this principle. 
 
As in previous chapters, this is a short point. In reality, and whether they themselves 
openly address this, none of the above accounts relevantly admits that enrichment 
and contract can co-exist. So none of them admits that they might overlap – that is, 
concur. If none admits that, then none leaves any role for subsidiarity. Accounts which 




For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it 
must bind the relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in 
relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their 
relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be 
the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), 
there would be no need for subsidiarity. This is subsidiarity as meta-authority. A rule 
of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained. And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. Of the accounts which can be understood under this head, 
none satisfies the instant principle. 
 
The rule in article 1303-3 of the Code civil is not a meta-authority in relation to the 
action en enrichissement injustifié or contract actions. It is placed in the chapter of the 
Code on the enrichment action, of which it is an ‘inherent condition’.52 This is clearly 
                                               
52 See Civ 1re, 4 April 2006, pourvoi no 03-13986, Bull civ I, no 194; [2006] RLDC, no 28, 11, observations 
by S Doireau: ‘le caractère subsidiaire reconnu à l’action fondée sur le principe de l’enrichissement 
sans cause ne constitue pas une fin de non recevoir au sens de l’article 122 du nouveau Code de 
procédure civile mais une condition inhérente à l’action’; CA Rennes, 18 December 2007, RG no 
06/00867; CA Nîmes, 8 January 2008, RG no 04/01413; CA Basse-Terre, 5 January 2009, RG no 
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reflected in the more specific reasoning addressed above, also. So the rule is not 
sourced independently of the action de in rem verso, one of the entities to which it is 
supposed to apply. And it does not actually govern any potential contract action which 
might come under its formula, either. It works by making the action en enrichissement 
injustifié disappear in the face of a contract action, whether open or legally barred. The 
contract claim decides for itself, so to speak, what it is, or is not, going to do, and there 
is nothing in article 1303-3 that can change that. The French commentary referred to 
above appears to accept that subsidiarity is part of the action de in rem verso. This 
suffices to declare all of it incorrect on the meta-authority point. Rules which are not 
independent, and cannot actually govern the things to which they apply, are not rules 
of subsidiarity. 
 
Grantham and Rickett say that ‘subsidiarity is not merely a consequence of unjust 
enrichment’s inherent doctrinal nature, but also reflects the ordering of private law in 
the common law system’.53 What they see as the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment to 
contract is part of unjust enrichment. So it is not independent or sourced on a higher 
plane than at least one of the entities to which it is supposed to apply. It is not 
subsidiarity at all. 
 
All three limbs of Burrows’ account are rules of unjust enrichment: the first tells us 
about injustice; the other two are worded as rules about defences, and as argued 
under subsection A, they are probably really about injustice, too. Whoever is right on 
this point, Burrows’ rules are not independent of unjust enrichment, do not constitute 
meta-authority in relation to unjust enrichment, and so cannot be rules of subsidiarity. 
This is also correct when one turns to consider the rules’ relationship with contract, 
and contract claims. Contract sweeps unjust enrichment from play on Burrows’ 
account. Without authority over any relevant contract claim, they are reactive, not 
directive. They are not about subsidiarity.  
 
Virgo’s account is open to the same objections that Burrows’ is under this head. They 
are not repeated. 
                                               
05/01889; CA Douai, 26 October 2009, RG no 08/06633; CA Limoges, 4 March 2013, RG no 12/00560; 
CA Metz, 21 September 2017, RG no 17/00339. 
53 Grantham and Rickett (n 3) 293. 
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Lord Beckett’s account in Courtney’s case is ambiguous as to the source of his 
Lordship’s ‘subsidiarity principle’. The strongest suggestion that it is supposedly part 
of unjustified enrichment appears in recognition of common ground between the 
parties that recompense, sought in Varney,54 and Transco,55 is merely a remedy for 
unjustified enrichment, but that subsidiarity is not confined to recompense cases.56 But 
this remains weak evidence, and it would be unfair to conclude either way upon the 
point which interests us here. 
 
For Evans-Jones, an important part of unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity concerns 
contract’s justification of a given enrichment. It seems that, for him, the rule is part of 
unjustified enrichment. Like similar rules in accounts surveyed above, it is not about 
subsidiarity. His further point, that failure to prove the existence of a contract will take 
an enrichment claim with it, is made citing French jurisprudence, which is part of that 
relating to the action de in rem verso. So it is open to the same objection: it is not 
meta-authority. 
 
Whitty criticises the idea that any ‘primacy’ – for which, read sovereignty – should be 
accorded to contract using subsidiarity. If subsidiarity were doing that, it might be 
possible to say that, for Whitty, subsidiarity does constitute a meta-authority over 
contract and unjustified enrichment. But he says the opposite, and tells us clearly that 
his account cannot be correct on the meta-authority point. His account is further unsafe 
to the extent that it relies on Evans-Jones’ ‘justification of enrichment by contract = 
subsidiarity’ view. 
 
MacQueen’s view that subsidiarity and absence of cause overlap seems to permit the 





                                               
54 Varney (n 32). 
55 Transco (n 44). 
56 Courtney’s Executors (n 20) [52]. 
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E. Not sovereignty 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship 
can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there 
would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because authority in that context would be 
allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence of subsidiarity – as argued 
in chapter 2, subsidiarity is a conditional idea. 
 
This is another short point. On all but one of the above accounts,57 it is clear that, 
whenever contract exists, it always wins against unjust enrichment, so to speak. There 
is no condition. There is no doubt. In French law, article 1303-3 of the Code civil and 
the specific jurisprudence confirm that there is no enrichissement injustifié on the field 
on which contract is at play, or was, until itself barred by an obstacle of law. The 
commentators cited above accept this, too. Grantham and Rickett’s definition of 
subsidiarity specifically says that ‘unjust enrichment […] is subsidiary in the sense that 
the scope and operation of the principle of unjust enrichment are necessarily 
constrained by the scope and operation of the other core doctrines of the private law’. 
One of these doctrines is ‘consent-based obligations (dominantly but not solely the 
law of contract)’.58 All three limbs of Burrows’ account speak to contract’s ability to 
overpower unjust enrichment. For Virgo, ‘it is vital’ that unjust enrichment give way to 
contract. Evans-Jones thinks that for unjustified enrichment to do anything which 
contract would not would be a ‘fraud on the law’. Whitty denies a straightforward 
‘primacy’ of contract, but it is actually entailed by his endorsement of Evans-Jones’ 
general principle (according to which ‘justification of enrichment by contract = 
subsidiarity’). MacQueen’s acceptance that Scots law recognises a principle of 
subsidiarity which is sometimes interpreted as meaning that enrichment recovery is 




                                               
57 Lord Beckett’s account in Courtney’s case, ibid, is again ambiguous, so is not criticised under this 
head. 
58 Grantham and Rickett (n 3) 273. 
59 MacQueen (n 24) 350. 
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F. Not concurrence 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the 
entities said to be part of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a 
situation, since competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point 
of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen, as 
argued in chapter 2. 
 
All of the accounts discussed here infringe at least one of the principles of subsidiarity 
discussed under subheadings B, C, and D of this part of the chapter. So to some 
extent, none admits that unjust enrichment and contract can co-exist, or concur when 
not restrained by a meta-authority. None, therefore, breaches the instant principle of 
subsidiarity. This is only a small consolation, of course, since if there is no concurrence 
to prevent, subsidiarity is redundant, assuming that it is correct to say that subsidiarity 
exists in the first place, which, on the accounts here surveyed, it does not. 
 
III. RE-ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter elaborates on a better explanation than subsidiarity for 
unjustified enrichment’s contingency on the operation of contracts that exclude or limit 
unjust enrichment claims. It is that contracts which do this justify enrichments, to which 
extent, there is no unjust enrichment to be subsidiary to anything. First, that contracts 
justify enrichments will be demonstrated comparatively. Secondly, the effect of this 
upon the accounts surveyed above will be set out.  
 
A. Contracts as justifications for enrichments 
 
As Edelman J put it in an Australian case: ‘no cause of action for restitution of unjust 
enrichment can exist where the action is inconsistent with the express or implied terms 
of a contract’.60 The Cour de cassation has held: ‘an enrichment which has its origin 
                                               
60 Anderson v McPherson (No 2) [2012] WASC 19 [239] (emphasis added); approved in Mineralogy Pty 
Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 10) [2016] WASC 90 [46] (Chaney J). See also Re Beppler & Jacobson Ltd 
[2018] EWCA Civ 763 [63] (Gloster LJ, with whom Singh LJ and Sir Jack Beatson agreed); Landmark 
Ltd v American International Bank (In Receivership) [2014] UKPC 17 (Antig & Barb) [29] (Lord Hodge, 
with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, and Lord Toulson agreed). For the concern, 
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in one of the lawful modes of acquiring rights, such as a contract, is not unjustified’.61 
This principle applies most clearly to benefits transferred under valid and subsisting 
contracts.62 
 
Example.63 A Ltd contracts with B Ltd to advance funds to X, B’s liquidator, in order to 
fund B’s administration by X. On its true construction, the contract contains a right for 
A eventually to be repaid by B. So A has no unjust enrichment claim against B. 
 
As the precise wording of Edelman J’s dictum indicates, unjust enrichment is 
impossible on the above facts, where a contract between the claimant and defendant 
justifies the latter’s enrichment.64 But the principle does not stop there. ‘Generally, a 
third party is not liable in unjust enrichment simply for benefitting from a contract 
between two other parties.’65  
 
Example.66 Builder Ltd contracts with Tax Vehicle Ltd to do construction work for Ms 
Clever. Builder is left unpaid. Builder cannot claim against Ms Clever because the 
condition on which it carried out the work benefitting Ms Clever was that it would be 
paid by Tax Vehicle. So Ms Clever is not unjustly enriched. 
 
                                               
in France, that the contract must cover the relevant enrichment, see Civ 1re, 20 December 1993, 
pourvoi no 92-10134, Bull civ I, no 383; [1994] JCP G, II, 22307, noted by F Roussel; [1994] RTD Civ 
914, observations by J Patarin; Com, 4 November 1982, pourvoi no 81-14631, Bull civ IV, no 331. 
61 Civ 3e, 25 February 1975, pourvoi no 73-13781, Bull civ III, no 77; Soc, 17 June 1960, Bull civ IV, no 
648. See also Code civil, art 1303-1. 
62 Bailey v Barclays Bank Plc [2014] EWHC 2882 (QB) [67](4) (HH Judge Keyser); point not appealed 
[2015] EWCA Civ 667; Toll Global Forwarding Pty Ltd v Theiss Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 365 [232], [245] 
(Kenneth Martin J); Robertson Construction Central Ltd v Glasgow Metro LLP [2009] CSOH 71, 2009 
GWD 19-304 [17]-[21] (Lord Hodge); Jones v Muir unreported 10 March 2015 (Sh Ct, Lochmaddy), 
2015 GWD 11-183 [6] (Sheriff Principal Derek Pyle). Until set aside, the same goes for voidable 
contractual obligations, as to which, see A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract 
(OUP 2016) §34(3). 
63 This example is based on TOC Investments Corporation v Beppler & Jacobson Ltd [2016] EWHC 20 
(Ch) [89], [96], [102], [110], [117]-[126] (Hildyard J); reversed [2018] EWCA Civ 763 esp [63] (Gloster 
LJ, with whom Singh LJ and Sir Jack Beatson agreed). 
64 See also two arrêts of the Cour de cassation in quick succession with the same attendu de principe: 
Civ, 21 February 1944; [1944] Gaz Pal, I, 249; Civ, 17 May 1944; [1944] S, I, 132, noted by L Audiat. 
65 Thimjohn Farms Partnership v First National Bank and Trust (2013) 837 NW 2d 327 (NDSC) 336 
(Grothers J, with whom Maring and Sandstrom JJ agreed). For a Scots case denying an enrichment 
claim where the pursuer had a contract with a third party, see Express Coach Finishers (n 27) 12 
(Sheriff-Substitute Irvine Smith). See also Dantzer v CP Loewen Enterprises Ltd [2005] ABCA 159, 
(2005) 54 Alta LR (4th) 182 [3] (Paperny JA, for Côté JA and Whittmann ACJ), affirming [2004] ABQB 
6 esp [45] (Gallant J). 
66 This example is based on MacDonald Dickens & Macklin (a firm) v Costello [2011] EWCA Civ 930, 
[2012] QB 244 [20]-[23], [30] (Etherton LJ, for Patten and Pill LJJ).  
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The same position may also hold where it is the enrichment defendant who has a 
contract with a third party that covers the enrichment in question.67 A contract need 
not even subsist for it to prevent an unjust enrichment’s coming into existence: a fully 
performed contract can serve as a relevant justification for benefits transferred during 
its currency.68 
 
Example.69 Investor Ltd participates in Fund Ltd’s investment scheme. Their 
agreement contains definitive valuation, withdrawal and redemption provisions. 
Investor makes returns and cashes out. Unfortunately, Fund puts most of its capital 
with the fraudulent scheme concocted by Evil Ponzistas Ltd. Fund collapses. Fund 
has no claim in unjust enrichment against Investor for the returns to which it was 
entitled under its contract with Fund, even though there no longer exists an agreement 
between the parties. 
 
A contract’s justificatory power can survive termination as well as performance. An 
enrichment transferred pursuant to a right accruing before the termination of a contract 
is justified. The same principle applies: ‘enrichment sanctioned by the contract is not 
unjust’.70 And in continuation of the argument outlined in chapter 2, and set out in more 
depth in chapter 4, it should further be noted for completeness that a contract need 
not confer a right to a benefit in order for it to justify the transfer of that benefit. What 
matters is whether the contract, by its terms or distribution of risks, makes that benefit 
                                               
67 Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) [2008] HCA 27, (2008) 232 CLR 635 [43]-[55] (Gleeson 
CJ), [79]-[80], [125]-[126] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); Civ 3e, 28 May 1986, pourvoi no 
85-10367, Bull civ III, no 83; [1987] RTD Civ 548, observations by J Mestre. 
68 Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 429 [101] (Chaney J); Palmar Properties Inc v 
JEL Investments Ltd [2013] BCSC 623 [23]-[24], [33], [71] (Brown J), affirmed [2014] BCCA 169; Com, 
18 January 1994, pourvoi no 91-22237, Bull civ IV, no 27; Gibson v Gibson unreported 4 August 2010 
(Sh Ct, Peterhead), 2010 GWD 30-614 [16] (Sheriff Principal Sir Stephen Young QC). 
69 This example is based on Fairfield Sentry Ltd v Migani [2014] UKPC 9 (BVI), [2014] 1 CLC 611 [3], 
[17], [18]-[19], [24], [27]-[31] (Lord Sumption, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke and 
Lord Toulson agreed). 
70 See Newland Shipping and Forwarding Ltd v Toba Trading FZC [2014] EWHC 661 (Comm) [85], 
[87], [89]-[93] (Leggatt J); Com, 23 October 2012 (two arrêts), pourvois nos 11-21978, 11-25175, Bull 
civ IV, nos 192-193; [2012] D 2862, observations by N Dissaux; [2013] RTD Civ 114, observations by B 
Fages; [2013] RDC 641, observations by C Grimaldi; Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties 
Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90, 94, 100-101 (Lord Hope, with whom Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Jauncey, Lord 
Nolan, and Lord Hoffmann agreed). On the survival, in English law, post-termination, of rights accrued 
pre-termination, see Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185 (HL) 193-194 (Lord Millett, with whom Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, Lord Nicholls, Lord Hope and Lord Clyde agreed). A contract may also provide for a party’s 
rights to survive termination so that payments not yet made must still be made and are justified by the 
agreement: Cadogan Petroleum Holdings Ltd v Global Process Systems LLC [2013] EWHC 214 
(Comm), [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 26 [18]-[21], [27], [41]-[42] (Eder J). 
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a just one. This appears, for example, from common law cases, in which contracts 
conferred no rights to payment at all, but impliedly excluded unjust enrichment 
claims;71 or French cases declaring that enrichments resulting from the performance 
or cessation of performance of contracts according to their terms, but in respect of 
which no provision is made in the contract, are justified.72 
 
B. The impact of the re-analysis 
 
It has been said that ‘[t]here can be no better justification for an enrichment’ than 
contract.73 The upshot is that, where a contract relevantly approves the receipt of a 
benefit, the issue of unjust enrichment ‘does not arise’.74 Put the other way round, 
unjust enrichment is ‘exclusive of the idea of contract, and always presupposes an 
obligation foreign to any positive agreement’.75 
 
Unjust enrichment cannot, therefore, ever be subsidiary to contract. The two 
institutions cannot co-exist in the required manner. But the law and scholarship 
addressed in this chapter need only jettison subsidiarity in favour of the justification-




This chapter first surveyed English, French and Scots law for claims that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to contract. It highlights France as the only jurisdiction 
considered to make such claims very strongly, and subsidiarity’s slight but notable 
                                               
71 Beppler & Jacobson (n 60) [63] (Gloster LJ, with whom Singh LJ and Sir Jack Beatson agreed): ‘[t]he 
short point here is that a claim to unjust enrichment in the present case (even on the assumption that it 
might otherwise lie) would directly interfere with the manner in which the parties had allocated risk under 
the terms of the contract. In my judgment, therefore, the judge’s conclusion on subrogation cannot stand 
if, as I have held, he is wrong on his primary conclusion that TOC has a pre-existing right of repayment’; 
Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd v Glenalla Properties Ltd [2018] UKPC 7 (Gue) [144]-[151] (Lord Hodge, 
with whom Lord Sumption and Lord Carnwath agreed), [194] (Lord Mance, dissenting on other 
grounds), [237] (Lord Briggs, dissenting on other grounds). 
72 Com, 23 October 2012 (two arrêts) (n 70). 
73 Dollar Land (n 70) 94 (Lord Hope, with whom Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Jauncey, Lord Nolan, and 
Lord Hoffmann agreed). 
74 Landmark (n 60) [29] (Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, and 
Lord Toulson agreed). 
75 Cour de Grenoble, 15 December 1909; [1910] J de la C de Grenoble 8; [1918] S, I, 41. See, more 
recently, CA Paris, 12 June 2014, RG no 12/08266. 
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foothold, in one Scots enrichment case. English and Scots scholars appear to have 
produced more relevant accounts than they have on the subsidiarity of unjust 
enrichment to property. 
 
The second part of this chapter suggested that it is incorrect to claim that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to contract. First, with the exception of MacQueen’s account, 
which is hard to interpret on this point, what the law and scholarship surveyed above 
take to be rules of subsidiarity obviously determine the existence of unjust enrichment, 
one of the entities which is supposed to be in a relationship of subsidiarity. Rules of 
subsidiarity do not do that. Secondly, they do not admit that unjust enrichment and 
contract can exist at the same time, such that there is never a relevant plurality of 
entities, required for a relationship of subsidiarity. Thirdly, they do not admit that unjust 
enrichment and contract can overlap, without the possibility of which subsidiarity is 
redundant. Fourthly, with the exception of Lord Beckett’s account in Courtney’s case, 
which is hard to interpret on this point, they do not see their rules of subsidiarity as 
meta-authorities, which they must be if they are to be rules of subsidiarity. Fifthly, and 
leaving aside Courtney’s case again, they all see contract as somehow sovereign over 
unjust enrichment – something antithetical to subsidiarity. It is conceded that no 
account breaches this study’s sixth principle of subsidiarity. But that is only because 
none successfully surmounts hurdles logically prior to its relevance. 
 
The third part of this chapter suggested a better explanation of unjust enrichment’s 
relations with contract based on the view that contracts provide justifications for 
enrichments. This view can deliver unjust enrichment discourse from talk of 
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CHAPTER 7 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, SUBSIDIARITY, AND TORT OR DELICT 
 
Previous chapters in this study provide background on the law of unjust enrichment, 
introduce a definition and principles of subsidiarity, and sketch the history of, and 
reasons for, subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment. This chapter 
is the fourth to put those general chapters to use. Its first part addresses arguments in 
the law and literature made about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to the law of tort or 
delict, or tortious or delictual actions. France is the only jurisdiction with positive claims 
on point. After these are set out, they are tested against the theory of subsidiarity 
developed in chapter 2 of this study. It will be seen that the available material cannot 
correctly be characterised as entailing unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to tort or delict. 
The third part of this chapter explains why, in France, subsidiarity is irrelevant to how 
enrichissement injustifié interacts with delict. 
 
I. THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter presents claims about unjust enrichment’s subsidiarity to tort 
or delict. They are found only in French law and scholarship. 
 
A. England  
 
In England, and other common law jurisdictions, it is not the law that unjust enrichment 
is subsidiary to the law of tort, or tort claims. And it is unlikely to become the law. This 
is arguable, based on the interaction of contract and tort actions. The language of 
subsidiarity has not been put to this in leading cases, and the substance of the law 
does not fit the principles of subsidiarity put forward in this study. Prima facie, there is 
a free choice between open actions in contract and tort arising distinctly from the same 
ensemble of facts.1 The mere availability of a tort action will not prevent the exercise 
                                               
1 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 191-194 (Lord Goff, with whom Lord 
Keith of Kinkel, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Mustill, and Lord Nolan agreed); Astley v Austrust Ltd 
(1999) 197 CLR 1 (HCA) [44]-[48], [84]-[88] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), [129], 
[135], [142] (Callinan J, dissenting on other grounds); both cases approving aspects of Le Dain J’s 
judgment in Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147 (SCC) esp 204-206 (Dickson CJ, and Beetz, 
Estey, McIntyre, Lamer, and Wilson JJ concurring). 
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of a contractual one.2 The mere unavailability of a contractual action does not take a 
tort action with it. For that, the contract’s terms must exclude the tortious duty.3 That 
contract can do this without reference to any higher rule governing the interaction of 
both areas of law makes the questions which arise here inapt for resolution by 
subsidiarity – meta-authority is absent.4 
 
It has not been possible to trace any academic claims that unjust enrichment is 
subsidiary to the English or common law of torts. Contrary views have been 
expressed, though: Andrew Burrows favours concurrent liability in unjust enrichment 
and tort, but without reference to subsidiarity.5 And Ross Grantham and Charles 
Rickett explicitly argue that most torts do not ‘interface’ with unjust enrichment, and 




As shown in chapter 3, article 1303-3 of the Code civil, and the Cour de cassation’s 
formulae from which it derives, are claims or rules about the subsidiarity of the action 
de in rem verso in France. Though they do not themselves use the language of 
subsidiarity, many other sources, referred to earlier, do put it to the now-codified rules. 
Article 1303-3 encompasses open or legally barred delictual actions, and the older 
holdings mention delict specifically.7 
                                               
2 See the speeches of Lord Nicholls (with whom Lord Goff, and Lord Mackay agreed) and Lord Steyn 
(with whom Lord Goff, Lord Mackay, and Lord Mustill agreed), in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International SA (in liq) [1998] AC 20 (HL) 40-41, 52-53. 
3 For a case in which this happened, and usefully states the English law, see Robinson v PE Jones 
(Contractors) Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 9, [2012] QB 44 [77]-[80], [87]-[88] esp [84], [88] (Jackson LJ, with 
whom Maurice Kay LJ agreed), [91], [94] (Stanley Burnton LJ). It should be noted that, whilst a 
contractual exclusion may prevent a tortious duty from arising in the first place, this is perhaps not the 
orthodox view of the effect of exclusion and limitation clauses on contractual duties: Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977, ss 3(2)(b), 13; Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 659 (CA) 664 (Slade LJ, 
with whom Neill J and Sir John Megaw agreed). 
4 This paragraph could also to apply to tort’s interaction with statute. Take the implied statutory 
permission precluding tortious liability in trespass in The Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd v United 
Utilities Water Plc [2014] UKSC 40, [2014] 1 WLR 2576 [19] (Lord Sumption, with whom Lord Clarke 
and Lord Hughes agreed), [35]-[36] (Lord Toulson) [70]-[75] (Lord Neuberger). 
5 ‘A right to restitution for unjust enrichment may be claimed concurrently with another claim (for 
example, for a tort or breach of contract) but satisfaction of more than one claim is not permitted where 
it would produce double recovery’: A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(OUP 2012) §1(4) and commentary, 28-29; citing Henderson (n 1). 
6 R Grantham and C Rickett, ‘On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 117 LQR 273, 295-296. 
7 See, eg, Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] DP, I, 102 (first case). 
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To this general claim in French law, that enrichissement injustifié is subsidiary to open 
or legally barred actions, including delictual ones, may be added specific claims. Take 
open delictual actions first. In one decision, the Cour de cassation approved a court of 
appeal for having based its decision on delict and not unjustified enrichment. It seems 
clear from the reasoning that, had this not happened, the judgment would have been 
quashed. And the vocabulary of subsidiarity used before the court was implicitly 
approved.8 The Cour de cassation seems never to have endorsed an option between 
an open action in delict and the action de in rem verso.9 Predictably, though, the lower 
courts are against it.10 So, a recent case held that that the mere ‘theoretical 
applicability’ of the general law of delict sufficed to exclude unjustified enrichment 
based on its ‘subsidiary character’.11 
 
The same disfavour is shown towards unjustified enrichment in the presence of legally 
barred delictual actions. In a case in which the claimant failed to prove the existence 
of fault by the defendant (a necessary element of success in the France’s general 
delict action), and whose enrichment action was therefore rejected, the Cour de 
cassation dismissed her appeal by holding that ‘the court of appeal which, giving 
specific and solemn reasons, applied the principles relating to unjustified enrichment 
and highlighted its subsidiary character, rendering the claim […] inadmissible, has 
                                               
8 Civ 1re, 9 May 1996, pourvoi no 94-16114. Without the vocabulary, see TGI Paris, 24 November 1977, 
[1978] D IR 341, observations by M Cabrillac; Civ 2e, 10 October 2002, pourvoi no 00-18554. 
9 Contra is N Almosnino, Le caractère subsidiaire de l’action de in rem verso (LGDJ 1931) 115-121; 
citing Req, 21 December 1926; [1927] Gaz Pal, I, 426; [1929] Rép jur transp, II, 504, which is analysed 
as having permitted enrichment liability in the presence of a potentially open (but unpleaded) delictual 
action. Following the first world war, a special statute prohibited any liability (responsabilité) of a rail 
company for loss or damage in relation to transport its network. The company appropriated and, it 
seems (though this was yet to be investigated), used, a cargo of rails in transit, which was subject to a 
contract of carriage between a mining company and a third party. The mining company succeeded in 
unjustified enrichment against the company, because the alleged appropriation was unrelated to the 
performance of the carriage contract, ie, outwith the statutory exclusion. Almosnino’s contention that 
the Cour de cassation admitted the possibility of a delictual action by declaring that the statutory 
prohibition covered only carriage is tenuous. This was not pleaded or mentioned. And the post-war 
context makes it unlikely that the company’s appropriation of the rails would have been delictual. 
10 CA Paris, 22 December 2017, RG no 14/19086. 
11 CA Pau, 14 November 2017, RG no 15/04720: ‘l’action fondée sur l’enrichissement sans cause, qui 
présente un caractère subsidiaire, ne doit être admise que dans les cas où le patrimoine d’une personne 
se trouve, sans cause légitime, enrichi au détriment de celui d’une autre personne qui ne jouit, pour 
obtenir ce qui lui est dû, d’aucune action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi contrat, d’un délit ou d’un 
quasi délit[;] qu’en l’espèce, l’absence de toute autre action ouverte au demandeur n’est pas 
caractérisée, étant constaté que le [demandeur] ne se prévaut ni des dispositions des articles 1382 et 
1383 anciens du [C]ode civil dont l’applicabilité théorique ne peut être exclue […]’. See also  
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thereby legally justified its decision’.12 This approach dates to at least the 1920s.13 
One well-known decision reached the opposite conclusion in the same circumstances. 
But it does not fit the trend in the cases, and still explicitly affirms in principle the action 
de in rem verso’s subsidiary character.14 
 
Claims that unjustified enrichment is subsidiary to delict also exist in French 
scholarship.15 It is tacitly accepted by the current of doctrine which reasons on the 
broader bases outlined at the start of this subsection.16 More targeted claims about 
enrichment’s subsidiarity to delict also exist, such as the following, under the heading 
of subsidiarity: ‘if the impoverished person has […] a delictual or quasi-delictual action 





No Scots case supports unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity to the law of delict. None 
puts the language to any such rule. Scholarship is also against it.18 Robin Evans-Jones 
argues that pursuers may choose between delictual and enrichment-based claims, 
                                               
12 Civ 1re, 20 March 2014, pourvoi no 12-28318: ‘la cour d’appel qui, par motifs propres et adoptés, a 
fait application des principes relatifs à l’enrichissement sans cause et souligné son caractère subsidiaire 
rendant irrecevable la demande de Mme Y, a ainsi légalement justifié sa décision’. For other decisions 
using the vocabulary of subsidiarity whilst rejecting unjustified enrichment actions in the presence of 
legally barred delictual ones, see CA Aix-en-Provence, 4 December 2008, RG no 07/20133; CA Paris, 
15 September 2015, RG no 1415549. Without the vocabulary, see Civ 3e, 8 June 1993, pourvoi no 91-
19076; Civ 3e, 14 February 1996, pourvoi no 93-21791. In lower courts, see CA Orléans, 10 April 1985, 
Juris-Data no 1985-044278; CA Metz, 14 March 2007, Jurisdata no 2007-331358. 
13 CA Paris, 8 March 1922; [1922] Ann prop indust artist et lit 379; [1922] RTD Civ 887, observations 
by Demogue. 
14 Civ 1re, 3 June 1997, pourvoi no 95-13568, Bull civ I, no 182; [1997] RTD Civ 657, observations by J 
Mestre; [1998] JCP G, II, 10102, observations by G Viney. 
15 Against was Paul Esmein: Traité pratique de droit civil français par Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert, 
vol VII (P Esmein, J Radouant and G Gabolde eds, 2nd edn, LGDJ 1954) nos 762 in fine, 763(1). See 
also Almosnino (n 9) 115-121. 
16 See, eg, A Rouast, ‘L’enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile’ [1922] RTD Civ 35, 89-
91; or the survey and propositions put forward by P Drakidis, ‘La “subsidiarité”, caractère spécifique et 
international de l’action d’enrichissement sans cause’ [1961] RTD Civ 577, esp 595, 600-601, 612-613. 
17 F Terré et al and F Chénedé, Droit civil: Les obligations (12th edn, Dalloz 2018) no 1311 (original 
emphasis). See also, eg, the exposition of subsidiarity by J Bonnecase, Supplément au Traité théorique 
et pratique de droit civil par G Baudry-Lacantinerie et L-J Barde, vol III (Sirey 1926) nos 145-156 esp 
154, claiming specifically that delict trumps unjustified enrichment. 
18 In addition to both accounts discussed fully, see also Eric Clive’s view that there need only be a rule 
against double recovery in enrichment and delict: Draft Rules on Unjustified Enrichment and 
Commentary – Appendix to Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 99 (HMSO Scot 1994) rule 
11(1)(c); and Martin Hogg’s view that enrichment is not subsidiary to delict in the ‘very small’ category 
of cases in which they will both engage: Obligations (2nd edn, Avizandum 2006) [6.04]. 
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because ‘[t]here is no definitional consumption’ by delict of enrichment.19 Allowing this 
option ‘does not normally undermine wider aims of the legal system’.20 In support, 
Evans-Jones refers to Stair’s separation of enrichments by ‘engagement’ or 
‘delinquence’ from those arising lawfully but not by agreement; Barry Nicholas’ view 
that French law permits a choice between enrichment and delictual claims; and the 
same author’s citation of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, article 852, which allows an 
enrichment action after a delictual one prescribes.21  
 
In his long note on Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council,22 Niall Whitty addresses 
‘[s]ubsidiarity; enrichment by act of party enriched and delict’.23 With others, he 
instances, as an example of ‘those cases where a claim for recompense has been 
rejected because of its alleged subsidiarity to the law of delict’, the decision in 
Exchange Telegraph Co v Giulianotti.24 But the case is nothing of the sort. A 
terminated his contract for advance information about horse racing with C and got B 
to breach its contract with C by continuing to provide A with the information that it 
wanted. Lord Guest held, in application, inter alia, of Edinburgh & District Tramways 
Co Ltd v Courtenay,25 that C had suffered no loss.26 This is a condition of the old action 
for recompense, not subsidiarity.27 Despite his straw man, Whitty concludes that ‘the 
                                               
19 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, I: Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio (W Green 
2003) [1.101]. 
20 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W Green 
2013) [7.24]-[7.26]. 
21 ibid, [7.25]-[7.26]; citing Stair – the version relied upon by the present writer being The Institutions of 
the Law of Scotland (2nd edn, Anderson 1693) I.7; and B Nicholas, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil 
Law and Louisiana Law, I’ (1961) 36 Tulane L Rev 605, 640-641; in turn critically discussing CA Paris, 
8 March 1922 (n 13); and citing Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, art 852. It is respectfully suggested that 
Nicholas’ view of French law was questionable when expressed (the 1922 decision is actually against 
him), and is now unsupported by the cases.  
22 [2005] CSOH 76, 2005 SLT 958. 
23 N Whitty, ‘Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council: Developing Enrichment Law after Shilliday’ (2006) 10 
Edinburgh L Rev 113, 130. 
24 ibid, 130 and note 109; citing Exchange Telegraph Co v Giulianotti 1959 SC 19 (OH). Of ‘those 
cases’, this is the only one cited by Whitty. See also J Blackie and I Farlam, ‘Enrichment by Act of the 
Party Enriched’ in R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative 
Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (OUP 2004) 497 and note 208; 
citing Exchange Telegraph: ‘A problem in Scots law has been an occasional tendency to reject claims 
under reference to some other area of law. In one case, for example, a claim was excluded on an 
analysis that saw it as subsidiary to the law of delict.’ In their footnote, the authors continue: ‘[a]s in 
rejecting wrongly the claim where A received valuable information being marketed to B by C through 
getting B to pass it on to him in breach of his contract with C’. 
25 1909 SC 99 (IH) 105 (Lord Dunedin). 
26 Exchange Telegraph (n 24) 26. 
27 In earlier solo work, John Blackie recognised this: ‘Enrichment and Wrongs in Scots Law’ [1992] Acta 
Juridica 23, 39. Why not later, in his work with Ian Farlam, is unclear: (n 24) 497 and note 208. 
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pursuer should be entitled to choose’ between concurring delictual and enrichment 
actions.28 
 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
In this second part of the chapter, the claims set out above are analysed. The 
framework for discussion is the principles of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this 
study. The background is the conditional nature of subsidiarity, also developed in 
chapter 2, and both the law of unjust enrichment, and the general question of its 




Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to 
determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. To be a rule of 
subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or put an end to, 
a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one or more of the 
entities the interaction of which it is supposed to manage might be thought to prevent 
it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. It would also seem to deal 
with a question of overlap in a less then conditional manner. And as argued in chapter 
2, subsidiarity is an inherently conditional idea. Once an entity does not exist, there is 
no way for it eventually to become competent. Here, the relevant entities are, on one 
side, the law of tort or delict and relevant claims, and on the other, the law of unjust 
enrichment and unjust enrichment claims. The above French law and scholarship 
does not satisfy the instant principle.  
 
The general claim found in French law and scholarship that enrichissement injustifié 
is subsidiary to open or legally barred delictual actions fails. Focusing particularly on 
the Code civil, the rule clearly makes the enrichment action disappear (the claimant 
‘has no action’).29 So it is not a rule of subsidiarity. The same reasoning applies to the 
more specific claims in particular cases and academic accounts. 
                                               
28 Whitty (n 23) 131. 
29 The partial exception to the obstacle of law bar, for negotiorum gestio in the Code civil, art 1301-5, 
makes no difference to the basic principle here. This issue is discussed further in chapter 9. 
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B. Plurality 
 
A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, 
or groups of entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible 
at all in a given context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie 
unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. The above French law and 
scholarship does not satisfy this principle. 
 
In French law, and for the commentators there who favour subsidiarity in the context 
under discussion, the existence of an open delictual action means that there can be 
no action en enrichissement injustifié. The same is true when the former action is 
legally barred. In neither situation will more than one action relevantly exist. One thing 
cannot be in a relationship with another thing if one of those things does not exist. An 




For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that 
context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. The above French law and 
scholarship does not satisfy this principle. 
 
The short point made in previous chapters applies again here. The French law and 
scholarship surveyed does not admit that delict and unjustified enrichment actions can 
co-exist. They deny that they can overlap – that is, concur. In so doing, they leave no 
role for subsidiarity. Accounts which leave no role for subsidiarity cannot sensibly be 




For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it 
must bind the relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in 
relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their 
relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be 
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the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), 
there would be no need for subsidiarity. This is subsidiarity as meta-authority. A rule 
of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained. And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. The above French law and scholarship does not satisfy the 
instant principle. 
 
The rule in article 1303-3 of the Code civil is not a meta-authority in relation to the 
action en enrichissement injustifié or delictual actions. It is placed in the chapter of the 
Code on the enrichment action, of which it is an ‘inherent condition’.30 This is clearly 
reflected in the more specific reasoning addressed above, also. The action de in rem 
verso has a ‘subsidiary character’, which applies when it comes up against delictual 
actions.31 So the rule is not sourced independently of the former action, one of the 
entities to which it is supposed to apply. And it does not actually govern any potential 
delictual action which might come under its formula, either. It works by making the 
action en enrichissement injustifié disappear in the face of an action in delict, whether 
open or legally barred. The delict action decides for itself, so to speak, what it is, or is 
not, going to do, and there is nothing in article 1303-3 that can change that. The French 
commentary referred to above appears to accept that subsidiarity is part of the action 
de in rem verso. This suffices to declare all of it incorrect on the meta-authority point. 
Rules which are not independent, and cannot actually govern the things to which they 






                                               
30 See Civ 1re, 4 April 2006, pourvoi no 03-13986, Bull civ I, no 194; [2006] RLDC, no 28, 11, observations 
by S Doireau: ‘le caractère subsidiaire reconnu à l’action fondée sur le principe de l’enrichissement 
sans cause ne constitue pas une fin de non recevoir au sens de l’article 122 du nouveau Code de 
procédure civile mais une condition inhérente à l’action’; CA Rennes, 18 December 2007, RG no 
06/00867; CA Nîmes, 8 January 2008, RG no 04/01413; CA Basse-Terre, 5 January 2009, RG no 
05/01889; CA Douai, 26 October 2009, RG no 08/06633; CA Limoges, 4 March 2013, RG no 12/00560; 
CA Metz, 21 September 2017, RG no 17/00339. 
31 Recall, eg, Civ 1re, 20 March 2014 (n 12). 
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E. Not sovereignty 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship 
can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there 
would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because authority in that context would be 
allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence of subsidiarity – as argued 
in chapter 2, subsidiarity is a conditional idea. The above French law and scholarship 
does not satisfy this principle. 
 
This is another short point. The above French law, specific jurisprudence, and 
scholarship cited, takes the view that whenever delict exists, or did, until barred by an 
obstacle of law, it always wins against unjustified enrichment. There is no condition or 
doubt that there is no enrichissement injustifié on the field on which delict is, or was, 
at play. 
 
F. Not concurrence 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the 
entities said to be part of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a 
situation, since competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point 
of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen, as 
argued in chapter 2. 
 
The French law and scholarship discussed here infringes the five foregoing principles 
of subsidiarity. Neither admits that unjust enrichment and delict can co-exist, or concur 
when not restrained by a meta-authority. Neither, therefore, breaches the instant 
principle of subsidiarity. This is only a small consolation, of course, since if there is no 
concurrence to prevent, subsidiarity is redundant, assuming that it is correct to say 
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III. RE-ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter argues that subsidiarity is not relevant to the relationship of 
unjustified enrichment and delict in French law. In essence, they do not overlap, such 
that subsidiarity contributes nothing to how we understand their co-existence in the 
legal system. 
 
Take definitions first. It appears that in France, delictual liability (la responsabilité civile 
délictuelle) is engaged by different analyses of facts to those which engage unjustified 
enrichment. It is important to focus on what, through French eyes, makes each a 
private injustice.32 
 
Delict is constituted by an unlawful act (fait illicite), the breach of a legal duty. From 
the defendant’s point of view, this act is what creates the obligation; harm and loss (a 
dommage and préjudice) are caused to the claimant – imposed upon it.33 Unjustified 
enrichment is still formally a quasi-contrat in French law. It is constituted by the lawful 
and voluntary act (fait licite et volontaire) of the claimant.34 From the defendant’s point 
                                               
32 For what follows, see M Douchy, La notion de quasi-contrat en droit positif français (Economica 1997) 
217-223; J Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol II (final def edn, PUF 2004) no 1213; F Chénedé, Les 
commutations en droit privé: Contribution à la thérie générale des obligations (Economica 2008) nos 
342-347, emphasising the spontaneous nature of the quasi-contrat and the imposed nature of the 
(quasi-)délit; reflected shortly in Terré et al and Chénedé (n 17) no 1264, note 7; J Flour, J-L Aubert 
and E Savaux, Les obligations, II: Le fait juridique (14th edn, Sirey 2011) nos 1-2; F Terré, P Simler 
and Y Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (11th edn, Dalloz 2013) no 1029; M Fabre-Magnan, Droit 
des obligations, vol II (3rd edn, PUF 2013) 507-508. See also the detailed survey by F Chénedé, 
‘Charles Toullier, le quasi-contrat’ [2011] RDC 305. The lawfulness-unlawfulness (licéité-illicéité) 
distinction is emphasised elsewhere: Masdar (UK) v Commission [2008] EUECJ C-47/07, [2009] 2 
CMLR 1 (English text) [33], [45], [49], affirming [2006] EUECJ T-333/03 (French text) [69], [91]-[92]. 
33 See now Code civil, arts 1235 (dommage and préjudice), 1239-1240 (causation); the different causes 
of delictual liability, 1241ff, all presuppose that these common requirements will be satisfied. 
34 Up to this point, the decision of a Chambre mixte, ruling on ex article 1371 of the Code civil (which 
did not require the enrichment of the debtor for a quasi-contrat), may be cited in our favour: Ch mixte, 
6 September 2002, pourvoi no 98-22981, Bull mixte, no 4; BICC 15 October 2002, conclusions by R de 
Gouttes AG, report by J-P Gridel; [2002] LPA no 213, 16, noted by D Houtcieff; [2002] JCP G, II, 10173, 
noted by S Reifegerste; [2002] D 2963, observations by D Mazeaud; [2003] RTD Civ 94, observations 
by J Mestre and B Fages, impliedly endorsing the distinction between the unlawful causation of harm 
(delict) and the lawful, voluntary, spontaneous act (quasi-contract). As the conclusions, report, and case 
notes cited show, this decision in the mail order prize draw cases (l’affaire des loteries publicitaires) 
was controversial. To award a sum represented to be payable on return of a confirmation form, but 
which was not guaranteed, it uses the concept of quasi-contrat instead of delict (the result is sometimes 
called a quasi-contrat d’annonce de gain, or d’illusion de gain). Despite criticism, see, more recently, 
Civ 1re, 19 March 2015, pourvoi no 13-27414, Bull civ I, no 67; [2015] RDC 861, observations by R 
Libchaber. For further discussion, see A Bénabent, Droit des obligations (17th edn, LGDJ 2018) nos 
504-506. There is a special consumer regime, but without civil monetary redress (see now Code de la 
consommation, arts L121-7 7o, L121-20, L132-10ff). It could, however, re-open the way for a delictual 
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of view, this, and not its own act, is what creates the obligation, whilst spontaneously 
and unduly benefitting the defendant at the claimant’s expense.35 
 
Secondly, and most importantly, the goals which each institution pursues differ. 
Delictual liability aims classically to compensate losses, with neither loss nor profit 
between the parties.36 It has evolved more recently to fulfil other functions,37 but none 
applies to unjustified enrichment.38  This is a principle mandating ‘the restitution of an 
undue benefit’:39 of gains surviving in the hands of the defendant in good faith.40 It 
confers a right to the award ‘of an amount equal to the enrichment or the 
impoverishment, whichever is the lesser’, according to the Code civil, article 1303.41 
But where the defendant behaves in bad faith, article 1303-4 changes the way in which 
the defendant’s enrichment is valued:42 
 
                                               
analysis based on breach of statutory obligation once the French law of delict is reformed. See Projet 
de réforme de la responsabilité civile (2017) art 1242 (breach of statute), or art 1266-1 (punitive civil 
fines for deliberate wrongdoing designed to be profitable). 
35 See now Code civil, art 1300: ‘Quasi-contracts are purely voluntary actions which result in a duty in 
a person who benefits from them without having a right to do so […].’ (‘Les quasi-contrats sont des faits 
purement volontaires dont il résulte un engagement de celui qui en profite sans y avoir droit […].’) 
36 Civ 2e, 5 July 2001, pourvoi no 99-18712, Bull civ II, no 135; Civ 2e, 23 January 2003, pourvoi no 01-
00200, Bull civ II, no 20; [2003] JCP G, II, 10110, noted by J-F Barbièri. See also, ex multis, Civ 2e, 9 
July 1981, pourvoi no 80-12142, Bull civ II, no 156: ‘le propre de la responsabilité civile est de rétablir 
aussi exactement que possible l’équilibre détruit par le dommage et de replacer la victime dans la 
situation où elle se serait trouvée si l’acte dommageable ne s’était pas produit’. 
37 Failure to recognise this evolution leads one author to argue that delict only compensates for loss, to 
the exclusion of unjustified enrichment, which can operate once delict is exhausted, ‘only to restore 
profits which exceed the amount of the loss compensated by la responsabilité civile’. For him, this 
makes unjustified enrichment not subsidiary, but complementary, to delict: CP Filios, L’enrichissement 
sans cause en droit privé français (Bruylant 1999) no 540. This amounts to conferring on unjustified 
enrichment a punitive function, and the author does not overcome the difficulty that, on orthodox French 
legal principles, it fulfils no such purpose. 
38 Projet de réforme de la responsabilité civile (n 35) arts 1258 (compensation [réparation]), 1266 
(cessation and prevention), 1266-1 (punishment [punition]). For commentary on delict’s voyages 
beyond compensation, see, in particular, S Carval, La responsabilité civile dans sa fonction de peine 
privée (LGDJ 1995): punishment; C Thibierge, ‘Libres propos sur l’évolution du droit de la 
responsabilité’ [1999] RTD Civ 561: prevention; C Bloch, La cessation de l’illicite (Dalloz 2008): 
cessation; C Sintez, La sanction préventive en droit de la responsabilité civile (Dalloz 2011): prevention. 
See also B Girard, Responsabilité civile et droits fondamentaux (LGDJ 2015). 
39 CA Paris, 22 December 2017 (n 10): ‘l’action “de in rem verso” a pour finalité la restitution d’un profit 
indû’. 
40 Civ 1re, 11 March 2014, pourvoi no 12-29304, Bull civ I, no 37; [2014] RDC 622, noted by R Libchaber: 
‘la bonne foi de l’enrichi ne prive pas l’appauvri du droit d’exercer contre celui-là, l’action de in rem 
verso’. 
41 See previously, eg, Civ 1re, 19 January 1953, Bull civ I, no 21; [1953] D 234. 
42 For other illustrations of disgorgement in French law, see Code de la propriété intellectuelle, arts 
L331-1-3, L615-7. 
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‘Impoverishment established on the day that it occurred, and enrichment 
such as it subsists on day of the claim, are valued on the day that the 
court gives judgment. If the enriched person was in bad faith, restitution 
is equal to the higher of these two values.’ 
 
Taking all the defendant’s original profits seems to prevent an analysis in loss-based 
terms, because any link between the remedy and the claimant’s situation is ignored. 
And the quantum of any award against a bad faith defendant potentially surpasses 
that to which unjustified enrichment gives access – gain surviving. This seems, 
therefore, to be a punitive application of the law of delict to disgorge unlawful profits 
obtained in bad faith.43 
 
We see here, then, that delict and unjustified enrichment exist in proximity. In one 
sense, cartographically, they may appear close to one another, even in the same 
chapter of the Code civil. In another sense, theoretically, they can arise on the same 
facts. But it is submitted that in French law, as the Cour de cassation appears to have 
recognised at least once,44 these institutions are not of concurrent application. Since 




This chapter first surveyed English, French and Scots law for claims that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to tort or delict. Only French law and scholarship disclose 
findings to evaluate. English law has not considered the question specifically, and is 
unlikely to do so. English and Scots scholarship is against subsidiarity in this context. 
 
The second part of this chapter suggested that accounts which claim that unjust 
enrichment is subsidiary to delict are wrong. First, what French law and scholarship 
                                               
43 For agreement, citing the present writer’s unpublished work, see O Deshayes, T Genicon and YM 
Laithier, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations – 
Commentaire article par article (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2018) 636-637. 
44 Com, 16 July 1968, Bull civ IV, no 243. In that case, the Cour de cassation explicitly denied any 
overlap between unjustified enrichment and delictual actions in approving a lower court’s double award 
under two separate heads of injustice: first, in unjustified enrichment, for a period of unauthorised, but 
not delictual, occupation of premises; and secondly, in delict, for a subsequent attempt by the defendant 
to divert clientele to his new premises, away from the business in the premises he previously occupied. 
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take to be rules of subsidiarity determine the existence of unjustified enrichment, an 
entity said to be in a relationship of subsidiarity. Rules of subsidiarity do not do that. 
Secondly, they do not admit that unjustified enrichment and delictual actions can exist 
at the same time, such that there is never a relevant plurality of entities, required for a 
relationship of subsidiarity. Thirdly, they do not admit that unjust enrichment and 
delictual claims can overlap, without the possibility of which subsidiarity is redundant. 
It was further suggested that each institution is definitionally and functionally distinct, 
such that their overlap is not possible, anyway. Fourthly, French law and scholarship 
do not see what they take to be rules of subsidiarity as meta-authorities, which they 
must be if they are truly to be rules of subsidiarity. Fifthly, they see delict as somehow 
sovereign over unjustified enrichment – something antithetical to subsidiarity. It is 
conceded that this study’s sixth principle of subsidiarity is not infringed. But that is only 
because the material discussed does not successfully surmount hurdles logically prior 
to its relevance. 
 
The third part of this chapter examined the definitions and functions of delictual liability 
and unjustified enrichment in French law. It suggested that subsidiarity is irrelevant to 
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CHAPTER 8 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, SUBSIDIARITY, AND OBSTACLES OF FACT 
 
Previous chapters in this study provide background on the law of unjust enrichment, 
introduce a definition and principles of subsidiarity, and sketch the history of, and 
reasons for, subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment. This chapter 
is the fifth to put those general chapters to use. It addresses material, found only in 
French law and literature, about enrichissement injustifié’s subsidiarity in situations 
where an obstacle of fact bars a claimant’s action against a primary debtor, and (i) an 
action de in rem verso is then allowed against an indirect party enriched, or (ii) where, 
at one time, an action against the primary debtor is barred by obstacle of fact, and an 
action de in rem verso is later allowed against the same debtor. There is no material 
in either English or Scots law and scholarship to evaluate. In the first part of this 
chapter, a central claim is framed. This is then tested against the theory of subsidiarity 
developed in chapter 2 of this study. The claim cannot correctly be characterised as 
addressing the subsidiarity of unjustified enrichment in France. The third part of this 
chapter re-analyses the sources, in order better to understand what is happening in 
this context. 
 
I. THE CLAIM 
 
From the available material, this part of the chapter constructs a claim about 
enrichissement injustifié’s subsidiarity and the obstacle of fact bar. There is much 
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A. French law 
 
As shown in chapter 3, article 1303-3 of the Code civil, and the Cour de cassation’s 
formulae from which it derives, are claims or rules about the subsidiarity of the action 
de in rem verso in France. Though they do not themselves use the language of 
subsidiarity, many other sources, referred to earlier, do put it to the now-codified rules. 
Article 1303-3 provides: 
 
‘The impoverished person has no action on this basis [ie, in unjustified 
enrichment] where another action is open to him or is barred by an obstacle 
of law, such as prescription.’ 
 
The rule which interests us here appears from an a contrario reading of this provision:1 
if an obstacle of fact prevents the success of another action, then the action en 
enrichissement injustifié may still lie. Instead of being a bar to unjustified enrichment, 
this rule is, rather, a permission to invoke it. The distinction between obstacles of law 
and fact, with the language of subsidiarity, dates to at least 1949 in the cases,2 and 
persists in the twenty-first century.3 Also common is the vocabulary of subsidiarity with 
one or other kind of obstacle alone.4 
 
The usual obstacle of fact is the insolvency of a person against which a non-
enrichment-based action is available.5 Use of the action de in rem verso in this 
situation dates at least to the 1860s.6 The issue may even have been under the surface 
                                               
1 O Deshayes, T Genicon and Y-M Laithier, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la 
preuve des obligations – Commentaire article par article (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2018) 634. Philippe 
Rémy has said that ‘it seemed unnecessary to burden the text’ of an identical reform proposition ‘by 
pronouncing a particular rule, settled in the law’: ‘Des autres sources d’obligations’ in F Terré (ed), Pour 
une réforme du régime général des obligations (Dalloz 2013) 45. 
2 CA Orléans, 5 January 1949; [1949] S, II, 64. The court distinguished an ‘obstacle juridique’ from a 
‘simple obstacle de fait’ by reference to the ‘caractère subsidiaire’ of the action de in rem verso, and its 
status as a ‘voie subsidiaire’. 
3 CA Grenoble, 27 May 2010, RG no 07/03382; CA Montpellier, 29 September 2011, RG no 10/08133; 
CA Aix-en-Provence, 21 November 2017, RG no 16/01803. 
4 Soc, 5 November 2009, pourvoi no 08-43177; [2010] Bull Joly Soc 462, observations by P Le Canu 
(law); CA Caen, 31 May 2018, RG no 16/02993 (law); CA Bastia, 30 May 2018, RG no 17/00368 (law); 
CA Nîmes, 13 September 2012, RG no 09/02741 (fact). 
5 For the vocabulary in this context, see, with other cases cited here, Civ 1re, 25 March 2003, pourvoi 
no 00-15449. 
6 Cour de Montpellier, 5 February 1869; [1869] D, II, 213: action de in rem verso of tutor against minor 
children when parents insolvent. Compare Cour de Paris, 17 November 1838; [1839] D, II, 33. See also 
Trib rég sup de Darmstadt, 20 April 1895; [1897] DP, II, 332: successful action de in rem verso against 
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in the famous affaire Boudier of 1892.7 There, a lease between a tenant farmer and a 
landowner was terminated. The parties agreed that the tenant would abandon to the 
landowner what crops remained, partly to satisfy outstanding rent. A fertiliser 
merchant, who had delivered to the tenant before the lease ended, was granted an 
action de in rem verso against the landowner. In his note on the decision, published 
in the Recueil Sirey, Joseph-Emile Labbé elaborates.8 His account of counsel for the 
landowner’s argument suggests that the tenant’s contract with the landowner may 
have stipulated that the tenant would put manure on the land, and take all proper steps 
to render it more fertile. Labbé also tells us that the rapport written for the court by one 
of its judges, Conseiller Loubers, clarifies, first, that the experts, appointed to draw up 
an account on the termination of the lease between the landowner and the tenant, 
estimated the value of the harvest minus the fertiliser’s value. They assumed that the 
landowner would only have the harvest by paying for the benefit of the merchant’s 
wares. Secondly, Loubers’ rapport raises the fact of the tenant’s insolvency. Labbé 
then says:9 
 
‘These two details are not without importance in determining the conditions 
on which the action de in rem verso was granted, and in helping to theorise 
it. We think that the true principle to which it is necessary to adhere is that 
a person should not enrich itself without juste cause at another’s expense. 
[…] It would not have been fair for the landowner to keep the entire harvest, 
valued with the fertiliser deducted, when the fertiliser merchant could not 
have obtained its value due to the farmer’s insolvency.’ 
 
Perhaps Labbé was right that the tenant’s insolvency weighed in the court’s 
considerations. Certainly, it appears that the Chambre des requêtes ignored the 
(practically useless) contractual relationship within which the unpaid merchant 
                                               
bathhouse owner benefitting from urgent repair works by a carpenter in contract with the owner’s 
insolvent tenant; Trib civ de Marseille, 24 January 1907; [1907-1912] Tables quinq Gaz Pal 369: ‘the 
action de in rem verso must be subject to the condition that the claimant have no other action against 
another person or, at the very least, that the competing action be paralysed by the known insolvency of 
the debtor or rendered ineffective by any other analogous circumstance’. 
7 Req, 15 June 1892; [1892] DP, I, 596; [1893] S, I, 281, noted by J-E Labbé. 
8 On Labbé’s contribution to unjustified enrichment in France, see noted lawyer and politician Gaston 
Monnerville’s thesis: Labbé et la théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause (Falandry 1921); and F 
Chénedé, ‘Joseph-Émile Labbé, l’enrichissement sans cause’ [2011] RDC 1005. 
9 [1893] S, I, 281, 282 (second column, original emphasis). 
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conferred the benefit of the fertiliser on the insolvent tenant, and the stipulation in the 
terminated landowner-tenant contract, pursuant to which the tenant apparently acted 
to the landowner’s advantage. Insolvency seems to have been relevant in a 1898 
decision, too, still early in the action de in rem verso’s development. The Chambre 
civile of the Cour de cassation held that a landowner, whose contract with his tenant 
farmer stipulated a right to a portion of any harvest, was not unjustifiably enriched at 
the expense of an unpaid harvester who contracted with tenant, and that the harvester 
already had a ‘direct debtor’.10 This suggests that (though the judgment does not 
mention insolvency) the tenant was not just the direct, and correct, debtor, but a 
solvent one. 
 
From these early clues about insolvency in the multi-party context, we may jump to 
1940, and the arrêt Gorge, the first French case in which the Cour de cassation used 
the phrase caractère subsidiaire in relation to the action de in rem verso. An affordable 
housing company sold land to one Bourse. The company then concluded a 
construction contract with a builder, Gorge. Bourse, the buyer of the land, was the 
intended beneficiary of the works: the construction contract stipulated that he would 
pay for them. That contract also allowed the company’s architect to authorise 
supplementary works; and following any authorisation, the builder could not refuse to 
undertake them. Bourse never paid, either the housing company under the contract of 
sale, or Gorge, for supplementary works ordered under the construction contract. The 
housing company rescinded the sale and retook the land, benefitting from the 
supplementary works for which Gorge had received no payment. But Bourse was 
insolvent. The court below granted the contractor an action de in rem verso against 
the company. The Cour de cassation said:11 
 
                                               
10 Civ, 18 October 1898, [1899] DP, I, 105, noted by LS. 
11 Req, 11 September 1940; [1940] Gaz Pal, II, 114; [1941] S, I, 121, noted by P Esmein: ‘Attendu, 
d’autre part, que le tribunal, après voir admis l’existence d’une action contractuelle contre le bénéficiaire 
Bourse des travaux supplémentaires, ayant expressément subordonné la condamnation prononcée 
contre la société en raison de l’enrichissement sans cause du fait de la reprise par elle de l’immeuble, 
au cas de l’insolvabilité de Bourse rendrait vaine la condamnation prononcée contre lui, a nettement 
affirmé ainsi le caractère subsidiaire de l’action de in rem verso contre la société […] le jugement […] 
a, sans dénaturer l’action de in rem verso, justifié légalement sa décision […].’ That (i) the company 
was in contract with Gorge, and (ii) the powers of the company’s architect, are both clear from the 
Court’s exposition of the first ground of appeal, which addressed whether the contract was one for a 
fixed price, to which Code civil, art 1793 applied (it did not). 
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‘Considering […] that the court below, having admitted the existence of 
a contractual action against Bourse, the beneficiary of the 
supplementary works, [and] having expressly conditioned the judgment 
against the company on the basis of its unjustified enrichment due to its 
retaking of the property, on the insolvency of Bourse, such that judgment 
against him would be in vain, has in so doing clearly affirmed the 
subsidiary character of the action de in rem verso against the company 
[…] the judgment […] has, without misapplying the action de in rem 
verso, legally justified its decision […].’ 
 
Here, then, is a foundational case. It discloses an initial theme for this chapter in four 
points: 
 
(i) where A confers a benefit upon B, who is contractually obliged to A in respect of it; 
(ii) A may sue a third party enriched, C, for the value of that benefit; if 
(iii) B is insolvent; and 
(iv) this is concerned with the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso. 
 
Two ancillary details before variations on the initial theme. First, in 2000, the Chambre 
commerciale of the Cour de cassation held, in a multi-party situation, that where a 
claimant could have sued a person other than the primary debtor outwith unjustified 
enrichment – the primary debtor had guarantors, who had not been sued, but merely 
put on notice, and whose insolvency had not been established – no action de in rem 
verso lay against a fourth party enriched.12 This raises a second point: what is required 
to establish the relevant insolvency? A primary debtor’s entry into insolvency 
proceedings suffices,13 if this shows that a claimant will receive no satisfaction.14 
                                               
12 Com, 10 October 2000, pourvoi no 98-21814, Bull civ IV, no 150; [2000] D 409, noted by V Avena-
Robardet; [2001] RTD Civ 591, observations by J Mestre and B Fages. 
13 Civ 3e, 25 March 1998, pourvoi no 96-18641, though no action on the ‘subsidiary basis’ of unjustified 
enrichment on the facts. The claimant had already declared participation in the insolvency procedure, 
with the result that it had a créance – an asset – which it could eventually satisfy. See also Civ 1re, 14 
January 2003, pourvoi no 01-01304, Bull civ I, no 142; [2003] Defrénois 259, noted by J-L Aubert; [2003] 
RTD Civ 297, observations by J Mestre and B Fages: contractor suing owner of land benefitting from 
improvements made before an aborted land sale to the contractor’s insolvent primary contractual 
debtor. 
14 Civ 1re, 18 October 2017, pourvoi no 16-22582; [2017] Ess dr banc, Dec, 7, observations by M Mignot: 
based on ‘the subsidiary character of the action de in rem verso’, no action against a third party where 
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However, this general rule seems to have been tempered where considerable 
unfairness to the enrichment defendant might result.15 
 
The fourth element of the initial theme here – subsidiarity – is constant. The first three 
are not. We turn now to developments in the cases in relation to each. 
 
First variation: B need not be contractually obliged to A 
 
In the Gorge case, Bourse was contractually obliged to the builder. Let us examine a 
decision in which there was a relevant statutory obligation on person B instead.16 We 
will return to it in part III of this chapter, so will call it the Case of the False Father. A 
woman’s first husband contributed to the upkeep of the woman’s child, whom he 
thought was his daughter. The woman and her second husband successfully 
contested the first husband’s paternity. So the husband’s payments were made 
without legal ground, because the statutory parental obligation on the basis of which 
they were made became retroactively null.17 Since the mother was insolvent, and 
recourse against her practically useless, the first husband successfully sued the 
second husband, and true father, in unjustified enrichment. 
 
Second variation: obstacles of fact are relevant in two-party cases 
 
The Gorge case, and most of the decisions cited in this chapter, concerned at least 
three parties.18 But this is not necessary, as shown by a decision in the family context 
from 2007. We will return to this case in part III of this chapter, too, so will call it the 
Case of the Kindly Aunt. During the 1980s, Mr X left the country. His sister, Ms Y, 
brought up his daughter. Much later on, the siblings fell out. X sued Y over the 
repayment of a loan. Y replied that X should compensate her for costs related to 
                                               
the primary debtor was in liquidation, but no attempt had been made to enforce a court judgment for 
repayment of a loan. 
15 Civ 1re, 5 November 2008, pourvoi no 07-18123: bank should first have attempted to enforce a 
judgment against a fraudster before suing his apparently unwitting father in enrichment, into whose 
account monies were transferred. 
16 Civ 1re, 1 February 1984, pourvoi no 82-15496, Bull civ I, no 45; [1984] D 388, noted by J Massip; 
[1984] RTD Civ 712, observations by J Mestre. 
17 For the parental obligation d’entretien, see now Code civil, arts 371-1 and 371-2. 
18 There were many persons on the facts, but three key parties, in Civ 1re, 18 October 2017 (n 14), for 
example. 
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looking after her niece. She sued in unjustified enrichment. The Première chambre 
civile approved the court below for allowing her action. X had argued that Y should 
have asked a judge to arrange for her to receive support for bringing up her niece back 
in the 1980s. But in 1982, X had written to a family judge to say that he had no income 
whatever, and had to leave the country to find work. So at the material time, Y could 
never have obtained support from X. In so reasoning, the court of appeal had ‘legally 
justified its decision in relation to the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso’.19 
 
Third variation: obstacles of fact other than insolvency 
 
The Gorge case involved the insolvency of the primarily liable person – Bourse. But 
other obstacles of fact have appeared before the courts. The Case of the Kindly Aunt 
involved the absence and destitution of Mr X. Insolvency goes unmentioned. Take, 
also, a 2012 case before the Cour d’appel of Nîmes. There, some of the funds 
obtained in a cheque fraud had been diverted abroad by one group of wrongdoers. 
And a ‘subsidiary’ unjustified enrichment action was allowed against other parties, in 
the jurisdiction, who had also benefitted from the scheme.20 We can also instance a 
2017 decision of the Cour d’appel of Riom, in which a primary defendant’s lack of 
known domicile constituted an obstacle of fact, with the result that an unjustified 
enrichment action was allowed against another.21 
 
This concludes the sketch of law and jurisprudence relevant to this chapter. We now 




                                               
19 Civ 1re, 3 May 2007, pourvoi no 05-19454; [2007] RTD Civ 765, observations by J Hauser: ‘Mais 
attendu que l’arrêt retient que Mme Y ne pouvait solliciter auprès du juge des tutelles le versement 
d’une pension alimentaire pour l’éducation et l’entretien de l’enfant Loreleï, que M X, qui avait écrit le 
27 décembre 1982 au juge des tutelles ne disposer d’aucune source de revenus et devoir quitter la 
France pour rechercher un emploi et qui n’a par la suite donné aucune nouvelle auprès de sa tante et 
de sa fille avant sa lettre du 1er décembre 1988, était dans l’impossibilité absolue, tant matérielle que 
financière, de pourvoir à l’éducation de sa fille, en sorte que Mme Y ne disposait, au moment de 
l’ouverture de la tutelle et pendant toute la durée de celle-ci, d’aucune possibilité de réclamer le 
versement par M X d’une contribution à l’éducation de l’enfant qui lui était confiée; Que la cour d’appel 
a ainsi légalement justifié sa décision au regard de la subsidiarité de l’action de in rem verso’. 
20 CA Nîmes, 13 September 2012 (n 4). 
21 CA Riom, 13 mars 2017, RG no 15/02796. 
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B. French Scholarship 
 
Where the distinction between obstacles of law and fact originates is uncertain. In the 
materials of most interest in this study, the terminology dates at least to the fourth 
(1873) edition of Charles Aubry and Charles-Frédéric Rau’s Cours de droit civil 
français, on a note unrelated to subsidiarity, but still concerned with unjustified 
enrichment.22 The substance of the rule which interests us here has been discussed 
for over a century. So, in the Revue trimestrielle de droit civil’s first article on unjustified 
enrichment, Georges Ripert and Raymond Teisseire state that, in three-party 
situations, where the primary debtor is contractual, and solvent:23 
 
‘[A claimant] will not hesitate to use this route rather than the action de in 
rem verso, less sure of success and less advantageous in its result. So, in 
situations of this type, the action de in rem verso will function as a subsidiary 
action and will only be brought where the direct debtor is insolvent.’ 
 
For these authors, there was no hard and fast rule. This was a practical matter. 
Opinion in early twentieth century doctoral theses varies, and at most only partially 
discloses today’s principles.24 
 
                                               
22 C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français d’après la méthode de Zachariae, vol VI (4th edn, 
LDJ 1873) no 578(4): ‘L’action de in rem verso tend à la restitution de l’objet même, dont l’un des 
patrimoines a été dépouillé au profit de l’autre, lorsque aucun obstacle de fait ou de droit ne s’oppose 
à cette restitution en nature, et au cas contraire, à la restitution de la valeur qui en forme la 
représentation.’ 
23 G Ripert and R Teisseire, ‘Essai d’une théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause en droit civil français’ 
[1904] RTD Civ 727, 776-778 esp 778. 
24 See, eg, V Poltzer, L’enrichissement sans cause (Sirey 1912) 96-97: vocabulary of subsidiarity and 
indirect enrichment actions where a party is insolvent, but as a practical matter; E Bouché-Leclercq, De 
l’action “de in rem verso” en droit privé (Sirey 1913) 184-193 esp 191: idea that the action de in rem 
verso is a ‘subsidiary action’ à la Aubry and Rau is superfluous, but a primary action against a primary 
debtor must be used first, and if the primary debtor is not insolvent, the claimant is not impoverished, 
and there is no action de in rem verso; M Possa, L’enrichissement sans cause (Giard & Brière 1916) 
177-179 esp 179: insolvency of a primary debtor not concerned with ‘whether the action de in rem verso 
is subsidiary or not, but with whether there is harm to the claimant’s patrimony’. This is absent if the 
claimant ‘has another action successfully to invoke, whether against a third party, or the defendant to 
the action de in rem verso itself’. (‘[C]e qui intéresse la Cour de cassation, ce n’est pas de savoir si 
l’action de in rem verso est subsidiaire ou non, mais le fait de savoir s’il y a ou non lésion dans le 
patrimoine du demandeur. Or, cette lésion n’existe pas tant qu’il a une autre action à exercer utilement, 
soit contre un tiers, soit contre le défendeur même à l’action de in rem verso.’) 
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The work most likely responsible for the modern currency of the obstacle of law-fact 
distinction, and the rule which concerns us, is the fifth (1917) edition of Aubry and 
Rau’s Cours, annotated by Etienne Bartin. In a footnote to the Strasbourg professors’ 
famous formula,25 employed in the arrêts Clayette and Briauhant,26 Bartin explains 
that it can variously be understood: no action de in rem verso unless there is no other 
action on the facts, whether against the enrichment defendant or a third party; no 
action de in rem verso unless that other action is now lost; or, asks Bartin, and most 
interestingly for present purposes, did Aubry and Rau mean:27 
 
‘[T]hat the claimant can succeed, even if an action of this type [ie, one other 
than an action de in rem verso, against the enrichment defendant or a third 
party] exists to his advantage, and continues to exist, but only where it is 
devoid of all utility due to the insolvency of the person against whom it could 
be brought?’ 
 
Bartin does not actually conclude in favour of any of the possibilities put forward. But 
the great authority of Aubry and Rau’s Cours, and the quality of Bartin’s continuation,28 
                                               
25 See, eg, Cours, 4th edn (n 22) no 578(4): ‘L’action de in rem verso, dont on ne trouve au Code civil 
que des applications spéciales, doit être admise d’une manière générale, comme sanction de la règle 
d’équité, qu’il n’est pas permis de s’enrichir aux dépens d’autrui, dans tous les cas où le patrimoine 
d’une personne se trouvant, sans cause légitime, enrichi au détriment de celui d’une autre personne, 
celle-ci ne jouirait, pour obtenir ce qui lui appartient ou ce qui lui est dû, d’aucune action naissant d’un 
contrat, d’un quasi-contrat, d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit.’ The most relevant part of the formula was 
slightly different, and actually clearer, in the first three editions. See C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de 
droit civil français, traduit de l’allemand de M CS Zacharie, revu et augmenté, avec l’agrément de 
l’auteur, vol IV (1st edn, Lagier 1844) no 576; C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français, traduit 
de l’allemand de M CS Zacharie, revu et augmenté, avec l’agrément de l’auteur, vol II (2nd edn, Meline, 
Cans et Cie 1850) no 576; C Aubry and CF Rau, Cours de droit civil français: d’après l’ouvrage allemand 
de C-S Zachariae, vol V (3rd edn, LDJ 1857) no 576 (emphasis added): ‘[U]ne personne peut même 
[…] exercer efficacement le droit de revendication dont jouit tout propriétaire, en ce sens qu’elle est 
autorisée à réclamer, au moyen de l’action de in rem verso, les valeurs dont le patrimoine d’une autre 
personne s’est enrichi au détriment du sien, et pour la restitution desquelles elle n’aurait à exercer 
aucune action naissant d’un contrat, d’un quasi-contrat, d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit.’   
26 Discussed in chapter 3: Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull somm, I, 86; 
[1918] S, I, 41, noted by E Naquet; Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] DP, I, 102 
(first case). 
27 E Bartin (ed), Cours de droit civil français d’après la méthode de Zachariae par C Aubry et C Rau, 
vol IX (5th edn, LDJ 1917) no 578(4) note 10: ‘Ou bien enfin ce caractère subsidiaire signifie-t-il que le 
demandeur peut réussir, même si une action de ce genre est née à son profit, même s’il l’a conservée, 
mais seulement dans le cas où elle se trouve dépourvue de toute efficacité par suite de l’insolvabilité 
de celui contre qui elle pouvait être dirigée?’ 
28 A Tunc, ‘Book Review’ (1956) 69 Harvard L Rev 1157, 1158: ‘The impact of this treatise on French 
law has been unrivalled. […] Although Bartin was a man of extraordinarily strong personality, his respect 
for the work of Aubry and Rau was such that he did not dare to alter the text of the fourth edition. He 
reproduced it without change except to bring it up to date by additions, and sometimes to add criticisms, 
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likely contributed to the eventual development of the insolvency hypothesis, and 
today’s wider obstacle of fact rule. Support for this derives from the first serious 
doctrinal attempt to elaborate the subsidiary character of the action de in rem verso 
according to a distinction between obstacles of law and fact. André Rouast 
acknowledged his debt to Bartin’s footnote in arguing that the action de in rem verso 
would not lie where another action would, or when that action was blocked by an 
obstacle of law, or an obstacle of fact, unless that obstacle of fact was external to the 
claimant. His leading example of this was another person’s insolvency, as distinct from 
the claimant’s fault.29 Rouast’s attenuation went too far for one contemporary author.30 
But another accepted it.31 And it has survived through the decades in other accounts, 
whether or not they accept Rouast’s precise model, and which the Code civil now 
endorses in its article 1303-3.32 
 
C. Summary and generalisation 
 
The obstacle of fact permission is clearly a rule of subsidiarity in French eyes. 
However, the Code civil is silent. The cases disclose no general exposition 
accommodating all of the variations discussed. Scholarly approaches differ in detail, 
                                               
between brackets in the text or, more often, in footnotes – long powerful footnotes, some of which 
themselves became famous pieces of legal literature.’ 
29 A Rouast, ‘L’enrichissement sans cause et la jurisprudence civile’ [1922] RTD Civ 35, 82-91, esp 84, 
note 2, 86-89. Rouast’s model is replicated exactly without citation in CA Orléans, 5 January 1949 (n 
2); and, in a notable decision of the Trib civ de Florac, 17 June 1952; [1953] D 261, his article is 
referenced repeatedly in the court’s exposition of the law, and it clearly influenced the formulation of 
the subsidiarity condition. 
30 J Bonnecase, Supplément au Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil par G Baudry-Lacantinerie et 
L-J Barde, vol III (Sirey 1926) nos 146, 153. 
31 R Demogue, Traité des obligations en général, vol III (LNDJ 1923) no 175. This was actually the only 
rule of subsidiarity which Demogue accepted, because he thought subsidiarity was simply needed to 
prevent needless litigation (économie des moyens). 
32 Not using the distinction between obstacles of law and fact, see, eg, P Esmein (ed), Aubry & Rau: 
Cours de droit civil français, vol IX (6th edn, Libraries Techniques 1953) nos 577-578(5); P Esmein, 
Traité pratique de droit civil français par Marcel Planiol and Georges Ripert, vol VII (P Esmein, J 
Radouant and G Gabolde eds, 2nd edn, LGDJ 1954) nos 761-763; P Drakidis, ‘La “subsidiarité”, 
caractère spécifique et international de l’action d’enrichissement sans cause’ [1961] RTD Civ 577, 586-
587, 601-603, 613; F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, vol II/1 (9th edn, 
Montchrestien 1998) no 707; J Carbonnier, Droit civil, vol II (final def edn, PUF 2004) nos 1224(a), 
1228(c); J Flour, JL Aubert and E Savaux, Les obligations, II: Le fait juridique (14th edn, Sirey 2011) 
no 55; F Terré, P Simler and Y Lequette, Droit civil: Les obligations (11th edn, Dalloz 2013) no 1073-1; 
(12th edn, with F Chénedé, Dalloz 2018) nos 1309-1314. Using it faithfully, see, eg, G Marty and P 
Raynaud, Droit civil: Les obligations, vol I (2nd edn, Sirey 1988) no 398; B Starck, H Roland and L 
Boyer, Droit civil: Les obligations, vol II (6th edn, Litec 1998) nos 2207-2210 esp 2210; P Malaurie, L 
Aynès and P Stoffel-Munck, Droit des obligations (10th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 1071. Partial use, post the 
2016 reform: A Bénabent, Droit des obligations (17th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 489; B Fages, Droit des 
obligations (8th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 480.  
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and appear insufficient. In particular, the point that obstacles of fact might be relevant 
in two party cases seems insecure.33 And the acceptance of obstacles of fact beyond 
insolvency is rare.34 Since a definitive formulation of the claim which this chapter seeks 
to address is lacking, the following is suggested as a point of reference for the rest of 
this chapter: 
 
(i) A claimant may sue a defendant in enrichissement injustifié where another action 
is open to the claimant, but that action is rendered practically useless by an obstacle 
of fact; 
(ii) The basis of the claimant’s non-enrichment-based action may vary, and need not 
be contractual; 
(iii) The claimant’s non-enrichment-based action may lie against the same person as 
the action en enrichissement injustifié; 
(iv) Whilst the main obstacle of fact is insolvency, others, such as the absence of a 
defendant, are valid; and 
(v) The foregoing is part of the subsidiary character of today’s action en 
enrichissement injustifié. 
 
We can now test this claim, before its re-analysis in the third part of this chapter. 
 
                                               
33 One leading account appears to deny it, explaining that obstacles of fact are only relevant to indirect 
enrichment cases: Terré, Simler and Lequette (n 32) no 1073-1; F Terré et al and F Chénedé, Droit 
civil: Les obligations (12th edn, Dalloz 2018) no 1312 note 2. Bartin, however, did not discount it, as 
shown from his remark that the obstacle of fact permission ‘ne vaudra qu’autant que l’action donnée à 
l’auteur de l’enrichissement, soit contre le défendeur éventuel à l’action de in rem verso, soit contre un 
tiers, ne résultera pas d’un contrat’: (n 27) no 578(4) note 10. Rouast only denied it because he 
considered that the real obstacle in two party cases would be a legal one, namely the principle of 
equality between unsecured creditors: (n 29) 88-89. But the Case of the Kindly Aunt, Civ 1re, 3 May 
2007 (n 19), has shown that this will not always be a concern. 
34 But see, accepting other possibilities, Trib civ de Marseille, 24 January 1907 (n 6): insolvency or ‘any 
other analogous circumstance’; Trib comm de Paris, 10th chamber, 13 September 2010, no 
2008012046; [2013] Gaz Pal, 13 August, 7: ‘an obstacle of fact, like insolvency’; and, similarly, CA 
Nîmes, 13 September 2012 (n 4). In scholarship, Antoine Gouëzel’s research demonstrates the trend. 
He says that ‘reference to obstacles of fact is misleading, an examination of la jurisprudence revealing 
that it always amounts in reality to the insolvency of the debtor’; five sources are cited in support of this, 
and only one against: La subsidiarité en droit privé (Economica 2013) no 119 and note 6; and see, too, 
Terré et al and Chénedé (n 33) no 1312 note 2. For later recognition that other factual impediments 
might prevent recourse against a primary debtor, like non-identification, see A Posez, ‘La subsidiarité 
de l’enrichissement sans cause: étude de droit français à la lumière du droit comparé’ (2014) 91 Rev 
dr int et comp 185, 226. For his thoughtful approach, Posez does not endorse the law-fact model. Carla 
Habre also leaves open the possibility of other obstacles of fact, but gives no examples: La subsidiarité 
en droit privé (LGDJ 2015) no 81. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIM 
 
In this second part of the chapter, the claim set out above is analysed. The framework 
for discussion is the principles of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this study. The 
background is the conditional nature of subsidiarity, also developed in chapter 2, the 
law of unjust enrichment, and the general question of its subsidiarity, both surveyed in 




Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to 
determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. To be a rule of 
subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or put an end to, 
a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one or more of the 
entities, the interaction of which it is supposed to manage, might be thought to prevent 
it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. It would also seem to deal 
with a question of overlap in a less then conditional manner. And as argued in chapter 
2, subsidiarity is an inherently conditional idea. Once an entity does not exist, there is 
no way for it eventually to become competent. Here, the relevant entities are, on one 
side, any practically useless action(s), and on the other, the action en enrichissement 
injustifié. Our five propositions do not satisfy the instant principle. 
 
It might be thought that the claim escapes criticism under this head because, ex 
hypothesi, the obstacle of fact permission does not make an action in unjustified 
enrichment disappear, as the rules about other open actions and actions barred by 
obstacles of law do (in which cases, according to the Code civil, art 1303-3, the 
claimant ‘has no action’).35 However, the obstacle of fact rule preserves the existence 
of the action en enrichissement injustifié. In this sense, it does determine whether, on 
a given set of facts, there is any unjustified enrichment which might potentially be 
subsidiary. Rules of subsidiarity assume the existence of the entities to which they 
apply. The rule which this chapter addresses does not. 
                                               
35 The partial exception to the obstacle of law bar, for negotiorum gestio in the Code civil art 1303-5, 
makes no difference to the basic principle here. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
10. 
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B. Plurality 
 
A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, 
or groups of entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible 
at all in a given context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie 
unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. Our five propositions cannot be 
criticised here. 
 
This second principle of subsidiarity is satisfied where the obstacle of fact problem 
arises. This is because, first, the action en enrichissement injustifié will be open – that 
is, exist – on any relevant facts. Secondly, any other action will remain legally open, 
also, even though practically useless, as distinguished commentators have reminded 
us.36 When an enrichment claimant invokes enrichissement injustifié due to an 
obstacle of fact, therefore, there will indeed exist a plurality of entities – of actions – 




For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that 
context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. Our five propositions satisfy this 
principle. 
 
The claim is simply caught by this part of our theory of subsidiarity. The obstacle of 
fact permission is not concerned with any potential initial overlap, ie, before its own 
application, between the action en enrichissement injustifié  and any other action, 





                                               
36 L Andreu and N Thomassin, Cours de droit des obligations (3rd edn, Gualino/Lextenso 2018) no 
1755 (original emphasis): ‘l’action est juridiquement « ouverte » mais pratiquement « fermée »’. 
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D. Meta-authority 
 
For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it 
must bind the relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in 
relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their 
relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be 
the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), 
there would be no need for subsidiarity. This is subsidiarity as meta-authority. A rule 
of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained. And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. Our five propositions do not satisfy the instant principle. 
 
The rule which concerns us, tucked behind article 1303-3 of the Code civil, living on 
in jurisprudence and doctrine, is not a meta-authority in relation to the action en 
enrichissement injustifié, or any other practically useless action. It finds expression in 
the chapter of the Code on the enrichment action, of which it is an ‘inherent 
condition’.37 So the rule enjoys no source independent of that action. It does not govern 
other useless actions which might be relevant, either. It merely preserves unjustified 
enrichment, and allows it to compete with other actions. These decide for themselves, 
so to speak, what they are, or are not, going to do, and nothing in our rule change that. 
Rules which are not independent, and cannot actually govern the things to which they 
apply, are not rules of subsidiarity. 
 
E. Not sovereignty 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship 
can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there 
would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because authority in that context would be 
                                               
37 See Civ 1re, 4 April 2006, pourvoi no 03-13986, Bull civ I, no 194; [2006] RLDC, no 28, 11, observations 
by S Doireau: ‘le caractère subsidiaire reconnu à l’action fondée sur le principe de l’enrichissement 
sans cause ne constitue pas une fin de non recevoir au sens de l’article 122 du nouveau Code de 
procédure civile mais une condition inhérente à l’action’; CA Rennes, 18 December 2007, RG no 
06/00867; CA Nîmes, 8 January 2008, RG no 04/01413; CA Basse-Terre, 5 January 2009, RG no 
05/01889; CA Douai, 26 October 2009, RG no 08/06633; CA Limoges, 4 March 2013, RG no 12/00560; 
CA Metz, 21 September 2017, RG no 17/00339. 
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allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence of subsidiarity. Our five 
propositions do not infringe this principle. 
 
When the rule addressed in this chapter applies, the claimant has a free choice 
between the action en enrichissement injustifié and any other practically useless 
action. The rule does nothing to prevent the witless claimant from making a bad 
choice. In situations covered by our claim, no action is sovereign over any other. 
 
F. Not concurrence 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the 
entities said to be part of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a 
situation, since competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point 
of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen, as 
argued in chapter 2. Our five propositions do not satisfy this principle. 
 
There can be no subsidiarity when the entities supposedly in such a relationship can 
freely concur. That is the antithesis of subsidiarity. But it is precisely what is allowed 
to happen when the obstacle of fact rule applies. If they know what is good for them, 
claimants should not use the practically useless action. But they can. Rules of 
subsidiarity build relationships which prevent this. 
 
III. RE-ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIM 
 
This part of the chapter attempts to replace the subsidiarity-based explanation of the 
obstacle of fact permission with something else. After a summary, the basic argument 
is applied to some of the material collected in the first part of this chapter. 
 
A. The argument in five stages 
 
First, the obstacle of fact permission derogates on two levels from the subsidiarity 
rules in the Code civil, art 1303-3, which bar the action en enrichissement injustifié 
where the claimant (i) has a useable, open, non-enrichment action, or (ii) had a non-
enrichment action which is now legally barred. On one level, it derogates from the 
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open action rule: an open action does not necessarily bar enrichissement injustifié. On 
another level, it derogates from the barred action rule: where the obstacle is factual, 
not legal, enrichissement injustifié remains competent. 
 
Secondly, previous chapters dispatched the rules in 1303-3 from which the obstacle 
of fact permission derogates, in the statutory, proprietary, contractual, and 
tortious/delictual settings. They cannot be about subsidiarity. So a derogation from 
them on the basis of subsidiarity does not assist. 
 
Thirdly, as seen in part II of this chapter, the obstacle of fact permission cannot be 
about subsidiarity, either. So it is unsatisfactory, both as a derogatory rule, and on its 
own terms. 
 
The next two points inform the analysis conducted in the rest of this part of the chapter. 
 
The fourth stage of the argument is to remember that the practical uselessness of 
relief against one person bears not on the (in)justice, either of that person’s 
enrichment, or the enrichment of another person. Whenever the obstacle of fact 
permission applies, any enrichment coveted by the claimant must still be unjustified. 
Suppose A confers a single benefit, directly on B, and, indirectly, on C. Either C’s 
enrichment is unjustified, and A may be able claim in unjustified enrichment against 
C; or it is not. If it is justified, then there is no unjustified enrichment on the facts, and 
nothing to claim, or complain, about. 
 
The fifth stage of the argument is to consider an explanation of the material in this 
chapter to replace subsidiarity. The better question to ask may framed around policy: 
does a legal system stultify itself in allowing unjustified enrichment to be used as an 
alternative route to redress – the phrase ‘as a form of insurance’ is too loaded – if relief 
from a third party is in fact useless (as where that party is insolvent), or, in a two party 
case, in order later to strike at a defendant once relief against it is in fact useful (as 
upon its return to financial stability)?38 The proposition for development, then, is that 
French law appears to have answered this question positively. 
                                               
38 For this latter scenario, see Civ 1re, 3 May 2007 (n 19). 
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B. Development of the argument 
 
The above proposition can now be investigated. This will be done by focusing on the 
situations in which French courts have confronted the obstacle of fact permission: in 
contract cases – the Boudier/Gorge-type scenario; in statutory obligation cases – like 
the Case of the False Father; and in two-party situations – like the Case of the Kindly 
Aunt. 
 
Before this, however, we remind ourselves of the fourth stage of our argument: 
whenever the obstacle of fact permission applies, any enrichment coveted by the 
claimant must still be unjustified.39 This is now established by the Code civil: article 
1303-3 operates on the footing that it is additional to the content of article 1303 and 
following (‘[t]he impoverished person has no action on this basis’ [ie, in unjustified 
enrichment] where…’). If the basis of the action is not established, the obstacle of fact 




If they have thought about it in such terms, French courts have answered positively 
the policy question in contract cases to which the obstacle of fact permission applies. 
Here, we focus on Boudier,,41 and the Gorge case. 
 
We first ask whether the enrichments in Boudier and Gorge were justified. As to the 
landowner’s enrichment in the former, it seems not to have been. The enrichment 
claimant – the fertiliser merchant – had a contract with a third party – the tenant. In 
turn, the tenant had an obligation to the landowner – though we do not know precisely 
                                               
39 Esmein, Traité pratique (n 32) no 763. One critic in principle of the obstacle of fact permission seems, 
with respect, to ignore this: CP Filios, L’enrichissement sans cause en droit privé français (Bruylant 
1999) no 410. 
40 For the Anglo-Australian rule against ‘leapfrogging’ contractual counterparties, see MacDonald 
Dickens & Macklin (a firm) v Costello [2011] EWCA Civ 930, [2012] QB 244 [21]-[32] (Etherton LJ, with 
whom Patten and Pill LJJ agreed); Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (in liq) [2008] HCA 27, (2008) 
232 CLR 635 [43]-[55] (Gleeson CJ), [79]-[80], [125]-[126] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
For Scots law, see N Whitty, ‘Indirect Enrichment in Scots Law, I and II’ [1994] JR 200 and 239. More 
generally, see HLE Verhagen, ‘The Policies against Leapfrogging in Unjust Enrichment: A Critical 
Assessment’ (2018) 22 Edinburgh L Rev 55. 
41 Some do not take Labbé’s word about insolvency: Flour, Aubert and Savaux (n 32) no 55(c) note 1. 
Compare Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck (n 32) no 1071(2). 
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how it was framed – to make the land fertile. As the Code civil, article 1303-1, now 
provides, ‘[a]n enrichment is unjustified where it stems neither from the fulfilment of an 
obligation by the person impoverished nor from his intention to confer a gratuitous 
benefit’. However, Labbé’s note assists: the termination account indicated a right to 
the benefit of the harvest minus the value of the fertiliser. There was no cause légitime 
for the landowner’s receipt of that latter benefit. As Labbé also reported, the court 
knew that the tenant farmer was insolvent.  
 
It seems that the housing company’s enrichment in the Gorge case was unjustified, 
too. The entire basis of the contract between it and the builder, Gorge, was that the 
company would never benefit from the works. In the judgment, Bourse is referred to 
as the ‘beneficiary’ of the works. This must mean the intended beneficiary, since it was 
the company which actually benefitted from them on the facts (after the rescinded 
sale), and Bourse was obliged to pay for them under the construction contract between 
the company and Gorge. So even though Gorge performed according to a contractual 
obligation to the company, the contract provided no legal ground for the housing 
company’s enrichment. This appears consonant, a contrario, with the view, put 
forward more fully in chapter 4, that legal grounds need not confer upon a party 
enriched any entitlement to the enrichment: we do not need a contractual provision to 
clarify the objective basis on which the transfer of benefits occurred. Just as the footing 
on which a contract is concluded can point in favour of an enrichment’s being justified, 
in the Gorge case, it pointed against it.42 
 
We can now examine French responses to the policy question in more detail. 
Unsurprisingly, commentary is most extensive in contract cases. Analysis tends to be 
found in the older books, perhaps because now, the rule to which the question relates 
is so settled. For François Goré, there is no question that the obstacle of fact 
permission grants an improper priority to the enrichment claimant whose contractual 
                                               
42 For another aborted sale case, like Gorge, see Civ 1re, 14 January 2003 (n 13). Compare Civ 3e, 11 
June 1985; [1986] D 456, noted by P Dubois, in which a contractor’s enrichment at a subcontractor’s 
expense was clearly justified by the former’s contract with the employer. It should be noted that there 
is a special and regularly updated regime for all subcontracting (la sous-traitance): Loi no 75-1334 of 31 
December 1975 relative à la sous-traitance. For the failure of an unjustified enrichment action after non-
compliance with the statute, see, eg, Civ 3e, 4 December 2002, pourvoi no 01-03907, Bull civ III, no 247; 
[2003] Defrénois 1271, observations by H Perinet-Marquet. 
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counterparty is insolvent. This is precisely not what is being granted,43 when the 
claimant succeeds in unjustified enrichment against the third party:44 
 
‘It is, purely and simply, the application of the general principles of 
unjustified enrichment. The party impoverished no longer comes forward 
as a contractual creditor, but as an extra-contractual one. […] In such a 
case, the claimant will perhaps be able to sue directly the debtor of [its 
primary] debtor. […] The action [in unjustified enrichment] will permit the 
avoidance of competition with the other creditors of the contractual debtor, 
even though this is not its essential goal.’ 
 
The question whether the claimant might have taken the risk of its contractual 
counterparty’s insolvency does not feature in Goré’s account. This is because 
impoverishment at one’s own risk is considered separately in French unjustified 
enrichment. The Code civil, article 1303-2, provides that ‘[t]here is no restitution where 
the impoverishment stems from an act done by the impoverished person with a view 
to his personal benefit’. Such behaviour is a justification for any enrichment of the 
defendant.45 As a jurisprudence constante has held: the action de in rem verso ‘cannot 
apply when [the claimant] has acted in its own interest and at its own risk’,46 or ‘of its 
own initiative and at its own risk’.47 It appears that the rule has not been applied to 
                                               
43 Though he does not see this as a bad thing, Jean-Pierre Béguet disagreed, viewing the mitigation of 
the consequences of others’ insolvency as the principal spur to unjustified enrichment’s development 
(‘l’idée générale motrice’), and affirming the action de in rem verso’s potential to subvert priority rules: 
L’enrichissement sans cause (Tepac 1945) nos 43-51, 164, 166-167. 
44 F Goré, L’enrichissement aux dépens d’autrui (Dalloz 1949) 184: ‘Ce sont les principes généraux de 
l’enrichissement injuste qui sont purement et simplement appliqués. L’appauvri ne se présente plus 
comme créancier contractuel, mais comme créancier extracontractuel. L’action [en enrichissement 
injuste] permettra d’éviter le concours entre les autres créanciers du débiteur contractuel, bien que son 
but essentiel ne soit pas d’éviter ce concours.’ 
45 In favour: Marty and Raynaud (n 32) no 397; Starck, Roland and Boyer (n 32) no 2202; Flour, Aubert 
and Savaux (n 32) no 50. Seeing self-interest as a sui generis condition of the enrichment action: 
Chabas (n 32) no 701. 
46 Civ, 28 March 1939; [1939] S, I, 265, noted by L Audiat; [1942] DC 119, noted by FG; Civ 3e, 2 
December 1975, pourvoi no 74-13104, Bull civ III, no 351; Civ 1re, 19 October 1976, pourvoi no 75-
12419, Bull civ I, no 300: self-interested extension of electricity cables justified the enrichment of another 
landowner branching off from the extension. See also Civ 2e, 3 March 2016, pourvoi no 15-14067; 
[2016] Bull Joly soc 337, observations by H Lécuyer; [2016] Gaz Pal, 6 September, 67, observations 
by B Dondero: self-interested extra work for a business by a person with a 49% stake justified the 
enrichment of the business by that extra work, necessary when the business partner could not work 
after a car accident. 
47 Civ 3e, 20 May 2009, pourvoi no 08-10910, Bull civ III, no 116. 
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exclude the action de in rem verso where a party enriched is sued upon its return to 
liquidity, or because another person became insolvent. 
 
The question whether contracting with a person who later becomes insolvent 
constitutes negligence or other blameworthy conduct barely features in Goré’s 
account, beyond a passing acceptance that this might be relevant to obstacles of 
fact.48 Again, this is understandable. Fault by the claimant is a separate question, on 
which a short diversion is necessary before addressing fault by the claimant and 
obstacles of fact. The Code civil, article 1303-2, provides that ‘[t]he court may reduce 
the quantum of a restitutionary award if the impoverishment stems from the fault of the 
person impoverished’. Reduction includes reduction to nothing, according to the 
French Ministry of Justice’s report on the reform of the Code civil,49 and academic 
opinion.50 There are many cases on the matter. So, it is well established that deliberate 
fault,51 or dol (bad faith or fraud),52 will deprive claimants of unjustified enrichment 
actions.53 
 
                                               
48 When criticising Rouast’s view that fault is relevant to the obstacle of law bar, and that author’s later 
analysis of the arrêt Marty, Civ, 12 February 1923; [1924] D, I, 129, noted by A Rouast, as one in which 
the claimant’s fault led to the loss of his enrichment action due to an obstacle of law. Goré appears to 
disagree with this, and sees it as a case in which the claimant negligently allowed himself to be affected 
by an obstacle of fact in failing to comply with statutory formalities for a privilege in insolvency. See A 
Rouast [1924] D, I, 129, 131 (second column); Goré (n 44) 170, 178-179. A later case suggests that 
Rouast’s view prevails: CA Aix-en-Provence, 21 November 2017 (n 3). 
49 Ministère de la justice, ‘Rapport au Président de la République relatif à l’ordonnance no 2016-131 du 
10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations’ 
[2016] JORF no 0035, 11 February 2016, text no 25 
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/rapport/2016/2/11/JUSC1522466P/jo/texte>: ‘the award of persons 
whose impoverishment results from a faute can be reduced, [or] even reduced to nothing’. On the 
authority of the report, as equivalent to academic work, see P Puig, ‘L’autorité des rapports relatifs aux 
ordonnances’ [2017] RTD Civ 84. 
50 G Chantepie and M Latina, La réforme du droit des obligations – Commentaire théorique et pratique 
dans l’ordre du Code civil (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) no 752. 
51 Ie an intentional act with intended consequences (‘la volonté de commettre le dommage tel qu’il est 
survenu’): Civ 2e, 1 July 2010 (two arrêts), pourvois nos 09-10590, 09-14884, Bull civ II, nos 129, 131; 
[2010] Resp civ et assur no 10, October, comm 263, observations by H Groutel; [2011] D 355, noted by 
Y Avril. 
52 ‘[L]a faute dolosive exige de la part de son auteur des agissements frauduleux’: Civ 1re, 6 December 
1977, pourvoi no 76-12855, Bull civ I, no 460; Civ 3e, 20 December 1978, pourvoi no 77-13377, Bull civ 
III, no 375. 
53 Soc, 3 July 1990, pourvoi no 88-18723, Bull civ V, no 337: intentional fault; Com, 19 May 1998, 
pourvois nos 96-16393, 96-17136, Bull civ IV, no 160; [1999] D 406, noted by M Ribeyrol Subrenat; 
[1999] RTD Civ 106, observations by J Mestre; [1999] JCP G, II, 10194, A Karm: dol. Naturally, criminal 
fault will also justify the enrichment of a defendant to an enrichment action. See Civ 1re, 18 January 
1989, pourvoi no 87-16938, Bull civ I, no 21: no action for tax paid and work done on property obtained 
by the presentation of a false will. 
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Example.54 Jane takes her television to Shop to see about having it repaired. She 
specifically asks for a quote before any repairs. Shop repairs the television without 
contacting Jane. Since there is no contract between the parties, Shop sues Jane in 
unjustified enrichment. It fails, because it deliberately disregarded Jane’s wishes. 
 
On the effect of other kinds of fault, different chambers of the Cour de cassation 
diverge. The Chambre Commerciale has denied actions for simple fault,55 that is, 
negligence or carelessness without an intention to harm.56 But the Première, 
deuxième, and troisième chambres civiles insist that at least serious fault – faute 
lourde – loosely translated as gross negligence,57 is necessary to do this:58 
 
‘Though having behaved imprudently or negligently will not deprive a 
person who, in impoverishing itself, has enriched another, of its recourse 
founded upon unjustified enrichment, the action de in rem verso cannot be 
                                               
54 This example is based on Civ 1re, 15 December 1998, pourvoi no 96-20625, Bull civ I, no 363; [1999] 
D 425, observations by J-C Saint-Pau; [1999] Defrénois 377, observations by J-L Aubert; [1999] RTD 
Civ 400, observations by J Mestre. 
55 See, respectively, Com, 18 May 1999, pourvoi no 95-19455, Bull civ IV, no 104; [1999] JCP E 1127, 
observations by P Morvan; [2000] D 609, observations by J Djoudi: straightforward mistaken payment; 
Com, 14 October 2014, pourvoi no 13-22894: money paid out on wrong account. The latter case 
returned to the Cour de cassation as Com, 21 March 2018, pourvoi no 16-18202. The argument that 
negligence would not bar the action was again rejected. 
56 Civ 2e, 2 April 1997, pourvoi no 95-14687, Bull civ II, no 113; [1997] D 411, noted by B Edelman. 
57 Characterised by extreme negligence bordering on fraud or bad faith (‘la négligence d’une extrême 
gravité confinant au dol’): Com, 1 April 2014, pourvoi no 12-15939, Bull civ IV, no 62; [2014] RTD Com 
393, observations by B Bouloc; Civ 1re, 29 October 2014, pourvoi no 13-21980, Bull civ I, no 180; [2015] 
D 188, noted by V Mazeaud; [2015] RDC 246, observations by O Deshayes. Evaluation of faute lourde 
is subjective: Com, 29 June 2010, pourvoi no 09-11841, Bull civ IV, no 115; [2010] RDC 1220, 
observations by Y-M Laithier; [2010] RDC 1253, observations by O Deshayes; [2010] RTD Civ 555, 
observations by B Fages. 
58 Civ 1re, 5 April 2018, pourvoi no 17-12595, Bull civ I, forthcoming; [2018] RTD Com 353, observations 
by F Pollaud-Dulian; [2018] Gaz Pal, 15 May, 36, observations by C Berlaud: ‘si le fait d’avoir commis 
une imprudence ou une négligence ne prive pas de son recours fondé sur l’enrichissement sans cause 
celui qui, en s’appauvrissant, a enrichi autrui, l’action de in rem verso ne peut aboutir lorsque 
l’appauvrissement est dû à la faute lourde ou intentionnelle de l’appauvri […].’ Civ 1re, 13 July 2004, 
pourvoi no 01-03608, Bull civ I, no 208; [2005] RTD Civ 120, observations by J Mestre and B Fages: 
rejet, claimant succeeded as negligence acceptable; Civ 1re, 27 November 2008, pourvoi no 07-18875, 
Bull civ I, no 272; [2009] RTD Civ 113, observations by B Fages; [2009] D 1122, noted by Y Dagorne-
Labbe: cassation, claimant should have succeeded as only negligence on the facts; Civ 1re, 19 March 
2015, pourvoi no 14-10075, Bull civ I, no 66; [2015] D 1084, observations by J Lasserre Capdeville; 
[2015] Gaz Pal, 2 July, 13, observations by M Mekki; [2015] JCP E 1238, noted by S Le Gac-Pech; 
[2016] RLDC no 134, 8, observations by M Tchendjou; Civ 2e, 2 December 1998, pourvoi no 96-22524, 
Bull civ II, no 289; [1999] RTD Civ 105, observations by J Mestre: rejet, claimant succeeded as 
negligence acceptable; Civ 3e, 31 May 2006, pourvoi no 05-18214, Bull civ III, no 137: rejet, claimant 
succeeded as negligence acceptable. 
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brought when the impoverishment is due to the serious or intentional fault 
of the party impoverished […].’ 
 
Example.59 Developer arranges for a property purchase in its favour to be financed in 
part by a cheque from Bank. Bank omits to conclude any contract of loan or other 
recognition of debt between the parties but issues and negligently honours the 
requested cheque. Realising its mistake, Bank sues Developer in unjustified 
enrichment and succeeds, despite failing to take an ‘elementary precaution’ in line with 
‘normal banking procedures’. 
 
The difference of opinion might be explained by a more rigorous approach in business 
contexts, with which the Chambre commerciale is generally concerned.60 In any case, 
it appears that the new codification can reconcile the jurisprudential divergences, and 
suggests legislative approval of the idea that some simple faults will merit judicial 
sanction through a reduction in the claimant’s award.61 The more serious the 
claimant’s fault, the ‘less unjust’ the defendant’s enrichment. Deliberate fault or dol 
should entirely justify it: such conduct can be interpreted as evincing either an intention 
gratuitously to enrich (donative intent, or une intention libérale),62 or risk-taking 
(addressed above). But, lacking intention, negligence and faute lourde cannot be so 
analysed. To understand fault by the claimant as a whole in unjustified enrichment, it 
is perhaps necessary to accept, with some French writers, that the courts, and now, 
the legislator, have moralised the institution of unjustified enrichment due to 
instrumentalist concerns.63 
                                               
59 This example is based on Civ 1re, 11 March 1997, pourvoi no 94-17621, Bull civ I, no 88; [1997] D 
407, observations by M Billiau. 
60 J-L Aubert ‘Quelques remarques sur la faute de l’appauvri dans l’enrichissement sans cause’ in F 
Chabas and others (eds), Etudes offertes à Jacques Dupichot: Liber amicorum (Bruylant 2004) no 13. 
61 F Chénedé, ‘Les «quasi-contrats»’ [2015] JCP G, supplement to no 21, May, 60, no 16: ‘Cette 
disposition viendra opportunément mettre fin aux incertitudes et divergences jurisprudentielles 
actuelles en consacrant une solution d’ailleurs susceptible de concilier les positions contraires : le juge 
pourra diminuer – sans doute jusqu’à la supprimer – l’indemnité due à l’appauvri en tenant compte de 
la gravité de sa faute.’ 
62 As to which, see Code civil, art 1303-1: ‘An enrichment is unjustified where it stems neither from the 
fulfilment of an obligation by the person impoverished nor from his intention to confer a gratuitous 
benefit’. Whether there is intention libérale will depend on the facts of the case. Compare the differing 
results in Civ 1re, 24 September 2008 (two arrêts), pourvois nos 06-11294, 07-11928, Bull civ I, nos 211-
212 [2008] AJ Famille, 431, noted by F Chénedé; [2008] RTD Civ 660, observations by J Hauser; [2009] 
Defrénois 545, observations by J Massip; [2009] Defrénois 2516, observations by E Savaux. 
63 For this view in specific studies, see M Lecène-Marénaud, ‘Le rôle de la faute dans les quasi contrats’ 
[1994] RTD Civ 515 nos 7-11; J Beauchard, ‘Etudes sur l’enrichissement sans cause: la faute de 
l’appauvri’ in V Mannio and C Ophèle (eds), L’enrichissement sans cause – la classification des sources 
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What, then, of fault and obstacles of fact in unjustified enrichment? In a 1939 case, 
the claimant repaired premises under a contract with their occupier, who became 
insolvent and did not pay. Unknown to the claimant, the occupier was a mere lessee. 
So the premises could not be judicially sold to cover the repairs. The Chambre des 
requêtes approved two grounds on which the court below had rejected claimant’s 
action in unjustified enrichment against the lessor. The first was that his contract with 
the lessee entitled the lessor to the benefit of the repairs. The second was the 
claimant’s serious fault – ‘le juge du fond […] déclare qu’elle [la société demandeuse] 
a commis une grave négligence’ – in not establishing the status of its contractual 
counterparty, ‘especially given how valuable the contract was’. This could have been 
done by consulting an official register. In the result, the claimant’s impoverishment was 
‘the consequence of the insolvency of the person with whom’ it had ‘dealt, and 
derive[d] from its own imprudence’.64 In this instance, then, an unjustified enrichment 
action in the face of an obstacle of fact – insolvency – would have made a mockery of 
what might reasonably be thought to have been policy objectives of the official register: 
certainty in commercial dealings, and the careful arrangement by businesspeople of 
their affairs. The claimant’s failure to do the latter was, through French eyes, serious 
indeed, and justly sanctioned. 
 
To sum up, Gorge suggests a positive general answer to the policy question in contract 
cases.65 Even for those reasoning in terms of subsidiarity, this is understandable: the 
action de in rem verso is not, in such a case, ‘an underhanded way of obtaining what 
                                               
des obligations (LGDJ 2007) 78-80; and, though arguing for a different approach to that taken in the 
cases based on risk-taking, rather than the kind of fault, S Moisdon-Chataigner, ‘La nouvelle 
appréciation du comportement fautif de l’appauvri dans l’enrichissement sans cause’ [2005] RRJ 1291, 
nos 22-23, 28, 46. In mainstream textbooks, see, eg, Flour, Aubert and Savaux (n 32) no 51; Terré, 
Simler and Lequette (n 32) nos 1069, 1071; not reflected in Terré et al and Chénedé (n 33) no 1318. 
For a useful survey of older cases and commentary, see Marty and Raynaud (n 32) no 397. For 
comparative perspective, see C Kennefick, ‘La faute de l’appauvri: comparaisons anglo-françaises sur 
l’enrichissement injustifié’ [2015] RDC 961. 
64 Req, 22 February 1939; [1940] DP, I, 5, noted by G Ripert (second case): ‘Attendu, d’autre part, que 
le juge du fond […] constate qu’il était loisible à cette société, par la consultation du registre du 
commerce, de connaître la véritable situation de Fourraut, et déclare qu’elle a commis une grave 
négligence en ne se renseignant pas, surtout à l’occasion d’un marché si important, sur la qualité de 
son cocontractant; qu’il suit de là que l’appauvrissement de la Société Lartaut et Pol est la conséquence 
de l’insolvabilité de celui avec qui elle a traité et dérive de sa propre imprudence […].’ 
65 Despite early opposition by Bartin (n 27) no 574 note 10. Though his remark is brief, it would appear 
that his view was predicated on the assumption that any relevant contract would always justify any 
enrichment. 
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cannot be [got at] by the normal route, because, ex hypothesi, the contractual action 
is [in fact] open’.66 It is suggested that the courts will not sanction a claimant who 
comes up against an obstacle of fact, simply because protection against, say, 
insolvency, could have been obtained. That approach has been rejected.67 But 
sometimes, as with the scenario before the court in the 1939 case, failure to prevent 
mishap may be so bad that an example must be made. 
 
Statutory obligation cases 
 
The Case of the False Father responds positively to the policy question in statutory 
obligation cases to which the obstacle of fact permission applies. There is no detailed 
discussion on this point, as there is in relation to the contract cases. It can be 
considered more briefly. 
 
Was the second husband’s enrichment in the False Father’s Case justified? Clearly 
not. The statutory basis on which the false father contributed to the little girl’s upkeep 
fell away once his true status was established: he had, in effect, been subsidising the 
second husband. 
 
Can there be a stultification-based objection to the pursuit of the second husband 
when the mother was insolvent? Seemingly not. Both true parents were obliged to 
maintain the child. Neither’s duty was more important than the other’s. Since one could 
not pay the false father, there was no reason why the other should not step in. This 
symmetry makes the case particularly clear; there will naturally be other less 
compelling scenarios in which claimants still succeed,68 or in which the relevant 
obstacle of fact is not insolvency.69 
 
 
                                               
66 Esmein, Traité pratique (n 32) no 763(2). 
67 Cour de Lyon, 27 June 1934; [1934] S, II, 219: ‘Attendu, en tout cas, que la simple possibilité qu’aurait 
eue Peylet d’acquérir une autre action, s’il avait eu la diligence d’exécuter certains actes à cette fin, ne 
suffit pas à exclure l’action de in rem verso; Attendu que si l’on en décidait autrement il faudrait la 
refuser également contre le tiers enrichi à celui qui, par son simple manque de diligence à poursuivre 
son débiteur contractuel, a laissé l’insolvabilité de celui-ci se produire […].’ 
68 See, eg, Civ 1re, 16 February 1954, Bull civ I, no 60, in which A had a statutory action against B. B 
was insolvent, so A successfully sued C in unjustified enrichment instead. 
69 See, eg, CA Nîmes, 13 September 2012 (n 4), discussed above. 
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Two-party cases 
 
The Case of the Kindly Aunt answers the policy question positively in two-party cases 
to which the obstacle of fact permission applies. Again, there is no in-depth material, 
but the questions can still be considered. 
 
First, Mr X’s enrichment appears to have been unjustified. During the time for which 
he should have been maintaining his daughter, Ms Y did it for him without obligation 
or donative intent. 
 
What of policy? If anything, the indirect enforcement of X’s obligation to maintain his 





This chapter has addressed the obstacle of fact limb of the action en enrichissement 
injustifié’s supposed subsidiarity in French law and scholarship.  
 
The claim drawn from the available material is incorrect. First, it involves a rule which 
does not presuppose the existence of the entities to which it applies. Rules of 
subsidiarity do the opposite. Secondly, the rule is not relevantly a meta-authority, 
whereas a rule of subsidiarity must be. And thirdly, the rule provides for free 
concurrence between the action en enrichissement injustifié and any practically 
useless action. This state of affairs is the antithesis of subsidiarity. 
 
After establishing that the obstacle of fact permission cannot be about subsidiarity, 
this chapter moved to suggest an alternative explanation. It was suggested that all of 
the cases supposedly applying the obstacle of fact permission in the claimant’s favour, 
are simply straightforward cases of unjustified enrichment, in which there is no 
objection based on grounds of coherence in the law to the doctrine’s operation. In fact, 
they are quite unremarkable. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUBSIDIARITY WITHIN THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
 
Previous chapters in this study provide background on the law of unjust enrichment, 
introduce a definition and principles of subsidiarity, and sketch the history of, and 
reasons for, subsidiarity in the law and scholarship on unjust enrichment. This chapter 
is the sixth to put those general chapters to use. It addresses arguments in the law 
and literature made about the subsidiarity of one kind of enrichment claim to another. 
English law discloses no material to evaluate. However, one prominent Scots writer’s 
views on the interaction of that jurisdiction’s general principle against unjustified 
enrichment and the established categories of enrichment liability are addressed. And 
there is plenty in the French sources on the supposed subsidiarity of the action de in 
rem verso to other kinds of quasi-contractual action. The law and commentary are set 
out in part one of this chapter. In the second part, they are analysed against the theory 
of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this study. It will be seen that the material 
under consideration cannot correctly be characterised as addressing subsidiarity. The 
third part of this chapter re-analyses the sources, in order better to understand what 
is happening in each context. 
 
I. THE CLAIMS 
 
This part of the chapter confirms that we need not here concern ourselves with 
England. It then sets out material containing claims about the supposed subsidiarity 
of France’s action de in rem verso to negotiorum gestio and the condictio indebiti, and 
of Scotland’s general enrichment principle to recognised cases of liability in unjustified 
enrichment. 
 
A. England  
 
English law ‘recognises a number of discrete factual situations in which enrichment is 
treated as vitiated by some unjust factor’.1 However, far from taking an essentialist 
                                               
1 Lowick Rose LLP v Swynson Ltd [2017] UKSC 32, [2018] AC 313 [22] (Lord Sumption, with whom 
Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, and Lord Hodge agreed). 
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approach, English courts, in common with their Australian and Canadian counterparts, 
consider that grounds for or (in Canada’s case) against restitution may cumulate.2 
Several commentators support this, also.3 It is not that the language of subsidiarity 
has not been put to any rule which might interest us here. Rather, no rule of interest 





Of interest here is the interaction of the action in enrichissement injustifié with the other 
institutions grouped under the heading of quasi-contrat, found in subtitle three of title 
three of book three of the Code civil: negotiorum gestio, governed by articles 1301 to 
1301-5, and the condictio indebiti, governed by articles 1302 to 1302-3.4 Before turning 
to this, however, two preliminary observations. First, our other two quasi-contractual 
sources of obligation appear not to be subsidiary. The Cour de cassation has held that 
the condictio indebiti ‘has no subsidiary character’.5 It has also allowed a claimant to 
proceed in negotiorum gestio having failed to prove a contract of mandate, when 
taking over management left unfinished by a former contractual mandatary.6 Such an 
obstacle (of law) would sink an action de in rem verso. 
 
                                               
2 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] UKHL 49, [2007] 1 AC 
558 [12]-[18] (Lord Hoffmann), [50]-[51] (Lord Hope), [136]-[142], [154] (Lord Walker), [161] (Lord 
Brown); Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7, (2012) 246 CLR 498 [30] (French CJ, Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ); Jedfro Investments (USA) Ltd v Jacyk [2007] SCC 55, [2007] 3 SCR 679 [34]-[36] (McLachlin 
CJ, with whom Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Charron, and Rothstein JJ agreed). 
3 A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2012) s 5(3)(a), and 
commentary, 39-40 (subject to a rule against double recovery); J Edelman and E Bant, Unjust 
Enrichment (2nd edn, Hart 2016) 127; K Mason, JW Carter and GJ Tolhurst, Mason & Carter’s 
Restitution Law in Australia (3rd edn, Lexis Nexis 2016) [164]: ‘[n]eedless to say, more than one unjust 
factor can co-exist in a particular situation’; M McInnes, ‘Revising the Reason for Restitution: Garland 
Ten Years After’ (2015) 57 Can Bus LJ 1, 27-30. 
4 For brisk, accessible coverage, see R Cabrillac, Droit des obligations (13th edn, Dalloz 2018) nos 
192-207. We leave aside here other debated, uncodified quasi-contrats, such as that based on the 
illusory representation of a gain, discussed briefly in chapter 7, footnote 34. 
5 Civ 1re, 19 October 1983, pourvoi no 82-11383, Bull civ I, no 242; [1985] RTD Civ 169, observations 
by J Mestre. 
6 Civ, 20 April 1931; [1931] Gaz Pal, II, 54. For rare academic accord (absent reference to this case), 
see L Josserand, Cours de droit civil positif français, vol II (3rd edn, Sirey 1939) nos 564, 574, 1450: 
‘the action negotiorum gestorum does not have the essentially subsidiary character that la jurisprudence 
has assigned to the action de in rem verso’; and at greater length in the now classic study by R Bout, 
La gestion d’affaires en droit français contemporain (LGDJ 1972) no 93. The general lack of treatment 
by commentators perhaps indicates that this position is considered obvious. Denying negotiorum gestio 
where a contract did exist, compare Com, 16 November 1976, 74-13681, Bull civ IV, no 291. 
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Secondly, however, academic claims have been made to the effect that the quasi-
contractual category as a whole is subsidiary – to the rest of the entire legal system, 
one supposes. One of these claims is unsubstantiated.7 A second rests on a 
suggested extension of the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso,8 authority which 
does not support that extension to negotiorum gestio,9 and assertion:10 
 
‘The principle of subsidiarity can […] be transposed to the other quasi-
contrats […]. Its stated goal was to prevent the subversion of the legal 
system, under the perilous pretext of equity. However, it does not mean that 
the quasi-contrats are inferior in relation to the other sources of law. It 
[subsidiarity] should be understood as a rule of good sense and coherence, 
consisting in the constant use of the most relevant and specific legal 
recourse.’ 
 
Against the specific confirmations (above) that the other two codified quasi-contrats 
are not subsidiary, these views are too weakly supported. They may be left aside. 
 
The relationship between enrichissement injustifié and negotiorum gestio is partly 
governed by article 1301-5 of the Code civil. A very similarly worded provision 
originally appeared in one of the reform projects leading up to the new codification, 
the avant-projet Catala, at the suggestion of the distinguished commentator, Alain 
Bénabent.11 He has since remarked on its novelty, and used the language of 
subsidiarity to describe the situation which it creates.12 Article 1301-5 states: 
 
                                               
7 See the two-sentence assertion by M Fabre-Magnan, Droit des obligations, vol II (3rd edn, PUF 2013) 
418. 
8 This is the only argument of a third author, favouring a single, unified quasi-contractual action: M 
Douchy, La notion de quasi-contrat en droit positif français (Economica 1997) 267-270. 
9 The case simply excludes both enrichissement sans cause and negotiorum gestio in the presence of 
incompatible statutory provisions: Com, 14 October 1997, pourvoi no 95-19468, Bull civ IV, no 258; 
[1997] Dr mar fr 1082, noted by J-P Rémery and P Bonassies. 
10 P Le Tourneau, ‘Quasi-contrat’, Rép civ Dalloz (2018) no 32. 
11 G Cornu, ‘Quasi-contrats’ in P Catala (ed), Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit 
de la prescription (Documentation française 2006) 76 and note 1, referring to the project’s article 1329-
1. 
12 A Bénabent, Droit des obligations (17th edn, LGDJ 2018) no 444: ‘le nouvel article 1303-5 ouvre une 
voie subsidiaire’. 
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‘If the action of the intervener does not satisfy the conditions for the 
application of management of another’s affairs but nevertheless benefits 
the principal, the latter must[13] compensate the intervener according to 
the rules of unjustified enrichment.’ 
 
Two features of this rule stand out. First, it does not displace the first limb of article 
1303-3 (set out below) by allowing a free choice between concurrently open actions 
in negotiorum gestio and in enrichissement injustifié. This mirrors previous authority, 
both judicial and academic,14 and does not constitute a separate claim about 
subsidiarity to that already made by article 1303-3. Secondly, article 1301-5 creates 
an exception to the second limb of article 1303-3, which bars enrichissement injustifié 
if another action is barred by an obstacle of law. This is a claim about subsidiarity in 
French enrichment law. A person may sue and fail in negotiorum gestio, then, 
potentially,15 win in enrichissement injustifié. Previously unrecognised by the courts,16 
this possibility divides academic opinion.17 
 
A full historical examination of this latter position has not been attempted. But support 
in older commentary is of interest. Some authors founded their initial recognition of the 
action de in rem verso upon its arising from gestion d’affaires anormale – extended 
                                               
13 The ‘must’ here does not remove the need to satisfy the conditions of unjustified enrichment, as 
confirmed by the Code civil, art 1303. This reminds us that unjustified enrichment applies on its own 
terms, ‘[o]utwith the situations of management of another’s affairs and undue payment’. A prior reform 
project substituted ‘can’ for ‘must’: F Terré (ed), Pour une réforme du régime général des obligations 
(Dalloz 2013) art 19. 
14 See, specifically, Civ 1re, 16 March 2004, pourvoi no 01-00186. More generally, see the arrêts 
Clayette and Briauhant, the formulae of which barred the action de in rem verso in the presence of any 
open quasi-contractual action: Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull somm, I, 
86; [1918] S, I, 41, noted by E Naquet; Civ, 2 March 1915; [1915] S, Bull somm, I, 20; [1920] DP, I, 102 
(first case). For scholarly accord, see A Sériaux, Droit des obligations (2nd edn, PUF 1998) 333; AM 
Romani, ‘Enrichissement sans cause’, Rép civ Dalloz (2017) no 291. 
15 The courts have, on occasion, not used subsidiarity-like reasoning, but found that the conditions of 
both actions were unsatisfied, as where an action in negotiorum gestio failed due to management in 
the sole interest of the intervener, which self-interest also discounted an action de in rem verso: Civ 
1re, 5 July 1988, pourvoi no 86-18218. 
16 See, specifically, Civ 1re, 26 June 1990, pourvoi no 89-11396. More generally, recall the wide formula 
pronounced in Civ 3e, 29 April 1971, pourvoi no 70-10415, Bull civ III, no 277; [1970-1971] Rapport 
annuel C cass 37; [1971] Gaz Pal, II, 554; [1971] RTD Civ 842, observations by Y Loussouarn. This 
precluded the action de in rem verso where any other action – including, therefore, another quasi-
contractual one – was barred by obstacle of law. 
17 In favour: P Esmein (ed), Aubry & Rau: Cours de droit civil français, vol IX (6th edn, Libraries 
Techniques 1953) 333 in fine. Against: F Chabas (ed), Leçons de droit civil de H, L et J Mazeaud, vol 
II/1 (9th edn, Montchrestien 1998) no 706 in principio. 
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negotiorum gestio.18 They essentially based it on the same thing as the latter: an 
interference with another’s affairs. For example, Charles Demolombe declared the 
action de in rem verso to be an ‘irregular or incomplete’ version of, or an ‘auxiliary’ to, 
negotiorum gestio, which would lie where the latter’s conditions went unsatisfied.19 
The language of subsidiarity was imposed on Demolombe’s account in the early 
twentieth century.20 
 
As to the relationship between enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti, the 
starting point is still article 1303-3 of the Code civil. As will be recalled from chapter 3, 
article 1303-3, and the Cour de cassation’s formulae from which it derives, are claims 
or rules about the subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso in France. Though they do 
not themselves use the language of subsidiarity, many other sources, referred to 
earlier, do put it to the now-codified rules. Article 1303-3 provides: 
 
‘The impoverished person has no action on this basis [ie, in unjustified 
enrichment] where another action is open to him or is barred by an obstacle 
of law, such as prescription.’ 
 
There is no rule like article 1301-5 to soften this position. Both open and legally barred 
condictiones indebiti preclude the use of an action in unjustified enrichment. This 
reflects prior authority that an open condictio indebiti prevents the operation of an 
action de in rem verso.21 On the question whether the latter’s use is prevented where 
the former was barred by an obstacle of law,22 it has not been possible to trace a 
specific case. A negative answer has perhaps long been considered self-evident, and 
                                               
18 For this position in the courts, see, eg, Req, 18 June 1872; [1872] DP, I, 471; Req, 19 December 
1877; [1878] S, I, 57; Req, 16 July 1890; [1891] DP, I, 49, noted by M Planiol; [1894] S, I, 19. 
19 C Demolombe, Cours de code Napoléon, vol XXXI (4th edn, Lahure 1882) no 49. See also F Laurent, 
Principes de droit civil français, vol XX (Bruylant-Christophe 1876) nos 333-340; L Larombière, Théorie 
et pratique des obligations, vol VII (2nd edn, Pedone-Lauriel 1885) 448-450. 
20 See, though disagreeing with Demolombe, CC Stoïcesco, De l’enrichissement sans cause 
(Chevalier-Marescq 1904) 44-45 and note 3. Stoïcesco refers to other authors of the same view, but 
opines that Demolombe’s is the account to alight upon. 
21 Civ 1re, 5 July 1989, pourvoi no 87-19984, Bull civ I, no 278; [1990] RTD Civ 282, observations by J 
Mestre; [1991] D 322, noted by J-L Aubert; CA Nîmes, 16 March 1979; [1979] JCP, IV, 347; CA 
Montpellier, 18 January 2007, RG no 05/06026. This position was also endorsed by the arrêts Clayette 
and Briauhant, which bar the action de in rem verso when quasi-contractual actions are available: Civ, 
12 May 1914 (n 14); Civ, 2 March 1915 (n 14). 
22 A clear example being the absence of a mistake where a person discharges another’s debt: Code 
civil, art 1302-2. 
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in any event has had firm support since 1971, from the Troisième chambre civile’s 
general formula, barring actions de in rem verso where claimants had other actions at 




In Scotland, different legal grounds for enrichments, reasons against success in an 
unjustified enrichment action, may cumulate.24 Of interest in this chapter, however, is 
a point which has yet to be discussed by the courts: the question whether some kinds 
of enrichment liability are barred because others are, or were, open to a given pursuer. 
 
One Scots commentator has made a claim relevant to this chapter.25 Robin Evans-
Jones has said that Scotland’s general principle against unjustified enrichment must:26 
 
‘[B]e understood differently according to the different groups of cases to 
which it is applied. It must also operate at a level subsidiary to the 
requirements of the established claims like condictio indebiti. The reason is 
that it expresses a single abstract condition of liability (without a legal 
                                               
23 Civ 3e, 29 April 1971 (n 16). 
24 Applying contract and self-interest, see Jones v Muir unreported 10 March 2015 (Sh Ct, Lochmaddy), 
2015 GWD 11-183 [6]-[7] (Sheriff Principal Pyle). 
25 Two authors did claim that recompense was a ‘subsidiary’ general action in Scots enrichment law, 
which would operate only when no other action could: HL MacQueen and WDH Sellar, ‘Unjust 
Enrichment in Scots Law’ in EJH Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of 
the Law of Restitution (2nd edn, Duncker & Humblot 1999) esp 312-314; and, arguing that recompense 
is subsidiary to negotiorum gestio, HL MacQueen, ‘Payment of Another’s Debt’ in D Johnston and R 
Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified enrichment: key issues in comparative perspective (CUP 2002) 646, 
466-467, 475-476, 489. The Scottish Law Commission referred to, but remained neutral on, a similar 
proposition. It used the language of subsidiarity liberally, asserted that the ‘doctrine of subsidiarity’ 
applied such that the condictio indebiti must be invoked before recompense. Passing reference was 
made to the ‘similar’ result in French law: Scottish Law Commission, Recovery of Benefits Conferred 
Under Error of Law, vol I (Scot Law Com DP no 95, 1993) [3.107]-[3.108]; citing Varney (Scotland) Ltd 
v Lanark Burgh Council 1974 SC 245 (IH); and D Friedmann and N Cohen, ‘Payment of Another’s Debt’ 
in P Schlechtriem (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol X (Mohr / Siebeck / Nijhoff 
1991) [84]. However, Scots law has overtaken these views, and ‘it is no longer appropriate to speak of 
recompense as a ground of action’: MacAdam v Grandison [2008] CSOH 53 [35] (Lord Hodge). And 
Professor MacQueen appears to have changed his opinion: ‘The Sophistication of Unjustified 
Enrichment: A Response to Nils Jansen’ (2016) 20 Edinburgh L Rev 312, 317: the ‘suggestion […] was 
not in general accepted by others working in the field. I do not want to return to that argument now […].’ 
26 R Evans-Jones, ‘Thinking About Some Scots Law: Lord Rodger and Unjustified Enrichment’ in A 
Burrows, D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger 
of Earlsferry (OUP 2013) 445. 
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ground) which, in the absence of subsidiarity, would be likely to elide the 
more numerous concrete conditions of the individual claims.’ 
 
The same author’s treatise on unjustified enrichment in Scots law provides more detail. 
Evans-Jones understands the general principle against unjustified enrichment in Scots 
law to fulfil three functions. Two are the consolidation and explanation of previously 
recognised enrichment claims, and the provision of a general framework within which 
the likeness of a potential new instance of enrichment liability may be tested against 
established claims.27 In relation to a third function of the general enrichment principle, 
Evans-Jones makes his claim about subsidiarity, which is set out in extenso:28 
 
‘Level 1. Single Criterion of Liability and General Justiciability 
 
At the most general level, to found a cause of action the defender’s 
enrichment must be “unjustified”. At the next level Scots law recognises the 
general enrichment principle. Here it is the expression of a single criterion 
of liability to which all causes of action of the law of unjustified enrichment 
conform. For example, there is a cause of action called condictio indebiti 
which is available when P paid money that was undue in error as to legal 
liability. Its requirements may also be expressed more succinctly in the 
terms that D retains P’s money “without a legal ground”. All the other 
recognised causes of action like “interference” are equally expressions of 
the principle at this level. Thus, where D interferes with P’s property and is 
enriched at his expense without right D retains the gain without a legal 
ground. 
 
In modern legal systems, private law is expressed primarily as a system of 
rights and not of remedies or actions. In Scots law, therefore, it is not on 
the remedies of Roman law, or on any other “actional” responses, but on 
the judicial statements of the general enrichment principle that the law of 
unjustified enrichment is now generally justiciable. […] 
                                               
27 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W Green 
2013) [3.11]-[3.14]. 
28 ibid, [3.09]-[3.10], [3.37]-[3.39] and notes 39-42. 
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General Enrichment Principle is Subsidiary to the Requirements of 
Established Single Causes of Action 
 
The general enrichment principle may be expressive of all causes of action 
in unjustified enrichment or it may be used more concretely to express in 
shorthand the cause of action of a single established claim (Level 1). Thus, 
for example, a condictio indebiti may properly be expressed in the terms 
“retention without a legal ground”. In such a case the general principle is 
subsidiary to the specific requirements of the recognised claim. What does 
this mean and why is it necessary? 
 
Comparative: French and Italian Law[29] 
 
For historical and political reasons, the approach to unjustified enrichment 
of these two legal systems is very similar.[30] They both operate a principle 
of strict subsidiarity of the general enrichment principle. The purpose of the 
“subsidiarity” rule is to contain the general principle within its appropriate 
sphere of operation and to ensure that it does not undermine the principles 
and causes of action of the settled law. 
 
It is perfectly acceptable to use the term “without a legal basis” as a 
shorthand to indicate that a benefit is recoverable in a particular recognised 
fact situation. However, as in French and Italian law, the general principle 
must operate at a subsidiary level to the detailed requirements of any 
established cause of action.[31] In determining what is “unjustified” and 
founds a cause of action, Birks made the point that the law looks 
downwards to the decided cases and not upwards to an unknowable justice 
                                               
29 Citing K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, (1996) 3rd edn, OUP 
1998) 547ff. 
30 Citing P Gallo, ‘Remedies for Unjust Enrichment in the History of Italian Law and in the Codice Civile’ 
in EJH Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution 
(Duncker & Humblot 1995). 
31 Citing D Visser, ‘The Potential Role of a General Enrichment Action’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch L Rev 
454, 456-458. 
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in the sky.[32] If a court approaches the applications of the established law 
from the perspective of the general principle alone, because it expresses 
only a single abstract condition (without a legal ground) to found the cause 
of action, the result can be to elide the more numerous concrete conditions 
that need to be satisfied to found the established claim. Therefore, if the 
principle is not treated as subsidiary to the recognised causes of action it 
will result in decisions that proceed on its single abstract condition. In time 
this will inevitably undermine the established law and “unjustified 
enrichment” will have set off in pursuit of a justice in the sky.’ 
 
Evans-Jones asks himself what he means by ‘the general principle must operate at a 
subsidiary level to the detailed requirements of any established cause of action’. With 
respect, his elaboration is unclear.33 But examining the principal source to which he 
refers assists. Therein, Danie Visser favours an approach suggested for South African 
enrichment law by Schutz JA, in McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC:34 a 
‘subsidiary’ general action in unjustified enrichment should be accepted, by which is 
meant one which operates as a gap-filler, when established actions do not lie. A 
general action which replaced all pre-existing actions would be ‘an unacceptable 
erosion of the principle of certainty’.35 Evans-Jones’ preoccupation is clearly the same. 
                                               
32 Citing P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (rev ed, Clarendon 1989) 19. 
33 Unfortunately, similarly uncertain is a passage, largely summarising those cited, in R Evans-Jones, 
‘Thinking about Principles and Actions: Unjustified Enrichment in Scots and South African Law’ in D 
Bain and others (eds), Northern Lights: Essays in Private Law in Memory of Professor David Carey 
Miller (AUP 2018) 340. 
34 2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA) 487-489 (Olivier and Cameron JJA concurring), arguing for ‘a general action 
which will fill the gaps’ between and around South Africa’s established enrichment actions, and noting 
historical support for a general action, ‘at least one of a subsidiary nature’. Like approval of the solution 
was expressed in D Visser and A Purchase, ‘The General Enrichment Action Cometh’ (2002) 119 S 
African LJ 260, 266-269; D Visser, ‘Unjustified Enrichment’ [2002] Ann Sur SA Law 367, 368-369. 
35 Visser, ‘General Enrichment Action’ (n 31) 456-458. Evans-Jones’ citation of Visser reminds us of 
the regard in which Scots lawyers hold him. See also, eg, HL MacQueen, ‘The Future of Unjustified 
Enrichment in Scotland’ [2017] RLR 14, 24 and note 77, describing ‘valiant and valuable work’. Visser’s 
obvious influence renders appropriate the provision of some background on his thinking about 
subsidiarity. He did not always use the language: ‘Rethinking Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of 
the Competition between Contractual and Enrichment Remedies’ [1992] Acta Juridica 203. He then 
started to use it in relation to others’ work: ‘Not the General Enrichment Action’ [1994] TSAR 825, 831; 
D Visser, ‘Unjustified Enrichment’ in R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds), Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa (OUP 1996) 551. In the late 1990s, he appears to have accepted the 
usefulness of the language of subsidiarity in talking about unjustified enrichment’s internal and external 
relations, and been influenced by subsidiarity abroad, expressing scepticism about ‘formalistic’ French 
reasoning on protecting ‘the technical structure of the law’, but recognising the difficulty of allowing ‘a 
completely free choice to the plaintiff’: ‘[p]erhaps the best approach is to allow a choice [between 
different claims] unless there is a clear policy consideration that necessitates excluding one of the 
[available] remedies in a particular situation’: D Visser, ‘Unjustified Enrichment’ [1999] Ann Sur SA Law 
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It seems reasonable to assume that he favours the same rule as Visser, in support of 
Schutz JA. 
 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 
In this second part of the chapter, the claims set out above are analysed. The 
framework for discussion is the principles of subsidiarity developed in chapter 2 of this 
study. The background is the conditional nature of subsidiarity, also developed in 
chapter 2, the law of unjust enrichment, and the general question of its subsidiarity, 




Once in place as an operative rule or principle, subsidiarity is not concerned to 
determine whether a given entity to which it applies actually exists. To be a rule of 
subsidiarity, it would seem necessary for a rule to create, maintain, or put an end to, 
a relationship of subsidiarity between entities. For a rule to destroy one or more of the 
entities, the interaction of which it is supposed to manage, might be thought to prevent 
it from carrying out these functions in relation to that entity. It would also seem to deal 
with a question of overlap in a less then conditional manner. And as argued in chapter 
2, subsidiarity is an inherently conditional idea. Once an entity does not exist, there is 
no way for it eventually to become competent. Here, which entities are relevant 
depends on the jurisdiction under consideration. In France, they are, on the one side, 
the action in enrichissement injustifié, and on the other, either negotiorum gestio or 
the condictio indebiti. In Scotland, they are (according to Evans-Jones), on the one 
side, the general principle against unjustified enrichment (potentially creative of new 
instances of enrichment liability), and on the other, all established instances of liability 
in unjustified enrichment (such as the condictiones).  
                                               
232, 240; discussing the findings of B Nicholas, ‘Modern Developments in the French Law of Unjustified 
Enrichment’ in PWL Russell (ed), Unjustified Enrichment: A Comparative Study of the Law of Restitution 
(VUUP 1996); and R Zimmermann and J du Plessis, ‘Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified 
Enrichment’ [1994] RLR 14. Analysis by Visser of these policy considerations is well known, and has 
been conducted using the language of subsidiarity: see, eg, D Visser and S Miller, ‘Between Principle 
and Policy: Indirect Enrichment in Subcontractor and Garage-Repair Cases’ (2000) 117 S African LJ 
594, 600, 603, 606, 610, 612. He has also singled out, as a ‘main theme’ of his treatise, the use of ‘the 
notion of subsidiarity to give appropriate protection to the principle of certainty in the context of a general 
enrichment action’: D Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (Juta 2008) 56-59. 
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As to the action in enrichissement injustifié and the unfulfilled (ie, legally barred) action 
in negotiorum gestio, article 1301-5 of the Code civil appears to satisfy the instant 
principle. The exception to the obstacle of law bar does not determine the existence, 
either of an action based on negotiorum gestio, or in enrichissement injustifié. Instead, 
it presupposes the non-application – the non-existence on a set of facts – of the former 
doctrine, in order that a claimant might invoke unjustified enrichment. And it makes no 
assumption about the existence – ie, satisfaction of the conditions – of any action de 
in rem verso which might eventually be brought. 
 
Article 1303-3 governs relations between, first, the action in enrichissement injustifié 
and the open action negotiorum gestio, and, secondly, enrichissement injustifié and 
condictiones indebiti (both open and legally barred). As noted in previous chapters, 
this provision does not satisfy the instant principle. It cannot be a rule of subsidiarity, 
because it can determine the existence of the action in enrichissement injustifié. If it 
applies, the claimant ‘has no action’. So, for example, where a claimant has, or has, 
and then subsequently loses, a condictio indebiti, there simply is no enrichment action 
on the facts. 
 
It is unclear how the instant principle applies to Evans-Jones’ conception of the 
interaction of Scotland’s general enrichment principle and the established categories 




A relationship of subsidiarity positively requires the existence of at least two entities, 
or groups of entities. Without a plurality of entities, no relationship would be possible 
at all in a given context, and whatever authority existed in that context would lie 
unconditionally with the only relevantly extant entity. 
 
The relationship between enrichissement injustifié and negotiorum gestio does not 
satisfy the instant principle. There can be no relationship of subsidiarity between them, 
because articles 1301-5 and 1303-3 of the Code civil combine to prevent an action in 
enrichissement injustifié from existing when an action negotiorum gestorum exists. So 
 - 230 - 
these institutions will never form part of a plurality of coexistent entities, capable of 
being in a relationship of subsidiarity. 
 
The relationship between the action in enrichissement injustifié and the condictio 
indebiti does not satisfy the instant principle, either. According to article 1303-3, the 
presence, on a given set of facts, of an open or legally barred condictio indebiti, means 
that there can be no action in enrichissement injustifié on those facts. The two can 
never relevantly co-exist. One thing cannot be in a relationship with another thing, if 
one of those things does not exist. 
 
Evans-Jones’ account of the relationship between the Scots general enrichment 
principle and the established categories of enrichment liability does not satisfy the 
instant principle. A gap-filling approach to general enrichment liability obviously means 
that it will never arise at the same time as, say, a condictio causa data causa non 
secuta. If two things cannot co-exist, they cannot be in a relationship with each other 




For a rule of subsidiarity to be relevant in any context, at least two entities in that 
context must be capable of overlapping if unrestrained. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing for a conditional rule of subsidiarity to do. 
 
The claim that enrichissement injustifié is subsidiary to negotiorum gestio does not 
satisfy the instant principle. This is because, as will be explained in more detail when 
the claims in this chapter are re-analysed in part III(A), the concurrence of 
enrichissement injustifié and negotiorum gestio on the same set of facts is 
substantively impossible. So there is nothing – no potential overlap – for a rule of 
subsidiarity to prevent. On this basis, article 1301-5 of the Code civil cannot be a rule 
of subsidiarity. 
 
Turning to enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti, it seems clear that both 
routes to relief could theoretically apply to an identical set of facts. So if article 1303-3 
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did not exist, these actions could overlap with each other. Here, the French law 
satisfies the instant principle. 
 
As to the Scots general enrichment principle and the established categories of 
enrichment liability, it is equally clear that the general principle against unjustified 
enrichment can overlap with at least some of the established instances of enrichment 




For a rule of subsidiarity definitively to resolve questions of allocation and overlap, it 
must bind the relevant entities by constituting an independent, higher authority in 
relation to them. If this were not so, and the relevant entities could manage their 
relations without an independent, higher, organising rule (as, for example, would be 
the case if one of them were sovereign and could dictate any relevant interactions), 
there would be no need for subsidiarity. This is subsidiarity as meta-authority. A rule 
of subsidiarity is what dictates whether the entities to which it applies have 
competence or authority, however they might behave if unrestrained. And the 
condition, howsoever framed, on which allocation takes place, goes to the general 
essence of subsidiarity. 
 
It is suggested that article 1301-5 of the Code civil would be a meta-authority in relation 
to an action in enrichissement injustifié an action negotiorum gestorum which is barred 
by an obstacle of law, if only they could exist simultaneously. If an action negotiorum 
gestorum is open, then article 1301-5 preserves the application of article 1303-3, 
which prevents an action in enrichissement injustifié from ever formally coexisting with 
the former kind of action. And, again, as will be explained properly in part III(A), their 
substantive co-existence is impossible also. However, for completeness’ sake, it is 
worth pursuing the analysis on the basis that the actions are indeed capable of co-
existing. To be a meta-authority, article 1301-5 must be an independent, higher 
authority in relation to the institutions to which it applies. 
 
First, article 1301-5’s independence from both enrichissement injustifié and 
negotiorum gestio is confirmed by three points. In the first place, the rule which article 
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1301-5 instates has never been declared part of either institution to which it refers. 
Indeed, no similar provision appeared among the previous provisions of the Code civil 
on negotiorum gestio (ex arts 1372-1375);36 and the courts previously endorsed a 
position straightforwardly contrary to article 1301-5.37 In the second place, this 
historical argument is supported by article 1301-5’s reference to the conditions of each 
institution. This suggests that it is separate from them, and that they are separate from 
each other: article 1301-5 takes into account the possibility that the conditions of 
negotiorum gestio will be unsatisfied, and directs the claimant to the conditions of 
enrichissement injustifié in that event. In the third place, this textual argument is 
supported by academic commentary. Remarking on article 1301-5’s novelty, Nicolas 
Dissaux and Christophe Jamin have called it a simple ‘exit door’, not previously found 
in the Code civil.38 François Chénedé has called it a ‘gateway [une passerelle] 
between negotiorum gestio and enrichissement injustifié’, which makes the latter ‘a 
fallback solution [une solution de repli]’.39 These remarks suggest that article 1301-5’s 
rule is not integral, either to negotiorum gestio, or enrichissement injustifié. 
 
Secondly, article 1301-5 is a higher authority in relation to enrichissement injustifié 
and negotiorum gestio. It operates to preserve the latter’s competence against the 
former, whilst it is able to come to a claimant’s aid by maintaining the application of 
article 1303-3. And when negotiorum gestio is found wanting, it liberates 
enrichissement injustifié from the strictures of article 1303-3. In this, article 1301-5 
uses a conditional formula to regulate definitively the competence, in relation to each 
other, of the institutions to which it refers. 
 
We move on to consider the interaction of enrichissement injustifié with, on the one 
hand, open actions based on negotiorum gestio and, on the other, condictiones 
indebiti (whether open or legally barred), governed by article 1303-3. The rule in that 
article of the Code civil is not a meta-authority in relation any doctrine to which it 
                                               
36 See CA Douai, 21 September 2017, RG no 16/05574. 
37 Recall Civ 1re, 26 June 1990 (n 16); Civ 3e, 29 April 1971 (n 16). 
38 N Dissaux and C Jamin, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des 
obligations (Dalloz 2016) 150: ‘une porte de sortie’. 
39 F Chénedé, Le nouveau droit des obligations et des contrats (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) [132.15]; See 
also G Chantepie and M Latina, La réforme du droit des obligations – Commentaire théorique et 
pratique dans l’ordre du Code civil (2nd edn, Dalloz 2018) 658-659; O Deshayes, T Genicon and YM 
Laithier, Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations – 
Commentaire article par article (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2018) 620. 
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applies. A settled line of cases confirms that it is an ‘inherent condition’ of the action 
in enrichissement injustifié.40 So the rule is not sourced independently of that action, 
one of the entities to which it is supposed to apply. And it does not actually govern any 
potential action negotiorum gestorum or condictio indebiti which might come under its 
formula, either. It works by making the action in enrichissement injustifié disappear in 
the face of either kind of other action, whether open or legally barred. For example, 
the condictio indebiti decides for itself, so to speak, what it is, or is not, going to do, 
and there is nothing in article 1303-3 that can change that. Rules which are not 
independent, and cannot actually govern the things to which they apply, are not rules 
of subsidiarity. 
 
It is hard to be sure what kind of rule Evans-Jones envisages to govern relations 
between the Scots general enrichment principle and the established categories of 
enrichment liability. Criticism will not, therefore, be attempted. 
 
E. Not sovereignty 
 
For a relationship of subsidiarity to exist, no entity said to be part of that relationship 
can be sovereign over any other entity in that relationship. In such a situation, there 
would be nothing for subsidiarity to do, because authority in that context would be 
allocated unconditionally. This goes against the essence of subsidiarity – as argued 
in chapter 2, subsidiarity is a conditional idea. The above French law and scholarship 
does not satisfy this principle. 
 
Turning first to when enrichissement injustifié is allowed to operate where negotiorum 
gestio is legally barred, it appears that article 1301-5 of the Code civil manages their 
respective application to the same facts. Neither action – neither entity – dictates to 
the other whether and when it can operate. The instant principle is therefore satisfied 
here. 
                                               
40 See Civ 1re, 4 April 2006, pourvoi no 03-13986, Bull civ I, no 194; [2006] RLDC, no 28, 11, observations 
by S Doireau: ‘le caractère subsidiaire reconnu à l’action fondée sur le principe de l’enrichissement 
sans cause ne constitue pas une fin de non recevoir au sens de l’article 122 du nouveau Code de 
procédure civile mais une condition inhérente à l’action’; CA Rennes, 18 December 2007, RG no 
06/00867; CA Nîmes, 8 January 2008, RG no 04/01413; CA Basse-Terre, 5 January 2009, RG no 
05/01889; CA Douai, 26 October 2009, RG no 08/06633; CA Limoges, 4 March 2013, RG no 12/00560; 
CA Metz, 21 September 2017, RG no 17/00339. 
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Turning next to enrichissement injustifié, open actions based on negotiorum gestio, 
and condictiones indebiti (both open and legally barred), article 1303-3 governs their 
relations. The position of French law here does not satisfy the instant principle. 
Whenever, for example, a condictio indebiti exists, or did, until barred by an obstacle 
of law, one of the inherent elements of enrichissement injustifié – the rule in article 
1303-3 – operates to give way to the condictio indebiti. This suggests that the latter is 
sovereign over the former, and so these institutions cannot be in a relationship of 
subsidiarity. 
 
It is hard to be sure what kind of rule Evans-Jones envisages to govern relations 
between the Scots general enrichment principle and the established categories of 
enrichment liability. Criticism will not, therefore, be attempted. 
 
F. Not concurrence 
 
An extant relationship of subsidiarity is incompatible with the free concurrence of the 
entities said to be part of that relationship. Conditionality would be absent in such a 
situation, since competence would not be ordered in any way at all. The whole point 
of subsidiarity is to prevent concurrence which is happening, or might happen, as 
argued in chapter 2. 
 
As to enrichissement injustifié and negotiorum gestio, the position instated by article 
1301-5 of the Code civil does not infringe the instant principle: the rule clearly prevents 
any state of open concurrence between the two doctrines. That is the central concern 
of subsidiarity. 
 
As to enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti, article 1303-3 governs their 
relations. The position which it produces does not infringe the instant principle, either, 
again because it prevents any overlap between the institutions the interrelation of 
which it exists to manage. 
 
Evans-Jones’ rule would certainly not infringe the instant principle. Though it is hard 
to evaluate it against three of the principles addressed in this part of the chapter, it is 
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certain that the whole point of Evans-Jones’ desired rule is to prevent the concurrent 
application of the general principle and established instances of enrichment liability. 
 
III. RE-ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS 
 





We will first address the interaction of enrichissement injustifié with negotiorum gestio. 
Then, we will turn to enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti. 
 
As to the former relationship, let us first consider articles 1301-5 and 1303-3 of the 
Code civil as provisions which would prevent the concurrence of an open action 
negotiorum gestorum with an action in enrichissement injustifié. The point has been 
made above that their concurrence is formally impossible, because article 1301-5 
preserves the usual application of article 1303-3 to such a situation. It was also 
indicated above that their substantive concurrence is also impossible. Here is why. As 
the Code civil now confirms,41 negotiorum gestio will only operate when the intervenor 
acts out of altruism,42 or, altruistically, and with only partial self-interest.43 These are 
both legal bases for enrichment under enrichissement injustifié, in the presence of 
which such an action will fail for want of injustice.44 This means that there is no need 
                                               
41 Code civil, 1301, 1301-4(1): 1301, 1301-4(1): ‘A person who, without being bound to do so, knowingly 
and usefully manages another’s affairs […]. – A personal interest in the intervener in taking on the 
affairs of another person does not exclude the application of the rules governing management of 
another’s affairs.’ 
42 Barring an action for total self-interest: Civ, 25 June 1919; [1921] S, I, 12; Civ 1re, 28 May 1991, 
pourvoi no 89-20258, Bull civ I, no 167; [1992] RTD civ 96, observations by J Mestre. 
43 Allowing an action in the presence of partial self-interest (ie, intervention in the common interest of 
both the intervenor and the person whose affairs are managed): Req, 20 December 1910 (two arrêts); 
[1911] DP, I, 377, noted by M Planiol; Civ 1re, 12 January 2012, pourvoi no 10-24512, Bull civ I, no 4; 
[2012] D 1592, noted by A Gouëzel; [2012] RTD Civ 115, observations by B Fages. See further F 
Chénedé, ‘La gestion d’affaires intéressée: la réforme du droit des quasi-contrats au secours des 
concubins?’ [2017] D 71. 
44 Code civil, arts 1303-1, 1303-2(1): ‘An enrichment is unjustified where it stems neither from the 
fulfilment of an obligation by the person impoverished nor from his intention to confer a gratuitous 
benefit. – There is no restitution where the impoverishment stems from an act done by the impoverished 
person with a view to his personal benefit.’ Rejecting both negotiorum gestio and an action de in rem 
verso in the presence of sole self-interest: Civ 1re, 5 July 1988 (n 15). Also in favour of the altruism / 
gratuitous intent objection is CP Filios, L’enrichissement sans cause en droit privé français (Bruylant 
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to use subsidiarity to prevent the unwanted intrusion by enrichissement injustifié into 
the proper domain of negotiorum gestio. Where overlap between entities cannot occur, 
no one of them can be subsidiary to another. 
 
Let us next consider article 1301-5 of the Code civil as an exception to the obstacle of 
law bar. The application of article 1301-5 in a claimant’s favour seems most probable 
when the intervenor’s management takes place without the intervener’s full 
knowledge, as where a farmer works the wrong field, which belongs to his or her 
neighbour; or perhaps when the condition that any intervention be useful is unsatisfied, 
as where the neighbouring farmer whose field was worked has already decided to 
leave the land in question fallow.45 Given that unjustified enrichment’s subsidiarity is 
now all but absolute, the exception which concerns us is striking. Though not hostile 
to this development, commentators have not analysed it at length.46 Attempts to 
discover Professor Bénabent’s original motivation for it have failed. Speculation: the 
question is one of policy. After enrichissement injustifié’s independence from 
negotiorum gestio was clarified by the arrêt Boudier,47 the work of authors such as 
Demolombe, discussed in part I(B) of this chapter, does not explain article 1301-5. If 
not justified because the action de in rem verso is an offshoot of negotiorum gestio, it 
is perhaps an admission that the latter is unadapted to modernity.48 So recently 
codified, negotiorum gestio will not be abolished soon. Even so, article 1301-5 may be 
                                               
1999) no 541; approving F Goré, L’enrichissement aux dépens d’autrui (Dalloz 1949) 272. Favouring 
the possibility of concurrence, but failing, in particular, to meet the objection based on altruism’s being 
a justification for enrichments, see N Almosnino, Le caractère subsidiaire de l’action de in rem verso 
(LGDJ 1931) 112-114, 126; citing Cour de Poitiers, 2 December 1907; [1908] DP, II, 332; [1908] RTD 
Civ, observations by R Demogue. But the court (i) held that it did not matter whether, as in the court 
below, the action was treated as one in unjustified enrichment, or was based on an ‘innominate quasi-
contract deriving from a contract for services’ (‘contrat de louage de services’); (ii) did not specifically 
mention negotiorum gestio (as confirmed by Demogue in his observations, since, after acknowledging 
the juridical bases put forward in point (i), he suggests that ‘one might also see a negotiorum gestio in 
the case’); and (iii) only ever conceived that one action could be possible – not that two or more might 
concur on the same facts. The decision cannot, therefore, bear the weight placed upon it. For further 
discussion of the case, see Bout (n 6) no 55. 
45 This could still, of course, enrich the neighbouring farmer (and so satisfy the rules in article 1301-5, 
and 1303), who might be saved work maintaining the fallow field that year, or preparing it for planting 
the next. For the conditions of liability mentioned in each example, see Code civil, art 1301. 
46 See, eg, stating simply that the rule is not a bad thing (‘ne nuit pas’), Chantepie and Latina (n 39) 
658. Similarly accepting, but uncritical, are Deshayes, Genicon and Laithier (n 39) 620. 
47 Req, 15 June 1892; [1892] DP, I, 596; [1893] S, I, 281, noted by J-E Labbé. 
48 See E Descheemaeker, ‘Quasi-contrats et enrichissement injustifié en droit français’ [2013] RTD Civ 
1, 16: ‘the institution should quite simply disappear. […] [It] was born of precise needs of roman society 
with regard to the legal representation of absent persons. The causes of its appearance have long 
disappeared, but their effects remain.’ See further J Kortmann, Altruism in Private Law (OUP 2005) 99-
102. 
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evidence that the legislator recognises the difficulty of proving negotiorum gestio, and 
that, as a matter of policy, it is nevertheless unfair – inéquitable – to deny well-meaning 
claimants a second chance in court. Put simply, the legislator is whittling away 
casuistically at the once steadfast rule of subsidiarity. 
 
We will now examine the interaction of enrichissement injustifié with the condictio 
indebiti. In short, the latter’s ousting the former can sometimes be justified by the 
maxim specialia generalibus derogant. Further, there may be also no need for that 
principle, or subsidiarity, because neither action will exist on a given set of facts. Yet 
further, it is possible that only enrichissement injustifié is at work on a given set of 
facts, similarly removing any need at all for an organising principle. 
 
The unavailability of the action in enrichissement injustifié in the presence of an open 
and barred condictiones indebiti can sometimes be analysed in part as an application 
of the maxim specialia generalibus derogant: the more specific rule derogates from 
the more general rule.49 It is not necessary to claim that the rules which make up 
enrichissement injustifié are truly part of France’s droit commun – rules the application 
of which in a given field is not restrained by more focused ones.50 They probably are 
not, for they do not apply to every instance of a quasi-contrat until derogated from, 
unlike, for example, general rules of contract law,51 or delict.52 Rather, they relate to a 
special kind of quasi-contrat. But this does not matter. 
 
The maxim specialia generalibus derogant can function as between quasi-contrats 
themselves, ie, as between enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti. Rather 
                                               
49 See H Roland and L Boyer, Adages du droit français (4th edn, Litec 1999) no 418. 
50 F Pollaud-Dulian, ‘Du droit spécial au droit commun – et retour’ in N Antaki and others (eds), Aspects 
actuels du droit des affaires – Mélanges en l’honneur de Yves Guyon (Dalloz 2003) 935; C Goldie-
Genicon, ‘Droit commun et droit spécial’ (2013) 7 RD Assas 29, 31. 
51 The Code civil, art 1105, provides: ‘Whether or not they have their own denomination, contracts are 
subject to general rules, which are the subject of this sub-title. Rules particular to certain contracts are 
laid down in the provisions special to each of these contracts. The general rules are applied subject to 
these particular rules.’ F Chénedé, ‘Interprétation et amélioration du nouveau droit des contrats’ [2017] 
D 2214, no 5. In favour of this provision, see N Balat, ‘Réforme du droit des contrats: et les conflits entre 
droit commun et droit spécial?’ [2015] D 699. 
52 Code civil, art 1240, provides (emphasis added): ‘Any human action whatsoever which causes harm 
to another creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it occurred to make reparation for it.’ For 
the censure of a lower court for failure to apply this provision (ex art 1382) in the absence of a special 
regime, see Civ 1re, 11 January 2005, pourvoi no 02-19016, Bull civ I, no 13; [2005] RTD Civ 375, 
observations by J Hauser. 
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than requiring the existence of at least one set of rules which are genuinely part of the 
droit commun, the maxim operates simply where some rules are more special than 
others, and if one set of (more special) rules’ field of application is covered by that of 
a more general set;53 and it may apply to suggest that a more specific regime would 
be rendered ineffective were it beset by the more general one.54 In our case, it can 
apply to suggest that the more specific requirements of the condictio indebiti cannot 
be stultified by recourse to enrichissement injustifié. Since both institutions are 
constituted in regimes of special rules, they are to be interpreted strictly to ensure that 
they stay within proper bounds.55 
 
There is considerable doubt over precisely when the condictio indebiti and 
enrichissement injustifié could overlap if unrestrained. It is not possible to address the 
details. French law is yet to work them out for itself. They primarily concern the 
interaction of the condictio indebiti with property and delict, and the question whether 
the condictio really covers matters which belong elsewhere.56 However, we can 
exercise caution in the light of them, and confine ourselves to demonstrating the 
explanatory potential of specialia generalibus derogant with an uncontroversial 
example of potential overlap between the condictio indebiti and enrichissement 
injustifié. 
 
The clearest instances of this are when money or the value of services are received, 
in good faith, without their being owed. The Code civil’s headline provision on 
enrichissement injustifié, article 1303, easily encompasses such cases. So do the 
rules of the condictio indebiti, in articles 1302, 1302-1, 1302-2, first sentence, 1302-3, 
first sentence, referring to remedies provisions in article 1352ff, the most relevant 
being articles 1352-6, -7, and -8. Of note for our purposes is that the conditions of 
                                               
53 For the censure of lower courts for failure to apply the ‘more special’ among concurrently applicable 
special rules, see Civ 3e, 26 January 2017, pourvoi no 15-27580, Bull civ III, forthcoming; Com, 8 
February 2017, pourvoi no 15-23050, Bull civ IV, forthcoming; [2017] RTD Civ 372, observations on 
both decisions by H Barbier. 
54 Clarifying that the maxim does not always apply systematically to exclude more general rules, and 
that stultification is a reason why it might, N Balat, Essai sur le droit commun (LGDJ 2016) nos 158-178 
esp nos 162, 168, 169, 177. 
55 Req, 26 July 1928; [1929] S, I, 70; Civ, 30 June 1971; [1971] D 477: ‘dérogatoire du droit commun 
en la matière, ladite disposition doit être interprétée restrictivement et ne saurait trouver application en 
dehors du cas visé’. 
56 Descheemaeker (n 48) 16-21; E Descheemaeker, ‘The New French Law of Unjustified Enrichment’ 
[2017] RLR 77, 18-23. 
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liability under the condictio indebiti and enrichissement injustifié will sometimes differ. 
A key question is when a mistake is required under the former doctrine, and we will 
use this to clarify the potential of specialia generalibus derogant, or indeed the 
necessity of any mechanism, in analysing the relationship between the condictio 
indebiti and enrichissement injustifié. 
 
The condictio indebiti can arise in three sets of circumstances. In what follows, it 
should be assumed that benefits are money or the value of services, and that these 
are always received in good faith. First, a non-debtor solvens may confer a benefit 
upon a non-creditor accipiens: no debt exists at all. This scenario is covered by article 
1302 of the Code civil, the first limb of which provides: 
 
‘Every payment presupposes a debt; something which is received without 
being due is subject to restitution.’ 
 
No mistake by the party impoverished is required in this scenario.57 Referred to as 
indu objectif, because the problem is with the existence of the debt rather than the 
persons impoverished or enriched (indu subjectif),58 an action will fail if there is 
donative intent on the part of the claimant solvens.59 This kind of condictio indebiti 
cannot overlap with enrichissement injustifié, because neither exists if no debt exists. 
If the benefit were due, neither doctrine would apply on a set of facts, and neither 
specialia generalibus derogant – nor subsidiarity – would be needed. 
 
Secondly, a debtor solvens may confer a benefit upon a non-creditor accipiens: the 
wrong person is enriched in respect of a debt owed to somebody else. This scenario 
is covered by article 1302-1 of the Code civil, which states: 
 
‘A person who receives by mistake or knowingly something which is not 
owed to him must restore it to the person from whom he unduly received it.’ 
                                               
57 Ass plén, 2 April 1993, pourvoi no 89-15490, Bull ass plén, no 9; [1993] D jur 373, conclusions by M 
Jeol AG; [1993] RTD Civ 820, observations by J Mestre; [1994] D 14, observations by J-L Aubert; Civ 
1re, 20 January 1998, pourvoi no 96-11176, Bull civ I, no 18; [1998] D 500, noted by DR Martin. 
58 For both expressions, and an example of indu objectif in the form of a double payment, see Civ 1re, 
16 May 2006, pourvoi no 05-12972, Bull civ I, no 218. 
59 Soc, 5 April 2005, pourvoi no 02-45784. 
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This provision refers to the irrelevance of mistake and knowledge in relation to the 
accipiens, the party enriched. There will often be a mistake by the solvens, the party 
impoverished, on the facts.60 But the Code civil is silent on the question whether this 
is actually a requirement in the scenario under consideration. The courts have not 
decided the point definitively, either.61 And the question divides academic opinion.62 If 
a mistake is required here, then specialia generalibus derogant may apply to explain 
the denial of enrichissement injustifié where the condictio is both open and barred. In 
either eventuality, its special condition would be stultified if it would be circumvented. 
 
Thirdly, a non-debtor solvens may confer a benefit upon a genuine creditor accipiens. 
In other words, a person may pay another’s debt. This scenario is covered by article 
1302-2 of the Code civil, which provides: 
 
‘A person who by mistake or under constraint has discharged another 
person’s debt can sue the creditor for restitution. However, this right ceases 
in the situation where the creditor, as a result of payment, has cancelled his 
instrument of title or has released any security guaranteeing the right 
arising from the obligation. 
 
                                               
60 See, eg, Com, 23 June 1987, pourvoi no 86-12820; CA Chambéry, 18 January 2018, RG no 17/00520; 
CA Fort-de-France, 15 May 2018, RG no 17/00236. 
61 See, CA Angers, 18 October 2011, RG no 10/02582. During a lengthy preliminary description of the 
differences between indu subjectif and indu objectif, the court appeared to assume that mistake by the 
solvens is required where a genuine debtor pays the wrong person (a non-creditor). However, this is 
an apparently isolated lower court decision, and, though there happened to be a mistake on the facts, 
the court correctly reasoned on the basis of indu objectif. It does not provide a definite answer to our 
question. 
62 Textual analysis suggests that mistake is not required: Fabre-Magnan (n 7) 493; P Rémy, ‘Des autres 
sources d’obligations’ in F Terré (ed), Pour une réforme du régime général des obligations (Dalloz 2013) 
38-39; P Malinvaud, D Fenouillet and M Mekki, Droit des obligations (14th edn, Lexis Nexis 2017) 751-
752. In addition, it is unclear why a non-creditor defendant should be protected by a mistake 
requirement in the same way as a creditor defendant: Bénabent (n 12) no 467, cross-referring to no 
465. However, others accept a mistake requirement: F Terré, P Simler and Y Lequette, Droit civil: Les 
obligations (11th edn, Dalloz 2013) no 1055; citing J Flour, J-L Aubert and E Savaux, Les obligations, 
II: Le fait juridique (14th edn, Sirey 2011) no 26. Favouring mistake where a debtor solvens enriches a 
non-creditor accipiens, the latter authors argue unconvincingly that the solvens owes something to 
somebody, so should be made to prove that it has made a mistake to discount donative intent, or 
intention to manage another’s affairs. This is not self-evident: F Terré et al and F Chénedé, Droit civil: 
Les obligations (12th edn, Dalloz 2018) no 1219. A mistake requirement is hard to accept. Where the 
accipiens is not a creditor, either of the solvens or a third party on whose behalf payment is made, there 
should simply be a requirement of no donative intent in the solvens. 
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Restitution may also be claimed from a person whose debt has been 
discharged by mistake.’ 
 
This provision explicitly requires a mistake by the solvens. Cases confirm this, and 
further accept the possibility of an action where the solvens is forced to pay the 
accipiens.63 Article 1302-2 covers two kinds of action. The first lies against the creditor 
of the person whose debt has been paid.64 In such a case, specialia generalibus 
derogant may apply. If the simple absence of donative intent or self interest were 
required, the maxim would be redundant, because the condictio’s conditions of liability 
would then match those of enrichissement injustifié and each action would fail.65 But 
as things are, it might be argued that it should not be possible to mitigate an inability 
to prove a mistake by recourse to the more general enrichment action. 
 
Article 1302-2 also provides an action against the proper debtor whose debt has been 
paid. Previous doubt about whether this action was based properly on enrichissement 
sans cause,66 negotiorum gestio,67 or the condictio indebiti,68 may now have been 
resolved,69 in favour of the latter.70 The rule about recourse against the proper debtor 
is located with the others on paiement de l’indu, and the specific reference, in the 
second limb of article 1302-2 to restitution, indicates the application of the common 
restitutionary regime to which the other variations of the condictio are also subject.71 
In reality, however, it is hard to see how this can really be anything other than a poorly 
                                               
63 Com, 5 May 2004, pourvoi no 02-18066, Bull civ IV, no 85; [2004] Cont conc consomm nos 8-9, August, 
comm 123, commentary by L Leveneur, quashing the court below for failing to assess whether there 
had been error or duress. 
64 See further W Dross, ‘L’article 1377 du Code civil a-t-il encore un avenir à la Cour de cassation?’ in 
O Cachard and X Henry (eds), Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Gilles Goubeaux (Dalloz/LGDJ 
2009). 
65 For an example, where donative intent discounted both, see CA Aix-en-Provence, 14 June 2016, RG 
no 15/05761. 
66 Civ 1re, 4 April 2001, pourvoi no 98-13285, Bull civ I, no 105; [2001] Defrénois 721, observations by 
J-L Aubert; [2001] D 1824, observations by M Billiau; [2002] LPA 2 April no 66, 9, noted by A Gosselin-
Gorand; [2002] JCP G, I, 134, no 18, observations by A-S Barthez; Civ 3e, 2 April 2008, pourvoi no 07-
10101, Bull civ III, no 64. 
67 Civ 1re, 12 January 2012 (n 43). 
68 Civ 1re, 13 October 1998, pourvoi no 96-22515, Bull civ I, no 299; [1999] D 116, noted by L Aynès; 
Soc, 20 December 2001, pourvoi no 99-21671, Bull civ V, no 395. 
69 For approval, see V Perruchot-Triboulet, ‘L’indu à trois’ [2003] RTD Civ 427, 439-446 esp 444. 
70 Doubtful, however, is Chénedé, Le nouveau droit des obligations (n 39) [133.52]; though not engaging 
with Perruchot-Triboulet (n 69). 
71 The Code civil, art 1302-3 provides: ‘Restitution is subject to the rules set by articles 1352 to 1352-
9.’ 
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placed action in enrichissement injustifié: the proper debtor is never paid anything. 
There is no need for specialia generalibus derogant, or subsidiarity, in this situation. 
 
To sum up, where the condictio indebiti and enrichissement injustifié are capable of 
overlapping, the primacy of the former can be explained with the maxim specialia 
generalibus derogant. Where the doctrines do not overlap, for whatever reason, there 




Turning to the Scots material, it is difficult to tell whether Evans-Jones’ is an avowedly 
desired position, or whether he believes that it represents the current law. Having seen 
above, in part II(B), that regardless, subsidiarity cannot explain what he believes is or 
should be happening, we will proceed in two steps. First, it will be shown that Evans-
Jones’ view does not reflect the current law. Secondly, we will ask whether the 
adoption of his underlying view, shorn of its subsidiarity baggage, would improve on 
the present position. 
 
As mentioned in part I(A), above, the Scottish courts do not appear directly to have 
addressed the point with which this chapter is centrally concerned. But it is possible to 
sketch their attitude to the interaction of usual situations of unjustified enrichment with 
liability on a more general basis. The picture is different to Evans-Jones’ account.  
 
In the first place, the courts have repeatedly clarified that there exist recognised fact 
situations in which an enrichment will normally be found to be unjustified. Thus, Lord 
Hope said that a claim for repetition ‘may be based upon the condictio causa data 
causa non secuta, the condictio sine causa or the condictio indebiti, depending upon 
which of these grounds of action fits the circumstances which give rise to the claim’.72 
The Inner House later recognised that the existing law will often be determinative of 
                                               
72 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian RC 1995 SC 151 (IH) 155 (Lord Mayfield and Lord 
Kirkwood concurring). 
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enrichment claims.73 And in Shilliday v Smith,74 Lord Rodger mentioned the 
identification of ‘various situations where persons are to be regarded as having been 
unjustly enriched at another’s expense’, falling into ‘into recognisable groups or 
categories’, which may assist in determining whether there is a relevant case. Their 
Lordships would not likely have mentioned these ‘grounds of action’,75 ‘various 
situations’, or ‘recognisable groups’, if they were valueless and could be ignored. For 
Lord Rodger, ‘[a] pursuer whose case falls into’ a recognised category ‘has a ground 
of action under our law’.76 More generally, it is certain, for example, that if a pursuer 
invokes the condictio indebiti, a liability mistake must be proved.77 Nevertheless, it is 
important to notice that there is no mention of disastrous consequences if a relevant 
ground of action is not invoked or does not apply. 
 
In the second place, other authorities clearly support the view (suggested by its 
omission from the cases just mentioned) that failure in an established category will not 
preclude success on a more general footing. In Thomson v Mooney,78 for example, 
the Inner House simply took generalised pleadings and analysed them for itself as a 
condictio causa data causa non secuta. The action did not fail simply because it was 
not pre-formulated, and no criticism was levelled. In the Outer House, it has been said 
that ‘it may not be necessary to ascribe the claim to one of the traditional categories’ 
of enrichment liability, as long as the pursuer pleads on ‘some identifiable basis’;79 and 
that judges are ‘no longer required to shoehorn the facts into a particular style of 
Roman sandal before the remedy could be made to fit’.80 Lord Hodge captured this 
second strand of judicial thought in 2010. To an argument that there was, on the facts 
                                               
73 Fife Scottish Omnibus v Tay Bridge Joint Board unreported 12 June 1997 (IH, Ex Div), 1997 GWD 
23-1180, [1997] Lexis Citation 582, page 13 of transcript (Lord Prosser, with whom Lord Cameron 
generally agreed, page 5). 
74 1998 SC 725 (IH) 727-728 (Lord Kirkwood and Lord Caplan concurring). 
75 After Lord Hope in Morgan Guaranty, Lord Rodger and Lord Caplan also mentioned the phrase 
‘grounds of action’ in Shilliday, ibid, 728, 731, 734. 
76 ibid, 728 (Lord Kirkwood and Lord Caplan concurring). 
77 Morgan Guaranty (n 72) 155 (‘the condictio indebiti is available for the recovery of money paid or 
property transferred under an obligation which is void but was erroneously thought to be valid’), 165-
166 (the Lord President [Hope], with whom Lord Mayfield and Lord Kirkwood agreed). See also ibid, 
168 (Lord Clyde): ‘considerations of error arise because an ingredient of the claims of this kind is that 
the payment should have been made in the mistaken belief that it was due’. 
78 [2013] CSIH 115, 2014 Fam LR 15 [7] (Lord Eassie, Lord Bracadale, and Lord Wheatley): ‘In our 
view it is clear that the claim which the pursuer advances is an example of a well recognised category 
of unjustified enrichment, commonly described by reference to the Roman law term condictio causa 
data causa non secuta.’ 
79 Lyon and Turnbull Ltd v Sabine [2012] CSOH 178 [24] (Lord Brodie). 
80 Esposito v Barile 2011 Fam LR 67 (Sh Ct, Tayside) [17] (Sheriff Way). 
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before him, ‘a cause of action in the form of’ a condictio causa data causa non secuta, 
his Lordship responded that he ‘would not […] state the submission in those terms’. 
He acknowledged that established categories (in the case before him, condictiones) 
may be useful in indicating circumstances in which an enrichment will be unjustified. 
But he noted that, fundamentally, the question is whether a person has been 
unjustifiably enriched at another’s expense. Precisely matching facts with Roman 
condictiones would be ‘unnecessarily rigid’ in view of Scotland’s ‘unitary principle of 
unjustified enrichment’.81 
 
How to summarise these two lines of authority? At the highest level in Scotland, there 
is at most an inclination towards the view that pursuers should seek to bring their cases 
within one of the recognised fact patterns of enrichment liability if possible. But an 
inability to do this will not of itself dash all hopes of victory in unjustified enrichment. 
The preference is not a rule. 
 
This is more subtle than Evans-Jones’ view, which cannot represent the current law. 
The relationship between what Lord Hodge called the ‘unitary principle of unjustified 
enrichment’,82 and established fact patterns, is more refined than one in which the 
latter are an all or nothing option, or one in which the former is a fallback and the latter 
are a mandatory first port of call. The following nuanced observations are instructive:83 
 
‘[I]t would perhaps be reading too much into the judgment [in Shilliday] to 
speak of a general action which is subsidiary to the discrete condictiones 
as a fail-safe catch-all. Rather one should say that the judgment seeks to 
create a context in which both established and new grounds of action can, 




                                               
81 Mactaggart & Mickel Ltd v Hunter [2010] CSOH 130, 2010 GWD 33-683 [98]-[99]. 
82 See also his Lordship’s later reference to ‘the generalisation of the obligation to reverse unjustified 
enrichment’ in Robertson Construction Central Ltd v Glasgow Metro LLP [2009] CSOH 71, 2009 GWD 
19-304 [18]. 
83 Visser and Purchase (n 34) 267. 
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This passage is useful, also:84 
 
‘[In Shilliday,] Lord Rodger […] did not regard the condictiones as 
autonomous ‘actions’ but rather as ‘grounds of action’ to reverse unjustified 
enrichment. He made no reference to a residual general enrichment action 
and therefore he could not consider whether such an action is or should be 
subsidiary. However, in Lord Rodger’s characteri[s]ation of the condictiones 
as grounds of action it is at least implicit that where a situation is covered 
by an existing ground of action, the limitations on that ground cannot easily 
be circumvented by invoking the general enrichment principle.’ 
 
It is not disputed that the condictiones, for example, are causes of action,85 in the 
sense that they shortly express ensembles of facts which, if proved, entitle the pursuer 
to a remedy for unjustified enrichment.86 But this does not entail that they 
systematically dominate the more general principle against unjustified enrichment. For 
in Scots law, unjustified enrichment simpliciter is clearly an obligation-creating event,87 
of which transfer (subdividing into the condictiones), imposition (dividing according to 
the kind of benefit imposed), and interference are different (and, in themselves, 
obligation-creating) mutations.88 
                                               
84 N Whitty and D Visser, ‘Unjustified Enrichment’ in R Zimmermann, K Reid and D Visser (eds), Mixed 
Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa 
(OUP 2004) 405. Writing solo, Whitty’s view appears subsequently to have hardened, but his 
contribution with Visser tacks closer to authority. See N Whitty, ‘Transco Plc v Glasgow City Council: 
Developing Enrichment Law after Shilliday’ (2006) 10 Edinburgh L Rev 113, 126 (emphasis added): 
‘Under the new [post-enrichment-revolution] law this particular type of subsidiarity [between enrichment 
claims] has presumably taken on a new form. For so long as our enrichment law retains some specific 
grounds of action (for instance the condictiones) existing alongside a residual general ground, it is likely 
that the courts will not allow the specific grounds to be evaded by recourse to the residual general 
ground.’ 
85 ‘A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain 
from the court a remedy against another person’: Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 (CA) 242-243 
(Diplock LJ); approved for Scotland in Smith v Sabre Insurance Co Ltd [2013] CSIH 28, 2013 SC 569 
[39] (Lord Brodie, with whom Lady Paton and Lord Philip agreed). 
86 For confirmation that Evans-Jones sees the recognised instances in this way, see Evans-Jones, ‘Lord 
Rodger and Unjustified Enrichment’ (n 26) 443, 444-445; where an abridged version is found of Evans-
Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 27) [1.51]-[1.52], [3.35]. 
87 Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90, 98 (Lord Hope, with whom 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Jauncey, Lord Nolan, and Lord Hoffmann agreed): ‘In general terms it 
may be said that [a] remedy is available where the enrichment lacks a legal ground to justify the 
retention of the benefit.’ On this sentence, see also P Hellwege, ‘Rationalising the Scottish Law of 
Unjustified Enrichment’ (2000) 11 Stellenbosch L Rev 50, 63 in fine. 
88 See, eg, HL MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland (14th edn, 
W Green 2017) [24.18]: the terms used to refer to the condictiones ‘are not straitjackets and should be 
understood in their modern or Scots law rather than their Roman guise; they merely serve to distinguish 
 - 246 - 
 
Having established that Evans-Jones’ view does not represent the current law, we turn 
to the question whether it should be impossible to reason on the basis of the general 
principle against unjustified enrichment unless no established pattern of recovery will 
avail the claimant. 
 
Scots law is close to the point envisaged by Evans-Jones. But his position should not 
be adopted. Currently, Scots law balances structure with flexibility. Structure is 
provided, both by the established instances of unjustified enrichment, covering well 
known fact patterns, and the general principle, marking the frontier of enrichment 
liability. Without Evans-Jones’ brightline rule, categories and principle already 
combine to consolidate and clarify.89 Clarity increases predictability and decreases 
uncertainty.90 The general principle further provides bounded flexibility,91 in the sense 
of built-in potential for change according to ordinary methods of judicial reasoning, 
                                               
various situations in which an enrichment remedy may be available, and it may be that some cases 
could be classified under more than one heading’. See also M Hogg, Obligations (2nd edn, Avizandum 
2006) [4.17]. 
89 For the importance of which, see, eg, Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v Laughton [1983] 2 AC 
570 (HL) 612 (Lord Diplock, with whom Lord Edmund Davies, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Brandon of 
Oakbrook, and Lord Brightman agreed): ‘[a]bsence of clarity is destructive of the rule of law’. For the 
view that clarity is at the base of rule of law compliance, see P Burgess, ‘The Rule of Law: Beyond 
Contestedness’ (2017) 8 Jurisprudence 480.  
90 For the importance of both generally, see N MacCormick, ‘The Rule of Law and the Arguable 
Character of Law’, in his Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (OUP 2005) 11, 15-16; J Waldron, 
‘Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law’ [2011] Brit Acad Rev 1; and, in the (albeit English) unjust 
enrichment context, HM Revenue and Customs v Investment Trust Companies [2017] UKSC 29, [2018] 
AC 275 [39]-[41] esp [41] (Lord Reed, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Carnwath and 
Lord Hodge agreed). 
91 The most basic effect of this, underneath which many refinements of the general requirements of 
liability (enrichment of the defender, at the pursuer’s expense, without justification, subject to equity or 
defences) have taken place, is that there is no discretion to decide cases as ‘a matter of mere ad hoc 
discretion’: Fife Scottish Omnibus (n 73) page 13 of transcript (Lord Prosser, with whom Lord Cameron 
generally agreed, page 5); Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (HL) 
237 (Lord Clyde). This has been forgotten by some: MacKays Stores Ltd v Toward Ltd [2008] CSOH 
51 [28] (Lord Drummond Young); Advocate General for Scotland v John Gunn and Sons Ltd [2018] 
CSOH 39 [62] (Lord Uist). 
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usually incremental.92 This prevents ossification, and permits the Scottish common 
law to evolve, and respond to novelties.93 
 
If Evans-Jones’ brightline rule were introduced, enrichment pursuers could only ever 
proceed from the specific to the general, rather than pass freely between principle and 
categories. It might be thought that this would increase the predictability and certainty 
of Scots enrichment law, Evans-Jones’ motivation for his view. Normally, when 
prescriptions are more precise than vague, legal certainty improves. The contrary 
perhaps starts to become true, and a mix of general standards with specific ones more 
certain, only with regard to very complex, evolving social phenomena, involving high 
economic stakes (such as nationwide systems of old age care), which are less 
susceptible to detailed regulation.94 However, in neither the short nor the long term 
would Evans-Jones’ model increase legal certainty. He does not propose that 
pursuers should have to sue on an established cause of action, then be sent home if 
this fails, unable thereafter to invoke the general principle against unjustified 
enrichment. Rather, he simply wants pursuers to have to sue in a recognised category, 
before invoking the general principle. So on both the current and proposed models, 
and however much time passes, the outer limit will always be the same. The final 
frontier will simply be whatever are the farthest reaches of the general enrichment 
principle. Since certainty is the only reason Evans-Jones gives for his position, one 
might expect him to propose a model which would improve the current law in those 
terms. 
 
Evans-Jones’ preferred position would also worsen Scots enrichment law. Consider 
the short term first. In the first place, and since no proposal of codification is made, it 
is to be assumed that judicial development is envisaged. Suppose this were to happen 
                                               
92 In Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd [2003] ZASCA 30, [2003] 2 All SA 167 [30], in the context of delict, 
Howie P (with whom Marais, Conradie, and Cloete JJA, and Jones AJA agreed) said the following about 
the common law’s flexibility. It seems relevant. ‘Mention is sometimes made of the common law as 
having the flexibility which allows sound incremental development as society’s circumstances change. 
[…] The emphasis must be on incremental development, however. Flexibility does not necessarily entail 
the abolition of a long-standing requirement of principle or, on the other hand, the creation of what 
would, in effect, be an entirely new delict.’ 
93 Rules for change are necessary, and do not imply rule of law non-compliance, provided the law 
remains capable of guiding human behaviour: T Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 
19 OJLS 1, 8-9. 
94 J Braithwaite, ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27 Aust J Leg Phil 47, passim 
but esp 50-63, 65, 71, 75 (for abstract propositions and conclusions). 
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tomorrow. Evans-Jones might not go so far as to say that it would require the 
acceptance of his entire proposed taxonomy of unjustified enrichment, which he 
concedes remains academic.95 But at the very least, it would involve upsetting the 
considerable body of authority, presented above, on the current interrelation of the 
categories of enrichment liability and the general principle. At a stroke, without any 
indication of what was coming,96 we would pass from fluidity to rigidity, even though, 
more generally, ‘[i]t can hardly be doubted that the law is still in the course of 
development’.97 The prospect of such a jarring change should give pause. For it goes 
against established judicial methods,98 and is perhaps not predictable enough relative 
to its scale.99 
 
We turn, secondly, to the long term. Recall, in the first place, that, on Evans-Jones’ 
model, we would always have the same relative outer limit on enrichment liability at 
any given point in time: the boundary of the general principle and its conceptual 
content, such as the notion of enrichment. In return for zero substantive improvement 
in legal certainty, it is possible that the cost of enrichment litigation would rise. The 
relevance of both general and specific bases of liability to sets of facts would probably 
have to be meticulously pleaded more often than under the current regime. Time and 
money spent might both increase. 
 
                                               
95 Evans-Jones, Enrichment in Any Other Manner (n 27) [1.52], and, for a summary of his taxonomy, 
[2.02], with accompanying diagram. It might be said that, following Shilliday (n 74), the category of 
enrichment by transfer, subdividing into the condictiones, is quite safe. But judicial approval of whether 
and how other cases are to be taxonomised is still to come. 
96 Unlike in South Africa, following suggestions about its similar potential change of step in McCarthy 
Retail (n 34) 487-489 (Olivier and Cameron JJA concurring); as discussed in, eg, Afrisure CC v Watson 
NO [2008] ZASCA 89, 2009 (2) SA 127 [4] (Brand JA, with whom Mpati P, Lewis JA, Combrinck JA and 
Boruchowitz AJA agreed). 
97 Stork Technical Services (RBG) Ltd v Ross’s Executor [2015] CSOH 10A, 2015 SLT 160 [34] (Lord 
Tyre); cited with approval by Lord Woolman in Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Patersons of Greenoakhill 
Ltd [2015] CSOH 137, 2015 GWD 34-548 [29], who said that ‘[t]he precise contours of unjustified 
enrichment remain to be mapped’. 
98 A Rodger, ‘Thinking about Scots Law’ (1996) 1 Edinburgh L Rev 3, 11: ‘Scots law has long been built 
by the working-out of doctrine in our case-law and that this is what gives strength to any statements of 
principle which may from time to time emerge.’ For accord, but recalling that ‘if there is no obvious 
answer in the case law or in statute, the Scots courts will readily seek out principle’, E Reid, ‘Scotland’ 
in V Palmer (ed), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide (2nd edn, CUP 2012) 240-246 esp 245-246. 
99 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ [2007] CLJ 67, 69, 71: ‘First, the law must be accessible and so far 
as possible intelligible, clear and predictable. […] [W]ithout challenging the value or legitimacy of judicial 
development of the law, the sub-rule under consideration does […] preclude excessive innovation and 
adventurism by the judges. It is one thing to alter the law’s direction of travel by a few degrees, quite 
another to set it off in a different direction. The one is probably foreseeable and predictable […] the 
other not.’ See also Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2010) 37, 45-46. 
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Conversely, the quality of the law could decrease. In the first place, take the brightline 
procedure of asking whether an established action applies, failing which the general 
principle may be invoked. This could mean that recognised causes of action, which 
could usefully be extended to cover new problems,100 would remain undeveloped. It 
might be easier to let them fall into desuetude than continue to hammer them out on 
the anvil of new facts. This could produce the uneven treatment of cases without 
normatively attractive distinctions. So, an established category, containing an 
additional condition of liability, might catch a set of facts due to the kind of benefit 
received by the defender, when a different benefit would be addressed more generally, 
without the extra condition.101 It could also lead to an unintentional burgeoning of 
generalised liability. In turn, this might have the opposite effect on legal certainty which 
Evans-Jones desires. 
 
In the second place, the level of depth at which unjustified enrichment disputes are 
argued might decrease. The multiplication of legal issues might not go hand in hand 
with an increase in economic stakes for the parties to cases argued in the courts. They 
may be unwilling or unable to pay whatever is required for full treatment of every point. 
And in any event, pleaders might not be allowed to place enough authorities before 
the courts to do this.102 
 






                                               
100 As where it was unanimously confirmed, after lengthy consideration, that an error of law may satisfy 
the error requirement of the condictio indebiti: Morgan Guaranty (n 72) 164-165 (the Lord President 
[Hope], with whom Lord Mayfield and Lord Kirkwood agreed), 171-172 (Lord Clyde), 174-175 (Lord 
Cullen). For other authority on developing established claims, see also First National Bank of Southern 
Africa Ltd v Perry NO 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA) [28] (Schutz JA, with whom Hefer ACJ, Zulman JA, and 
Brand and Nugent AJJA agreed), and the cases cited. 
101 J du Plessis, The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (Juta 2012) 6-8. 
102 See, eg, ‘Court of Session Practice Note No 1 of 2017: Commercial Actions’ [30](b): no more than 
ten authorities in joint bundle without the court’s permission. For (extra-)judicial endorsement of this 
rule in cavalier tone, see Lord Carloway, ‘How to Win Your Case – What the Court Expects from 
Advocates’ Advocacy: International Women’s Day at the Faculty of Advocates (8 March 2018) 
<http://www.advocates.org.uk/media/2727/iwd18carloway.pdf> 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The first part of this chapter surveys English, French and Scots law for claims that 
subsidiarity is capable of explaining the interaction of different kinds of enrichment-
based and, in France’s case, quasi-contractual, liability. English law was left aside. 
There was much material to discuss in French law and scholarship. And one prominent 
Scots writer has contributed relevant material. 
 
Part two of this chapter concludes that the material which supports subsidiarity’s 
usefulness in the context in question is pro tanto incorrect. As to French material, 
claims relating to enrichissement injustifié and negotiorum gestio infringe the second 
and third principles of subsidiarity developed earlier in this study, and partially infringe 
the fourth and fifth (in respect of open actions negotiorum gestorum). Claims relating 
to enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti infringe the first through fifth 
principles. Evans-Jones’ account of the Scots position infringes the second principle. 
 
Part three of this chapter re-analyses the sources. As to French law, it is suggested 
that the concurrence on the same set of facts of an action negotiorum gestorum and 
an action in enrichissement injusitifé is not possible. No organising mechanism is 
needed at all. It was further suggested that the exception to the obstacle of law bar in 
article 1301-5 of the Code civil is based on policy, and recognises the difficulty of 
establishing the conditions of liability in negotiorum gestio. Turning to enrichissement 
injustifié and the condictio indebiti, it seems that where the doctrines are indeed 
capable of overlapping, the latter’s primacy is explicable on the basis of the maxim 
specialia generalibus derogant. Finally, an examination of Evans-Jones’ position 
leaves no doubt that it would represent a marked regression from the point at which 
Scots law now stands. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this brief concluding chapter, the overall findings of this study are summarised. 
Some suggestions on what the foregoing can offer comparative legal scholars are 
made, before speculation on the prospects for the subsidiarity of unjust enrichment in 




This study first laid foundations, by briefly outlining basic features of English, French, 
and Scots law, necessary to an understanding of its examination of the subsidiarity of 
unjust enrichment (chapter 1). Six principles of subsidiarity were then derived from a 
linguistic and contextual perspective (chapter 2), and the status of, and reasons for, 
subsidiarity in the law and scholarship of unjust enrichment were outlined (chapter 3). 
 
Turning from the general to the specific, this study attempted to show, first, that none 
of the material which it surveys correctly claims that unjust enrichment is subsidiary to 
statute, property, contract, tort or delict (chapters 4-7). Secondly, it has been argued 
that the obstacle of fact permission in French law cannot be about subsidiarity, either 
(chapter 8). Thirdly, claims that subsidiarity correctly describes any of unjust 
enrichment’s internal workings were similarly criticised (chapter 9). 
 
Having dispatched subsidiarity, analyses to replace it were suggested. The 
relationship between unjust enrichment and statute, and unjust enrichment and 
contract, can certainly be best explained via the requirement that an enrichment be 
unjust: inconsistent statutes and contracts render enrichments which they cover just, 
with the result that there is no unjust enrichment on the field of play (chapters 4 and 
6). 
 
As to unjust enrichment and property (see chapter 5), it was suggested that the current 
state of the English authorities (taken at face value, rather than debated) can be 
explained without subsidiarity, adopting the view that title justifies enrichments. There 
is less debate about French law’s commitment to the underlying legal rules, and so 
this explanation was more straightforwardly suggested for them. And whilst Scottish 
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legal discourse contains no significant claims that unjustified enrichment is subsidiary 
to property, the authorities were examined, and it was found that the same analysis is 
suitable for them, too. 
 
As to the French law of unjustified enrichment and delict, it was suggested that there 
is simply no relevant interaction to explain, since the two institutions are incapable of 
overlap in a manner to which adherents of subsidiarity object (chapter 7). And the body 
of law and doctrine about the French obstacle of fact permission in fact gives 
exaggerated importance to a set of quite unremarkable situations of unjustified 
enrichment which, as ever, simply require careful analysis (chapter 8). 
 
Turning, lastly, to relations between different kinds of enrichment claim (see chapter 
9), France’s doctrine of negotiorum gestio and action en enrichissement injustifié 
cannot overlap, and so, in common with relations between France’s law of delict and 
unjustified enrichment, they do not interact in a manner with which this study concerns 
itself. And to the extent that they can overlap, the primacy of France’s condictio indebiti 
over enrichissement injustifié can be explained with the maxim specialia generalibus 
derogant. As to Evans-Jones’ account that Scotland’s general enrichment principle is 
subsidiary to other kinds of enrichment claim, this was found not to represent the law. 
This is positive, since, if correct, it would not improve legal certainty – the only reason 
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II. COMPARISON 
 
The value of comparative approaches to unjust enrichment was recognised at the 
outset of this study.1 But we should not forget Robert Stevens’ warning that 
‘[c]omparative law is a dangerous business’:2 
 
‘Comparison of narrow legal rules may mislead unless done in context as 
apparent inconsistencies may be explicable by more fundamental structural 
difficulties. Harmonisation of individual rules may increase rather than 
remove the dissonance between different systems and runs the risk of 
creating incoherence within individual systems.’ 
 
Despite having encountered no such complex problems, we are left with a case study 
in the potential unhelpfulness of comparative material, unless it is digested and 
employed with care.3 
 
As shown in part I(B) of chapter 3, in building their account of the subsidiarity of unjust 
enrichment, Grantham and Rickett make extensive use of comparative scholarship. 
The puzzle is how the forceful criticism of subsidiarity in that material went 
unaddressed, and appears not even to have given pause for thought. In turn, 
Grantham and Rickett’s account influenced the acceptance of subsidiarity by Rohan 
Havelock and Graham Virgo. So it forms part of, and has contributed to, an 
unfortunately substantial foothold for subsidiarity in English enrichment scholarship. 
 
Turning to the Scottish material, scholarly engagement with the comparatists has been 
quite detailed, as seen especially in Hector MacQueen and Niall Whitty’s work 
(summarised in part III(B) of chapter 3, a fuller account of some of both authors’ output 
being given in part I(C) of chapter 6). This is perhaps due to a more general 
                                               
1 See also, eg, HLE Verhagen, ‘The Policies against Leapfrogging in Unjust Enrichment: A Critical 
Assessment’ (2018) 22 Edinburgh L Rev 55, 56: ‘In past decades the comparative approach has proven 
to be extremely fruitful for unjust enrichment’. 
2 A Burrows and others, ‘The New Birksian Approach to Unjust Enrichment’ [2004] RLR 260, 270. For 
recent expression of similar sentiments in an apex court, see Roering NO v Mahlangu [2016] ZASCA 
79, 2016 (5) SA 455 [49] (Wallis JA, with whom Willis, Saldulker and Zondi JJA and Tsoka AJA agreed). 
3 Recall the caution (outlined in part I(B) of chapter 3), based on comparative work, accurately read, 
and appropriately cited, of C Mitchell, P Mitchell and S Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones: The Law of 
Unjust Enrichment (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) [2-04]. 
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Caledonian feeling that, ‘[i]n an important sense, all good lawyers are now comparative 
lawyers’, and is but a small example of ‘[t]he comparative law enterprise’ which ‘has 
changed the nature of private law scholarship in Scotland’.4 Whilst it has not prevented 
this study from suggesting areas for improvement (see, eg, the analysis of Whitty and 
MacQueen’s work in part II of chapter 6), comparison seems directly responsible, at 
least in part, for some healthy scepticism in Scotland about subsidiarity. 
 
However, the picture is broader. Robin Evans-Jones uses a considerable amount of 
comparative material. First, he employs it, on occasion, similarly to Grantham and 
Rickett. Under the rubric of subsidiarity, he endorses a rule that failure to prove a 
contract should prevent a claim in unjustified enrichment. This rests on an approval of 
the arrêt Clayette, ‘discussed by B[arry] Nicholas’.5 But the latter’s treatment of that 
decision, with other cases, leads him to suggest that ‘subsidiarity […] hardly merits 
separate treatment’.6 Whether one is minded to approve Clayette’s holding or not, 
Nicholas’ uncompromising position might prompt questions about whether it can be 
rationalised using subsidiarity. Secondly, Evans-Jones’ reference to comparative 
sources reminds us that they are not a panacea. His subsidiarity-based understanding 
of the relationship between general and specific grounds of enrichment liability (set 
out in full in part I(C) of chapter 9, and analysed in part III(B) of the same) relies on 
multiple comparative sources. These are either quite neutral on subsidiarity,7 or 
strongly in favour of it.8 So this use of comparative material cannot be criticised in the 
same way as the first one identified in this paragraph. The lessons here are different. 
In the first place, reliance on international perspectives only assists if one’s own law is 
                                               
4 K Reid, ‘Smoothing the Rugged Parts of the Passage: Scots Law and Its Edinburgh Chair’ (2014) 18 
Edinburgh L Rev 315, 330, 331. A good example of Scottish openness to comparative law is the 
Scottish Law Commission’s work on contract. See, latterly, Scottish Law Commission, Report on 
Review of Contract Law: Formation, Interpretation, Remedies for Breach, and Penalty Clauses (Scot 
Law Com No 252, 2018) esp ch 1. 
5 R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, II: Enrichment Acquired in Any Other Manner (W Green 2013) 
[7.20] and note 36; citing Civ, 12 May 1914; [1914] D Chron 56; [1914] Pandectes, Bull somm, I, 86; 
[1918] S, I, 41, noted by E Naquet; ‘discussed by’ B Nicholas, ‘Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law 
and Louisiana Law, I’ (1961) 36 Tulane L Rev 605, 634f. 
6 Nicholas (n 5) 635, internal quotation marks omitted. 
7 P Gallo, ‘Remedies for Unjust Enrichment in the History of Italian Law and in the Codice Civile’ in EJH 
Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (Duncker & 
Humblot 1995); K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (T Weir tr, (1996) 3rd edn, 
OUP 1998) 547ff; both cited by Evans-Jones (n 5) [3.38]-[3.39] notes 39-41. 
8 D Visser, ‘The Potential Role of a General Enrichment Action’ (2009) 20 Stellenbosch L Rev 454, 456-
458; cited by Evans-Jones (n 5) [3.39] note 41. 
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amenable to analysis from those perspectives.9 As part II of chapter 9 shows, the 
relevant Scottish material cannot be understood using subsidiarity. In the second 
place, beneficial insights from the world elsewhere do not dispense with the need 
accurately to survey the legal landscape. It was suggested in part III(B) of chapter 9 
that Evans-Jones’ account of the interaction between established cases and the 




It was suggested in part I(B) of chapter 3 that, in all likelihood, Goff & Jones’ reluctance 
is an important rampart against subsidiarity’s acceptance in England.10 But what can 
English law do to ensure that it does not fall into the trap of subsidiarity? From this 
study, in particular chapters 2, 4, and to a lesser extent, given underlying debate about 
the creation of property rights by unjust enrichment, 6, it appears that progress towards 
a more explicitly mixed approach to the ‘unjust question’ would be beneficial. In part 
I(B) of chapter 1, relevant cases, and academic approval, were noted.11 It seems that 
the law will move in that direction, even though difficult questions may have to be 
answered on the way.12 If this prediction is correct, English law should be safe from 
subsidiarity’s shortcomings. 
 
The subsidiarity of the action de in rem verso is of such vintage, so recently codified, 
and so rarely questioned, that French law will almost certainly not abandon it. But what 
would happen if it did? The legal ground requirement (as discussed in chapters 2, 4, 
5, 6, and 8) could largely rise to the challenge of containing enrichissement injustifié, 
though in places, it would require considerable development, such as the recognition 
of the relevance of statutory policy (discussed throughout chapter 4), and resolution 
                                               
9 See further J du Plessis, ‘Comparison and Evaluation: Lessons from Enrichment Law’ [2012] Rabels 
Z 947, 960-965. 
10 See Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 3) [2-04]. See also G Jones (ed), Goff & Jones: The Law of 
Restitution (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) [1-061], note 78; (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) [1-
061], note 78. 
11 See also, eg, Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 [246]-[247] (Lord Sumption); R Stevens, 
‘Is There a Law of Unjust Enrichment?’ in S Degeling and J Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in 
Commercial Law (Lawbook Co 2008); T Baloch, Unjust Enrichment and Contract (Hart 2009) ch 3; 
building on T Baloch, ‘The Unjust Enrichment Pyramid’ (2007) 123 LQR 636. 
12 H Scott, ‘Defence, Denial or Cause of Action? “Enrichment Owed” and the Absence of a Legal 
Ground’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Unjust Enrichment (Hart 
2016); approved by Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (n 3) [29-26]-[29-27]. 
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of doubts about whether a legal ground must entitle a person to an enrichment 
(discussed and demonstrated generally in part IV(B) of chapter 2, and part III(B) of 
chapter 4; applied to French law, and further explained in relation to Scotland, in parts 
III(C) and III(D), respectively, of chapter 4). The maxim specialia generalibus derogant 
(discussed in part III(A) of chapter 9), could mop up any leftover confusion about 
relations between enrichissement injustifié and the condictio indebiti. The only real 
expansion in enrichment liability resulting from the demise of subsidiarity would be into 
areas from which its absence has already been criticised. It will be recalled from part 
II(B) of chapter 3 that François Chénedé has very recently thrown mainstream weight 
behind the disapproval of the practice of denying unjustified enrichment actions where 
the lack of proof element of the obstacle of law bar is engaged.13 He applauds 
decisions allowing actions de in rem verso where, for example, a delict,14 or contract,15 
could not be proved, or where a person fell entirely outwith a statutory regime.16 With 
the caveat that, as discussed throughout chapter 4, the justification requirement’s 
concern in the statutory context extends to whether a statutory policy conflicts with 
unjustified enrichment, as well as the existence of a potentially conflicting set of 
statutory rules,17 Chénedé’s argument convinces: the absence on a set of facts of a 
contractual or delictual, regime, or incompatible statutory policy, renders it difficult 
indeed for unjustified enrichment to upset any commitments which the legal system 
has made. It is hoped that the courts will continue their nuanced interpretation of 
subsidiarity’s lack of proof rule, as evidenced in recent decisions of the Cour de 
cassation.18 This could at least achieve the concrete gains which the rejection of 
                                               
13 F Terré et al and F Chénedé, Droit civil: Les obligations (12th edn, Dalloz 2018) no 1313. 
14 Civ 1re, 3 June 1997, pourvoi no 95-13568, Bull civ I, no 182; [1997] RTD Civ 657, observations by J 
Mestre; [1998] JCP G, II, 10102, observations by G Viney. 
15 Civ 1re, 25 June 2008, pourvoi no 06-19556, Bull civ I, no 185; [2008] RDC 1138, observations by Y-
M Laithier; [2008] Defrénois 1980, observations by R Libchaber; [2008] Defrénois 2421, observations 
by J Massip. 
16 Civ 1re, 14 March 1995, pourvoi no 93-13410, Bull civ I, no 130; [1996] D 137, noted by V Barabé-
Bouchard; [1995] JCP G, II, 22516, noted critically by F Roussel; [1996] RTD Civ 160, favourable 
observations by J Mestre; [1996] RTD Civ 215 guarded observations by J Patarin; [1996] Defrénois 
468, noted by J-L Fillette. 
17 This would, for example, preserve the denial of actions de in rem verso in the case of certain 
contracts, like contracts of loan. See, eg, Civ 1re, 2 April 2009, pourvoi no 08-10742, Bull civ I, no 74; 
[2009] Defrénois 1285, observations by E Savaux; [2009] RTD Civ 321, observations by B Fages. As 
mentioned briefly in chapter 3, with references in footnote 69, loans are subject to particular statutory 
rules of proof, such as writing, the policy of which formalities might be stultified if unjustified enrichment 
were allowed when they go unsatisfied. 
18 Eg, allowing unjustified enrichment despite an unproved contract of ad hoc partnership, see Civ 1re, 
4 May 2017, pourvoi no 16-15563, Bull civ I, forthcoming; [2017] JCP G 790, noted by Y Dagorne-
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subsidiarity would bring, though its entire internment would actually be far better for 
unjustified enrichment in general. For it is likely that only with such a move would the 
improvements advocated here in relation to the legal ground requirement commence, 
and these are desirable in themselves. 
 
Lastly, and in particular because it has not been embraced by the Inner House,19 
subsidiarity can still be laid to rest in Scotland. Certainly, if this occurred, the non-
entitling conception of the legal ground element of the unjustified enrichment enquiry 
would need to be maintained generally, and developed in relation to statute specifically 
(this was discussed and demonstrated generally in part IV(B) of chapter 2, and part 
III(B) of chapter 4; applied to French law, and further explained in relation to Scotland, 
in parts III(C) and III(D), respectively, of chapter 4). Furthermore, talk of subsidiarity to 
understand how the general principle against unjustified enrichment interacts with 
recognised instances of liability must be eschewed, and no such rigid relationship 
instated between them (as argued in part III(B) of chapter 9).  
 
In sum, whilst French law is probably fairly fixed on its path, it can nevertheless contain 
subsidiarity’s excesses, and obtain the practical, if not analytical benefits, of its 
abolition. The ways for England to avoid subsidiarity, and for Scotland to reject it, are 
to hand. Only time will tell, however, if the former will step back from the edge of the 









                                               
Labbe; [2017] D 1591, noted by A Gouëzel. See further A Gouëzel, ‘Retour sur la subsidiarité de 
l’enrichissement sans cause en cas d’échec de l’action principale faute de preuve’ [2017] D 1591. 
19 Recall, eg, from part III(A) of chapter 3, subsidiarity’s absence from Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark 
Burgh Council 1974 SC 245 (IH). 
20 With apologies to JP Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis ((1951) repr, Hein 1999) 
8, 12. 
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